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ABSTRACT 
The principal drivers of modern irrigation development in tropical Asia are widely 
understood to be political economy related factors such as demographics, changing 
diets, international food prices, globalization, urbanization, national food and energy 
policies, and increasingly, climate change. Such standard drivers of change tend to 
dominate mainstream water resources development discourse, embedded in 
instrumental and functional modes of thought and practice. Contrary to the dominant 
tendency in professional irrigation literature to rely on engineering or managerialist 
paradigms to conceptualize the field of water resources development, this thesis 
takes as its starting point an inherent recognition of the political and ideological 
nature of irrigation development, seen as an organizational tool for state control of 
people, society and water. This study is concerned with understanding the exercise of 
power and authority in societal irrigation development, through the analysis of a 
complex, cross-scalar, multi-actor case study in the context of Thailand, conceived 
of as an exemplar of a modern hydraulic society.  
Examining a single river basin case study (the Nam Songkhram) in Thailand’s 
marginal Northeast and based on a mixed methods, inter-disciplinary approach, the 
empirical evidence suggests that a number of powerful actor groups in society, 
including hydraulic bureaucracies, the military, the private sector, national 
politicians and the monarchy, form alliances or “strategic groups” that compete to 
control the process of irrigation development at multiple scales and draw upon a 
range of material practices and discursive processes to further their individual and 
collective interests. The research contends that irrigation development is justified by 
socially constructed narrative framings located within the cultural and historical 
milieu of Thailand, understood to form part of a resilient and rather static nationalist-
linked ideology (termed irrigationalism), employed in the reproduction and outward 
expansion of state power from the Bangkok-centric core to the periphery.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Historically, it has frequently been recognized that irrigation development has not 
only created a strong bond between humans and river basins that dates back to the 
sixth millennium BC, but irrigation has also had a propensity to unleash profound 
transformations in human societies. This power to transform has created the 
necessary conditions from which some civilizations have “sprung and blossomed”, 
or conversely, been instrumental in the subsequent wither and collapse of those same 
societies as a result of inherent vulnerabilities resulting from the mis-application of 
this technological intervention (Postel, 1999). The simple notion that water has been 
critical to the “making of human history” and has exerted a certain degree of control 
over societal evolution claims ancient precedents
1
 (Worster, 1992). Hydraulic 
engineering works for irrigation and flood control purposes can be traced back to 
some of the earliest great civilizations, moulding the fabric of their respective social 
structures to create “hydraulic cultures” in the Near, Middle and Far East (Newson, 
1997). At the same time, it has been suggested that water possesses a dualistic nature, 
“as life-giving material substance and as the wellspring of form, on which are 
founded the most basic myths and cultural manifestations” (Illich, 1986). 
Control over flows of water in different global and historical contexts has 
consistently proved an effective means to consolidate power within and between 
social groups. Occasionally this may have been brought about by external necessity 
and was unforeseen, but in far more cases, “the concentration of power within 
human society that comes from controlling water was a deliberate goal of ambitious 
individuals, one they pursued even in the face of protest and resistance” (Worster, 
1992:20). During more recent history, water resources development has been 
recognized as an intentional political strategy for controlling space, water and people, 
                                                   
1 Worster (1992) points to the example of an eighteenth century BC map of the Middle East that 
shows the River Euphrates dividing the lands of the earth into two separate islands and surrounded by 
a huge circling sea, Oceanus, seen as both the source and the destination of the Euphrates.  
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as well as “an important part of everyday forms of state formation” (Molle et al., 
2009d). Irrigation, perhaps to a greater extent than flood defence and other protective 
hydraulic technologies, is a form of water control that has a tendency to lead to 
communal reorganization, novel patterns of human interaction, and new modes of 
discipline and authority. Societal relations to water as a universal and essential 
resource, while “empirically fascinating and theoretically challenging” (Tvedt and 
Jacobsson, 2006), are often under-researched and poorly understood, especially in 
the socio-politically complex field of irrigation development which has long been 
dominated by a social engineering paradigm, claims Mollinga (2008). 
Research dedicated to a critical enquiry about past and potential future paradigms of 
irrigation development in different worldwide contexts would seem particularly 
apposite at this juncture in history. Irrigated agriculture expansion and associated 
crop productivity increases are considered to have been an indispensable contributor 
to meeting fast-rising world food demand over the last half century, in addition to 
supporting rural economic development, stabilizing prices and reducing poverty 
(Rosegrant et al., 2002; World Bank, 2006). Across large parts of Asia, irrigation is 
often credited with bringing widespread food security improvements and banishing 
food crises or famines (Pingali et al., 1997), in addition to diminishing poverty levels 
and significantly contributing to socio-economic development (Hussain, 2007; 
Faures and Mukherji, 2009). Looking to the future, it has been predicted that rising 
population and income trends will continue to stimulate rapidly growing food 
demand and that irrigated agriculture will have to provide at least 60 % of the extra 
food needed over the next quarter of a century (Independent Evaluation Group, 
2010). A recent influential report by the British government addressing the “The 
Future of Food and Farming”, suggests that agricultural water demand could increase 
by a further 30 % by 2030 and will require new investments in irrigation systems, 
although a note of caution is expressed over the dangers of untrammeled irrigation 
expansion (Foresight, 2011).  
While some respected commentators believe that the era of rapid expansion of 
irrigated agriculture is essentially over (e.g. Molden, 2007), others have argued that 
there is a need for increased external investment  in water institutions and large-scale 
infrastructure in developing countries to achieve economic growth and development 
(Shivakoti et al., 2005), especially in those poorer nations that are portrayed as 
3 
 
“hostages to hydrology”2 (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). Such calls for further hydraulic 
infrastructure investment and construction, characterized by a quantitative 
“harnessing” approach to water resources development, tend to be dominated by 
instrumentalist and managerialist perspectives (Mollinga, 2007). Molle et al. (2009a) 
and Hoanh et al. (2009) noted a new rhetoric of justification for large-scale hydraulic 
development projects emerging amidst calls for renewed investment in irrigated 
agriculture following the 2008-09 “food crisis”. Despite the relative wealth of 
literature addressing historical cases of failed or collapsed hydraulic states, often 
induced by over-zealous and unsustainable harnessing of river flows for irrigation, 
relatively little research has been conducted around contemporary developing world 
cases. This thesis is a partial attempt to redress this imbalance by trying to 
understand the underlying political and societal drivers of irrigation development and 
discourses employed by different groups in contestation over water control, through 
consideration of a single case in Southeast Asia.   
 
1.2 Contested paradigms and drivers of irrigation development  
 
A common characteristic of the global and regional literature relating to explanatory 
factors for irrigation development pathways has been a tendency towards making 
macro-analytical claims of generalizability at the global or continental levels, but 
often overlooking the context-specificity of local and nationally situated accounts of 
underlying processes and “drivers” behind water resources development. Mollinga 
(2007) documents the gradual shift in water resources development discourses from 
supply enhancement approaches, with agricultural growth and national food security 
being prime drivers, to more recent instrumentalist approaches focused on irrigation 
management reform programmes and “getting the institutions right”. It would appear 
that there has been an inordinate amount of effort devoted to the task of getting 
irrigation development “right”, both technically and socially3, even in the face of 
                                                   
2 Countries that remain “hostage to hydrology” are typified as those with high inter- and intra-annual 
rainfall and a “difficult” hydrology supposedly contributing to their poverty, according to Grey and 
Sadoff (2007).  
3 Getting the “right irrigation” refers to comments made by President Barak Obama at the G8 
Conference held in Italy in July 2009, in which he talked about introducing “the right irrigation” to 
assist farmers in Africa to increase agricultural productivity and achieve food self-sufficiency, without 
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repeated monumental application failures documented across various spatio-
temporal scales and contexts (Reisner, 1986; Kortenhorst et al., 1989; Moris and 
Thom, 1990; Adams, 1992; McCully, 1996; Postel, 1999). In the context of African 
development, Moris (1987) has argued that irrigation is a “privileged solution”, that 
is largely immune to critical scrutiny as a development strategy, because its value 
and relevance are taken to be self-evident. Yet, surprisingly little research to date 
(with a few notable exceptions), has been devoted to understanding causal 
explanations for certain societies’ dogged (often perverse) pursuit of strongly 
irrigation-oriented development pathways (i.e. understanding the underlying drivers 
of development) or conceptualizing the socio-political processes that accompany a 
privileging of this mode of development.  
At the global level, Molle has elaborated eight main drivers providing explanation 
for why river basins may become “overbuilt”4, many of which relate directly to 
irrigation development and draw attention to the artificial nature of water scarcity 
and how project planning tends to gain “a life of its own, overriding criteria of 
hydrologic or economic relevance” (Molle, 2008b:217). “Ideology and state building” 
is identified as one category of explanatory mechanism by which water scarcity is 
engendered and resources overcommitted. By contrast, Faures and Mukherji (2009) 
identified nine rather different drivers of change in Asian irrigation nearly all of 
which relate to a broad political economy, with diversification of agriculture, 
changing diets and aspirations and climate change being perceived as the most 
important drivers in Southeast Asia. The possibility of national political, cultural and 
ideological factors being proximate drivers of irrigation development is hardly 
considered in such conventional or mainstream normative analyses. 
The apparent paucity of research concerning national-level political and ideological 
drivers of irrigation development reinforces the relevance of current development 
debates around notions of sustainability, in light of the observation that societies 
which dogmatically pursue an irrigation-based paradigm at the expense of 
environmental sustainability or adaptability, tend to eventually collapse or fail 
(Newson, 1997; Postel, 1999). The documented historical fate of many irrigation-
                                                                                                                                                
elaborating the technology he had in mind, but gave an opportunity to open up a discussion on this 
contentious topic by Lankford (2009). 
4 An “overbuilt” basin implies one where the development of infrastructural resources tends to 
outstrip available resources, leading to a situation of manmade water scarcity for some resource users.  
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based societies becomes all the more prescient in the contemporary context when it 
is considered that more irrigation and general hydraulic development has occurred 
worldwide in the last half century than at any other period in human history (Tvedt 
and Jacobsson, 2006). Mollinga (2007) has drawn attention to the inclination for 
water professionals to remove the “political” dimensions from water resources 
management discourse, a phenomenon that has often extended to academic 
researchers of irrigation who treat it as an apolitical technological intervention. 
Instead, Mollinga calls for the adoption of a “political sociology of water resources 
management” that recognizes the notion “that water control is at the heart of water 
resources management and should be conceived as a politically contested resource 
use” (Mollinga, 2008:10, emphasis in original).  
Critical perspectives incorporating theoretical and empirical dimensions of 
differential societal power relations and control of water resources through 
technological intervention have been the subject of study by a relatively small 
number of Asian history and politics scholars. Amongst the most influential studies 
has been that of Karl Wittfogel (1957), whose theory of powerful agro-managerial, 
state dominated “hydraulic societies” originating in certain arid and semi-arid 
regions of the world strongly influenced wider theories of state formation. Wittfogel 
developed an alternative meta-theory of history that placed nature at the centre of a 
broad framework of development-orientated, historical materialism (Tvedt and 
Jacobsson, 2006). Wittfogel’s hydraulic society theory has over the decades since its 
publication been the subject of much debate, especially in the field of social 
anthropology (e.g. Mitchell, 1973; Peet, 1985; Davies, 2009), and has occasionally 
been rejected out of hand on the basis that it is overly “deterministic”, “empirically 
untenable” and cast as theoretically “deeply flawed” (Robbins, 2004:48). Despite the 
criticisms, the hypothesis still continues to hold explanatory relevance for some 
researchers of water and society relations, but in a wider variety of political contexts 
than originally envisaged by Wittfogel, (including the United States), and most 
recently adapted to theorize the formation of a modern hydraulic society in the 
Vietnamese Mekong Delta (Evers and Benedikter, 2009b). Perhaps now would be a 
good opportunity to re-appraise the conceptual relevance of hydraulic society theory 
applied to a modern national context in mainland Southeast Asia, a region only ever 
superficially studied by Wittfogel it seems, as it lay outside of the agro-climatic zone 
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he considered primarily gave rise to hydraulic societies. Given the remarkable 
persistence of an irrigation development imperative and an apparently static 
discourse, this task becomes all the more relevant as the Thai state seeks to 
materialize latent plans for water abstraction from the transboundary Mekong river 
to irrigate vast swathes of the Northeast, as part of an ongoing hydraulic mission.   
 
1.3 Ideology and politics – going beyond material drivers of 
irrigation development  
 
The provision of water to society through technological means, for example via the 
fountains of ancient Greek cities or early historical irrigation systems, have been said 
to represent “an ideological and cultural notion of the triumph of civilization over 
nature” (Tvedt and Jacobsson, 2006:ix); in other words, water portrayed as both life 
giver and taker appears as if it were fully under the control of humans. Such 
technological beliefs symbolize the material fact that no society or nation has been 
able to exist or develop without subjugating water in various forms to the demands 
of that society, maintains Tvedt and Jacobsson (2006). As such, the struggle to 
control water is viewed as an endless task for powerful groups, aware of the social 
organizational properties of physical water control, who may call on the adoption of 
ideological means to achieve the desired ends. 
Different perspectives surrounding the social processes of water resources 
development and ultimately, societal control of water for irrigation purposes, already 
briefly alluded to, raise pertinent questions about the degree to which irrigation 
systems
5
 should be conceived of as merely agricultural intensification technologies, 
incorporating socio-economic and functional water usage elements, or whether they 
should be recognized more broadly as social objects, that embody more ideological 
and ideational elements. It has been noted that there has long been a concentration of 
effort and resources aimed towards understanding irrigation development as a 
technological process, and this paradigm still tends to dominate the mindsets, 
discourse and practices of the state agencies and organizations charged with 
                                                   
5 NB: I employ the term in the wider sense of agricultural water resources management, rather than in 
the more restricted sense of communal or state-managed irrigation systems alone 
7 
 
implementing irrigation development in many developing countries (Chambers, 1980; 
Coward, 1980a; Mollinga and Bolding, 2004). The political and ideological dimensions 
of control over water facilitated by irrigational development pathways, however, are 
rarely considered in mainstream water resources discourse for reasons that will 
become apparent in the literature review and subsequent chapters. There are however, 
some precedents for considering irrigation an ideological phenomenon, which are 
explored in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
1.4 Irrigation development in Thailand – so obviously a good 
thing? 
 
Some authors have claimed that human-water relationships, and not human-land 
relationships, are determining in Southeast Asia (Stott, 1992). Further, it has been 
recognized that water resources management discourses are fundamental to studies 
of Southeast Asian society and culture and represent a “linking theme” and “defining 
element” (Rigg, 1992). Thailand has been claimed to have a long history of 
unrivalled competency in irrigation management dating back to the thirteenth 
century (e.g. Ounvichit, 2005; Whaley, 2005) that has essentially continued 
unchecked to the present, with some domestic researchers claiming it as “the most 
advanced country in South-East Asia as far as water resource management is 
concerned” (Tuntawiroon and Samootsakorn, 1984:291). If water resources 
management prowess was measured in quantitative terms of hydraulic infrastructure 
constructed then these hubristic claims might hold some validity, as Thailand was 
recorded by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) as having 204 large dams, far 
ahead of Indonesia, the second most heavily dammed country in Southeast Asia with 
96 dams (World Commission on Dams, 2000). It also ranks as the world’s largest 
rice exporter
6
, the sixth largest rice producing country in the world and a major 
exporter of a variety of other agricultural crops (Falvey, 2000), although much of 
                                                   
6 Thailand exported a reported 10 million tons (milled equivalent) of rice in 2008, constituting about a 
third of total global rice trade (Clayton, 2010). However, in 2012 Thailand slipped to the second 
ranking amongst rice exporting nations, with India ascending to the top slot (Source: 
http://www.blackseagrain.net/about-ukragroconsult/news-bsg/india-is-worlds-biggest-rice-exporter-
in-2012-fao Accessed 28 December 2012) 
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this agricultural production is grown on non-irrigated lands, with only 21 % of 
cultivable land officially irrigated.  
Beyond a curiously enduring image as essentially “an agriculture-based country” 
(e.g. The National Identity Board, 2000) with a close cultural affinity to water 
resources
7
, Thailand’s close historical association with rice cultivation has led a 
characterization as a “rice-based society” (Ishii, 1978; Yano, 1978). Internally, this 
popular perception has persisted over time, a position which appears to deliberately 
overlook the advanced socio-ecological transition processes of de-agrarianization 
that have been underway for many decades (Rigg, 2001, 2003; Rigg, 2005). As 
argued by Ganjanapan and Hirsch (2010:33), rural populations increasingly rely 
upon “capital-based production and labour markets with complex connections to the 
global market and regionalization of development”, more than land-based 
agricultural production. Indeed, Rigg and Nattapoolwat (2001) pointed out that few 
contemporary “farmers” in Thailand rely solely on agriculture to meet their 
livelihood needs. Based on 2011 data, the agricultural sector reportedly constituted 
just 12.2 % of the entire economy, against 45.3 % for industry and 42.5 % for the 
services sector, with agriculture’s share steadily declining over many years8 (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2011).  
Despite the on-going agrarian shift, the modern state of Thailand has placed much 
emphasis (both materially and discursively) on developing an extensive irrigation 
infrastructural coverage and capacity (Falvey, 2000; Molle, 2007a). Kaida (1978) 
noted that irrigation development imperatives have figured prominently in the 
regional development discourse for decades. Irrigation infrastructural development 
objectives have overwhelmingly been perceived as an end in itself, rather than a 
means to developmental progress by state actors (Brolsma, 1996). Indeed, the vast 
majority of the national budget allocated to the bureaucracies charged with hydraulic 
development, especially the Royal Irrigation Department, is devoted to 
infrastructural development (i.e. hardware-based solutions), rather than the operation, 
management and maintenance of the systems constructed or implementing 
                                                   
7 Based on contacts with people living along the banks and on raft houses floating on the Chao Phraya 
River, a British visitor to Siam in the early 19th century described the Siamese as “aquatic in their 
disposition” (Ishii, 1978). 
8 According to Baker and Phongpaichit (2005), industry overtook agriculture’s contribution to GDP in 
1984. 
9 
 
recommended sectoral reforms constituting the “software” components of water 
resources governance (Facon, 2002). Domestic state investment in expansion of 
irrigation infrastructure and water storage supply has continued unchecked during 
recent times, despite an internationally supported public rhetoric of institutional 
change towards a demand-side management paradigm and sectoral reform 
(Sethaputra et al., 2001), that has shown poor results in its application since the 
1990s
9
 (Molle, 2007b). Nowhere in Thailand is irrigation development discourse a 
more integral part of state visions to solve perceived rural development dilemmas 
such as regional poverty and water scarcity, than in the socio-ecologically distinctive 
Northeast (Molle et al., 2009a). But even after sixty years of continual investment in 
irrigation expansion, state irrigation systems still only serve an estimated 10-12 % of 
the total agricultural land area in the Northeast (Nesbitt et al., 2004; Turral, 2008), 
lower than any other region in the country, which is interpreted by the government as 
a signal to focus more development effort there. Significantly, the region also 
contains roughly a third of the total national electorate. 
The general model of irrigation development that has been applied in Northeast 
Thailand, still follows a strongly supply-driven, state-led and developmentalist 
paradigm skewed towards constructing outmoded rice-based system designs (Facon, 
2005), which tends to challenge the assumptions made by some theoretical 
characterizations of a uni-linear and stagist historical evolution of irrigation systems 
in Asia (e.g. Barker and Molle, 2004). What is perhaps most remarkable in the case 
of Thailand is that nearly all main strategic groups (state and non-state) appear to 
support a continuation of an irrigation-based development paradigm, with issues of 
contestation mainly restricted to determining “the right irrigation” (cf. Lankford, 
2009) in terms of technology, scale, institutions, policy, participation, etc. 
Fundamental questions about the benefits or wisdom of pursuing an irrigation 
development pathway itself are scarcely raised, despite the fundamental changes in 
Thai socio-economic structure alluded to earlier. This would seem to concur with 
Berkoff’s (2002) wry observation that “[I]rrigation is so obviously a good thing - 
who can be against it?”10, drawing attention to the internal political dynamics that 
                                                   
9 For example, the North-East Water Management and System Improvement Project (NEWMASIP) 
supported by the European Commission between 1991-98, devoted 90 % of total programme funding 
(US$ 60 million) to hardware investments (Brolsma, 1996).   
10 NB: Emphasis in original quote 
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invariably favour public irrigation projects proceeding in developing country 
contexts. In such contexts, questions that address the fundamental power relations in 
society, the origins of development discourses and who benefits and loses from the 
existing status quo in water resources development are frequently obscured or simply 
overlooked in research. 
Despite a growing awareness of multiple local struggles over water access, 
unresolved social conflicts, environmental issues and questionable economic 
performance of past hydraulic development (Hirsch, 1998; Sneddon, 2000; Sneddon, 
2002), powerful elements within the Thai state still appear committed to radically 
expanding irrigation coverage in the Northeast region, reliant on a well rehearsed 
clutch of rhetorical justifications. Successive governments over the past three 
decades have vowed to “green” the Northeast and transform it into a rich and 
prosperous land (Sneddon, 2003b; Floch et al., 2007; Molle et al., 2009a), based on a 
utopian premise of providing almost universal irrigation system coverage. Figure 1.1 
below illustrates one of the simplistic assumptions presented by the Thaksin 
Shinawatra government
11
 to justify the implementation of a national “Water Grid 
Project”, that provides a sense of the sort of hubristic claims and visions that inform 
the development discourse. Ignoring past deficiencies and failures of irrigation 
development to meet targets, it implicitly assumed a fantastical future straight-line 
irrigation expansion paradigm; oblivious to any economic, social or environmental 
barriers, quite apart from political realities. This so-called “mega-project”, while 
deeply flawed in its conception (Molle and Floch, 2008a), was the latest incarnation 
in a string of pan-regional irrigation developmental projects that stretch back to the 
Tennessee Valley Authority-inspired Pa Mong “multi-purpose” Mekong diversion 
dam project conceived in the late 1950s (Molle et al., 2009b; Molle et al., 2009c). 
The basic meta-justifications employed for that project have been tirelessly revived 
and recycled in every Northeast irrigation “mega-project” since (Molle et al., 2009a). 
The Democrat-led coalition vowed in 2010 to extend irrigation coverage by another 
176,000 ha nationwide to produce an extra 4.3 million tonnes of rice before 2012 
under its so-called Thai Khem Kaeng (“Strong Thailand”)12 economic stimulus 
                                                   
11 This government under the populist Thai Rak Thai (Thai Love Thai) party banner was in power 
from 2001-2006, before being ousted by a military coup. 
12 This stimulus measure initiated by the ruling Democrat Party coalition was designed to direct funds 
for various public infrastructure projects, mostly through established departmental line agencies. 
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programme (Arunmas, 2010). 
 
(Source: Presentation by Thai consultant for the Water Grid Project entitled “Water Grid: How & 
Why”, at the Research Development Institute (RDI), Khon Kaen University. 23 February, 2005. NB: 
Figure also shown on the front cover of Molle and Floch, 2007)  
 
 
 
 
While a presently rather limited, but growing, body of critical research concerning 
irrigation development politics exists in the Mekong region, there has been a 
tendency to emphasize the socio-economic and ecological contexts in which large-
scale, national and transboundary irrigation development is situated; while 
comparatively less attention has been paid to lower scalar levels of analysis and in 
particular, cross-scalar linkages between the micro and the macro levels. Some 
exceptions to the rule exist, but most studies have tended to privilege macro analysis 
                                                                                                                                                
About 22.4 % of the entire budget was earmarked for water resources and agricultural development 
projects.  
Fig. 1.1  Graph produced by the Department of Water Resources to justify the 
implementation of a proposed national “Water Grid Project”. It suggests that if the Water Grid 
Project option is adopted, then 88 % irrigation provision could be achieved nationally in just 
27 years, against a projected 165 years period under the fanciful “Classical Irrigation” scenario 
(i.e. existing development approaches). NB: 2548 in “Buddhism years” equates to 2005 AD. 
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over more local contexts, and the interrogation of meta-justifications and national 
politics over the “politics of the everyday” at the local, community, system or field 
levels (Molle, 2005; Molle and Floch, 2008a; Molle et al., 2009a). Conversely, some 
irrigation management studies have placed strong emphasis on the micro or sub-
basin level context, while placing less emphasis on the upstream hierarchical 
linkages (e.g. Bruns, 1991). Similarly scant attention has been paid to questions of 
national politics and power relations dynamics between key groups in society 
embedded in irrigation development paradigms. In an effort to address this perceived 
analytical gap, the present study seeks to extend an understanding of under-rated or 
“hidden” drivers of irrigation development in Northeast Thailand and thereby 
complement earlier scholarly contributions by field researchers such as Bruns (1991), 
Sneddon (2000; 2003b) and Molle and Floch (2008a), who have laid a solid 
foundation from which to build. In doing so, it attempts to address questions posed 
by Molle (2007b) concerning Thailand’s irrigation development pathways and the 
agency of hydraulic bureaucracies vis à vis that of individual actors; the question of 
beneficiaries of hydraulic development asked by Hudson-Rodd and Shaw (2003), 
“[w]ho benefits from the projects and who determines what projects are carried out in the 
name of ‘progress and development’?”; and more universally addressing the concerns of 
Mollinga (2008), regarding the paucity of studies explicitly making links between 
the local, national and (occasionally global) drivers and processes of irrigation 
development. Thus, addressing the underlying socio-political drivers of irrigation 
development in the context of Thailand, conceived as a modern exemplar of a 
hydraulic society, based on a grounded empirical case study, and linking these to 
questions of state control of water and unequal power relations is a primary objective 
of this research.  
 
1.5 Contention and justification 
 
This research contends that in the context of Thailand, irrigation development should 
not only be regarded as a socio-technical intervention in the process of agricultural 
intensification, but has additional distinctive political and ideological dimensions, 
found to be primarily embedded in the domestic political culture. It accepts the basic 
premise that ideology and politics are overarching drivers of water resource 
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development in Thailand and, “the way in which dominant players are able to cast 
their agenda largely determines outcome” (Molle et al., 2009a). An ideology of 
irrigation development, or “irrigationalism”, as I term it, is proposed as a key causal 
mechanism or driver that partly explains the persistence and resilient nature of a 
state-centric hydraulic development paradigm in the Northeast region during the last 
six decades or so, that appears to operate irrespective of trends towards basin closure, 
global water governance discourse shifts and escalating conflicts over water 
resources (Molle, 2008b; Molle and Wester, 2009). It is thought to be partly rooted 
in a broader nationalist ideology of central Thai dominance over a diverse and 
problematic “other” at the state’s margins (Winichakul, 1995) combined with a 
strong royalist discourse linked to the cult of the present monarch, Rama IX (Fong, 
2009). Drawing from a range of interpretations of “ideology”, irrigationalism is 
suggested to largely reflect the interests and values of a dominant elite group in Thai 
society and forms part of a strongly nationalist mission of control over the periphery. 
In Wittfogel’s (1957) notion of despotic “hydraulic societies”, he identified a typical 
domination by an agro-managerial bureaucratic elite class devoted to promoting and 
controlling hydraulic construction, which strongly resonates with the present 
findings and recognized several decades ago by Wijeyewardene (1973). At the apex 
of Wittfogel’s classical hierarchic hydraulic state, there was invariably an autocratic 
ruler, whose power “was total and not benevolent”, a claim that can be tested in the 
context of modern Thailand. It links the notion of irrigationalism to the  hydraulic 
society hypothesis, by using a single Northeast river basin (the Nam Songkhram) as 
an empirical case study to explore critical questions about the discourses, actors and 
practices surrounding irrigation development that sustain unequal power relations in 
Thai society.  
 
1.6 Significance of research 
 
This thesis attempts to make a modest contribution to wider critical political ecology 
research, by addressing questions concerning social processes, pathways and 
discourses of irrigation development and societal water control. As such, it attempts 
an engagement with key tenets of Wittfogel’s hydraulic society hypothesis in the 
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context of the inherently politically contested field of irrigation development 
paradigms in Thailand. Irrigation development and water control in modern Thai 
society are investigated through the lens of a post-structuralist critical political 
ecology approach that helps conceptualize and illuminate the competing narratives 
and actor interests involved. The research is especially concerned with differential 
power relations between actors and the notion of ideological domination, through 
state control of irrigation development pathways. It coins a novel term, namely 
“irrigationalism”, which owes inspiration to the earlier usage of “irrigationism” by 
Adams (1992) and Hamilton-McKenzie’s (2009) “irrigationist philosophy”, with a 
slightly broadened politicized meaning to that intended by these authors. It aims to 
offer novel ways of conceptualizing rarely considered political drivers of irrigation 
development and proximate causes of conflict occurring not only within the borders 
of Thailand, but quite probably neighbouring societies in mainland Southeast Asia, 
(including Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), thus opening up space for later 
comparative empirical research. Lastly, the thesis could be interpreted as a challenge 
to would-be irrigation developmentistas to pay closer heed to the warnings given by 
Postel (1999), that civilizations which opt to generally abuse and over-develop water 
resources, also threaten to undermine the very social and ecological fabric of society 
transformed in the co-evolutionary process of irrigation-based hydraulic 
development.  
 
1.7 Thesis genesis and personal positionality 
 
Before progressing into the main study, it might be helpful for the reader to gain a 
basic understanding about the author’s personal interest in the broad subject matter 
of this thesis, namely exploring some of the underlying socio-political drivers of 
irrigation development in Thai society. Having worked in Northeast Thailand for the 
best part of a dozen years in a number of positions and disciplinary fields directly 
and indirectly related to water resources management, I gained the opportunity to 
observe a large number of public irrigation systems across a range of scales, from 
small, groundwater-supplied systems covering little more than a hectare in size, right 
up to large-scale, pumped and gravity-fed irrigation systems that extend to tens of 
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thousands of hectares managed under the aegis of the Royal Irrigation Department 
and other state agencies.  
A number of issues struck me about the development of these systems including: 
firstly, the consistently vast sums of donor and public funds allocated to their 
planning, construction, operation and maintenance with little apparent post-facto 
evaluation or scrutiny; secondly, the notable rarity of dry season irrigated agriculture 
practiced, including many systems that had been entirely abandoned, and an 
invariably low level of water user participation at all project stages; thirdly, in terms 
of ownership the systems were generally regarded by both local users and officials 
alike as state property, as they were financed entirely from the national 
“development” purse and there was minimal local contributions (financial or 
otherwise) at any stage of planning and construction; fourthly, successive 
governments sooner or later in their term of office called for more and larger 
irrigation development schemes to be built, often in the same areas where earlier 
systems were failing, usually citing water scarcity as the justification; and fifthly, 
nagging questions arose as to why so few people appeared to challenge the 
underlying logic supporting continual irrigation development by the state, given 
what appeared to be an appalling record of implementation “success”. The purported 
benefits seemed to be based largely on articles of faith and taken-for-granted 
assumptions by their proponents, while comprehensive and independent evaluations 
of the sector seemed to be singularly absent, even while recent proposals for tapping 
the water of neighbouring nation’s rivers for irrigation gather momentum. It 
appeared to me that irrigation development was tied in some way to a dominant 
ideology or politicized set of values that had become embedded in the national 
psyche and could not be simply explained by standard socio-economic rationality or 
techno-centric modernity narratives.  
The longer I remained in Thailand, the more curious I became about the apparent 
lack of societal reflexivity at local or national levels concerning any coherent 
justification for continued investment in an irrigation development paradigm. On one 
hand, I heard perennial siren calls from various national leaders for further irrigation 
expansion on seemingly the most flimsy of pretexts; and on the other, personally 
observed and read numerous accounts from civil society actors about the mounting 
social and environmental costs of past irrigation development projects across the 
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Northeast. Such projects tend to generate cumulative costs which have thus far been 
inadequately internalized by society but will nevertheless have to be paid for by this 
and future generations; as has been recorded with societies elsewhere transfixed by 
unsustainable irrigation development paradigms (Postel, 1999). Furthermore, where 
limited domestic criticism or doubts about the wisdom of further irrigation 
investment has emerged, it invariably failed to make any overt connections between 
the ability to control water for irrigation and by extension, how this created new 
opportunities to exert political control over society. Rather most criticism tended to 
get mired at the social, ecological, economical or technical levels and ignored the 
cultural and political aspects. As I pondered these issues and implications, it 
strengthened my conviction that the core societal issues were under-researched, 
possibly because it represented a sensitive “off-limits” research topic, that inevitably 
brushed up against “untouchable” actors and “black box” institutions rarely broached 
in the cultural and political milieu of Thailand’s contentious societal power relations. 
This realization, I believe, becomes all the more prescient as the present king’s 
health declines and questions of monarchical succession and future political 
scenarios in the post-Rama IX era loom large.   
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
 
The structure of the thesis is ordered in such a way as to address the “research 
problem” posed in this introductory chapter and solidified into a research question in 
the following chapter, in a logical manner. Below, I provide a brief summary of each 
of the subsequent conceptual, methodological and empirical chapters, followed by 
the conclusions in Chapter 11. 
Chapter Two forms a literature review that details some of the important bodies of 
work informing the study and principle theoretical concepts utilized. It begins with a 
consideration of contribution of Wittfogel’s “hydraulic society” hypothesis and the 
associated debates that were subsequently precipitated, both in Southeast Asia and 
more generally. It examines the conceptual relevance of certain notions embodied 
within hydraulic society theory and contends that it may be time for a reappraisal of 
this theory in the context of Thailand’s modern irrigation development paradigm. It 
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also considers other closely related conceptual themes, such as the more recent 
“hydraulic mission” notion and the scale-bound literature surrounding hydropolitics 
in the Mekong Basin, before reviewing some of the literature that has previously 
linked irrigation development pathways with ideological underpinnings across a 
variety of contexts globally.   
Chapter Three establishes and justifies the study’s conceptual framework, laying 
out the main conceptual terms employed that underpin the contentions of the thesis 
to be developed, building on the concepts already outlined in the previous chapter. 
Following on, Chapter Four outlines the research design, data collection methods 
and main analytical approach employed that comprise the thesis methodology. The 
chapter helps to justify the case study approach taken and choice of location in 
Northeast Thailand, while elaborating field research methods and tools adopted and 
concludes with a listing of the sub-questions posed to support the overall main 
research question. 
Having established the methodological approach of the thesis, Chapter Five outlines 
and defines the notion of irrigationalism (or irrigational developmentalism) in some 
detail. The chapter begins by considering to what degree irrigationalism fits within 
some commonly understood concepts of ideology and how it is seen to embody 
socio-political “action-oriented” sets of beliefs, closely related to utopian and 
nationalistic visions of farming livelihoods and landscapes, in which irrigation is 
central. It addresses the question of the likely historical roots and origins of this 
ideology, looking back to the late nineteenth century and processes of elite group 
statemaking for explanation, and examines the associated narratives and actors, both 
historically and in recent times. 
Chapter Six considers the wider regional socio-historical and environmental context 
of Northeast Thailand, specifically locating the historical roots of the socially 
constructed “received wisdom” that causally links regional poverty with narratives of 
natural resources scarcity and drought, as the dominant state-led problem framing for 
the region. Using discourse analysis approaches, it finds that the development 
orthodoxy that defines the region in the present context can partly be traced back to 
early twentieth century accounts by European travelers and ruling national elites. 
The dominant narrative has been socially reproduced through the years to now 
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become an integral part of popular discourse, seen in a wide variety of media, and 
evident in the responses of members of the public questioned as part of a survey of 
perceptions around water resources development. It is argued that such dominant 
narratives necessarily constrain and dictate the available development solutions, 
which have consistently favoured supply-oriented, technocentric and irrigational or 
hydraulic agriculture approaches during the last six decades. 
Chapter Seven examines in depth the case of a single utopian regional-scale 
hydraulic development project of the late 1980s that incorporated a number of 
recurrent meta-justifications, used in similar irrigational “mega-projects” since. 
Known as the Green Isaan Project, in the public transcript (drawn principally from a 
historical narrative analysis of press cuttings) it was originally conceived by the king 
to be a solution to an environmental crisis of water scarcity and deforestation, and 
controversially entrusted to the military to implement. Over time it grew into an 
overarching regional development project that drew in multiple strategic actors and 
groups into its orbit, state and non-state, both supportive and oppositional. This 
chapter examines the contested public discourse around the project, the actors and 
their practices, and considers why despite a failure to be implemented, its spirit live 
on in present ideological clones.  
Chapter Eight narrows down the scalar analysis lens to the local level using 
empirical evidence from a number of irrigation project case studies in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin, across a range of scales. As such, it considers in detail the micro-
politics or everyday politics of irrigation development in each case and shows how 
each has emerged out of a process of contestation and struggle, which in the case of 
the Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project, involved central state coercion and violence to 
succeed initially, later to be replaced by more consensual processes of domination. 
Even the two smallest projects studied are shown to be top-down and 
bureaucratically driven, relying on complex political networks of actors tied to the 
core hydrocracies, where discourses of irrigationalism are never far away, even when 
no actual irrigation practice is engendered by the project     
Chapter Nine attempts draw upon the previous three chapters in conceptualizing 
power relations apparent in the multi-scalar politics of irrigation development and 
control of water, power and capital in Northeast Thailand. It begins by looking at the 
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competitive nature of the main hydrocracies and shows how authority may 
simultaneously be centralized at the core, but also dispersed between state agencies 
in a complex and dynamic process, where strategic groups emerge and compete for 
control of resources. At the provincial and local levels, networks of actors and actor 
groups (employing cliques and patron-client relations) tend to cluster around 
common development discourses (“discourse coalitions”), while trying to compete 
for benefits, that may be material and non-material. Some of the popular narratives 
and practices are elaborated upon using primary and secondary data from the field. It 
also considers some of the counter-narratives of groups opposing irrigational 
development at local, river basin and wider regional/national contexts. 
Chapter Ten provides an in-depth exploration of the present monarch’s pivotal 
contributions to irrigation development discourse and practice over the course of his 
long reign. It attempts to establish to what extent he fits the Wittfogel model of a 
hydraulic despot, portrayed as the ultimate arbiter and power holder in a hydraulic 
society, via a historical examination of his material and symbolic role in the modern 
Thai water resources development paradigm, with special consideration to empirical 
evidence gained from the Nam Songkhram Basin case study. Although his discursive 
and symbolic presence in irrigation policy and practice is ubiquitous, it concludes the 
king should be considered more hydraulic high priest than despot. 
In the concluding chapter, Chapter Eleven, the findings of the empirical chapters 
are summarized and discussed. The thesis contends that, broadly supporting 
Wittfogel’s (1957) assertion, Thailand provides a striking variant of a modern 
hydraulic society, showing more centralized agro-managerial control at present than 
at any time in the past, with a trend towards increasing centralization, especially if 
more large-scale projects are implemented. Existing hydroagricultural modes of 
production are gradually being replaced by state-centric hydraulic agriculture, as the 
dominant core attempts to gain control of the margins in a contested process of 
socio-ecological transformation. It is argued that a powerful set of elite actors, 
comprised of five key groups have combined strategically in what I term a 
“hydraulic network monarchy” (where the symbolic and discursive power of the 
king has been a constant), employ the ideology of irrigationalism to enable power-
laden processes of state simplification and legibility to take control over the 
periphery. Lastly, some recommendations for further research are offered. 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to provide an introduction to some of the primary literature 
informing the field of Southeast Asian socio-political hydraulic development. Some 
theoretical links between water control through irrigation development and society 
are explicated, with particular reference to debates about water resources control and 
state formation, sparked by Wittfogel’s hydraulic society theory. Part of the task of 
this section is to review and discuss some of the main bodies of literature on various 
sides of the debate that relate to the case of Thailand’s development. By taking a 
fresh look at some of the main tenets of Wittfogel’s “hydraulic society” theory and 
associated criticisms in the context of Southeast Asia generally and Thailand 
specifically, it may allow for a more informed approach to understanding modern 
state-society-water relationships, especially when attention is paid to national and 
regional discourses of irrigation development and related actors and practices. The 
chapter suggests that elements of Wittfogel’s most important theoretical 
contributions have possibly been prematurely rejected, overlooked or misconstrued 
by some of his critics.  
After a discussion of the potential explanatory value of Wittfogelian notions to the 
modern hydraulic development paradigm of Thailand, the chapter moves on to 
provide a broad conceptual overview of regional hydropolitics and societal power 
relations, with a special emphasis on the concept of the “hydraulic mission” and 
water conflicts, at the transboundary, national and sub-national levels. It goes on to 
consider the relevance of an ideology of irrigation development to this debate. The 
chapter concludes with a brief reconsideration of the potential relevance of 
Wittfogel’s theories to modern Thailand’s experience vis à vis other theoretical 
frameworks and how they have informed the research questions and approach.  
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2.2  Wittfogel’s hydraulic society hypothesis 
 
“Any discussion of irrigation bureaucracy should acknowledge its 
relationship to the well-known propositions of ‘hydraulic society’ 
elaborated by Wittfogel (1957).” (Source: Coward, 1980c:330)  
I draw attention to Coward’s recommendation as a useful starting point for this 
literature review. Of all scholars that have proposed theories concerning the 
relationships between water control, state formation and society, probably none have 
been more influential, or more controversial, than Karl A. Wittfogel (1896-1988). 
Wittfogel’s work has been variously lauded, embraced, rejected, vilified and quite 
often misunderstood by social scientists engaged across diverse disciplines (Mitchell, 
1973; Peet, 1985; Price, 1994). In the view of Robbins (2004), his scholarship has 
been widely interpreted as epitomizing a materialist and neo-colonialist view of 
history, for investigating relationships between nature and society that provided a 
generalized explanation for how the political history of certain centralized states 
were a result of the problems of water resources management.  
Drawing from the writings of Marx (“modes of production”), Engels (“Asiatic 
society”) and Weber (“formation of bureaucracy”), Wittfogel began to develop meta-
theories about the fundamental characteristics of certain Oriental societies, in 
particular China, related to environmental history
13
. He initially theorized that 
control of water through large-scale irrigation and other hydraulic works was the 
basis of a peculiarly “Asiatic mode of production”14 and accompanied by the rise of 
a powerful and exploitative ruling class (the “hydraulic bureaucracy”), which was 
termed a theory of “hydraulic monopoly.” Following emigration from Nazi Germany 
to North America in the early 1930s, Wittfogel began to substitute the phrase 
“hydraulic society” for “Oriental society” in his writings, to indicate a mode of 
production more aligned with water control and its associated social order, although 
he retained the latter term in the title of his magnum opus, Oriental Despotism: A 
Comparative Study of Total Power, notes Worster (1992). The new nomenclature 
                                                   
13 Refer to Peet (1985), for a comprehensive analysis of Wittfogel’s broad intellectual contributions in 
Introduction to the Life and Thought of Karl Wittfogel 
14 Wittfogel devotes an entire chapter in Oriental Despotism to an analysis of “The rise and fall of the 
theory of the Asiatic mode of production”, calling for its re-examination based on the twentieth 
century rise of totalitarian states under the banner of “Marxism-Leninism” and understandings of 
multi-linear processes of development. 
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stressed human action rather than geography, thereby facilitating a comparison with 
“industrial society” or “feudal society”, and stressed the prominent role of 
government in agricultural management and hydraulic infrastructure construction 
(Wittfogel, 1957:3).    
Wittfogel’s basic theory claimed that state organization first emerged in arid or semi-
arid regions of the world (e.g. parts of ancient Egypt, China, Mesopotamia, Sri 
Lanka, the Indus valley, and pre-Columbian Mexico and Peru), where systems of 
irrigation, drainage, aqueducts, navigation canals and flood control (typified as 
hydraulic works
15) were zealously pursued by a ruling “agrobureaucratic class”, to 
dominate the hydraulic means of agricultural production. A crucial condition 
governing the development of a centralized irrigation system was the presence of a 
riverine floodplain that was ecologically circumscript, yet provided ample annual 
water flow. According to the theory, only a powerful and complex state organization 
could manage the multiple activities and problems associated with large-scale 
irrigated agriculture, such as its planning, construction, enlargement, operation and 
maintenance; the allocation of water between upstream and downstream cultivators; 
the arbitration of conflicts; and tax collection functions. Furthermore, Wittfogel 
argued that the very centralized power afforded by the technological control of water 
resources resulted in the fundamentally despotic forms of governance found in these 
early hydraulic civilizations. Absolutism or totalitarianism was presumed to be the 
norm, while civil society was characteristically poorly developed and routinely 
oppressed where it appeared. Wittfogel noted that these societies had particular class 
differentiations, labour divisions and specialization typical of centralized urban life 
within a limited core area, surrounded by large interstitial and peripheral areas. He 
stressed that the marginal areas were politically connected to the hydraulic core areas, 
but they could also exist independently. Another defining feature of these hydraulic 
states was that they were frequently ruled by theocratic emperors or kings (often 
revered as semi-divine gods), in a more or less despotic manner. In the words of 
Wittfogel (1957:92), “[T]he agromanagerial sovereign cemented his secular position 
                                                   
15 Wittfogel (1957:42) makes it explicit that non-hydraulic construction works such as defence and 
communication structures and “edifices serving the public and personal needs of the secular and 
religious masters of hydraulic society” (e.g. palaces, tombs and temples) were also an integral part of 
hydraulic societies’ development.  
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by attaching to himself in one form or another of the symbols of supreme religious 
authority.”  
A characteristic of hydraulic societies was that there tended to be an absence of 
societal checks with few independent centres of authority capable of thwarting the 
regime’s power, argued Wittfogel (1957). Popular revolution was near impossible, 
and so even when a ruling dynasty died out or was overthrown by force, the new 
regime was unlikely to differ very much from the old. With power concentrated in 
the hands of the absolute rulers, military coercion had to be routinely used to 
terrorize the subjects, with members of the hydraulic society adjusting their 
behaviour accordingly – “obedience becomes the basis of good citizenship” 
(Wittfogel, 1957:149). He stressed the remarkable “staying-power” of hydraulic 
society rulers through the domination of “the technical and intellectual skills 
necessary to its perpetuation” by the monopolistic bureaucracy (Wittfogel, 1957:422). 
Societal change was perceived to be dependent on external non-hydraulic forces and 
instances of internal transformation were rare.  
Significantly, Wittfogel considered Thailand (or Siam, as it was pre-1939) to be an 
example of a hydraulic society, classifying it as a representative of “Type I: Aloof 
independence”, referring to what he saw as minimal direct interference exercised by 
Western powers in the country’s internal affairs (Wittfogel, 1957:425). He claims 
that as a result, “Thailand remained an independent and more or less aloof hydraulic 
society, which was free to adopt or disregard Western institutions and culture.” It is 
surprising however, that Wittfogel provides no more than a few sentences to justify 
his classification of Thailand’s as a hydraulic society, briefly noting that the 
government constructed a number of canals for “productive and protective” purposes, 
such as transport of rice surpluses to the capital and troop movements (Wittfogel, 
1957:32). Such a superficial treatment of the Thai case suggested that he had not 
studied it in any great depth (unlike China, for instance) and his conclusion was 
based on a limited evidential base. I return later to the specific case of Thailand and 
arguments made for and against its classification as a hydraulic society, after first 
considering some more general criticisms leveled against Wittfogel’s hypothesis and 
its theoretical application to monsoonal Southeast Asia. 
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2.2.1 Criticisms of hydraulic society theory 
 
Following its publication, Wittfogel’s thesis attracted much scholarly debate that 
highlighted certain limitations of his theory suggesting some kind of universal 
linearity between irrigation development, state formation and centralized power, and 
refutation of whether this necessarily leads to formation of a despotic state (Molle et 
al., 2009d). Some critics questioned the direction of causation, arguing that the 
formation of large, centralized states may precede and lead to the construction of 
large-scale hydraulic infrastructure (Steward, 1977). Mitchell (1973:532) argued that 
certain scholars took exception to the notion that centralized political power in the 
early states mentioned by Wittfogel centered upon control of irrigation activities, 
leading to “a premature rejection of the hypothesis”. Chambers (1980:47) points out 
that Wittfogel’s theories supported a “tendency to see the forms of irrigation 
organization as unavoidable, as generated and required by imperatives of the 
physical system and its technology”, thereby lending itself to deterministic 
interpretations. Cohen (1992) accuses Wittfogel of “technological determinism” for 
suggesting a relationship between technology and social structure. In citing the work 
of other critics, (Robbins, 2004:48) goes further and condemns Wittfogel’s thesis as 
“fundamentally flawed on both empirical and theoretical grounds” and claims that, 
“there is no evidence of an empirical association between large irrigation schemes 
and centralized authority either in contemporary cases or ancient periods (Butzer 
1976; Hunt 1988)”. Noting that detailed comparative and case-based studies 
conducted in the decades following the publication of Oriental Despotism provided 
counter-evidence to Wittfogel’s theory, Robbins (2004) argues that this 
demonstrated that large irrigation schemes may be collectively managed by 
decentralized producer associations as effectively as centralized bureaucracies, 
repeating a popular critique of the theory.  
Price (1994:193) noted a marked tendency for academic detractors of Wittfogel,  “to 
merely cite it to dismiss it instantly as ‘reductionistic’, ‘simplistic’, or ‘mechanical’”, 
without a more thorough reading. As well as accusations of ecological determinism, 
Robbins (2004) laid charges that Wittfogel’s writings demonstrated a tendency 
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towards Eurocentric historical thinking and classic “Orientalism”16. Robbins warns 
that the hydraulic society thesis provides a “cautionary tale” for how political 
ecology should proceed in causal explanations of social phenomena, by avoiding 
mistakes of reductionism. Other critics claimed that Wittfogel imagined hydraulic 
states everywhere he looked in the communist or oriental world (e.g. Dunn, 1982; 
Worsley, 1984). However, Peet (1985:8) in a retrospective of Wittfogel’s scholarship, 
maintains that he was not a historical materialist as frequently claimed, but accepted 
that “humans proceeded not as passive instruments of an irresistible, unilinear 
development force but as a [sic] discriminating, active beings, shaping their futures.” 
A number of studies have offered counter-illustrations of why certain societies in the 
global South developed complexity through irrigation systems, without succumbing 
to the totalitarianism associated with the hydraulic society thesis. For example, 
Clifford Geertz’s widely cited anthropological studies of the subak irrigation systems 
in Bali (Geertz, 1959, 1980); secondly Lansing (1992) who also explicated the social 
relations pertaining to the  “water temples” of  Bali; Leach (1959) in the case of Sri 
Lanka17; and across several global locations stands the work of Hunt (1988), who 
found no direct relationship between size of irrigation system and structure of 
authority. Similar claims have been repeated by Southeast Asia scholars to dismiss 
the theoretical basis for the existence of early hydraulic societies in the region, 
including several papers contained in Rigg’s (1992) collection, The Gift of Water, 
with the case of the ancient Khmer empire
18
 exciting most controversy. Of the 
contributors, Stott (1992) is perhaps most outspoken against the validity of the 
hydraulic society theory for explaining the rise and longevity of the Angkorian 
empire
19
. Stott traces these “insidious Western interpretations” of Angkor as a great 
                                                   
16 “Orientalism” is regarded as a trait of much Western scholarship which assumes fundamental 
differences between “Eastern” and “Western” civilizations that inevitably lead to culturally 
deterministic conclusions, as critiqued by Edward Said (1978). In the view of Robbins (2004:48), 
such explanations serve “to reinforce the artificial hierarchy of colonial thinking, where the 
traditionally colonized and dominated communities of the East (India, China, Arabia) are naturally 
inferior, bound in changeless tradition, and given to despotic rule.” 
17 Leach (1980:92-3) later adjusted his stance and claimed that the classical Sinhalese kingdom was “a 
striking and characteristic example of what Wittfogel has called ‘hydraulic civilization’”, but lacked 
an “Oriental despot”. 
18 The Khmer empire stretched over much of contemporary Cambodia and large parts of Laos, 
Northeast and Central Thailand between the 9th and 15th century A.D., centered on the city-state of 
Angkor on the northern shores of the Tonle Sap lake 
19 It should be noted that Wittfogel himself made no specific claims for the Khmer empire qualifying 
an example of a hydraulic society, with not a single reference to Cambodia (modern or ancient) in the 
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hydraulic state back to colonial French explorations at the end of the 19
th
 century, 
essentially blaming a “long dominant ideology” of Orientalism for continuation of 
the paradigm into the 20
th
 century (e.g. Groslier and Arthaus, 1966; Groslier, 1979).  
Stott (1992) examines four strands of historical and other scholarly evidence used to 
support the existence of a large, state-managed irrigation system in Angkor, and 
comes to the conclusion that there is an absolute lack of evidence to support the 
contention that the baaray (reservoirs) were used for irrigation purposes. He believes 
the strongest arguments for the rejection of the hydraulic society hypothesis came 
from agronomic and engineering evidence provided by van Liere (1980), pointing to 
the absence of outlet and irrigation distribution systems to fields and calculations 
made supporting a view that the baaray
20
 contained insufficient water to support 
large-scale irrigated agriculture. The most likely type of agriculture that permitted a 
rice surplus to support the urban centres of Angkor was flood recession farming, 
which according to Stott (1992:55), provided “the real economic basis of the 
Empire”. This form of agriculture allowed three or four crops of rice to be harvested 
in sequence as the floodwaters retreated which he described as, “a brilliant, farmer-
level South East Asian response to a distinctive set of local environmental conditions” 
(Stott, 1992:53). Moore (1992), studying archaeological evidence of early, pre-
Khmer water management in Northeast Thailand echoes Stott’s views claiming that 
although the early peoples of this region were influenced by foreign technologies and 
religions, their method of water enclosure was considered a unique response to the 
local ecology. As a result of the perceived lack of state agro-managerialism, he 
called for a “total rejection of the term and the concept of the ‘hydraulic society’ in 
the case of the Khmer Empire” (Stott, 1992:50) and believed the evidence served to 
illustrate that Angkor was “yet another example of a state founded on 
‘hydroagriculture’”21.  
                                                                                                                                                
entire book. Thus, any claims of the general theory of hydraulic society being relevant to Angkorian 
state formation and the water resources management system has been made by later observers.  
20 The largest baaray at Angkor, the Western Baaray, measures 8,000 m by 2,100 m. Other large 
baaray are the Eastern  Baaray (2,000 m x 7,000 m), the North Baaray (900 m x 3,700 m) and 
Indratataka (3,800m x 800 m) (Mabbett and Chandler, 1995), illustrating the ambitious scale of these 
hydraulic structures.  
21 Ironically perhaps, Stott here adopts Wittfogel’s own terminology, using it to refer to farming based 
on small-scale irrigation and rainfall, while still rejecting the overall tenets of the hydraulic society 
theory.  
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Another paper in the same volume, while not necessarily rejecting Groslier’s (1979) 
conjecture that the baaray had an agricultural function, attacked Wittfogel’s 
assertions that "the creation and maintenance of hydraulic works in Asia was a prime 
example of the despotism of a centralized court bureaucracy, with a monopoly of 
managerial as well as technical expertise, over the undifferentiated rural population", 
as being unsupported by evidence, even in the archetypal case of China (Stargardt, 
1992). In Stargardt’s view, the ancient court-based kingdoms of Southeast Asia were 
not construed as necessarily despotic, but tended more towards benevolent or 
consensual arrangements in their efforts to command mass labour for construction of 
the great structures that typified the state cores. Furthermore, she maintained that 
local people managing water resources infrastructure retained a degree of autonomy 
from the state through later centuries of war, strife, and collapses of central authority, 
thus preserving their essential function and utility to recent times. “This view of the 
power relationships between court and countryside differs fundamentally from 
Wittfogel's concept of a 'State Larger than Society’” (Stargardt, 1992:63). Likewise, 
Christie (1992), supporting the conclusions of Geertz (1959) and Lansing (1992) 
from the study of early Javan states, argued there was no evidence for linking the 
appearance of early states to the control of irrigation. 
For other commentators, it was recognized that the agricultural systems and 
hydraulic infrastructure of the Khmer empire played an influential role in the cultural, 
religious and political formation of later neighbouring states, including the Sukhothai 
kingdom and subsequently Siam (Falvey, 2000). Wittfogel was emphatic that the 
leaders of hydraulic societies were “great builders” and their public constructions 
went beyond large-scale irrigation systems to include other types of hydraulic and 
non-hydraulic works (see Footnote 15). Water infrastructure was constructed for a 
wide variety of productive and protective purposes, in addition to aesthetic, religious 
and symbolic uses. The Angkor complex and wider empire (which covered much of 
modern day Central and Northeast Thailand) provides archaeological remains of 
many of the types of infrastructure mentioned by Wittfogel, with the possible 
exception of aqueducts. At the city level of Angkor, two main water management 
features can be identified, namely the baaray plus various linear features such as 
water channels, roads and embankments, which have been interpreted as the city’s 
communications network (Hayao, 2001; Kummu, 2009). It has been suggested that 
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the grandest of these earthen structures were built at the command of the Hindu god-
kings (deva raajaa), whose outward expression of power was partially based on 
control and management of water, but also a rich religious and cultural symbolism 
embodied in the structures (Mabbett and Chandler, 1995). At a more localized scale, 
historians have noted similar cultural symbolism occurring in archaeological sites 
throughout the Khmer empire. For example, Vallibhotama (personal interview, 9 
April, 2010) noted the inseparability of the baaray from the temples (prasaat or 
puraa )
22
 and that neither could have been established without the order of the king, 
high ranking official or local lord. The puraa and baaray “reflected the political 
religion that served to maintain the state and society in the dry area”, argues 
Vallibhotama (1999:112). The king was the largest land owner, while the temple 
controlled the labour, based on an easy accommodation of the deva-raajaa belief 
system. According to van Liere (1980), various stone inscriptions between the ninth 
to thirteenth centuries proclaimed the king as both creator and director of public 
works.  
A strong Khmer influence is also believed to be evident in the agricultural 
technologies and techniques adopted by the inhabitants of the later Tai states, which 
according to Falvey (2000:44), “continues to flow through Thai agricultural 
development and culture”. Although the Tai states were eventually able to overrun 
and sack the declining Khmer empire, believed to be related to the costs of trying to 
maintain elaborate hydraulic systems and declining rice yields, the centrality of 
producing rice surpluses and controlling land, labour and water supplies remained 
intact. According to Wittfogel (1957:47), the hydraulic rulers were strong enough “to 
do on a national scale what a feudal sovereign or lord could only accomplish within 
the borders of his domain. They compelled able-bodied commoners to work for them 
through the agency of the corvée.” Wittfogel pointed out that corvée labour differed 
from slave labour in that workers were conscripted on a temporary, but recurring, 
basis. The corvée labourer, thus, was freer than a slave, but less free than a waged 
labourer. 
It is recognized that the use of slaves, conscripted armies and corvée labour were 
routinely used by the Siamese government up to the start of the twentieth century for 
                                                   
22 According to the Hindu-Buddhist cosmology the baaray and puraa were the physical 
manifestations of Mount Meru and its surrounding celestial ocean. 
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canal digging, flood protection and other state infrastructure projects in the Central 
Plains (Nabarath, 2000; Brummelhuis, 2005). Feeny (1989) reports that in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, one quarter to one third of the population of Siam 
belonged to one of seven categories of “slaves”23. Cohen (1992) documented how a 
late nineteenth century aristocrat (Chao Mahawong) appointed by the northern Thai 
ruler of Chiang Mai (Chao Inthanon) seized ricelands (both irrigated and rainfed) 
from peasants and appropriated them as royal land (naa luang), providing a rather 
different interpretation to the degree of local agency perceived by Stott (1992) and 
others. Villagers under Chao Mahawong’s jurisdiction were corvéed to work the 
royal lands and expected to surrender the total yield of the wet season rice crop and 
half the yield of the early-season crop. Peasants were also corvéed to dig and 
maintain irrigation canals, prompting Cohen (1992:62) to argue that this state elite 
control of irrigation represented a means to increase extractable surplus, “either by 
expanding the area of irrigated royal fields or by improving the supply of water to 
existing royal fields.” Cohen also expressed a degree of scepticism over the 
relevance of elements of Wittfogel’s hypothesis (1992:64), maintaining that the 
contemporary Thai state did not assume control over irrigation in these areas out of 
any technological or managerial necessity.   
A more recent historical study surrounding the central Thai state polity with regards 
to irrigation development plans during the early part of the twentieth century, titled 
King of the Waters: Homan van der Heide and the origin of modern irrigation in 
Siam by Brummelhuis (2005), also roundly rejects the hydraulic society theory from 
the start. Like Stott and others, Brummelhuis took the opinion that hydraulic society 
referred primarily to strong state control over water resources for irrigational 
purposes alone and not the other protective, productive, cultural and spiritual 
purposes actually referred to by Wittfogel. He sympathetically constructs the case of 
a colonial Dutch irrigation engineer, described as being “absolute in character”24 
                                                   
23 In the view of Brummelhuis (2005), the conditions for and what constituted slavery in Siam were 
different from Western concepts of slavery under market-oriented and capitalist society, such as those 
brought from Africa to work in the plantations of the Americas. For example, there was no open slave 
market and slaves were mostly obtained as spoils of war (“war slaves”) or acted as collateral on loans 
(“debt slaves”). Prince Dilok Nabarath, one of King Chulalongkorn’s many sons, notes that there was 
a third category, namely “born slaves”, and claims that the relationship between master and slave was 
“generally a humane, good and patriarchal one” (Nabarath, 2000: 40). Slavery was officially 
abolished in 1905 by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). 
24 Brummelhuis (2005:xiii) contends that van der Heide’s character, “brooked no argument, was 
convinced he was right and in his own field could not accept a boss above him.” 
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(Brummelhuis, 2005:xiii), who played a decisive role in designing a grand irrigation 
scheme for the Chao Phraya Delta
25
 and establishment of an irrigation department in 
Thailand, briefly headed by the protagonist. While he argued that there was little 
empirical evidence to make a causal connection between rice cultivation, water 
control, irrigation and a despotic state in Old Siam, he did concede that Ayutthaya, 
and later Bangkok, were at the centre of a remarkable “hydro-economy”, based on a 
network of extensive canals (khlong) and engineered waterways. From this account, 
the control of labour is portrayed as determining a facet of Siamese statecraft as any 
technological control of water practiced, albeit adopted for a mix of agricultural and 
non-agricultural purposes.  
 
2.2.2 Hydraulic society defenders 
 
After decades of attracting criticism, there would seem to be a recent trend towards a 
reconsideration of Wittfogel’s theoretical contributions and efforts to re-interpret his 
work within modern contexts of development. Drawing attention to anti-Wittfogelian 
perceptions amongst some scholars, the environmental historian Donald Worster
26
 
argued, "[o]ne of the most serious weaknesses in that literature..... is that the modern 
experience with irrigation hardly appears in it. Nowhere do the ecological 
anthropologists - nor does Wittfogel for that matter - seem to realise that the link 
between water control and social power might occur in places other than the archaic 
cradles of civilization nor that the past hundred years have seen more irrigation 
development than all of previous history" (Worster, 1992:30). Worster contends that 
far from being restricted to distant “oriental” or totalitarian states, a modern day 
hydraulic society can be found in the western United States, where he finds parallels 
between the centralized regimes of archaic hydraulic civilizations and the powerful 
state agencies of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. 
Furthermore, he points out that many of Wittfogel’s detractors have overlooked the 
                                                   
25 The Chainat Dam was eventually built in the 1950s using World Bank funding, diverting water 
across the lower Chao Phraya Delta Irrigation Scheme (Kaida, 2003).  
26 Worster’s (1985) classic book, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American 
West, documents the extent to which the irrigation development paradigm of the modern “hydraulic 
West” has resulted in extensive ecological damage, a reallocation of power (as well as water) to 
bureaucratic and corporate elites and societal conflict, based largely on a series of national myths and 
illusions. 
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critical distinction he made between capitalist and command economies, and 
mistakenly accused him of laying a blanket accusation of totalitarianism across 
Asian irrigation regimes. 
As noted in the previous section, some critics have claimed that irrigation-based 
societies evolved at multiple locations, without developing into forms of despotic 
hydraulic states purportedly predicted by Wittfogel’s model. Several of the cases 
regarded voluntarism, local ingenuity and community-led irrigation as being the 
norm; rather than elite coercion, despotism and state-centric hydraulic development. 
These same critics in mainland Southeast Asia have invariably failed to make 
linkages between the historical context under study and the modern milieu to assess 
degrees of continuity concerning patterns and processes of state-society irrigation 
development. Where links have been made, however, it has invariably been used as 
evidence against the tenability of the hydraulic society hypothesis, such as with 
nostalgic references to the muang fai
27
 irrigation systems of Northern Thailand. 
These are offered as evidence of the supremacy of local agency, communalism and 
polycentric patterns in irrigation governance being the norm (e.g. Tan-Kim-Yong et 
al., 2005; Surarerks, 2006). Stott (1992:53), for example, refers to muang fai 
irrigation as representing “extremely subtle, local, small-scale, community-based 
adaptations to the specific environments in which they occurred.” Thus no sense of 
the presence of an external authoritarian regime or despotic over-lords is admitted in 
this overly romanticized view of peasant-managed irrigation systems. Such 
perspectives regarding the muang fai systems have been contradicted by accounts 
that question both the present and historical degree of independence from state 
mechanisms and level of genuine local control exercised (e.g. Wijeyewardene, 1973; 
Cohen, 1992; Neef et al., 2006). In a consideration of the degree of state interference 
in irrigational water control during earlier periods of Thai history, Ishii (1978) 
termed the northern Tai kingdoms “quasi-hydraulic societies”, occupying what he 
termed “ancient core areas”. Like with Wittfogel’s distinction between “hydro-
agriculture” and “hydraulic agriculture”28, Ishii recognized that in a monsoonal or 
                                                   
27 Muang fai refers to small-scale diversionary weirs and canal irrigation systems developed primarily 
in the Tai administrative states of northern Thailand and Burma, supposedly dating back to the eighth-
century and posited as ancient examples of democratic social organization (e.g. Attwater, 1997; 
Surarerks, 1998). A muang was the canal or channel structure, while the fai refers to a weir structure, 
often made with bamboo to be seasonal and required annual re-building after the rainy season. 
28 These terms are defined and explained in a following section. 
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humid tropical zone, irrigation has less of a decisive significance than in arid or 
semi-arid regions, where he contends “the control of irrigation offers an effective 
means of controlling the peasantry. But in a monsoon climate it is less easy to 
exercise effective control and to establish a despotic 'hydraulic society'” (Ishii, 
1978:23).  
Rigg (1992:3) in his editorial role of the Wittfogel rejectionist papers makes the 
argument, “just as the world is witnessing what seems to be a fundamental shift from 
‘command’ to ‘guidance’ planning in the functioning and development of modern 
states (evident in South East Asia, in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), so there is a 
similar shift in the academic study of ancient states away from their ability to 
command production, and towards their role as facilitators in production”, 
suggesting that state “command and control” agricultural strategies were exaggerated 
and weakening. In the arena of Mekong Basin regional water resources development 
strategies, such a view tends to stand in contrast to other analyses that suggest little 
discernible decline in state control over hydraulic infrastructure development has 
occurred in practice (Contreras, 2007; Molle, 2007b), despite overall shifts in 
development rhetoric towards regional cooperation, decentralization, participation 
and privatization discourses, for instance.  
Bucking the general trend of hydraulic society scepticism amongst anthropologists in 
Southeast Asia, Wittfogel’s hypothesis found a receptive ally with Gehan 
Wijeyewardene, who believed it had explanatory relevance to Thai state 
development and social relations, based on a study of irrigation systems in Northern 
Thailand (including muang fai) (Wijeyewardene, 1973). While recognizing the 
overly deterministic nature of some “hydraulic despotism” arguments, 
Wijeyewardene was able to disentangle Wittfogel’s personal political biases from his 
historical insights into state development and water control patterns. Supporting 
Brummelhuis (2005), he noted that the primary interest shown by the pre-modern 
Thai state in major waterworks (particularly an extensive system of canals) was for 
communication and transport of rice surpluses, rather than for irrigation purposes, 
but contended, “the history of hydraulic society and despotism in Thailand appears 
to lend support to Wittfogel’s more general thesis – as the growth of despotism 
seems not directly connected to ecological and productive factors” (Wijeyewardene, 
1973:92-3). Wijeyewardene postulated that after the fall of the Ayutthaya kingdom 
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(post-1767), the Thai (Siamese) state centred on Bangkok became progressively 
more hydraulic and less despotic, at least in the Central Plains where during the latter 
part of the nineteenth century extensive irrigation development was heavily 
dependent on Western advice and modernization influences.  
In the twentieth century, he considered the Thai bureaucracy to have become 
essentially agro-managerial, citing the 66-fold expansion of lands irrigated by state 
provision between 1907 and 1967, vast increases in bureaucratic spending on the 
irrigation sector, the movement of land and property into the hands of the 
bureaucrats “and the class they appear to dominate” (Wijeyewardene, 1973:101), and 
how both the government and the peasantry viewed irrigation provision as the state’s 
duty.  He linked the state’s pre-eminence in water resources development to a 
nationalistic ideological bias, maintaining, “[I]n its official ideology, no doubt 
sincerely held, the bureaucracy is concerned with national development and security. 
National development means a strong and prosperous economy in which benefits 
will accrue to all sections of the population. The irrigation programme is the most 
spectacular manifestation of this ideology” (Wijeyewardene, 1973:100, emphasis 
added). Concluding that while Thailand did not have the “overriding factors” 
mentioned in Wittfogel’s theory (without elaborating in any detail), there was still 
evidence to suggest from a historical interpretation, “the country today is much more 
a hydraulic society than in the past” (Wijeyewardene, 1973:108). However, he 
concludes the paper by claiming a lack of certainty regarding the implications of this 
“fact” for Thailand’s socio-political present or future. Yet surprisingly perhaps, since 
this forty year old paper, no social scientist appears to have put Wijeyewardene’s 
assertions to the test, nor enquired what a modern hydraulic society might imply in 
the twenty first century. Seemingly, the hydraulic society concept has been either 
overlooked or summarily dismissed as being overly-deterministic and not been 
tested for explanatory validity for Thailand’s recent water resources development 
paradigm.  
A more recent regional advocate of Wittfogel’s hypothesis applied to the modern 
context of water, state and society relations in an environment far removed from the 
classic arid or semi-arid contexts that Wittfogel primarily interested in, is Evers and 
Benedikter’s (2009b) paper examining the recent hydraulic development paradigm 
of the Mekong delta in Vietnam. Rather than focus on a monolithic powerful state 
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bureaucracy being the sole directing authority of development, the authors argue that 
this is an insufficient pre-condition for developing and maintaining a large hydraulic 
system. Instead, they highlight a number of other social groups (termed “strategic 
groups”29) that variously compete and cooperate to stake a claim over control of 
water as the critical resource. In arguing the case for a “modern hydraulic society” in 
Vietnam, Evers and Benedikter (2009b) point to a process of socio-ecological 
transformation that accompanied the construction of a “dense and complex network 
of hydraulic works” throughout the delta, a process which has accelerated post-1975 
re-unification under conditions of centralized socialist rule.  
Hydraulic management in the delta contains both irrigation and flood control 
elements, with the authors stressing that after national re-unification, the initial 
construction of the hydraulic infrastructure entailed organizing thousands of peasants, 
soldiers and cadres to dig canals and build embankments, bringing to mind 
Wittfogel’s assertion that the hydraulic bureaucracy was able to command vast 
armies of labourers for maintaining the economic basis of the society
30
. In recent 
decades, mechanization has inevitably displaced the utilization of mass labour, but 
now the strategic groups promoting hydraulic society instead corral and control 
lucrative state funds and overseas development aid in pursuance of their aims and 
interests. There are believed to be strong interlinkages operating between lower level 
strategic groups dominated by local people, recently privatized large-scale hydraulic 
construction companies and high-ranking hydraulic bureaucrats from the North, that 
have consolidated their power base under new economic and political conditions. 
According to Price (1994), a key weakness of many of Wittfogel’s critics’ arguments 
is that they overlook the key distinction Wittfogel made between “hydraulic” and 
“hydroagriculture”. Wittfogel adopted these terms partly as a way to distinguish 
between the formation of societies that are rooted in irrigated agriculture, but lacked 
despotic forms of centralized government. As Wittfogel (1957:14) stressed, “[t]oo 
                                                   
29 Further consideration is given of the conceptual term “strategic groups”, as defined by Evers and 
Benedikter (2009), in the Methodology chapter, Section 3.1.4  
30 I find this specific timing interesting, as evidence exists that in both “democratic” Thailand under 
M.R. Kukrit Pramoj and the Khmer Rouge totalitarian regime in Cambodia during the same period 
(i.e. 1975-78), similar efforts to mobilize vast armies of peasants to construct hydraulic earthworks 
were underway. In the case of Cambodia, many hundreds of thousands people died during the 
enforced construction of state-controlled irrigation development project, known as Pol Pot’s “Super 
Great Leap Forward” (Himel, 2007), but in Thailand the mobilization was considerably less 
repressive. 
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little or too much water does not necessarily lead to governmental water control; nor 
does governmental water control necessarily imply despotic methods of statecraft.” 
But in the words of Price (1994:190), “the worst caricatures of Wittfogel’s theory 
represent his argument as one in which all irrigation systems lead to a system of 
centralized decision making. Nothing could be further from the truth.” He argues that 
Wittfogel’s definition of hydroagricultural societies should have removed such 
misunderstanding: 
“Strictly local tasks of digging, damming and water distribution can be 
performed by a single husbandman, a single family, or a small group of 
neighbours, and in this case, no far-reaching organizational steps are 
necessary. Hydroagriculture, farming based on small-scale irrigation, 
increases the food supply, but it does not involve the patterns of 
organization and social control that characterize hydraulic agriculture and 
Oriental Despotism.” (Wittfogel, 1957:18) 
By way of contrast, Wittfogel notes that for the evolution of hydraulic agriculture to 
occur: 
“If irrigation farming depends on the effective handling of a major supply 
of water, the distinctive quality of water – its tendency to gather in bulk – 
becomes institutionally decisive. A large quantity of water can be 
channeled and kept within bounds only by the use of mass labour; and 
this mass labour must be coordinated, disciplined and led. Thus a number 
of farmers eager to conquer arid lowlands and plains are forced to invoke 
the organizational devices which – on the basis of premachine technology 
– offer the one chance of success: they must work in cooperation with 
their fellows and subordinate themselves to a directing authority.” 
(Wittfogel, 1957:18 emphasis added) 
Although Price (1994) concludes that there were instances where Wittfogel managed 
to misclassify hydroagricultural societies as hydraulic societies, citing Bali and Sri 
Lanka (noted by Leach, 1959) as examples, the point remains that this fundamental 
distinction between the two categories is critical to understanding Wittfogel’s theory. 
Another important issue often overlooked is that Wittfogel consistently maintained 
that classic hydraulic societies only occur in arid or semi-arid environments
31
, 
whereas many anthropologists have discounted his theories on the basis of studies 
                                                   
31 This would imply that Central Thailand could not qualify as a “classic hydraulic society”, given its 
location in the humid tropics with average annual rainfall between 1,000 – 1,800 mm across most of 
the range, although water can still be artificially scarce in such environments due to over-allocation of 
supplies. 
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made at locations that are remote from arid and practice various forms of irrigated 
agriculture (Hunt et al., 1976). A second point relates to scale, as the majority of 
anthropological studies that have dealt with irrigation systems and water control, 
have done so at the local level, usually in communities that depend on irrigation for a 
significant part of their agricultural production, whereas Wittfogel’s general 
propositions were concerned with whole agrarian societies. Hence, there tends to be 
a logical gap between Wittfogel’s hypotheses and the case studies which purport to 
test them, notes Hunt et al. (1976).  
A further key distinction that Wittfogel made was differentiating among four levels 
of “hydraulic density”, based on the degree to which agricultural societies differ in 
their reliance on hydraulic agriculture. He never claimed, as Price  highlights, that 
the level of state control would covary with the size of an irrigation system, but he 
did claim that “‘the bureaucratic density of an agromanagerial society varies with its 
hydraulic density’” (Wittfogel 1957:167 cited in Price, 1994:194, empasis in 
original). Wittfogel gave the following definition of hydraulic density: 
“The core areas of the hydraulic world manifest at least two major types 
of hydraulic density. Some are hydraulically compact, whereas others are 
hydraulically loose. A hydraulic society may be considered ‘compact’ 
when its hydraulic agriculture occupies a position of absolute or relative 
economic hegemony. It may be considered ‘loose’ when its hydraulic 
agriculture, while lacking economic superiority is sufficient to assure its 
leaders absolute organizational and political hegemony.” (Wittfogel, 
1957:166) 
As can be ascertained from the first line of the quote above, Wittfogel distinguished 
between core and marginal areas, and beyond the marginal, proposed the existence 
of sub-marginal areas linked to the hydraulic civilization. Wittfogel clarified the 
primary division drawn between “compact” and “loose” hydraulic societies with 
further sub-divisions, such as spatially continuous or discontinuous variants, and 
relative or absolute economic hegemony of the central state. He also differentiated 
between those societies where hydraulic infrastructure development was primarily 
for productive or protective purposes, providing global historical examples of each 
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type of hydraulic density
32
 (Wittfogel, 1957:166). Price (1994) concedes that 
Wittfogel does not adequately operationalize his variables of hydraulic and 
bureaucratic density and makes some errors of classification concerning the 
examples given of each category.  
The intention of this rather convoluted discussion is to help throw some light on past 
tendencies for swift dismissals and indeed, occasional misconceptions, regarding the 
hydraulic society hypothesis as a route to comprehending state-society power 
relations expressed through water resources control patterns. On closer examination, 
I argue that the content of Wittfogel’s work appears rather more nuanced, non-
deterministic and complex than has often been alleged by critics, and may be worthy 
of a reappraisal of its value in contemporary contexts. Thus, taking into 
consideration some of these distinctions made by Wittfogel about hydraulic society 
typology and on the basis of Evers and Benedikter’s (2009a) contentions concerning 
the importance of strategic groups involved in maintaining control over a modern 
day hydraulic society, rather than simplistic binary distinctions between 
homogeneous villages and a monolithic state, could provide helpful concepts to 
consider for the case of Thailand. This is based on a contention that Thailand 
exhibits some basic characteristics that led Wittfogel (1957) to identify it as a 
hydraulic society, and later hesitantly seconded by Wijeyewardene (1973). The 
foregoing discussion of the weaknesses and merits of the hydraulic society thesis 
leads on to a consideration of related issues for conceptualizing social relationships 
of water, state, politics and development, framed under the rubric of the “hydraulic 
mission” (Allan, 2002). 
 
2.3 The Hydraulic Mission notion 
 
Updating elements of the Wittfogelian theory to a modern context, a recent issue of 
Water Alternatives (www.water-alternatives.org) contained a themed issue titled 
“Hydraulic Bureaucracies: Flows of Water, Flows of Power”, that placed a primary 
focus on the role and power of state water bureaucracies (hydrocracies) in securing 
                                                   
32 These were listed as Compact 1, Compact 2; Loose 1; and Loose 2 types. Price (1994) maintains 
that Hunt (1988) neglects these key hydraulic density variables of Wittfogel, and thus constructs a 
straw man to demolish. 
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control over “space, water and people and an important part of everyday forms of 
state formation” as part of an intentional political strategy (Molle et al., 2009d:328). 
The authors contend that the twentieth century trend towards increasing large-scale 
water resources development, including vast irrigation works, was “anchored in 19th 
century scientism and an ideology of the domination of nature, inspired by colonial 
hydraulic feats, and fuelled by technological improvements….” (Molle et al., 
2009d:328). They point out that this massive expansion in hydraulic works by 
governments was enthusiastically adopted by governments North and South, East 
and West, and term it the “hydraulic mission”33, entrusted to the powerful 
hydrocracies for discursive and material implementation. The synthesized paper 
highlights several key defining discourses associated with the motivations and 
worldviews of hydrocracies which can be summarized as comprising the following 
ingredients: a/ demonstrate an enthusiasm for “scientific irrigation”, as befits the 
professional bias of the civil engineers inhabiting them; b/ uphold an associated 
hubristic view of the domination of nature; c/ convey a utopian fascination with the 
vision of making deserts bloom; d/ associate irrigated farming with civilization itself 
and a moral ideal of farming, and; e/ often entertain biblical/messianic overtones to 
prompt calls for creating new Edens in dryland environments (Molle et al., 2009d). 
In line with the civilizing, moral and religious tones in which new irrigation schemes 
were justified during their inexorable spread into newly colonized lands in the 
western states of the United States (Reisner, 1986; Worster, 1992) and numerous 
nations of the global South. Molle et al. (2009d) document the emergence of the 
hydraulic mission in numerous locations and political regimes, from nominally 
communist to fascist to democratic states, and note the bureaucracies established to 
expedite it had their “secular priesthoods” to expedite the “irrigation gospel”. 
Echoing Wittfogelian notions of centralised state control over space, water and 
people, Wester et al. (2009:395), note that the rapid expansion of irrigation 
infrastructure precipitated by the hydraulic mission during the early twentieth 
century, “literally built the state and deepened its control over territory and people.” 
The hydrocracies are recognized primarily as representing, “the creation of nation 
states and reflect a number of their concerns and objectives”, and may 
                                                   
33 Wester et al. (2009) emphasize the apposite nature of the term “mission”, due to its military and 
religious connotations and as a reflection of the state’s conviction in its duty to develop water 
resources. 
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simultaneously possess unique sets of interests and ideologies (Molle et al., 
2009d:336). Ultimately, the power and legitimacy the hydrocracies hold is dependent 
on promoting and sustaining an endless cycle of planning and construction of water 
resources infrastructure. Maxims such as “not a single drop of water should reach the 
sea without being put to work for the benefit of Man”34 were no doubt sincerely held 
in the growing hydrocracies, often working in tandem with politicians and national 
leaders (Molle et al., 2009d). Describing the process of socio-natural transformation 
that occurred following the creation of a hydraulic mission in the nineteenth century 
by authoritarian public authorities in Spain, Swyngedouw (1999:460) asserts, “[I]t is 
the maelstrom of tensions and contradictions that weave the material, discursive, 
ideological, and representational, together in often-perplexing, always deeply 
heterogeneous, collages of changing and shifting positions of power and struggle 
that decisively shaped the production of the Spanish waterscape over the next 
century.”  
Regarding the power of hydrocracies, often correlated with the size of annual 
budgets allocated, Thailand is cited as providing a good example of water 
departments holding on their shelves multiple master plans which incorporate 
“projects penciled in to dam every single river that lends itself to dam construction, 
linked to the attendant development of irrigation areas (or where it is not the case, to 
flood control or hydropower objectives)” (Molle et al., 2009d:336). At the same time, 
the authors recognize that it is not only the interests of hydraulic bureaucracies and 
the governments they serve that shape water resources development pathways, but 
also identify four other categories of powerful actors involved; namely politicians, 
construction companies, landed elites and development banks. They argue, “[W]ater 
bureaucrats, state-level and local politicians, water business companies, and 
development banks are often tightly associated in ‘synergetic relationships’ whereby 
the ways of flows of water are created or modified by water infrastructure are 
intertwined with flows of power and influence, often manifested in the form of 
political or financial benefits, whether private or collective” (Molle et al., 
2009d:336). As a result, there is often collusion between private business, politicians 
and bureaucrats to create “iron-triangles” in the US, or in the global South, “iron 
                                                   
34 Molle (2006) found that similar statements can be traced to leaders of numerous countries, 
irrespective of ideology and faith. 
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rectangles” with the addition of development banks’ interests (see Molle et al., 
2009b). The combination of vested interests may often utilize such practices as 
bribery, bid-rigging, exchange of favours, benefit overestimation and cost neglect in 
order to keep a steady supply of infrastructure projects flowing, and facilitating a 
“lending culture” in contexts where there are rarely sanctions for failed projects. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to determine and elaborate during the course of 
this study, if Thailand fits a model that reflects most accurately a triangle, a rectangle 
or some other formation of actor groupings benefitting and promoting the hydraulic 
mission to further their interests and the discourses adopted in that process. 
 The discussion thus far has identified some of the core theoretical literature used in 
conceptualizing the politics of water resources development and management, with a 
special emphasis placed on issues related to Southeast Asia. I now turn to examine 
different approaches through which the hydraulic development paradigm has been 
conceived in the Mekong Basin, from socio-political and socio-ecological 
perspectives. This is an attempt to provide the reader with a sense of where irrigation 
development, as a technology, social practice and discursive object sits in a wider 
scholarly interest in historical hydro-politics and water control in the Mekong region, 
which may assist in better understanding the specific context of Northeast Thailand’s 
hydraulic-development. 
 
2.4 Hydropolitics in the Mekong Basin 
 
In recent decades, there has been a marked growth of academic research interest in a 
loosely defined “hydropolitics”35 of the Mekong Basin and wider region36 as an 
explanatory framework for understanding national and transboundary water conflicts 
(e.g. Ojendal, 1995; Hirsch, 1998; Bakker, 1999b; Goh, 2004; Onishi, 2005; Backer, 
                                                   
35 This term was first coined by Waterbury (1979) in his book, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, has 
mostly been adopted by political scientists, environmental economists and hydrologists to analyze 
contexts of growing water scarcity and the risks it poses for degeneration into potential conflict, 
principally at the transboundary or inter-state level.  
36 Whereas the Mekong Basin comprises a distinct hydrological unit, the Mekong region is a larger 
geographical construct, used to describe the countries of peninsular Southeast Asia that border the 
Lower Mekong River, namely Burma, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam, plus Yunnan 
province of China. Dore and Lebel (2010) point out that “many Mekongs” exist in the perceptions of 
different stakeholders, whether as a river, as a basin or various regional geo-political framings. 
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2006; Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Sneddon and Fox, 2008; Ojendal et al., 2012; Ojendal 
and Morck Jensen, 2012). There are three main issues I wish to draw attention to 
within this body of literature. Firstly, it has primarily focused on the politics of 
hydropower development, in preference to (and possibly at the expense of) 
considering more deeply other forms of hydraulic development such as irrigation or 
flood control works; secondly, it has tended to be rather scale-bound at the Mekong 
regional or transboundary levels, despite some attempts to counter this trend and 
reduce the analysis to sub-basin, sub-national levels or local levels; and thirdly, it has 
placed most emphasis on studying the role of nation states, international 
development organizations (especially the Mekong River Commission) and 
transnational corporations as the pre-eminent actors in hydro-politics, to the 
detriment of a more inclusive and nuanced view of a wider range of relevant sub-
national actors and groups (see Dore, 2003; Hirsch and Morck Jensen, 2006).  
Regarding the first point of a sectoral bias in research, it seems hydropower 
development has most frequently been at the centre of regional debates over water 
and politics, with the energy sector being regarded as a prime driver of regional 
economic development (Hirsch, 1998; Greacen and Palettu, 2007; Middleton et al., 
2009; Ojendal et al., 2012). The domination of hydropower development concerns in 
governance debates and academic literature has possibly been at the expense of 
considering conflicts around other hydraulic infrastructural sectors such as irrigation 
development and flood control. Hydropower development has tended to dominate 
discourses surrounding intra-regional and international contestation and cooperation 
for several decades, broaching a significant milestone recently following the bi-
lateral decision by the Laos and Thai governments to jointly develop the mainstream 
Mekong River
37
 without the apparent full consent of the Cambodian and Vietnam 
governments, occurring amidst widespread civil society opposition and expressions 
of concern from Hillary Clinton (Fawthrop, 2012; Ojendal and Morck Jensen, 2012). 
For example, Bakker (1999b:228) stated that, “insofar as dams assume an 
emblematic role in debates over water resources management, an examination of 
hydrodevelopment can shed light on debates over environment and development 
more generally.” The majority of her paper on “hydrodevelopment” is actually 
                                                   
37 In September 2012, the Thai company Ch. Karnchang was reportedly moving ahead quickly with 
construction of the Xayaburi Dam, a highly controversial $3.5 billion hydropower dam project which 
plans to export 95 % of power generated to Thailand (Fawthrop, 2012).  
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focused on discourses of hydropower development, and treats it apart from other 
forms of hydraulic infrastructure, rather than part of the same pattern of a general 
“hydraulic mission” in the basin. She believes that hydropower development at any 
scale operates primarily as a means of commodification and simultaneously as a way 
of extending state control into peripheral areas in a deliberate strategy of 
“territorialization”38, with the incursion of private capital becoming central to causal 
explanations. But the possibility of irrigation development fulfilling the same 
functions as hydropower seems to have been overlooked, perhaps unwittingly 
reinforcing a widespread belief that the benefits of irrigation primarily accrue locally 
(Shivakoti et al., 2005). Hence, hydropower development may be viewed as a 
socially exclusive, impersonal or coercive symbol of state authority for some critical 
scholars, while by comparison irrigation infrastructure somehow tends to retain an 
image as a more benign, inclusive and softer technological intervention in the 
hydrological cycle, which may partly account for a relative lack of critical research 
into societal power relations and irrigation development. 
The second and third issues concern notions of scale and a tendency for much of the 
Mekong basin’s hydro-political discourse to be preoccupied with regional and 
national level narratives, often at the expense of more localized or sub-national 
narratives and actors. The inter-linked concepts of scale and power in water 
resources development has been addressed by several other regional scholars in the 
context of the Mekong Basin (Sneddon, 2002; Sneddon et al., 2002; Sneddon, 2003b; 
Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004; Lebel et al., 2005) and Thailand’s Chao Phraya Basin 
(Molle, 2006, 2007a). Critiquing an apparent pre-occupation by much of the 
academic literature on international river basins concerning the principle of 
“cooperation” (e.g. the international scale of negotiations, transnational institutional 
arrangements, international legal principles and water allocation goals) as an 
analytical category and normative objective, Sneddon and Fox (2006:182) argue that 
this “obscures the ways in which states, non-state actors and river basins themselves 
interact to construct ‘transnational’ basins through institutional and material 
processes.” Cooperation in and of itself is not seen as a desired end for riparian 
                                                   
38 Territorialization has been defined as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or 
control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic 
area” (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995).  
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governments in the basin as such, but rather a means for proceeding with the 
accelerated development of water resources.  
Taking the highly contentious and emblematic example of the Pak Mun Dam in 
lower Northeast Thailand as a sub-national project with transboundary dimensions, 
Sneddon and Fox’s (2006) paper emphasizes the importance of examining conflicts 
over water resources that do not involve studies of struggles or cooperation 
mechanisms between riparian states per se in transboundary river basins, 
conventionally used in analyses of regional water governance. Instead they call for 
cross-scalar analyses of Mekong water conflicts that may involve state agents (e.g. 
dam-building agencies, irrigation departments, environmental agencies) and non-
state actors (e.g. communities affected by water development projects) over specific 
interventions to alter river systems. They note two current conceptual “blind spots” 
that deserve to be addressed: “1/ clarifications of how and why development agents 
(e.g. riparian states) have discursively engineered transboundary basins into spatially 
fixed entities; and 2/ the complex interactions among different scales of conflict 
within basins’ sociolecological dynamics” (Sneddon and Fox, 2006:183). The same 
authors advocate a “critical hydropolitics” framework, which they maintain, “help to 
reveal barriers – discursive, political, and institutional – to sustainable governance 
and meaningful participation” of all stakeholders in water resources management, 
while inherently recognizing the power relations that underpin the depoliticized 
discourses of development and cooperation (Sneddon and Fox, 2006:198). A similar 
conclusion was drawn by Kakonen and Hirsch (2009) in relation to revealing forms 
of development-driven participation promoted by the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC) and certain state agencies, that are argued to “contribute to the 
depoliticization of knowledge in support of a particular governance agenda”, which 
inevitably leads to the justification of large-scale hydraulic infrastructure (see 
Section 2.5 below for further discussion of this process).  
Water resources development contestation is but one of several inter-linked 
environmental conflict issues (e.g. forest degradation, land rights, industrialization, 
etc.) that appears to have become progressively politicized in the Lower Mekong 
Basin over recent decades through being “fixed” at a certain discursive scale by 
actors supporting particular ideological views (Hirsch, 1997; Molle et al., 2009b). 
Dore and Lebel (2010) underline the tendency for actors to privilege certain spatial 
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or temporal scales and levels in their analysis, arguments and responses, thereby 
increasing resource contestation. Reinforcing Swyngedouw’s (1997) contention that 
“the circulation of water is embedded in social power relations”, Sneddon 
(2003b:2230) argues that the manipulation of water through large-scale inter-basin 
transfer projects reveals linkages not only between water and “circuits” of state 
power, but also how the economic and political processes that transform river basins 
– both discursively and materially – will tend to “constantly rework the politics of 
scale through the extension and contraction of networks and non-humans.”39  
Sneddon (2003b) further notes the infrequency with which most academic literature 
dealing with notions of power have broached questions of ecology or the natural (i.e. 
non-human) sphere, while showing a marked pre-occupation with the social and 
technological realms. The same observation could be made for much of the critical 
socio-political work on irrigation development, where non-human entities have been 
largely obscured as agents. Sneddon (2003b:2246) suggests that political struggles 
concerning the trans-basin Khong-Chi-Mun (KCM) Project
40
 in Northeast Thailand 
and local nodes of conflict at specific dam sites are, “largely about maintaining the 
set of relations among Thai political agents and development agencies that confer the 
KCM project its power effects and capacity to reach across scales.” Sneddon 
(2000:341) earlier argued that large-scale water resources development is 
predominantly an activity of the state, as “the single most powerful environmental 
manager with regard to influence over how resources within the Thai national 
territory is accessed and used”. It followed that inherent contradictions were exposed 
when state agencies were appointed mediators in resulting conflicts over water 
resources control and access, with Sneddon perceiving the state’s primary motivation 
being economic development and capital accumulation. Sneddon acknowledged that 
it was not only state bureaucracies, but also “affiliated institutions” (such as 
politicians, business interests and international development agencies) that become 
“privileged actors” in the control and development of water resources. He identified 
a wide actor network that included a number of social and natural entities that were 
recruited into determining the project’s evolution, either in support or opposition. It 
                                                   
39 NB: The “politics of scale” metaphor is explored further in a section on scale issues in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.9. 
40 This pan-regional irrigation project was first proposed by powerful state actors for implementation 
during the early 1990s, although its roots go back much further, and has only ever been partially and 
unsuccessfully realized on the ground (refer to Chapter 6 for further detail). 
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is these “affiliated institutions” that may be interpreted as equating to the “strategic 
groups” in Evers and Benedikter’s (2009b) study and are of particular interest to my 
own in identifying those that determine control over water resources and discourses 
used.  
 
2.5 A social ecology of water resources  
 
Are there any alternative approaches to the national-centric “hydraulic mission” 
focused approaches and the trans-national and trans-basin oriented Mekong 
hydropolitics literature for developing better understandings of state-society-water 
interactions and discursive justifications for irrigation development paradigms at 
more local strata in society? One promising alternative could be the theoretical and 
empirical approaches applied in India by social anthropologist, David Mosse (1997a, 
2003, 2007), through impressive explorations of the changing ecological, political 
and cultural significance of water within communities utilizing tank irrigation 
systems in Tamil Nadu state. Rather than focus primarily on the national and 
regional political processes and discourses, he concentrates his analysis on the role 
of water, as a productive and symbolic resource, at the sub-basin and community 
levels. He argues in The Rule of Water: Statecraft, Ecology and Collective Action in 
South India that water forms a key part of the construction of social identities and 
political domains: “[T]he connections and interdependencies of hydrology 
interweave with those of caste and kinship, business and politics, and generate 
distinctive patterns of co-operation and conflict……… Water flows have not only 
shaped social and political institutions, they have also legitimized them. Medieval 
kings and chiefs controlled and gifted water flows, creating landscapes which 
inscribed their rule into the hydrology and thus naturalized it” (Mosse, 2003:4). 
Baviskar (2005) too notes a watershed mission (perceived as a similar concept to the 
hydraulic mission, but combines water and land management) in India, that is 
embedded in and a product of, landscapes “saturated with power”.  By the same 
token, irrigation development in Thailand could be viewed as both an ideology and 
discourse that, to quote Baviskar (2005:282), enables “an assemblage of practices 
that are part of a project of rule”.  
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As part of his analysis, Mosse (2003) reasoned that two dominant historical models 
of irrigation development have influenced scholarly debates over the past century. 
The first referred to Marxian themes elaborated by Wittfogel (1957) of centralized 
power, agromanagerial bureaucracy and extractive land taxes under a hydraulic 
(despotic) state built around large-scale irrigation technologies. The second stressed 
the autonomous role of small “village republics” 41 (e.g. Wade, 1988) and their 
assemblies, where the irrigation technology and practice is regarded as socially 
complex, indigenous and independent of the state, such as studies by Leach (1959) 
and Geertz (1959, 1980). Both models of representation are argued to be 
constructions that barely conceal “contemporary ideological agendas” and Mosse 
believes neither can be sustained for understanding irrigation in India. While 
Wittfogel’s “hydraulic despotism” was dismissed as a “thinly disguised and 
politically understood warning against the dangers of state socialism and modern 
totalitarianism”42; on the other hand, the “village republics” narrative was first 
adopted as part of the discourse invoked by colonial governments, but later popularly 
usurped, “as a trope in the critique of the modernizing development strategies of the 
centralized state and the dominance of Western technical engineering over 
indigenous community perspectives in irrigation” (Mosse, 2003:57). However, in 
dismissing Wittfogel’s contributions to some of the very issues he claims most 
interest in (i.e. the power and political economy aspects of irrigation expressed in the 
rule, rather than the management, of water), it appears that Mosse neglects to reflect 
on the wider tenets of “hydraulic society” theory for assessing elements of 
contemporary Indian statecraft and rule of water beyond the local through top-down, 
trans-basin grand irrigation schemes
43
 and myriad other coercive hydraulic 
infrastructure developments of the last half century or so. 
                                                   
41 This term refers back to Gandhian notions around self-sufficient, relatively state-independent 
villages in India, that has subsequently been adopted as a popular theme by scholars of commons 
management regimes, such as Wade (1988), who argued that the relative economic value of a scarce 
resource drove users to form village-based collectivities and jointly manage irrigation water systems. 
42I find it interesting that Mosse (2003) only refers to Wittfogel thrice in the whole book, apparently 
basing his critique on the second hand interpretations of hydraulic society theory by others who are 
equally dismissive of Wittfogel, as has been the tendency of many other social anthropologists in the 
past.   
43 For example, India appears to be pressing ahead with plans to execute a vast inter-basin water 
transfer engineering scheme, that would take water from the water “rich” areas to the water scarce 
parts (see the National Water Development Agency (under the Ministry of Water Resources) website 
- http://www.nwda.gov.in/index.asp?langid=1, Accessed 14 March, 2012) and is the third greatest 
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Mosse (2003) maintains that based on polarized notions of state and community, the 
two models leave little possibility for change or for understanding irrigation 
development in a local context of tank irrigation practiced in a complex and unstable 
ecological landscape. He proposes moving beyond the dual models identified to 
incorporate a more contextually aware account that takes into consideration 
questions of power, culture, history, ecology and technology as they relate to water 
resources management. In doing so, he advocates for adopting a “social ecology of 
water” approach which views environment and society as mutually adapted 
categories, to show “how water control systems come to inscribe new forms of 
power and new articulations of state and society” (Mosse, 2003:7). Mosse (2003:84) 
makes the argument that tank-irrigated paddy cultivation “provided a medium 
through which social relations of state and society were articulated and symbolically 
represented. Tanks were already part of a pre-colonial nostalgic ideal social order – 
however incompletely realized – and every bit as rooted in the exercise of power as 
later colonial and orientalist representations of the village community.” By 
demonstrating that contrasting local ecologies are historically produced rather than 
simply given, both Mosse’s (1997b, 2003) and Worster’s (1992) conceptual 
framings of society-ecology interactions demonstrate distinct theoretical similarities, 
albeit set across vastly different spatio-temporal scales and socio-cultural contexts. It 
suggests that a social ecology of water approach could be usefully applied in other 
contexts, where potentially modern powerful actors, rather than ancient, “kings, 
warriors and earlier forms of state” are in the process of inscribing their marks on 
contemporary landscapes currently undergoing the process of being transformed into 
irrigated waterscapes
44
, such as in Thailand where the documented history of water 
resources management lacks the rich detail of India and remains more open to 
historical interpretation. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
large dam building nation on earth, after China and the United States (World Commission on Dams, 
2000). 
44 While there are ancient Khmer archaeological ruins located throughout the Northeast of Thailand, 
including in the Nam Songkhram Basin, the majority of reservoirs (or “tanks” in Mosse’s terminology) 
found in the region are not old structures as in Tamil Nadu, but have been built within the past half 
century by state agencies. 
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2.7 A Political Sociology of Water Resources Management 
 
Reinforcing Mosse’s (2003) view that there is often a polarization of academic 
strands in agricultural water use in the case of India, Mollinga (2010) proposes that 
despite its vibrancy and intensive public debate and action, it has led to surprisingly 
little shift in agricultural water governance and policy, suggesting a deadlock 
situation has arisen. He points out some of the relevant dichotomies to critical water 
scholarship such as nature-society, global-local, modern-traditional and state-village, 
that can lead to “strategic essentialisms” (Baviskar, 2005)  or analytical 
reductionisms in research, implying one-dimensional abstractions from complex 
realities (Mollinga, 2010). Reality is not bipolar or dichotomous, but complex, 
leading to the fallacy of binarism in analysis. Mollinga (2010) recognises how social 
ecology orientations of agricultural water use have been helpful in moving beyond a 
straightforward political economy perspective and some overlap with political 
ecology approaches to establish a relationship between nature and society, without 
always theorizing that relation.  
Mollinga (2008) too accepts the general proposition that water resources 
management is inherently political, but acknowledges that within mainstream water 
policy discourse that this is not a commonly held perspective and has to be 
established. As he states, this proposition “is based on the idea that water control is 
at the heart of water resources management and should be conceived as a process of 
politically contested resource use” (Mollinga, 2008:10, emphasis in original). Water 
control
45
 thus becomes the subject matter of water resources management
46
. 
Mollinga (2008:11) goes on to advocate for the establishment of a new field of 
scholarship within water resources, namely a “political sociology of water resources 
management”, where the “sociology” in the rubric refers to the “social 
embeddedness” of water resources management, which is viewed as “a practice in 
which water and agency ‘meet’ to reproduce and transform society....”. The two 
                                                   
45 Mollinga (2008) posits alternative terms such as water guidance, direction or regulation as being 
potentially better, as far as describing what humans physically do in intervening in the hydrological 
cycle, but accepts the other terms are more awkward and confusing as general categories and so sticks 
to “water control”. Further explanation of the concept of water control as it relates to this thesis is 
provided in Chapter 3. 
46 Although Mollinga does not specifically mention it, I assume “water resources development” (my 
principal interest in this thesis) to be a category subsumed under an all encompassing “water 
resources management” rubric. 
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main forms of embeddedness he identifies are context (i.e. water resources 
management in relation to other structures and practices) and of history (water 
resources emerges from somewhere along a certain trajectory). In a footnote (13), 
Mollinga (2008:11) reasons that an embedded study of contested water resources 
management would simultaneously have to incorporate aspects of political ecology, 
political economy and a political sociology; illustrating the broad multi-disciplinary 
umbrella of this new field. Operationalizing such a project into one’s research calls 
to mind Mosse’s (2003:1) opening line in The Rule of Water, “[t]he relationship 
between water and society is as complex an historical, sociological, and regional 
problem as any that can be imagined” and one can only ever expect to produce a 
partial, incomplete, situated and constructed account of a far more complex reality. 
 
2.6 Ideological irrigation development  
 
I lastly turn to the central issue of water resources control as ideology. Mosse (2003) 
recognized that indigenous water harvesting discourses were ideological, whether 
expressed through environmental narratives or discourses of irrigation devolution 
and public sector reform. Significantly, he pointed out, “to argue that village water 
traditions are ideological does not deny their existence” Mosse (2003:13). Before 
moving on to the specifics of Thailand, it may be helpful to ask what other 
precedents exist for making a claim that irrigation development may embody 
ideological dimensions and under what kind of historical, ecological, social and 
political circumstances have they been theorized?  
Links between irrigation development and ideological underpinnings are not 
unprecedented, based on an examination of a broad water resources literature, one 
can find claims of inherent ideological elements being important drivers of 
development drawn in several contexts, including Australia, parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa and Israel. Taking the case of Australia first, Hamilton-McKenzie (2009) 
examined the pioneering drive for  irrigated agricultural development in the Murray-
Darling Basin during the late 19
th
 century, and concluded it was partly based on what 
she termed an “Irrigationist Philosophy”, strongly inspired itself by the irrigation 
colonies of California. This philosophy was categorized according to three main 
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components, the first being an attractive and civilized yeoman farmer ideal; secondly, 
the technologically progressive and scientific nature of irrigated farming over broad-
acre farming; and thirdly, fulfilling a God-given mission of transforming wild, 
barren and dryland landscapes  into well-ordered, green and productive land tracts. 
The irrigationist vision was expounded in a “Red Book” commissioned by a pair of 
Canadian brothers (the Chaffeys) who founded the first irrigation settlement and 
sought pioneer farmers from Britain and the United States to buy, emigrate and 
cultivate the remote land. Through this ideological treatise was produced to support 
an hitherto untested technology and although strongly contested at the time, once 
stamped with government authority, “the irrigationist movement was given a 
tradition, a sense of historical trajectory, which caught the readers in a sense of 
destiny”  (Hamilton-McKenzie, 2009:35). The same ideology still dominates 
contemporary Australian land developers’ attempts to transform the landscape and 
the old Red Book dreams recur entrenched in beliefs about the progressive nature of 
technology, more recently tied to irrigation efficiency discourses. Yet, argues 
Hamilton Mc-Kenzie (2009), the legacy of the irrigationist philosophy can be 
considered a patent failure, on environmental, economical and aesthetical grounds.  
The second example relates to northern Nigeria, where Adams (1991) identified an 
irrigation ideology having influence (he labels it “irrigationism” 47), characterized by 
a modernizing vision offered by large-scale irrigation, regarded by powerful actors 
as a “technofix” solution to the challenges of drought and the economics of a 
conservative and independent peasantry. He regarded it as a “remarkably coherent 
ideology” that was able to draw on a number of sources for its legitimacy, including 
“views of the nature of development as transformation and modernization” and 
embraced the notions entailed in a supposedly apolitical and technically advanced 
“Green Revolution” route to development (Adams, 1991:297). Referring to Moris’ 
(1987) notion of irrigation as a “privileged solution” and the primacy of “blueprint” 
approaches (Moris and Thom, 1990) to planning, Adams reasoned that irrigation-
                                                   
47 This term has also been used in a slightly different context by Bruce Lankford to refer to a rather 
narrow, ‘fixed’ way of going about improving irrigation with irrigation-based production and 
individual irrigation systems at its centre. Irrigationism is portrayed as a rigid and dogmatic ideology 
of pursuing irrigation-based solutions for agriculturalists in developing countries. Lankford contrasts 
irrigationism with irrigationality, which is painted as a far more flexible and pragmatic ideology for 
pursuing irrigation development. The latter term implies a more context-cognisant, conditional, 
cautious method of progressing towards irrigation-based livelihoods, situated within complex river 
basins and economies. (Lankford, personal communication, 2010)  
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based development was widely promoted by various international organizations and 
academic institutions as a popular solution to perceived problems of drought and 
food shortages in the 1970s. The messages delivered by the irrigation development 
experts fell on fertile ground with the indigenous elite of Nigeria, drawing in 
businessmen, politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats who were positioned to profit 
from the investment. That the promotion of and investment in irrigation development 
continued for decades, even in the face of poor performance at all phases of the 
project cycle from planning to operation, “owes something to the capacity of those 
technologies to blind policy-makers to their limitations and high costs”, argues 
Adams (1991:298). Elsewhere, Adams (1992, 2001) has shown that irrigationism has 
not only been a feature of Nigerian development thinking and practice, but has been 
a powerful ideology elsewhere in Africa too, including Kenya and Tanzania.  
A further context in which irrigation development and ideology have been closely 
associated is the state of Israel. Lipchin (2007) has outlined how the agricultural and 
water policy of Israel has been heavily influenced by Zionist ideology since the 
state’s formation. He claims that Zionism aided the state in instituting policies that 
favoured the continual expansion of agriculture through land settlement, and by 
extension, water development projects for irrigation in an effort to create a neo-
Garden of Eden in the arid landscape, referred to by Molle et al (2009d) as a “let the 
desert bloom” utopia common to some countries in the Middle East and the western 
United States. Lipchin (2007) argued that, “an ideology has developed around water 
by virtue of its association with agriculture”, as agricultural activity was central to 
the goal of returning the land to the Jewish diaspora. For example, this ideological 
mission was clearly stated by Ariel Sharon: 
“……..water is not merely an economic resource but a means of settling the 
periphery, protecting state land and a means of conserving farmers and farming.”  
Ariel Sharon, Israel’s Prime Minister, Ha’aretz Daily Newspaper, April 19, 2001 (cited in 
Lipchin, 2007:251) 
Thus, through a systematic process of territorial expansion and consolidation that 
extended above and below ground to also include aquifers, all water resources 
became state property under a highly centralized system of water management, 
allocation and development. Furthermore, due to the ideological nature of water 
resources development, he believed that there was “little practical, economic or 
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environmental value in terms of its relation to the physical nature of an arid and 
water scarce environment” (Lipchin, 2007:255), and further, the policy has left a 
legacy of mismanagement and environmental degradation. He finishes by noting that 
changing such ideological values clustered around water resources would be a 
daunting task, as a survey of local perceptions found there was a strong correlation 
between national policy making and local value systems. Expanding on reasons for 
societal resistance to change in water allocation to the agricultural sector, even when 
it is divorced from economical rationality Kartin (2001:277 nb. emphasis added) 
explains that it “is linked, primarily, to cognitive difficulties that stand in the way of 
reforming ideological symbols about agriculture in Israel. This difficulty stems from 
the fact that agriculture is associated with a broad set of moral, ideological and social 
ideas.” 
There is one further instance of irrigation-linked ideology I wish to draw attention to, 
which although it does not appear to have been academically recognized as such yet, 
I believe it represents both a geographically and culturally pertinent case to Thailand, 
as an extreme example of an irrigation developmental ideology promoted within a 
“modern” hydraulic society, that goes well beyond the instances raised thus far. I 
refer to Thailand’s eastern neighbor, Cambodia or Democratic Kampuchea, as it was 
officially known during the repressive and violent Khmer Rouge-led government 
which lasted between 1975 and 1979. “There has never been a modern regime that 
placed more emphasis and resources towards developing irrigation”48, states Himel 
(2007:42), with practically the entire population put to work digging irrigation canals 
and dikes and rice planting activities. A central goal of the regime during its tenure 
was the (re)construction of nationwide irrigation systems, in an attempt to construct 
an ideal socialist environment, where “the daily life in the collective and personal 
necessities were planned down to the very last detail” (Bultmann, 2012:40). Pol 
Pot’s monumental irrigational plan, articulated in his “Super Great Leap Forward” 
policy, was to increase rice yields three-fold on all agricultural land and to increase 
the area under irrigation from 74,000 ha to 1.5 million ha in the matter of a few years. 
In a rigidly deterministic manner and under a collectivized property system, the 
regime set about building large irrigation schemes across the country according to a 
                                                   
48 Describing the Khmer Rouge as presiding over a “modern regime” is somewhat ironic, as their 
stated aim was to turn the calendar back to Year Zero and create a utopian agrarian society, based on 
communal peasant labour. 
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landscape-independent grid-pattern network of canals and roads, laid out following 
1:50,000 topographical maps (see Fig 2.1 below). Dams, dykes, embankments, 
pumping stations and hydraulic control systems were constructed on river 
floodplains to divert water into the reservoirs and irrigation canals using a corvée 
system of mass enforced labour
49
. Once an irrigation system was complete (most of 
them were never completed), the state dictated almost every minutae of production 
(e.g. rice variety, planting time, fertilization regime, irrigation schedule, etc) and 
relayed this through a system of party cadres to the collectivized workers on the 
ground
50
. Bultmann (2012) argues that this deliberate irrigational strategy by the 
regime was designed to tighten control over the populace, “create” loyal subjects of 
the people, and tame a “deviant space” by inscribing power relations into the 
landscape (cf. Mosse, 2003). Perhaps utterly predictably under such a draconian 
system of control, even as the area of irrigation increased greatly, the rice yields 
declined rapidly as the systems collapsed both literally and figuratively (Himel, 
2007).  
  
Thus, to briefly summarize the cases raised of ideologically-based irrigation 
development, in Israel there would appear to be a distinctly quasi-religious and 
nationalist dimension to the official ideology of irrigation development and its 
associated state-centric hydraulic mission to make the “desert bloom” (Kartin, 2001; 
                                                   
49 Perhaps coincidentally, about the same time (i.e. 1975-76) under the government of M.R. Kukrit 
Pramoj, villagers in Northeast Thailand were being exhorted by the state to form working parties to 
build weirs, dig embankments and canals by hand to supposedly increase irrigated rice cultivation. 
The remains of these earthen structures (known as fai Kukrit) can still be seen across the landscape 
today (often abandoned) as a physical reminder of past state irrigational efforts to simultaneously 
control people and water.  
50 During the 44 months of Pol Pot’s leadership, a reported 1.7 million people died of exhaustion, 
disease and starvation, or were brutally executed, many of whom had been forced to toil in the 
creation of an irrigation-based utopian state. 
Fig 2.1 The official national emblem adopted by the 
government of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-9), 
illustrating the centrality of notions of orderliness 
and control over nature associated with rice-based 
irrigation, industrial modernization and water 
control for the regime's symbolic self-image  
(Source:  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Kampuchea 
Accessed on 23 September 2012) 
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Lipchin, 2007); in Australia an “irrigationist philosophy” was closely related to a 
pioneering vision of arid land transformation inspired by American-born dreams of 
conquest over nature; whereas in African states like Nigeria, irrigationism provided 
justifications for an idealized technocentric, modernist vision of development 
reproduced amongst both exogenous and indigenous elites, and borne out in largely 
failed irrigation schemes imposed on the periphery (Adams, 1991, 1992); in southern 
India, an ideology privileging indigenous water harvesting techniques is supported 
by environmentalist, traditionalist and localist narratives on one hand and an 
overlapping agenda provided by a discourse of devolution of water resources 
management to local communities; while in the final case during the four year 
Khmer Rouge era in Cambodia, a utopian irrigation-based ideology mixed with 
virulent nationalism and socialism was pursued to genocidal extremes (Himel, 2007; 
Bultmann, 2012). Such examples provide a rich source of material for future further 
study and possible comparison, although I would argue that each national case and 
context are likely to be unique and I shall not attempt to make direct comparisons, 
until the later stages of the thesis. 
 
2.7 Main Research Question  
  
This research takes as its starting point the contention that Thailand represents an 
example of a modern day hydraulic society, characterized by strong centralization of 
authority in water resources decision-making, and that this conceptual phenomenon 
can be partly explained by an ideological formation around irrigation development, 
referred to as “irrigationalism”. Acknowledging the socially contested and political 
nature of hydraulic development, this thesis is primarily interested in exploring the 
discourses (and their constitutive narratives), actors (and actor groupings) and 
material practices that drive irrigationalism, so will be guided by the following 
overarching research question, which is suggested to lie at the heart of the research 
problem concerning the underlying drivers of irrigation development in the specific 
context of Thailand. 
“What are the discourses, actors and practices that drive irrigationalism in the 
context of Thailand, cast as a modern hydraulic society?” 
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2.8 Summary 
 
The literature review has attempted to locate this thesis within a wider corpus of 
scholarship regarding water and state-society relations to establish an initial broad 
theoretical context. It has been primarily concerned with providing the reader an 
overview of Wittfogel’s (1957) hydraulic society hypothesis and some key debates 
surrounding it, critically examining some key arguments of detractors and supporters 
within the context of mainland Southeast Asia. It finds that the tenets of the theory 
remain relevant to the modern context, perhaps more so given the level of irrigation 
infrastructure that has been completed since its publication and supporting Mitchell 
(1973), Price (1994) and Worster’s (1992) arguments, much of his work has been 
overlooked or misrepresented. In this regard, Wittfogel’s distinctions between 
hydraulic and hydroagricultural societies and the size and density of hydraulic works 
are important facets to consider. Therefore, this chapter has argued for a re-
interpretation of the hydraulic society hypothesis and its relevance to the case of 
Thailand, engaging with the implications of Wijeyewardene’s (1973) contention and 
possible reasons for its neglect. When coupled with the highly evocative notion of 
the “hydraulic mission”, the hydraulic society hypothesis may provide a potentially 
useful means of theorizing irrigation development paradigms and state-society power 
relations for certain mainland Southeast Asian societies, although both concepts 
require further unpacking along with the actors, groups and discourses that sustain 
them (Molle et al., 2009d). 
Thus, critically exploring aspects of societal water control politics and power 
relations will be primary concerns of this thesis, in parallel with a close scrutiny of 
the various underlying or non-material drivers of irrigation development in Thailand 
(led by the notion of an ideology of irrigation development or irrigationalism, 
expanded upon in Chapter 5) and their role in influencing discourses, processes and 
practices at different scales. As such, the thesis will draw on an eclectic range of 
literature that will be inter-disciplinary in scope and treat irrigation as a social object 
that invokes both discursive and material dimensions in its study to address the main 
research question posed. While it will inevitably fall short of the complexity of 
analysis called for in Mollinga’s (2008) political sociology of water resources 
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management, it adopts this general framework in combination with critical political 
ecology approaches as starting points to the methodological approach.  The next 
chapter lays out the methodological concepts, tools, and analytical methods through 
which this thesis tackles the complex task. 
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Chapter 3  Conceptual Framework 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical points of departure and key concepts 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the exploration of issues related to the 
underlying socio-political drivers of irrigation development in a developing country 
context, which explicitly acknowledges the contested nature, complexity and multi-
actor plurality of water resources development and control. Essentially the study 
adopts a semi-inductive approach, with theory emerging from the conduct of 
empirical research, in other words, post data collection during the analytical process. 
From an initial orientation during the research formulation phase of being primarily 
concerned with determining socio-ecological explanations for deteriorating 
terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems in Northeast Thailand, linked to expansion in 
irrigated agriculture, I gradually shifted the focus of my attention towards 
conceptualizing irrigation development as a politically contested social practice and 
became more interested in understanding the links between irrigation development, 
politics and societal power relations, that aligned more closely with post-structuralist 
methodological premises. During the iterative research process, I began to recognize 
that the categories normally ascribed as being “environmental problems” related to 
irrigation development, including poorly conceived, planned and executed systems 
and resultant negative externalities on ecosystems, should more correctly, be viewed 
as “socio-political problems” with environmental manifestations. Hence, this study 
views nature/environment and society as being mutually constitutive categories, 
following authors such as Castree and Braun (1998), Mosse (2003), Peet and Watts 
(2004) and others; thus rejecting the common dualism forged between humans and 
nature, as essentially a false, socially constructed dichotomy
51
. This ontological 
perspective has implications on how social objects like irrigation systems are 
conceived in the thesis. 
                                                   
51 Other dichotomies or binary distinctions commonly used in sociology that this thesis rejects as 
largely unhelpful concepts in understanding the underlying issues related to a better understanding of 
irrigation development in the Thai context, might include micro-macro; agency-structure; and 
individual-society dualisms. For a broad discussion on the schools of thought surrounding such 
philosophical and sociological dualisms in social science analysis, see Layder, 2001. 
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This chapter begins by outlining and elucidating some of the key conceptual terms or 
variables encountered in the thesis, including ideology, irrigation itself, water control, 
drivers, power and knowledge, scale, discourse, discourse coalitions, strategic groups 
and their inter-relatedness in the chosen broad disciplinary field of a political 
sociology of water resources management (after Mollinga, 2008), drawing also from 
post-structural political ecology approaches. I have already discussed at length the 
hydraulic society hypothesis as a fundamental concept underpinning the thesis in 
Chapter 2. Due to the complexity and inter-connectedness of the concepts dissected, 
there is a need for a considerable degree of theoretical and thematic interlinking 
within the study. Initially I turn my attention to the abstract concept of ideology, a 
term that may seem a little unusual when integrated with a critical exploration of 
societal practices and discourses of irrigation development, within a post-structural 
framework. 
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
3.2.1 Ideology  
 
A central contention of this thesis is that state-led irrigation development in Thailand 
is driven by complex, socio-political mechanisms or processes related to unequal 
power relations in society, which may be partly explained through ideological 
concepts. Therefore, it would be helpful to unpack, even if superficially, the concept 
of ideology to justify its adoption in this research problem. Numerous definitions and 
meanings of the term exist
52
, not all of which are entirely compatible with each other, 
leading McLellan (1986:1) to reflect, “[I]deology is the most elusive concept in the 
whole of the social sciences. For it asks us about the bases and validity of our most 
fundamental ideas.” Given this diversity, it is sufficient initially to recognize 
ideology as an essentially contested concept
53
 and that to provide a more thorough 
treatment would require the resolution of certain epistemological and theoretical 
                                                   
52 Eagleton (1998) lists sixteen different definitions in his book Ideology: An Introduction 
53 For comprehensive accounts of the history and theory of ideology stretching back to de Tracy’s 
original usage of the term (idéologie) during the French Enlightenment, and subsequent philosophical 
debates surrounding it as a concept, the reader may refer to the works of Hall (1986), Heywood 
(1998), Van Dijk, (1998) and Eagleton (2007).  
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contradictions that extend beyond the scope of this thesis. I will therefore restrict 
myself to putting forward a couple of definitions that broadly encompass my own 
epistemological position and understanding of the term in relation to politically 
contested discourses of irrigation development.  
Many modern interpretations of the term are derived from Marx’s original concept of 
ideology, which incorporated a number of important characteristics, as noted by 
Heywood (1998). Firstly, ideology was couched as being about “delusion and 
mystification”. In other words, it propagates a false or mistaken view of the world, in 
what Engel’s later referred to as “false consciousness”. Marx used ideology as a 
critical concept, whose purpose was to unmask the façades in operation that 
concealed a reality that lay behind. The contrast between ideology and science (for 
he considered his own ideas as “scientific”), was vital to Marx’s use of the term. 
Secondly, ideology was linked to a hierarchical class system, as Marx believed that 
the implicit distortion in ideology stemmed from its reflection of the interests and 
world views of the dominant, bourgeoisie class. Thirdly, ideology was a 
manifestation of power. By concealing capitalism’s contradictions, ideology served 
to disguise from the exploited working class, the fact of its own exploitation, and 
thereby upheld a system of unequal class power. Lastly, Marx treated ideology as 
only a temporary phenomenon, which would survive only as long as the class system 
that created it continued. He did not believe that the proletariat needed ideology, as it 
was the only class that required no illusions. For Marx, dominant values and norms 
were never simply neutral and “innocent” expressions of the will of the majority 
(Layder, 2001). In this sense, ideology may mask the exploitative nature of power 
relations, by representing them as “natural” or somehow inevitable while 
legitimating the power of a dominant social group or class.  
Since Marx, many modern scholars of ideology have critiqued, developed and 
modified his original concepts to offer more nuanced, but equally contested 
interpretations. Two of the major criticisms have been related to the classical Marxist 
conception of society, whereby the base determines the superstructure and that there 
is a truth about social conditions behind the ideology that the researcher is able to 
unmask (Hall, 1986). Andrew Heywood, for example, (1998:12) provides a neo-
Marxist definition of ideology: 
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“An ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the 
basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, 
modify or overthrow the existing system of power.”  
Heywood maintains that this definition serves to draw attention to some of the 
significant and distinctive features of the phenomenon of ideology. He emphasizes 
that the complexity of ideology, “derives from the fact that it straddles the 
conventional boundaries between descriptive and normative thought, and between 
political theory and political practice” (Heywood, 1998:12). He argues that ideology 
brings about double syntheses between understanding and commitment, and between 
thought and action. Descriptive understandings of individuals and groups sharing a 
common ideology tend to be deeply embedded within a set of normative and 
prescriptive beliefs, encompassing both “the adequacy of present social 
arrangements and about the nature of any alternative or future society”  (Heywood, 
1998:12).  
Similarly, Eagleton (2007:47) explains, “[i]deologies are often seen as peculiarly 
action-oriented sets of beliefs, rather than speculative theoretical systems. However 
abstrusely metaphysical the ideas in question may be, they must be translatable by 
the ideological discourse into a ‘practical’ state, capable of furnishing their adherents 
with goals, motivations, prescriptions, imperatives and so on.” While ideologies tend 
to be both idea-oriented and action-oriented, some ideologies are usually stronger at 
one level than another, posits Heywood (1998). In this sense, certain ideologies may 
be understood as operating at a conceptual level above that of the abstract notion of 
discourse (see Section 3.2.2), which is the process whereby an ideology becomes 
translated into social practice. 
According to Thompson (1984), “[T]o study ideology…….is to study the ways in 
which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination”. Eagleton 
(2007:5) proposed that a process of ideological legitimation involved six separate 
strategies: “a dominant power may legitimate itself  by promoting beliefs and values 
congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-
evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which may challenge it; 
excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic; 
and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself.” In Eagleton’s view, such 
“mystification” frequently takes the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts, 
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“from which arises the conception of ideology as an imaginary resolution of real 
contradictions.” He stresses that in any actual ideological formation, all six strategies 
may interact in complex ways.  
Based on the various definitions articulated above, a simplified synthesis allows 
ideology to be understood as sets of beliefs and values held by individuals and 
groups, which serve to justify and obscure existing unequal power relations in 
society, and gives recognition to both action-oriented and idea-oriented dimensions. 
With respect to the broad appeal and commonsensical nature of some ideologies, 
Heywood (1998:16) argues, “ideologies are embraced less because they stand up to 
scrutiny and logical analysis, and more because they help individuals, groups, and 
societies to make sense of the world in which they live.” Is it feasible that irrigation 
development in Thailand, if found to be widely embraced by multiple groups across 
society, may be one such ideology that incorporates sets of beliefs, values and norms 
that help people to make sense of their sociological lifeworlds, while at the same 
time obscuring a system of domination and excluding rival discourses of water 
resources management? If so, which ideological beliefs and worldviews are 
embedded in Thai irrigation development discourse and are they universal or socially 
differentiated between various groups? And what could be the possible historical 
roots and origins of such shared beliefs and values? These conceptual issues and 
questions within the context of Thailand are examined in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2.2 Discourse  
 
According to Peet and Watts (2004), discourse is a rather vague term that has come 
to mean different things when used in different contexts. It is commonly understood 
as being synonymous with discussion or alternatively is seen as a shared meaning of 
a phenomenon (Adger et al., 2001). Discourse may also be seen as “a specific 
ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories that are produced, reproduced and 
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995:44). Alternatively, Dryzek (1997:8) 
conceives of discourse as being similar to “a narrative” or storyline, built from 
specific kinds of structural elements, through his definition: 
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“A discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in 
language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of 
information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts. Each 
discourse rests on assumptions, judgments and contentions that provide the 
basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements, in the 
environmental area no less than elsewhere.”      
However, the definition which I perceive may offer most utility for the purposes of 
this thesis, shows a linkage with the dualistic idea- and action-oriented aspects of 
ideology (cf  Heywood, 1998), suggesting “discourse is ‘practice and theory’ – 
material activity which transforms nature and society and the modes of thought that 
inform this action……In earlier days the word might have been ‘praxis’”54(Gasper 
and Apthorpe, 1996:4, citing Moore (1995)). Thus, discourse may be conceptually 
related to the social practices and positions in which it was produced, that draws 
from Foucauldian notions of knowledge and power (refer to section 3.2.4 below), 
and builds on a general social constructivist premise that knowledge is not just a 
straightforward reflection of reality (Phillips and Jorgenson, 2002). Foucault used 
the term discourse to mean “networks of consensus” (rather than ideology)55 and 
implied that discourse is a form of power, “discursive power”. If a discourse can be 
understood to refer to all that can be thought, said, or written about a particular 
concrete object (e.g. an irrigation system or canal), a notional object (e.g. drought) or 
a specialist area of knowledge (such as irrigation development), then the ability to 
employ a discourse reflects a command of knowledge in a particular discipline (e.g. 
agriculture, engineering or hydrology), and such command enables the speaker a 
degree of control over those without such technical knowledge, whether they are 
farmer, fisher or a lay person. In this sense discourse embraces a totalizing 
conception of how society constitutes its members (or subjects) and of the role of 
language in that process (Grillo, 1997).  
In considering modalities of ideological domination and resistance in Thailand, 
Turton (1986:41) proposed that concepts of ideology “can be usefully developed via 
                                                   
54 Praxis is said to refer to the “free, universal, creative and self-creative activity through which man 
creates (makes, produces) and changes (shapes) his historical world and himself” (Bottomore, 
1991:384).  
55 Foucault rejected the notion of ideology, at least as it had become defined by Althusser and other 
structural Marxists, where there was an opposition between “the truth” on one hand and ideology on 
the other (Layder, 1994). Instead he saw discourses as merely perspectives or partial claims on truth, 
and that there are many truths seen from different perspectives. 
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concepts of discourse, which allow for the conceptualization of procedures for the 
authorization, disqualification and restriction of discourse, of discursive practices 
and their material or physical adjuncts.” Turton, using the language of neo-Marxism, 
stresses how the ideological inculcation of knowledge and respect for the social 
division of labour in a wide sense, establishes an authoritative “context and social 
communication, of discourse in the fullest sense of what constitutes legitimate and 
prevailing forms of knowledge and expression” (Turton, 1986:42). Despite 
Foucault’s scepticism about the use of “ideology”, discourse and ideology appear 
compatible and complementary terms under Turton’s conceptual scheme. When 
ideology is conceived in a non-perjorative sense as a system of ideas, values and 
beliefs that are employed in ways which attempt to justify forms of domination and 
make them seem natural or eternal, then there is a common focus between ideology 
and some discourses according to Foucault’s conception, reasons Layder (2001). 
Thus, irrigation development is interrogated as an ideological formation, that masks 
unequal power relations and is thus variously promoted or contested by various 
actors and groups in society, that draw upon multiple discourses and narratives in 
support of their positions, which can be analyzed. In essence, ideologies are 
reproduced in daily life through discursive practices. 
 
3.2.3 Discourse coalitions and strategic groups 
 
Where dominant development narratives employed by disparate actors are not 
contested by others, but find resonance or agreement amongst the actors, then those 
who tell them may form a “discourse coalition”, a term coined by Hajer (1995) in an 
analysis of environmental policy discourse from a social constructivist perspective. 
“Discourse coalitions are defined as the ensemble of (i) a set of storylines; (ii) the 
actors who utter these story lines; and (iii) the practices in which this discursive 
activity is based”, states Hajer (1995:65). The simplification of storylines is said to 
allow concrete policy action and problem closure. They form the basis of political 
coalitions. Blaikie and Springate-Baginski (2007) point out that actor alliances are 
often temporary and strategic, suggesting a dynamism to the concept of discourse 
coalitions that can only be understood by uncovering historical context in a given 
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discourse. Discourse coalitions may sometimes be made up of rather unusual and 
surprising partners, whom often cluster around and sustain a particular discourse. 
According to Hajer (1995:13), “[T]hese coalitions are unconventional in the sense 
that the actors have not necessarily met, let alone that they follow a carefully laid out 
and agreed upon strategy. What unites these coalitions and what gives them their 
political power is the fact that its actors group around specific story-lines that they 
employ whilst engaging in environmental politics.”  
An alternative but rather similar conceptual term is “strategic groups”, used to 
describe societal groups that amalgamate to compete for access to scarce resources. A 
strategic group is in sociological terms, a “quasi-group”, not individuals but social 
groups which engage in strategic action aimed “at creating social, political and 
economic structures and institutions that enhance the chances to appropriate 
resources” (Evers and Benedikter, 2009b:4). These authors emphasize that strategic 
groups are not elites or social classes, but cut across hierarchies and strata, with 
members having disparate lifestyles and beliefs, united by a common goal of gaining 
access to, control over and distribution of resources, including but not limited to, 
water, power, prestige and knowledge. According to Evers and Benedikter (2009b) in 
the case of the Vietnamese Mekong Delta, typical strategic groups may include: 
government/bureaucracy, military, professionals, intellectuals, land owners, and big 
business. These authors maintain that the strategic groups share allegiance to a 
common discourse that invariably promotes infrastructural solutions to socially 
manufactured water resources problems, but may equally be a counter-strategic group. 
For Pye (2005) using a historical materialist approach to analyze forest politics in 
Northeast Thailand, he argued that different strategic groups adopted different 
strategies to surplus appropriation from non-elite groups, be it capital accumulation 
for corporate groups, or control of state budget for the bureaucracy. 
 
3.2.4 Power and knowledge 
 
Power is one of those concepts that is unavoidably value-dependent, maintains Lukes 
(2005:30), as “both its definition and any given use of it, once defined, are 
inextricably tied to a given set of (probably unacknowledged) value assumptions 
which predetermine the range of its empirical application”. According to one 
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definition, “[p]ower denotes any chance to implement one’s will in a social relation 
also against resistance” (Weber, 1922 cited in Ziai, 2009:185). Weber classified 
power into two distinct categories: power gained through coercive measures and 
power based on authority. Such definitions confine power to social relations between 
individuals, but ignore less personalized power effects. Furthermore, taking 
resistance as a defining feature of power relations, it overlooks the fact that power 
can work “to prevent resistance through fear, distorted information or ideologies, for 
example”, notes Ziai (2009:185), who suggests a more encompassing definition is 
required. In contrast to Weber, Foucault believed that power did not belong to 
particular agents such as individuals, the state or specific interest groups, but power 
was spread across different social practices (Phillips and Jorgenson, 2002). Instead 
of treating agents and structures as primary categories, Foucault focused on power, 
differentiating between three types of power; namely sovereign, disciplinary and 
governmental power. Further, Foucault demonstrated that power is not only 
something ‘held’ or repressive, as in conventional models of sovereign power, but 
rather, “power is diffuse – it operates unannounced in myriad social practices, 
including those we take as ‘merely’ discursive. Indeed, it is precisely because we 
mistake our ordering of appearances for the world itself, unaware of how our 
knowledges reflect their social context, that power relations become naturalized in 
our representations of nature” (Castree and Braun, 1998:19). In developing a theory 
of power and knowledge, Foucault noted the influential insight that, “the exercise of 
power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces 
effects of power” (Foucault, 1980:52). Power may have simultaneous enabling and 
constraining effects upon knowledge (Turton, 1991). 
Foucault maintained that the focus of analysis in social research should not be 
people’s consciousness, so much as the political, economic and institutional regimes 
that play a crucial role in the production of truth and knowledge (Rabinow, 1991). It 
is possible to distinguish formal and legitimate forms of power (e.g. government 
bodies, schools, the courts, etc) from informal, dispersed and “capillary” power, to 
adopt Foucault’s term. Such is the apparent pervasiveness of power, it has 
metaphorically been described as “the electrical current of society” Mosse (2005:52). 
The same author makes a similar distinction to Foucault between actor-oriented and 
structural views of power: “[I]n actor-oriented or transactionalist (Weberian) views, 
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power is a non-economic resource that individuals seek to maximize, rather as they 
might maximize economic returns…….Opposing actor-focused positions is the idea 
of power as structure, which has a strong tradition in social science. Of course, such 
structures are not visible; rather they are ideas about the distribution or balance of 
power in a given society…..” (Mosse, 2005:55) 
It has been argued that dominant managerial thinking on irrigation characteristically 
denies any connections between power and knowledge (Zwarteveen, 2010). She 
directly attributes this to the fact that much mainstream literature on irrigation is 
written from the perspective of those who are in control, such as planners, 
administrators and managers. “Produced knowledge is aimed at helping them realize 
their objectives, and enables them to speak more authoritatively through the 
disembodied, transcendent voice of reason”, argues Zwarteveen (2010:79). 
Moreover she notes how irrigation “overlords” such as chief engineers discussed 
effective control strategies, but the possibility of controlling human behaviour and 
manipulating flows of water and capital was rarely questioned in irrigation 
knowledge. Such are the socio-political conditions in epistemic communities that 
allow ideological formations to arise and thrive, supporting Zwarteveen’s (2010) 
pervasive “god trick”56 observation in mainstream water thinking.  
The theoretical position adopted in this thesis broadly aligns with that of Mosse 
(2003, 2005), following Foucault, who maintains that power is dispersed and 
pervasive throughout society. Such a position looks beyond the capacity of states or 
powerful elites alone to use coercion or force in controlling members of society 
through hydraulic control (as in forced relocation when building a dam or irrigation 
system), but also acknowledges power effects where individuals take voluntary and 
local decisions in a structured “field of action” (such as water allocation in a small-
scale irrigation systems) or in more consensual forms of domination expressed in 
everyday politics. Following Mosse (2003), I am primarily interested in the cultural 
articulations of power in and through irrigation development, and its practical and 
discursive dimensions in Thai society. In this sense, Mosse’s idiom of “the rule of 
water” seems apposite, as I intend to show elements of the culturally-specific 
                                                   
56 This is a reference to the assumption in modernist and post-Enlightenment thinking that one can see 
everything from nowhere and that disembodied reason can produce accurate and “objective” accounts 
of the world, derived from Haraway’s (1991) critique. 
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operation of power in Northeast Thailand and the ways in which the social practices 
of irrigation development produce symbolic and material articulations of power and 
authority. 
 
3.2.5 Irrigation as a complex socio-technical practice  
 
As with ideology, there are numerous definitions of irrigation in existence that may 
be adopted by different actors to emphasize certain dimensions or facets of the 
concept, technology and practice. A few of these definitions are presented in Box 3.1 
below.  
Box 3.1: Some selected definitions of irrigation 
“Irrigation can be defined as a human intervention to modify the spatial and temporal distribution of 
water occurring in natural channels, depressions, drainageways or aquifers and to manipulate all or 
part of this water to improve production of agricultural crops or enhance growth of other desirable 
crops.” (Newson, 1997:244) 
“A system of irrigated agriculture can be defined as a landscape to which is added physical structures 
that impound, divert, channel or otherwise move water from a source to some desired location. These 
structures are operated cooperatively for the purpose of producing food or fibre.” (Coward, 1980b:15) 
“Irrigation is usually associated with a permanent or semi-permanent water supply infrastructure and 
a control system consisting of diversion structures or pumps, canals or piped conveyance systems, and 
flow distribution structures or water application devices. In that sense, irrigation could be defined as 
the supply of water from elsewhere and its distribution or application for crop growth. That definition 
of irrigation, although based on a higher level of technology, also includes simple, manual methods of 
water supply and application, such as the use of a calabash or watering can.” (Kortenhorst et al., 
1989) 
As Box 3.1 suggests, each definition relies on a personal bias in setting the 
discursive boundaries of this term, illustrating irrigation’s socially constructed nature 
that is closely dependent upon the disciplinary and cultural context in which it is 
applied, rather than signifying a universally understood material practice. It is a 
generalization, but in both the academic and professional literature on irrigation 
development and management, most attention has traditionally focused on 
hydrological, engineering, agricultural and economic aspects. As a result, relatively 
little attention has been devoted to studying and understanding the human and social 
dimensions of the development, organization and operations of irrigation systems 
(Chambers, 1980). Mosse (2003) has argued that two frameworks for understanding 
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irrigation have dominated the professional arena, namely an “engineering paradigm” 
and a “managerial paradigm”. The engineering paradigm, with its sub-disciplines 
such as hydrology, hydraulics, agronomy and construction is based on forms of 
technical knowledge that rely on practical instrumental rationality, positivist science 
and are oriented towards the technical control of water and physical processes of 
agricultural production. The management paradigm, a much more recent arrival that 
the supply-led engineering paradigm, tends to view irrigation systems in terms of 
“the effectiveness and efficiency of key functions such as water acquisition and 
allocation, system maintenance and conflict management” (Mosse, 2003). Both 
paradigms and the mainstream discourses they produce have sought to command or 
manage water users’ behaviour as a means to improve irrigation management. 
Together they form what Mollinga (2007) terms a “social engineering perspective” 
within recent attempts to reform the agricultural water management sector, with 
attendant linear models or blueprint approaches for changing societies or 
organizations (e.g. Integrated Water Resources Management, Participatory Irrigation 
Management, Irrigation Management Transfer). 
In this thesis, rather than adopt a single all-encompassing definition of irrigation, 
instead I recognize irrigation systems as complex socio-technical interventions in the 
environment that may simultaneously be conceived as hydrologic entities, 
engineering works, farming systems or organizational entities (Coward, 1980b). 
Irrigation interventions, according to Gujit and Thompson (1994:295) “inevitably 
take on their own social dynamic, creating or disrupting, as they do, certain relations 
of power between insiders and outsiders and among insiders (local farmers / water 
users), changing access to and control of vital resources (including land and water), 
and ultimately altering the way those resources are managed and utilized. The result 
often has far-reaching consequences, well beyond the narrow focus of the irrigation 
engineer or planner.”   
As argued by Mosse (2003:20), “the wider social and political processes involved in 
irrigation and their effects remain largely obscure within both engineering and 
management frameworks”. My primary concern lies with the wider socio-political 
practices and processes that promote (or resist) irrigation development (in its 
multiple, pluralistic definitions) in Thai society, rather than the management and 
operation of irrigation systems. Supporting Mollinga et al.’s (2007) position, I 
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perceive agricultural water resources management and social transformation through 
irrigation development as inherently political, because it involves mediation of the 
social relations of power amongst the actors involved. Secondly, both irrigation 
development and management are embedded in social processes and forces from 
outside the field of water resources – therefore, “both the causes and solutions of 
water problems lie partly in other domains” (Mollinga et al., 2007:706).  
 
3.2.6 Irrigation as water control 
 
Closely related to the conceptual difficulties in pinning down an acceptable 
definition of irrigation, is the related notion of water control. Bolding et al. (1995) 
have argued for considering control over water and its distribution to be the central 
focus for understanding the role of irrigation in agrarian change and believe this is a 
relatively new insight to political economists, but not for irrigation management 
scientists, sociologists or engineers (at least in the case of India). However, each of 
these professions is trained to understand water control in quite different ways. The 
authors contend that a political economy of water is required, “to show how control 
in the technical engineering sense, in the sense of managerial control, and in the 
sense of control as domination, relate to and presuppose each other” (Bolding et al., 
1995:807). Ertsen (2008) goes further in arguing that irrigation development in 
colonial and post-colonial Asian and African nations was as much about exerting full 
control over farmer actions as it was about controlling water flows. He points to the 
specific engineering designs of the colonial irrigators (e.g. irrigation gates) changing 
the target societies and production systems – mostly intentionally, but occasionally 
not. Similarly, Adams (1990) asserts that the question of where control in decision-
making lies may be as important as that of scale for irrigation development in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Developing this theme further, Mollinga (2008) proposes that water control 
embodies three principal dimensions; namely a technical/physical, an 
organizational/managerial, and a socio-economic and regulatory. Respectively, these 
categories are said to refer to, “the manipulation of the physical flow and quality of 
water, the guiding of the human behaviour that is part of water use, and the socio-
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economic, legal, administrative and other structures in which water management is 
embedded and that constitute conditions and constraints for management and 
regulation” (Mollinga, 2008:10). In arguing for a further generic category of 
resource contestation in his formulation of water control conceived as a process of 
politically contested resource use, Mollinga uses it to refer to a range of interaction 
patterns, including negotiation and struggle, as well as less explicit and extended 
disputes and controversies surrounding water resources management. He stresses 
that the idea “is to convey that there tends to be something at stake in water 
resources management, and that the different individuals or groups have different 
interests” (Mollinga, 2008:10).  
Another conceptual distinction that might be made is between the notion of control 
of water and a wider notion of control of access to water (Bruce Lankford, personal 
communication, January 2010). Lankford differentiates these two categories by 
stating that the former category refers to “the ability of irrigation systems and 
stakeholders to place specified amounts of water at a specified time at a specified 
place in keeping with water demands for amounts, timing and place”, forming a 
technical hydraulic definition. The latter category of control of access is far more 
political and social in nature, and as such, captures the realms of states, communities, 
water user associations and other stakeholders, and refers to the balance of power, of 
structure and agency and of democratic spaces. It is this latter concept that 
principally concerns and informs questions surrounding water control within the 
present thesis. 
Following Tvedt and Jacobsson (2006:xx), there is another possible dimension to 
water control not adequately captured in Mollinga and Lankford’s models, namely 
that control of water is associated with cultural constructions of water, which 
simultaneously embody a range of highly contextual values or ideologies. For 
example, dams as classical avatars of state hydraulic control over the forces of nature, 
may also be symbolic reminders of various types of political domination and moral 
authority, and thus encompass cultural and ideological connotations for society. 
Mosse (2003:4) expressed this relationship succinctly when justifying how 
understanding  historical control of water helps explain the modern landscape in 
Tamil Nadu state of India when he stated, “(W)ater flows have not only shaped 
social and political institutions, they have also legitimized them. Medieval kings and 
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chiefs controlled and gifted water flows, creating landscapes which inscribed their 
rule into the hydrology and thus naturalized it.” While water control within an 
individual system may refer to a mix of technical, organizational and political 
aspects (Mollinga, 2003), in the case studies I will be more concerned with the 
control and distribution of the resource through higher order system development 
interventions than the micro, on-farm or post-turnout levels.  
An important distinction could be drawn between endogenously-conceived irrigation 
systems and those conceived and implemented via external actors or organizations, 
usually through means of discrete “projects” or “programmes” in time and space, 
which have multiple implications to social interactions and socio-ecological 
sustainability (Hill, 2008). Such a distinction quite neatly dovetails with the 
distinctions made by Wittfogel (1957) between hydraulic agriculture (i.e. state 
controlled) and hydro-agriculture (i.e. more farmer-controlled) forms of irrigation 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2), emphasized by Price (1994) as a vital conceptual 
point to understanding societal transformation related to water control.  
 
3.2.7 Actors and agency 
 
A recurrent dilemma in social science theory that often confounds researchers 
concerns the agency-structure dichotomy i.e. the division that reflects an opposition 
between structure and agency (or action) as mutually exclusive domains and starting 
points for social analysis. Layder (2001) asserts that this division creates a false 
assumption that these are separate categories, or that one determines the other in an 
exaggerated manner. Rather, both deflect attention from the fundamental 
connectedness of agency and structure (along with other dualisms such as object and 
subject, macro and micro, society and individual). In an attempt to overcome the 
division of the two methodological camps, Giddens (1986, 2006) has argued against 
dualism in social analysis and suggests that we should think in terms of a “duality of 
structure”. That is, rather than two separate and opposed phenomena, they should be 
conceived as a single structure which has a dual nature. In such a formulation, 
structure is intrinsically related to action and vice versa, and the two become united 
through social practices i.e. the things that people regularly do and which form part 
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of the social fabric of their lives, in this case with regards to agricultural water 
development and management practices. An actor-oriented view recognizes that 
communities of water users are heterogeneous bodies comprised of social actors 
possessing different, often conflicting, perceptions over water resources management.  
Early exponents of a “Third World Political Ecology”, including Blaikie (1985) and 
Watts (1983; 2000), were largely informed by political economy approaches within a 
structural framework of analysis. An emphasis on structure tended to downplay the 
ability of politically or economically weaker grassroots actors to resist their marginal 
status, notes Bryant and Bailey (1997). Much of the early scholarship explained local 
environmental conflicts in terms of class relations and surplus extractions connected 
to transnational capitalist extraction in “chains of explanation” (Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987). Often the role of local politics in mediating resource access and 
contestation was overlooked and discussion of diverse actors involved (e.g. farmers, 
state bureaucracies, traders, politicians, etc) was frequently simplistic. The state was 
typically seen as being little more than an agent of capital, thus “obscuring both the 
potential autonomy of this actor vis à vis capital, and the diversity of bureaucratic 
interests that the state often encompasses” (Bryant and Bailey, 1997:13). From the 
late 1980s on, many political ecology scholars became critical of the deterministic 
neo-Marxist positions previously adopted and moved towards demonstrating a more 
complex understanding of how power relations mediate human-nature interactions. 
In the process, the actual and potential agency of grassroots actors to influence 
environmental conflicts became more commonplace and it was increasingly used to 
explain how conflict and change at different scales was the outcome of interactions 
between different actors possessing unequal power.  
According to Bryant and Bailey (1997), actor-based approaches in political ecology 
“should disclose a complexity of interests and conflicts between organizations; 
conflicts and competing claims of authority within internal organizations of the state; 
political implications derived from organizational traits; and coalitions and alliances 
that may be taking place between competing organizations.” Taking an actor-
oriented approach, the research should, as far as possible, seek to identify and clarify 
the roles, functions and interests of multiple actors related to water resources 
development discourse (focused on irrigation aspects) both spatially and temporally 
(bearing in mind that key actors may change temporally). Against this approach were 
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more Foucauldian positions of decentering the individual as the subject of social 
analysis, as according to Layder (2001:120), “any position which begins with 
subjective understanding or a concern with individual meaning and motivation is 
bound to prove inadequate it its account of social phenomena”. Under a “critical 
political ecology” approach, the complex inter-relationship between agency and 
structure in understanding environmental problems and explanations is 
acknowledged, notes (Forsyth, 2003). In this approach, not only individual actors are 
considered as having agency in making decisions and acting upon them, but also 
households, communities, organizations and various other actor groupings are 
considered potentially valid units of analysis (see Table 3.1 below for some group 
categories and examples of organizational actors considered as having potential 
agency in influencing irrigation development outcomes in Northeast Thailand).    
Groups Specific actor examples 
International NGOs / 
civil society 
International Rivers; World Wildlife Fund; Stockholm Environment 
Institute; Save the Mekong coalition; Global Water Partnership?  
Transnational inter-
governmental 
Mekong River Commission (MRC); World Bank; Asian Development 
Bank (ADB); the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO); The International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN); the International Water Management Institute (IWMI); the 
Challenge Programme on Water and Food (CPWF)? 
National GOs e.g. Royal Irrigation Department (RID); the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (MoAC); Dept of Water Resources (DWR); Thai National 
Mekong Committee (TNMC); the Ministry of National Resources and 
Environment (MoNRE); The Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO); 
Land Development Department (LDD); Office of Natural Resources and 
Environment Policy & Planning (ONEP); Dept. of Environmental Quality 
Promotion (DEQP); Dept of Agricultural Extension (DoAE); the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT); the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC); various military 
institutions implementing water projects; National Water Resources 
Committee (NWRC) 
National NGOs Project for Ecological Recovery and Towards Ecological Recovery and 
Regional Alliances (PER/TERRA); Thailand Environment Institute (TEI); 
Population and Community Development Association (PDA); Alternative 
Agriculture Network (AAN); Southeast Asian Rivers Network (SEARIN); 
Thai Water Partnership  
Local GO Sub-district Administration Organizations (TAO); Provincial and district 
government offices (multiple natural resources, irrigation and agricultural-
based agencies); River Basin Committees (RBCs); Water Users 
Associations/Groups? 
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Local NGOs / Peoples 
movements / civil 
society 
Farmers’ organizations; Resource users groups (e.g. ex-Tai Baan network; 
Nam Songkhram Basin Conservation and Ecological Recovery Network; 
Living Rivers Siam; Assembly of the Poor (AOP); Alternative Agriculture 
Network (AAN); individual activists and alliances  
Private sector Agribusiness companies, local and national; infrastructure construction 
companies; private consultancy companies employed by state to conduct 
project surveys and studies; private commercial banks 
Politicians Local (village, sub-district), regional (provincial) and national (MPs and 
Senators). Political parties  
Academic institutions Universities / research centres at regional, national and international levels 
(these are mostly government-run, not private); individual academics and 
alliances 
Monarchical-linked 
institutions 
Crown Property Bureau; Royal Projects Development Centres; 
Chaipattana Foundation; Privy Council; the King and members of inner 
royal family 
Table 3.1  List of groups and organizations with an interest in water resources 
development in NE Thailand during the decade  
It will be noted that this list provides a mix of state and non-state actor categories 
(and some that are more problematic to classify as they may bridge or transcend this 
binary division, such as the monarchical institutions and the academic institutes), 
while actors may be considered formal or non-formal. The research will attempt to 
establish the power relations between these actors and their relative importance in 
determining water control. 
 
3.2.8 Drivers of irrigation development – overt and covert 
 
Drivers of developmental change are conceptualized here as a range of political, 
social, economic and ecological factors that help determine, promote or otherwise 
influence the development process, in this case the irrigation development paradigm 
of a developing country. Drivers may be overt or hidden, depending on the context; 
they may also be considered material, ideological or discursive drivers. This thesis is 
mainly interested in understanding the underlying or hidden drivers of development 
that are mostly causally related to socio-political conditions or factors. 
It was mentioned in the Introduction (Chapter 1) that there has been a widespread 
tendency in developing countries to treat irrigation development as a “privileged 
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solution” (see Moris, 1987), often operating within a “sanctioned discourse” (see 
Allan, 2002) where it has tended to escape a similar level of critical scrutiny by 
academic researchers, aid donors and state agencies compared to other major 
development intervention sectors, such as forestry or land rights. One possible 
explanation for the irrigation sector falling within a critical blind spot, could be the 
rarity with which political and cultural drivers of irrigation development (see Molle 
et al., 2009d) are considered in most mainstream managerialist and instrumentalist 
approaches to water resources development. Conventional analyses are more likely 
to consider only the socio-economic drivers of change identified in an IWMI and 
FAO report on trends and drivers of Asian irrigation (Faures and Mukherji, 2009). 
These included such drivers as demographic pressure, urbanization, agricultural 
diversification, changing diets and climate change in an analysis for Asian changes 
in irrigation. Similarly, the most common drivers of change reported to affect 
irrigation water management in large rice-based systems in Southeast Asia by 
participants at a 2005 FAO conference were cited as food security, poverty 
alleviation and regional development, increasing concerns for environmental 
protection and ecosystem management, issues of energy and other chemical inputs, 
and climate change (Facon, 2005). Supporting the more conventional drivers of 
change expressed above, Molle and Floch (2008a) identified overriding national 
policy concerns, such as enhanced national security, maintenance of political 
stability, rural poverty alleviation, food security, self-sufficiency and export-
substitution concerns as being the most “pervasive justifications” for Asian irrigation 
development. Additionally, modernization narratives, national and regional strategic 
or geopolitical objectives, such as the earlier struggle against the spread of 
communism, have also been powerful discursive elements fuelling water resources 
infrastructure development.  
A paper produced by the Australian Mekong Resource Centre (2005) found that 
water resources scarcity, conflict, ideology and international water and 
environmental policy were the most important drivers for change in the Australian, 
Southeast Asian and Pacific regional water policy sector. Turning to critical 
examinations of the evolutionary history, politics and discourses of irrigation 
development paradigms in the case of Northeast Thailand, there have been attempts 
to systematically identify some of the overarching ideological and political “meta-
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justifications” employed at the national level by powerful state actors to promote 
irrigation development (Molle and Floch, 2008a; Molle et al., 2009a). Building on 
this earlier analysis to further unpack the nexus of political and ideological drivers of 
irrigation development associated with the modern Thai hydraulic mission, both 
spatially and temporally, is a primary aim of this thesis 
 
3.2.9  Issues of scale  
 
Issues and choice of geographical scale are central to explanations of social 
transformation and political contestation over water resources. By stressing the 
importance of scale, Zimmerer and Bassett (2003:289), believe that one of the 
challenges of political ecology analysis is to break out of pre-given, scalar constructs 
(e.g. local, regional, national, global), “to examine human-environmental dynamics 
that occur at other socially produced and ecological scales”. This would imply 
paying greater attention to the politics of scale and integrating ecological scales into 
analytical frameworks. Actors may help to produce scales through their activities, 
and in turn, scales constrain and guide these activities by providing or concealing 
actors and resources (Williams, 1999). States, with their superior power, scope, pre-
eminence, ability to create policies, laws, and control of media are often able to 
circumscribe how scale is represented and if necessary, reinforced, whether through 
coercion or more consensual means. (See Section 2.4, Chapter 2 for further 
discussion about the limits of fixing scale). 
In attempting to forge linkages and connections between the local and the national 
levels, the micro and the macro, it becomes apparent that scale not only matters for 
water resources management discourse, but scale appears a highly political and 
contested concept. Several regional researchers have elaborated the close relations 
between scale and power in complex water resources and environmental conflict 
contexts in the wider Mekong region, by tracing the linkages across a variety of 
scales and through multiple actors (Sneddon, 2002; Molle, 2003; Sneddon, 2003b; 
Molle, 2007a). Recognizing that scales are joint products of social and biophysical 
processes and conscious that the politics-of-scale metaphor has been stretched to 
include a lot of different spatial relationships, Lebel et al (2005) argued that, “there 
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are benefits to understanding – and actions to distinguish – issues of scale from those 
of place and position”, when viewed under an encompassing “politics of space” 
rubric. Using examples drawn from water resources governance in the Mekong 
Basin, the authors use “politics of scale” to refer to situations where different actors 
contest the spatial extent and resolution of data and decisions. A “politics of position” 
is used to refer to politics among locations that are dependent on relative physical 
position, such as between upstream and downstream water users or opposite banks of 
a river. By contrast, a “politics of place”, refers to the enactment of power relations 
among stakeholders that arise because of specific characteristics of interactions 
between places, above and beyond those arising from levels or position. These scalar 
interactions point to the interconnectivity of water as a hydrological, ecological, 
socio-political and symbolic resource. 
This research will endeavour to take into account politics of scale, position and place 
considerations that emerge from the study of irrigation development discourse, 
actors and practices within the Nam Songkhram Basin, itself embedded in the wider 
Northeast region and Thai national scales. River basins provide a conceptually useful 
spatial unit, at least initially, for examining interactions between complex 
waterscapes and societies (Molle, 2007a). Following Sneddon’s (2000) approach, 
this research attempts to capture elements of four scale-related processes at play, 
namely, 1/ extra-basin processes (e.g. irrigation development in rest of Northeast 
Thailand and at wider national level); 2/ basin-scale processes (e.g. larger irrigation 
development schemes); 3/ intra-basin processes (e.g. dynamics of smaller-scale 
irrigation development); and 4/ cross-scalar processes (e.g. attempts to manage the 
river basin as a hydrological unit). Such an analytical strategy allows for an insight 
into ways in which socially constructed scales of action intersect with ecologically 
constructed scales. The Nam Songkhram Basin, it is suggested, offers a suitable 
primary arena within which to examine multi-scalar processes, in so far as it is a 
distinct, peripheral river basin located about as far from the hydraulic core (Bangkok 
and Central Plains) as one can find in Northeast Thailand, yet is embedded in several 
other scalar constructs, both social and environmental.  
The methodological approaches adopted in the research to gathering, analysing and 
explicating empirical evidence from the field is articulated in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4  Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction - Research Design 
 
The socio-politics of water resources development is recognized as a highly complex field of 
study that has material and discursive dimensions which encompass multiple disciplines that 
lend themselves to numerous methodological approaches and research methods.  This 
research, recognizing the inherent empirical and theoretical complexity of water resources 
seeks to understand some of the perceptions and discursive constructions of irrigation 
development adopted by various actors involved, using a multi-disciplinary approach in a 
number of arenas and research sites, from the strictly local or village to national or state 
levels.This chapter outlines the research methodology used in this study to provide an 
explanation for the linkages between water control for irrigation, society and politics 
in a cross-scalar settings. The spatio-temporal and disciplinary complexity provided 
numerous practical and theoretical challenges to the researcher that resides under a general 
rubric of “hybrid research” (see Batterbury et al., 1997; Robbins, 2004), which tries to 
combine scientific, critical and local knowledge sources and follows an inductive reasoning 
process.  Rocheleau (2007:718) notes how certain political ecologists using hybrid research 
have pioneered  “a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods with technological, 
ecological and social imagination”. The proposed research design outlined in this 
chapter begins to more concretely operationalize and justify the methodological 
approach employed, which primarily involved a range of qualitative social science 
research techniques that may appear rather eclectic at first glance. Initially I discuss 
the case study approach adopted and the reasons why it was selected and applied in the 
context of this research. I then go on to elaborate the data collection methods and tools, 
before discussing the main analytical methods used, namely discourse analysis. Lastly, I 
outline the main and supporting research questions adopted that guide the research. 
 
4.2.1 Case Study approach 
 
This study employed a case study approach, which tends to support more inductive 
and qualitative research approaches. Such an approach lends itself well to an 
exploration of the underlying processes of complex social phenomena to provide the 
researcher with an opportunity to ground the study at a particular geographical 
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location, to better understand local context and develop more refined arguments from 
empirical findings. In the view of Yin (1994), the case study can be conceived as an 
‘all-encompassing method’ that is grounded in the collection and subsequent 
interpretation of empirical data. It typically relies on multiple sources of evidence, a 
range of sampling techniques and its direction is guided by the formulation of a prior 
set of propositions and conceptual positions. Case studies may suggest theoretical 
generalizations, reveal power relations, unveil the complexity of existing social 
relations and emphasize the importance of historical analysis (Orum et al, 1991:6-7 
cited in Sneddon, 2000).  
In this study, the main “unit” of analysis adopted is the Nam Songkhram river basin, 
seen as both a grounded case study and case history, thus allowing wider social 
transformation processes (i.e. both internally and externally to the basin unit itself) to 
become apparent. A river basin affords an opportunity to empirically observe and 
investigate aspects of the cultural, political, economic, institutional, ecological 
processes of irrigation development operating at multiple scales, from the village 
level up to national and regional levels. Furthermore, the river basin case study is an 
apt unit of analysis, due to the basin-centric ways that states often perceive water 
resources development and management, such as through introductions of river basin 
organizations under narratives of decentralization and IWRM principles. I selected 
the Nam Songkhram basin for a variety of reasons, but important amongst them was 
its relative lack of previous exposure to study, my own previous knowledge and 
experience of the basin, its interesting socio-ecological diversity and fourthly, its 
recent targeting by state hydrocracies for new large-scale irrigation developments. 
A political ecology approach views river basins as politicized arenas where different 
actors “vie for access to the resource, for protection or compensation, and use their 
social or political power to elicit or impose regulations and interventions in line with 
their common interests”, argues Molle (2007a:361). The main variables in this case 
include, on one hand the underlying drivers of irrigation development within a wider 
context of national level hydraulic development pathways, and on the other, 
explicating the actors, discourses, processes and practices related to irrigation 
development at the river basin level. Hence, the thesis presents a partial historical 
analysis of both Northeast Thailand and the Nam Songkhram Basin irrigation 
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development paradigm essentially from the start of the twentieth century, 
highlighting multiple actor knowledge constructions.  
 
4.2.2 Multiple and Mixed Methods Research 
 
As alluded to above, adoption of a case study approach allows for appropriate 
multiple and mixed methods to be used. These commonly combine quantitative and 
qualitative data collected from the field, but with a predominant bias towards the 
latter techniques, as qualitative techniques are better suited methodologically to 
understanding the politically contested and situated nature of complex water 
conflicts and multiple actor narratives in a river basin setting. Mixing may involve 
multiple techniques including those which are not easily classified as either 
quantitative or qualitative, according to Lebel (2007), in recommending its value in 
water policy research. I have consciously attempted to shy away from what 
Chambers (1980:29) called a “cramped vision” amongst water resources researchers’, 
mired in narrow disciplinary boundaries, that has created a “reluctance to explore a 
no-man’s land between disciplines.” Mixing can be sequential or simultaneous and 
may involve several iterations, implying there are no hard and fast rules with regards 
to mixing methods (Lebel, 2007), which can open it up to possible criticisms of lack 
of rigour or eclecticism. However, I believe the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages and the plurality of sources can be complementary in working towards 
more complete and profound understandings of complex social phenomena in time 
and space. Indeed, Lebel argues that mixing quantitative survey techniques with 
qualitative data gathering procedures through surveys allows identification of 
interesting cases for later in-depth contextual and comparative analyses.   
In this study, some primary mixed quantitative and qualitative data was collected 
from a focused public questionnaire survey and secondary quantitative data gathered 
from various reports (e.g. declared areas of irrigation command areas and cropping 
areas) to triangulate amongst various sources, but not necessarily included in the 
final analysis. 
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4.2.3 Research Site Selection  
 
The Nam Songkhram Basin covers an area of 13,128 km
2
 that encompasses a wide 
variety of ecosystems and land use types, is eco-hydrologically linked to the Mekong 
river, has an estimated population of approximately almost one and a half million 
and spans parts of four provinces (Blake et al., 2009). The Nam Songkhram Basin 
exhibits a wide range of agricultural water management types and practices, has an 
inherently complex hydrology and ecology, and due to its peripheral position within 
the nation-state, has linkages with wider geo-political entities both inside and outside 
the confines of Thailand.  
 
The research was empirically grounded within the Nam Songkhram Basin at three 
case study villages, located in different parts of the basin (see Fig. 4.1) and selected 
as being broadly representative of a range of basin conditions. I wanted each to 
represent a range of agro-ecological conditions and different water resources 
management scenarios. Further, each village lay in a different administrational 
province (Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon and Udon Thani), providing more 
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heterogeneity to the cases. These were chosen through a process of careful 
consideration and elimination partly based on the researcher’s previous extensive 
experience of the Basin and partly following consultation with local knowledge 
“gatekeepers”. In two cases, these gatekeepers also provided recommendations about 
potential local hosts and key contacts. Before making a final selection concerning the 
villages, I visited each to assess its suitability based on a wide range of criteria, not 
least a willingness on the part of village elites (i.e. headperson) to host my research. 
The three community names, locations and brief contexts were as follows: 
1. Baan Naa Phiang (pop. 718 – Moo 557), Sri Songkhram District, Nakhon 
Phanom province – located in Lower Nam Songkhram riverine floodplain 
wetlands. Subject to prolonged annual flooding of surrounding lands for 
several months, seasonally curtailing agricultural potential, but providing rich 
capture fishery opportunities. Located just 3 kms from district centre of Sri 
Songkhram, so good local market connections. Agricultural frontier village, 
with declining reliance on capture fisheries and harvesting natural wetlands 
products, as natural wetland habitats are converted to cropland. Considerable 
off-farm revenue apparent in local economy. Main ethnic group: Lao Nyaw 
 
2. Baan Non Rua (pop. 1,576 – Moo 3 and 13 combined), Phanna Nikhom 
District, Sakon Nakhon province – located in Nam Oon basin (a main 
tributary of Nam Songkhram), lying partly within the RID Lam Nam Oon 
Irrigation Project. Has good access to nearby Phu Phan hill range and 
National Park (NTFP collection seasonally). Composed of mixed upland 
rainfed and lowland irrigated landscape. Some intensive irrigated dry season 
cultivation of vegetable, fruit, flowers and seed crops practiced, in addition to 
rice cropping and limited aquaculture. Considerable off-farm revenue 
apparent in local economy. Main ethnic group: Phu Thai 
 
3. Baan Nong Sa Plaa (pop. 1,174 – Moo 8 and 9 combined), Nong Han District, 
Udon Thani province – located in Upper Nam Songkhram Basin, composed 
                                                   
57 Moo is an abbreviated form of moobaan to refer to a village unit in the Thai administrative structure, 
and frequently a single large village may be split up into a several smaller units or moo, as in the case 
of Baan Non Rua and Baan Nong Sa Plaa. Each Moo is given a number which is often how local 
officials refer to particular villages in reports and formal documents, rather than their local names. 
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of wet rice floodplain and upper alluvial terraces, mostly planted to sugar 
cane. Local economy influenced by large sugar mill, 3 kms away, providing 
seasonal employment for many and permanent employment for a few. Sub-
district centre and location of TAO office, next to a large artificial lake. 
Agriculture-based employment in long-term decline and high rate of out-
migration, both domestic and overseas bringing considerable remittances to 
local economy. Main ethnic group: Lao Vieng 
 
From the grounded data and experience gained in the three fieldwork villages, the 
researcher was able to further identify and draw out sub-case studies of 
representative irrigation projects, selected across a variety of scales. These ranged 
from the large-scale, RID managed (e.g. Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project and the 
proposed Nam Songkhram Project) to much smaller, village-level water resources 
development projects (e.g. Huay Wang Rua, Ban Non Rua and Nong Saeng, Baan 
Naa Phiang), elaborated in Chapter 8. These empirical case studies are used to 
illustrate the discourses and practices of irrigation development in finer detail and 
provide comparisons and linkages across scales to the basin level and beyond, and to 
determine whether elements of a common irrigationalism ideology are discernible at 
all these projects. I am also interested to learn to what extent ideology plays a role in 
their planning, construction, implementation and outcomes, on the basis of a range of 
actor narratives related to these developments. The multi-scalar politics of irrigation 
development are explored at each site according to principles of grounded and 
reflexive research. 
 
4.3 Elaboration of data collection methods  
 
The principal data collection and generation techniques employed included: a/ 
document review; b/ qualitative interviews; c/ a structured questionnaire survey; d/ 
field and participant observation; e/ other participatory rural appraisal (PRA) tools 
(e.g. focus groups and timelines), as deemed appropriate and opportunity arose. 
Taken together, they allowed a range of contextually appropriate techniques to be 
trialed (e.g. interviews and in-depth observation) that helped to reinforce the 
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empirical depth of the research, and permitted a greater degree of triangulation of 
results between techniques. Fieldwork in Thailand took place between November 
2009 and August 2010, with about a year devoted afterwards to data analysis and 
interpretation. 
 
4.3.1 Document review 
 
This process began prior to commencement of fieldwork, studying various printed 
and electronic documents concerning water resources development and management 
in the Northeast, Thailand as a whole and the wider Mekong region, with a special 
emphasis on irrigation, from both the professional and academic spheres. I laid 
special emphasis on identifying texts that contained narrative justifications 
supporting or in opposition to irrigation development pathways and practices, taking 
note of the actors or organizations involved. The process continued once in-country, 
by accessing various donor organization, international development agency and 
government-commissioned reports, feasibility studies, project progress and 
evaluation reports, environmental impact assessments, newspaper and magazine 
articles, books and various other literature concerning irrigation development, much 
of which would be classified as “grey” literature. The literature, in both English and 
Thai languages, was accessed from a variety of sources, including library collections 
(universities, civil society organizations and those of the two main hydraulic 
bureaucracies), Internet sources, and from direct requests to document authors. A 
particularly useful collection that became available during the course of my 
fieldwork relating to water resources development in the Northeast over a period of 
thirty years (including invaluable progress and evaluation reports on the Lam Nam 
Oon Irrigation Project in Sakon Nakhon), were a set of previously classified 
documents released by USAID
58
. Much historically interesting data (textual and 
visual) on water resources development project evolution, key actors, organizations 
and popular narratives was obtained via both hard copy and online archives of the 
two main English language daily newspapers in Thailand – The Bangkok Post and 
                                                   
58 This resource is accessible through the archives of the USAID’s Development Experience 
Clearinghouse (DEC) website: http://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/information-
resources/development-experience-clearinghouse-dec 
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The Nation – especially for the discourse analysis of the Green Isaan Project in 
Chapter 7. The process of reading, coding and interpreting significant quantities of 
historical documents related to irrigation development reminded the researcher to be 
constantly aware of the particular institutional contexts, actors’ positions and frames 
of reference under which each was produced and remain sensitive to the strategies, 
rationales and ideologies of the subjects studied (cf. Mason, 2002).  
 
4.3.2 Qualitative interviews 
 
The researcher conducted a total of 36 formal, in-depth and semi-structured 
interviews (SSIs) with a range of actors from state and non-state organizations 
connected to irrigation development in Northeast Thailand during the course of 
fieldwork (these are listed in Appendix A). Attention was paid to trying to ensure a 
broad cross-section of interviewees representing the main water resource 
management bureaucracies at both the national and provincial levels (8 persons); 
politicians spanning local to national levels (4 persons); academics in water 
resources related disciplines (8 persons); present and former irrigation development 
consultants (2 persons); civil society representatives and activists (5 persons); 
international development and research agency officials (6 persons); plus local 
leaders (3 persons). Interviews were arranged via a mix of cold call contacts to 
individuals and organizations, recommendations and introductions from others and 
previous personal acquaintances, with interviews arranged up to several months in 
advance. The interviews were conducted both as formal interviews with prepared 
questions and more informal, less structured meetings, especially where 
serendipitous opportunities presented themselves in the course of fieldwork. The sets 
of questions (12 – 18 in total) were tailored specifically to the individual interviewee 
and designed to be open-ended, non-inductive and flexible in direction, if 
opportunities arose to pursue promising lines of enquiry. Certain questions, such as 
perceptions around drought or attitudes towards further large-scale irrigation 
development in Northeast Thailand were asked to most interviewees. Every 
interview was recorded with the prior consent of the interviewee and additional aide 
memoire notes were taken during or immediately after the interview. Those 
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interviews conducted in Thai language (approximately 50 %) were later transcribed 
and translated to English by a locally hired translator, with the balance transcribed by 
myself. In addition to the SSIs, numerous ad hoc interviews with local water 
resource users and actors within the Nam Songkhram Basin were conducted during 
field visits. The interview transcripts were later manually codified and analyzed by 
the researcher as a way of extracting patterns, regularities, differences and 
interpreting meaning from the texts. 
 
4.3.3 Structured questionnaire survey 
 
This field tool, although not normally associated with qualitative social science 
approaches, was employed to guage public perceptions across different locations 
regarding general water resources development and management issues in Northeast 
Thailand. I could find no published research on this topic, despite its potential 
relevance for understanding the assumptions on which an important regional 
development paradigm is based and whether the dominant discourse of the centre is 
reflected in the narratives and perceptions of the general population, especially those 
at the margins. I was particularly interested in getting a sense of how ordinary Thai 
people view some of the dominant narratives concerning water resources, including 
questions around attitudes towards drought and floods; causes of and favoured 
solutions to regional water related development problems; perceptions of the 
appropriateness of state development policies and strategies; attitudes towards large-
scale irrigation projects; and strength of agreement to certain statements about 
critical water resources development issues. I was originally interested in getting a 
measure of how such perceptions may differ or coincide with the proposed dominant 
ideology held by powerful actors (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2), taking into account 
such variables as location, age and education, for example. In this sense, it follows a 
similar approach to that employed by Lipchin (2007) to collect data on the 
perceptions of Israeli settlers to the dominant Zionist ideology with respect to water 
development and agriculture. It was seen as a complimentary method to the other 
qualitative methods used to elicit field data that allowed triangulation across methods. 
In addition, it permitted the researcher an opportunity to test and gain familiarity 
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with the advantages and disadvantages of this semi-quantitative method and how it 
could be integrated into a mixed methods approach. A preliminary set of questions 
were formulated and a questionnaire was designed in English and then translated to 
Thai prior to entering the field. The draft questionnaire was scrutinized for its utility 
in close collaboration with colleagues within the Wellbeing and Sustainable 
Development Research Group (WeSD) at Khon Kaen University (KKU), before 
conducting a pilot test on-campus in December 2009. The questionnaire design and 
questions were modified slightly following this practice exercise, prior to conducting 
the actual survey during January and February 2010, using social science students 
from KKU as enumerators. The survey was conducted at three locations, one day per 
site, with a total of 337 people interviewed, broadly representative of populations 
living in the capital (Bangkok), major regional city (Khon Kaen), and rural village in 
the Nam Songkhram Basin, as outlined in Table 4.2 below. 
Sample Group  Khon Kaen Bangkok 
Nam Songkhram Basin 
village 
Location of survey Main bus station and Central 
shopping mall 
Lumpini Park, Central 
Bangkok 
Baan Nong Batao, Sri 
Songkhram District 
Date of survey 23/1/10 30/1/10 13/2/10 
No of respondents (n) 121 107 109 
Table 4.2 Details of questionnaire survey locations, dates and number of 
respondents in each sample group 
The raw dataset acquired in Thai language was later coded by myself, translated 
back in to English, entered into a statistical software package (SPSS) by a recently 
graduated student experienced in the software, and the results analyzed across a 
range of variables. In the end, only a limited subset of the survey results are 
discussed in the thesis (in Chapter 6, Section 6.7), as I elected to focus my main 
analysis on other aspects of discourse analysis. In retrospect, this method provided a 
useful indication of the extent to which Thai citizens equate the Northeast region 
with descriptions of drought and perceive water scarcity to be an important 
development issue of the region, vis à vis other types of problems. Similarly, it was 
able to partially quantify across sample groups the level of popular support for a 
range of suggested development solutions to perceived dominant problem framings, 
which could then be triangulated with the responses over similar issues provided by 
more powerful societal actors in interviews, such as government officials, politicians, 
local leaders or civil society activists, to see how they coincided or differed. As such, 
the results obtained should be regarded as indicative only of the range of views held 
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by the wider population in each of the locations surveyed, and may be more 
thoroughly explored in future research outputs. A copy of the questionnaire survey is 
provided in Appendix B and some of the tabulated responses in Appendix C. 
 
4.3.4 Field and participant observation 
 
Mason (2002:84) defines observation as a method of generating data which entails 
the researcher immersing him/herself in a research setting in order to experience and 
observe at first hand “a range of dimensions in and of that setting”. Participant 
observation proved to be a crucial tool for understanding the local context of water 
resources development, the social actors and groups involved, and the discourses, 
narratives and practices they call upon across a range of spatial levels. The relatively 
long period of exposure (ten months) spent in the field, spanning a range of seasonal 
conditions allowed ample opportunity to directly observe a wide range of actors in a 
variety of situations, from undertaking agricultural water management tasks, to state 
official-villager interactions and most vitally, the development of several small-scale 
water resources development projects at the case study villages. By becoming 
temporarily “embedded” in the local context with host families and tending towards 
ethnographical methods consistent with the case study approach, permitted close 
observation of  local processes of decision-making, negotiation and contestation over 
water resources, ranging from individual, household and community levels. At the 
same time, I was able to observe extra-local actors (both state and non-state) 
involved at higher levels of the water resources governance hierarchy interact, 
through attendance as an observer at several regional meetings related to river basin 
and water resources development planning, offering further insights into the nature 
of decision-making processes and power relations in the sector. Notes of local 
observations, emerging narratives, key phrases and general reflections were kept in a 
field diary, and later used as an aide memoire for inductive theory building. The data 
contained in field notes, according to David and Sutton (2004:110) is, “the most 
explicit example of the on-going process of data analysis within the data collection 
process itself and in the resulting data.” The field notes become a record of a cyclical 
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process of data collection and provisional analysis, even though they are necessarily 
selective accounts of events, people and places.  
 
4.3.5 Other PRA tools: 
 
Whilst based in the field, the researcher adopted some of the basic tenets and tools of 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) for data collection purposes. This included focus 
group discussions, use of historical time lines and village transect walks with key 
informants, which often helped to triangulate and solidify other emerging themes, 
issues and ideas. At the end of the fieldwork, a final research feedback workshop 
was held in each village which provided a useful opportunity to test hypotheses 
concerning local power relations amongst the participants, who included state and 
non-state actors. 
 
4.4 Analytical Approach – Discourse Analysis 
 
The main analytical approach adopted was discourse analysis, which has become one 
of the most widely used analytical tools within post-structural political ecology 
approaches. Discourse analysis takes as its starting point, a view that our access to 
reality is always through language and that our ways of communicating do not 
neutrally reflect the world, identities and social relations, but play an active role in 
creating and changing them. For political ecologists like Escobar (1995), Bryant and 
Bailey (1997) and Agrawal (2005), the need to examine social and historical 
contexts behind discourses and narratives, is as important as the analysis of text itself, 
often based on Foucaultian-derived theories of discourse (see Section 3.2.2). In 
discourse analysis, theory and method are intertwined, stresses Phillips and 
Jorgenson (2002:4), and it is permissible to combine “elements from different 
discourse analytical perspectives and, if appropriate, non-discourse analytical 
perspectives”.  One approach, known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), has 
been used in the empirical study of relations between discourse and social and 
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cultural developments in different social domains (Phillips and Jorgenson, 2002:60-
64), drawing heavily from earlier work by Fairclough and Wodak (1997).  
In this approach, it is implicitly understood that “discourse functions ideologically”, 
and importantly in terms of researcher positionality, that CDA does not “understand 
itself as politically neutral (as objectivist social science does), but as a critical 
approach which is politically committed to social change” (Phillips and Jorgenson, 
2002:64). Regarding the first point, in CDA it is claimed that, “discursive practices 
contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between 
social groups – for example, between social classes, women and men, ethnic 
minorities and the majority. These effects are understood as ideological effects” 
(Phillips and Jorgenson, 2002:63, emphasis in original). These authors make the 
argument that in contrast to discourse theorists, including Foucault, CDA does not 
diverge completely from Marxist traditions on this point, but enlists the concept of 
ideology to theorize the subjugation of one social group over others. Hence, “the 
research focus of CDA is accordingly both the discursive practices which construct 
representations of the world, social subjects and social relations, including power 
relations, and the role that these discursive practices play in furthering the interests 
of particular social groups” (Phillips and Jorgenson, 2002:63). It is “critical” insofar 
as it aims to reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social 
world, including where unequal relations of power exist.  
Gasper and Apthorpe (1996:6-10) consider the following five (interlinked) aspects 
concerned with policy discourse analysis that they believe are important for 
examination in any given policy practice case: 
 The formation and use of concepts 
 The use of tropes and other stylistic devices 
 Framing 
 Stories and narratives 
 The implicit and explicit rules of validation 
Out of these categories, I have selected two aspects which I consider to be most 
directly relevant to analyzing the specific context of irrigation development 
discourse in Thailand, namely framing and development narratives or storylines. 
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4.4.1 Framing 
 
Peet and Watts (2004) have used the concept of framing in reference to 
“environmental imaginaries”, referring to the frameworks through which different 
individuals or societies perceive and evaluate aspects of environmental change. In 
the view of Gasper and Apthorpe (1996:6), framing is crucial in all policy practice, 
specifically, “who or what is actually included, and who and what is ignored and 
excluded.” The purpose of policy, from early proposals through to implementation, 
is to identify and frame a complex problem to be resolved by a simple solution. 
Through simplification of the complex, “policy arguments become the more 
compelling the more they are able to appear as inevitable, as if no other strategy 
could be feasible or conceivable” argue Friend and Blake (2009). (cf. “There is no 
alternative”, often referred to as TINA narratives (Mehta, 2001)). However, 
identifying frames is not always a simple task, as frames are generally implicit rather 
than explicit, notes Forsyth (2003:78), so “a distinction has to be made between an 
explicit policy position or choice, and the more tacit frames that give rise to explicit 
positions”. Reviewing some of the ways in which environmental and social problems 
have been explicitly framed and solutions arrived at within state policy statements 
regarding irrigation development will be a task of Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
4.4.2 Development narratives  
 
Evidence and arguments in development discourses are commonly expressed 
through narratives, which may be thought of as causal stories
59
 which bundle 
information and convey plausibility to the author or speaker. Policy often constructs 
what Roe (1995) refers to as “development narratives”, which may be seen as 
complete stories. More specifically, development policy narratives may be seen as, 
“not ‘just talk’ or inventions for others’ amusement, but persuasive constructions 
with a beginning (assumptions, problem framing, choice of issues, etc), a middle 
                                                   
59 Hajer (1995) prefers to use the term “storylines”, which essentially refers to the same phenomena as 
narratives within political debate over development or environmental discourses. 
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(argumentation, supporting evidence, justifications, troublesome side issues and 
other relevant circumstances) and a conclusion (what should be done and policy 
recommendations)” (Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 2007:92). They are selective of 
some facts while ignoring others, and interpret information in a particular way in 
order to tell a persuasive and consistent story. Narratives also tend to determine the 
data that can and cannot be considered in policy debates; they “help decision-makers 
confidently fill the gap between ignorance and expediency” argue Fairhead and 
Leach (1997:35). In the view of Molle (2006), “the ‘naturalness’ of narratives, or 
storylines, seemingly anchored in commonsense, makes them very resilient.” 
Where a dominant or mainstream narrative exists and is perceived by other actors as 
serving the interests of only particular groups in society, then frequently alternative 
or counter-narratives emerge to serve a different political constituency. These may 
just be counter-factual or identify and frame development problems and solutions in 
entirely different ways to the dominant or “classic” (often state-led) narrative or 
storyline. These may often include non-official narratives lying outside formal 
policy-making channels, constructed by less-powerful actors in society, who utilize 
less formal knowledge sources in their construction. These might include actors such 
as non-government organizations (NGOs), women’s groups, indigenous people’s 
groups, wetlands or forest user groups or alliances, activists, academics and 
individual resource users, and may not always be codified in writing but verbally 
reproduced. Blaikie and Springate-Baginksi (2007:93) state, “all narratives are often 
(but not always!) coherent, persuasive and common-sense accounts; but they are 
usually competitive with others for the ear of particular audiences.” Referring to 
Indian and Nepali narratives of participatory forest management, these authors 
identify and model a “state forest administrative” narrative and a “popular / civil 
society” narrative as being competing narratives in the policy process appealing to 
different networks of actors and target audiences. This study will attempt to identify 
and differentiate the main competing development narratives and the actors 
clustering around them through analysis of irrigational discourse and narratives. 
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4.5 Research Questions and methods 
 
In order to address the basic “problemshed” issue identified by this research 
regarding explanations for the underlying socio-political drivers of the multi-scalar 
irrigation development paradigm in Northeast Thailand, a main research question 
and a number of supporting questions have been formulated to assist in guiding the 
research towards satisfactory conclusions. The principal and overarching research 
question guiding the thesis is: 
“What are the discourses, actors and practices that drive irrigationalism in the 
context of Thailand, cast as a modern hydraulic society?”  
 
A number of sub-questions (SQ1-6) were formulated to further support and answer 
the framework of the main research question, with the research methods employed to 
generate empirical data noted below and the main chapter where each question is 
addressed indicated in parentheses: 
SQ1: What are the probable discursive roots and origins of irrigationalism in Thai 
society? 
Methods: Document review, structured and semi-structured interviews  
(Chapter 5/6) 
 
SQ2: What are the main development narratives driving irrigationalism, framed by 
different actors, both historically and in the present context? 
Methods: Document review, structured and semi-structured interviews, 
questionnaire survey 
(Chapters 5/6/7) 
 
SQ3: Which actors appear to determine control over irrigation development at 
multiple scales, using what discourses and pathways? 
Methods: Document review, structured and semi-structured interviews, direct 
observation 
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(Chapters 7/8/9/10) 
 
SQ4: Which are the important power relations mechanisms at work across various 
scales, and can distinct “discourse coalitions” or “strategic groups” be identified? 
Methods: Document review, structured and semi-structured interviews, direct 
observation 
(Chapters 8/9) 
 
SQ5: To what extent are understandings of water scarcity socially constructed, and 
whose interests are served by drought narratives? 
Methods: Document review, structured and semi-structured interviews, direct 
observation, questionnaire survey. 
(Chapters 6/7) 
 
SQ6: How closely does Thailand fit Wittfogel’s characterization as an exemplar of 
a “hydraulic society” in the modern-day context? 
Methods:  Document review and synthesis of other qualitative data. 
(Chapter 9/10) 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has laid out the methodology of the thesis through an elaboration of the 
research design, analytical approach and data collection methods used to help answer 
the research questions and “operationalize” the research. Drawing from 
methodological approaches from post-structural political ecology and tenets of 
Molllinga’s (2008) “political sociology of water resources management”, the 
research relies upon and discusses the relevance of the following key concepts: 
ideology, discourse, development narratives, discourse coalitions and strategic 
groups, irrigation as a complex socio-technical practice, irrigation as water control, 
actors and agency, irrigation development drivers, and issues of scale. I have 
discussed and justified elements of the research design, before outlining the main 
data generation techniques selected for use in the field and analytical methods 
adopted post fieldwork. Finally, I have laid out the main research question with 
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supporting sub-questions that have guided me towards addressing the principal 
research “problemshed” issues identified. In Chapter 5, the first of the main 
empirical chapters, I start to explore in greater depth the concept of “irrigationalism”, 
its roots, evolution and how it is manifested in the context of modern Thai society. 
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Chapter 5  Irrigationalism 
 
“Mai mee arai, tee wisawagon Thai thaam mai dai” 
“There is nothing that Thai engineers cannot do” 
(Slogan written on the back of a Khon Kaen University student’s 
jacket, observed on-campus in November, 2009, recalling a 
quote attributed to Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, in which 
“police” was originally substituted for the word “engineers”) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter develops the concept of “irrigationalism”, a term coined with reference 
to the specific context of Thailand, although it may have wider conceptual 
applicability beyond the borders of Thailand. It starts by providing a general outline 
of the concept with a working definition, before considering how irrigationalism may 
have evolved out of historical constructions of nationhood and official nationalist 
ideologies to become an integral and commonsensical part of Thai national identity. 
It then considers some of the ideological functions irrigationalism may fulfil and 
some of the ways in which these are expressed in contemporary Thai society. It 
attempts to provide a historically situated interpretation of the roots of 
irrigationalism in the Thai socio-political context. The chapter analyses narrative 
evidence from a handful of important political actors to illustrate the nature of 
contemporary irrigationalism and its relationship with closely related ideologies, 
such as royalism, nationalism, and the seductive ideology of developmentalism. As 
such, this section partly addresses the first two research sub-questions, namely: 
SQ1 What are the probable historical roots and origins of irrigationalism in 
Thai society? 
 
SQ2 What are the main irrigation development narratives framed by 
different actors, both historically and in the present context? 
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5.2 Irrigationalism – an outline of the concept 
 
From the conceptual discussion of ideology provided in Chapter 3 (see Section 
3.2.1), and some preliminary propositions of how an ideology of irrigation 
development or irrigationalism might prove useful theoretically, we can now move 
towards a more nuanced understanding of irrigationalism set within a specific spatio-
temporal context. For this to be achieved, a basic understanding of the historical 
formation of the modern Thai nation state and certain domestic meta-ideologies is 
necessary, that links irrigationalism to better recognized ideologies of nationalism, 
developmentalism and monarchism. To this end, I will argue that the phenomenon of 
modern irrigation development extends far beyond its material or physical 
dimensions, but also embodies elements of cultural beliefs and norms about the 
status of irrigation within Thai society, that has allowed irrigation to be considered a 
“privileged solution” ( Moris, 1987) or a “sanctioned discourse” (Allan, 2002), that 
limits what may be spoken about irrigation and whom may speak, thus ensuring a 
diminished space for alternative discourses to arise.  
It should be noted that well before Adams (1991) coined the phrase “irrigationism” 
as a synonym for ideologically motivated irrigation development in the context of 
certain sub-Saharan African nations, a conceptual link between ideological problem 
solving and decision-making with regards to water resources and irrigation 
development had been proposed as a significant phenomenon in developing country 
contexts by Wiener (1972). Wiener made a distinction between an ideological 
approach and a pragmatic approach to problem solving in general and around water 
resources management in particular. The ideological approach was considered rooted 
in the adoption of “a priori type of principles to an intentionally highly simplified 
planning space” which were considered related to “broader national, religious, moral 
or political tenets that have been taken over uncritically from an irrelevant past” 
(Wiener, 1972:26-7). He believed that the “off-the-peg” development models that 
accompany the ideological approach have a number of advantages, “such as 
economy in mental effort, as well as apparent ease of transmittal to individuals 
preconditioned to accepting these models” (Wiener, 1972:27, emphasis added). 
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Conversely, their main disadvantage is that in the majority of cases they failed to fit 
the situations in which they were “indiscriminately applied”. A critical aspect about 
this approach to water resources development is its frequent subjection to “sacred 
cow principles”, whereby despite the fact that predictions based on the principles fail 
to materialize, “instead some less hallowed aspect of the planning space is blamed 
for failure” (Wiener, 1972:27). The pragmatic approach is conceptualized as the 
antithesis of the ideological approach, where the development planner seeks a 
definition of the planning space, its problems, dimensions, structure, trends, and 
constraints, as free from political bias as possible. The development model selected 
is then deemed to better represent the functional relationship of the planning space 
and able to predict its responses.   
Discourse around irrigation development in Thailand seems to engender a distinctly 
normative worldview and preconditioned set of beliefs about a natural state of affairs 
concerning irrigation’s position within an idealized rural landscape and an imagined 
propensity of Thai citizens to be practitioners of irrigated agriculture (especially rice 
cultivation) (cf. Rigg and Ritchie, 2002). It also incorporates utilitarian views about 
the relationship between nature and society and the need to maximise use of 
available water for agricultural consumption within the borders of Thailand to avoid 
it flowing away “wasted” to the sea or transboundary rivers (Molle et al., 2009a), 
pointing towards a naturalizing and universalizing of beliefs within mainstream 
narrative accounts. I would argue that such discourse partly stems from rigidly 
hierarchical and paternalisitic views about the structuring of Thai society by the 
dominant elite (Jacobs, 1971; Rigg, 1991), and as such is culturally contextual and 
highly value-laden concerning irrigation development’s status and role in wider rural 
development narratives in a top-down ordering of Thai society. Manifestations of 
this dominant worldview are discussed in greater detail in this chapter and in 
Chapters 7 and 9.  
I would stop short of claiming that irrigationalism offers an entire worldview (cf. 
Mannheim’s Weltanschauung) or complete ideology, in marked contrast to, say 
capitalism, communism or socialism. Nevertheless, I maintain that it is a sufficiently 
distinctive ideology which embodies socio-political “action-oriented sets of beliefs” 
(see Eagleton, 2007) found within Thai society and is influential for guiding the 
ideas, goals, expectations and actions of large swathes of the population. Moreover, 
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the distinctly utopian irrigation development plans constructed by elite actors have 
provided a comprehensive, idealized vision of a future land in the Northeast (e.g. the 
“Green Isaan” or Water Grid Projects regionally, that provide primordial60 
connections to a mythical “Golden Land” or Suwannaphum61, incorporated in Thai 
Buddhist religious symbolism). These development projects embody distinct 
elements of mystification, illusion and falsity in their discursive outward 
dissemination from Bangkok to the peripheries of the nation. It forms an integral part 
of the elements that make up the “imagined community” of Thai nationhood 
(Anderson, 2006). As such, irrigationalism would seem to satisfy some basic 
conditions of an ideological formation, for example, as defined by Eagleton (2007), 
Heywood (1998) and others (see Section 3.2.1).  
Irrigationalism, as defined in this thesis, is a dominant ideology of irrigation 
developmentalism that incorporates utopian notions of agricultural modernism, 
technocentrism and more primordial nationalistic sets of beliefs, values and actions 
in Thai society about the potential of irrigation; performing important transformative 
functions in an elite-oriented project of domination over nature and society. 
I now go on to trace the history of the birth and rise of nationalism in Thailand, as 
this is of pertinence to explanations of the roots of irrigationalism and its relationship 
with nationalism, agriculturalism and other dominant ideologies. Rather than give a 
historically detailed account of statist or dominant group attempts to mould a Thai 
national identity
62
 during the nineteenth century, whether in more elite or popular 
forms of discourse, I intend to concentrate on emphasising the socially constructed 
nature of the nationalist discourse in the twentieth century, and examine why 
particular narratives of relevance to agricultural and water resources development 
may have been dominated by narrow social groups.   
 
                                                   
60 Primordialism, according to Fong (2009:678), “is conceived as containing socially-constructed 
nationalist properties that are activated by political entrepreneurs in their machinations to acquire and 
maintain power”. 
61 According to Keyes (1977), in ancient times the mainland Southeast Asian peninsular was known 
as Suvannaphumi in India, literally meaning the Golden Country, an allegorical reference used in the 
title of Falvey’s (2000) book, “Thai Agriculture: Golden Cradle of Millennia”. 
62 Critical scholars of the statemaking and national identity building process in Thailand that offer 
persuasive accounts of how selected recordings of locations, events and actors in the official historical 
narrative have served the purposes of the state and dominant elites include Anderson (1991), 
Chaloemtiarana (2007), Mulder (1997)  and Winichakul (1995) amongst others. 
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5.3 Official Ideologies and elite constructions of “Thai-ness” 
 
Thailand has sometimes been associated with a number of defining state ideologies 
during the course of the past century or so, including (but not limited to) the 
following: absolutism, authoritarianism, capitalism, fascism, feudalism, irredentism, 
liberalism, modernism, militarism, nationalism, monarchism, statism, and 
totalitarianism. Such ideological labels, often used in a pejorative sense, have been 
identified as some of the dominant ideologies adopted by the ruling establishment 
for statecraft purposes in first Siam, and later Thailand
63
. The most commonly cited 
mantra identified as the official Thai state ideology has been “Nation, Religion, King” 
(chart, saatsanaa, phramahaagasat)
 
(Chaloemtiarana, 2007), usually credited as a 
creation of King Vajiravudh or Rama VI (r. 1910-1925), who is reputed to have 
stated that, “loyalty to the king is identical with loving the nation because the king is 
the representative of the nation” (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005), thus firmly inter-
twining nationalism and royalism in the official state discourse. This trinity of 
institutions were viewed by elite nation builders as the pillars on which the existence 
and prosperity of the Thai nation depended, with the king representing the political 
embodiment of a Buddhist nation and the ordained protector of nation and religion 
(Connors, 2007). Even today, state officials will often legitimize their actions and 
authority with references to the ideological troika, symbolically represented in the 
tricolour national flag.  
A recurring pattern during the early decades of the twentieth century was a reliance 
of state elites on constructed official versions of Thai culture and identity, which 
amounted to little more than a popular “historical imaginaire” (Samudavanija, 2002). 
According to Winichakul (1995), there is a widespread assumption in Thai society 
that a common Thai nature or identity exists, understood in Thai language as 
“khwaam ben thai “ (literally meaning “Thai-ness”). Its existence is commonly 
believed to stretch back into the folds of history and all “Thai” people are supposed 
                                                   
63 Siam officially changed name to Thailand in June 1939, on the grounds that the latter name better 
corresponded with the race of the peoples of the Thai nation, at a time when Prime Minster Phibun 
Songkhram had just allied with Japan and wanted to recover an imagined lost “greater Thai empire” 
(maha anajaak Thai) (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). 
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to be aware of its provenance and virtue. King Rama V or Chulalongkorn (r.1868-
1910) was instrumental in defining “Thai-ness” by giving new meanings to various 
royal rituals and processions, and through the construction of symbols that placed the 
king at the centre of the state, with absolute authority over aristocrats, civil servants 
and subjects of “all races”, whose lives were deemed dependent on the king’s power, 
wisdom and generosity, asserts Sattayanurak (2005). Winichakul (1995) argues that 
maps, like the national flag, have become powerful state symbols of nationhood and 
(re)producing Thai-ness. Similarly, the creation of symbolic discursive enemies 
(whether ethnic “Others”, communists, terrorists or indeed, natural disasters like 
droughts and floods
64
) is an important function of the state apparatus and to the 
maintenance of its power base and political domination. 
Following the genesis of the modern Thai nation state in 1932, a series of military 
strongmen figures emerged to lead the nation down a predominantly authoritarian 
path of governance, which pitted the despots in a decades-long struggle against more 
liberal reformist figures, such as Pridi Banomyong (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). 
The autocratic leaders employed skilful propagandists to undertake the crucial task 
of forging a unifying Thai national identity, strongly influenced by nationalist 
ideologies employed in other fascist states. For example, Field Marshall Phibun 
Songkhram (twice Prime Minister, first from 1938-44 and again from 1948-57) 
utilized the talents of Luang Wichit Wathakan who was instrumental in creating a 
new public culture and fashioning notions of “Thai-ness” within a loose nation of 
disparate ethnicities and social groups, while Phibun’s successor, Field Marshall 
Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) appointed M.R. Kukrit Pramoj
65
 as the regime’s chief 
ideologue in defining new interpretations of “Thai-ness” and legitimating his regime 
according to “Thai-style governance” principles (Sattayanurak, 2005).  
Sarit justified his regime using a political philosophy based on indigenous principles 
of authority and social hierarchy, a paternalistic style of rule supposedly adapted 
                                                   
64 While Winichakul (1995) does not specifically identify natural disasters as a discursive enemy of 
the Thai state, given the adversarial attitude of the Thai state towards fighting drought and floods as 
perennial national scourges, there would seem to be a strong case for expanding understandings of the 
enemy function to also include non-human entities, a concept discussed further in Chapter 6, Section 
6.4.  
65 Mom Rajawong (a royal title) Kukrit Pramoj (1911-1985) was a great grandson of King Rama II 
and formed the Progressive Party in 1945, which merged into the Democrat Party the following year. 
He briefly served as Prime Minister between 1975-76 and is better known as a public intellectual, 
popular novelist and newspaper owner (The Siam Rath daily). 
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from the ancient Sukhothai system of governance
66
. Instead of placing primary 
emphasis on loyalty to an abstract state or constitution, (considered inappropriate to 
the Thai context), Sarit focused on promoting the monarchy, as both a beacon of 
loyalty for the mass populace and a source of legitimacy for the government itself. 
Sarit talked about the “Army of the King” and the “government headed by the King’, 
while the king in return anointed Sarit “Defender of the Capital” on the day of the 
1957 coup, notes Baker and Phongpaichit (2005:177). Sarit scrapped a Land Act 
from the previous government that was unpopular in palace circles, restored royal 
ceremonies
67
 and encouraged an expansion of the king’s role and interest in rural 
development. The government became little more than a secular arm of the semi-
sacral kingship and was worthy of respect and obedience by virtue of that connection, 
argues Wyatt (2003). The monarch was restored to the apex of Thailand’s moral, 
social and political order. Democracy was redefined by Sarit and M.R. Kukrit to 
mean the responsiveness of the government, the bureaucracy and the monarchy to 
the people’s needs and aspirations (Wyatt, 2003). Chaloemtiarana (2007) 
characterized Sarit as a “paternalistic despot” (pho-khun uppatham baeb phadet-gan) 
68
, who simultaneously represented a father-like figure with benevolent intentions 
towards his “children” (prachaachon or the people), and simultaneously wielded 
absolute power over his subjects as a feared tyrant. In the latter guise, he frequently 
ordered the incarceration, torture and execution of criminals, political rivals and 
communist sympathisers, labelled “un-Thai” for their political convictions69. 
Under Sarit, the king began to make more trips upcountry to isolated villages, often 
populated with impoverished ethnic minorities, to begin a tradition of charitable 
                                                   
66
 This period of Thai history has been idealized by both religious and political reformists as 
“providing a true Buddhist model of a participatory, liberal form of government”, which was used to, 
“uphold the true essence of Thainess”, according to Jackson (2002:173). 
67 One of the revived ceremonies under Sarit’s tenure was the Royal Ploughing Ceremony, a lavish 
combined Buddhist and Brahminical rite held each May that had ceased since 1932. The king (and 
more recently the Crown Prince) officiates at the ceremony conducted to ensure a bountiful rice 
harvest and abundant rainfall for the coming agricultural year. Officials and participants at the 
ceremony wear period attire from the reign of Rama IV. Fong (2009) describes it as an example of a 
primordialised royal ceremony used to reinforce the monarch’s sacrality. 
68 Chaloemtiarana (2007) argues that Sarit’s personality and role as national leader was a complex 
combination of both paternalism and despotism, leaving a legacy that sees him revered by some Thais 
and reviled by others. Originating from Mukdahan in Northeast Thailand and with Lao roots on his 
maternal side, there is an impressive statue and monument celebrating his public life in central Khon 
Kaen. 
69 The Thai anti-communist law of the 1930s was culturalized under Sarit, according to Streckfuss 
(2011:39), and communists were portrayed as those who caused “people to lose their faith in religion 
or the traditions and customs of the Thai race.” 
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royal giving funded through imaginative “gifting relationships with various powerful 
social groups” (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005:178). He turned to the generals, 
wealthy officials, growing business interests (domestic and foreign) and the US 
government to fund development projects, and offered royal decorations and prestige 
in return. Sarit seemed quite content with the new arrangement of promoting a 
popular “development king”. In the view of Baker and Phongpaichit (2005:180), 
“[T]he alignment of army, palace, and business concluded by Sarit under US 
patronage in 1957-58 benefited all parties. The US secured a base. The monarchy 
revived. The generals enjoyed power and profit. Business boomed.” Streckfuss 
(2011) posits that a twentieth century project of Thai-ification executed by elite state 
groups has been used to build loyalty to official nationalism has gradually become 
more entrenched over the course of the present king’s reign, in effect freezing 
Thailand in an official regime of truth and state of “exceptionalism” (refer to Chapter 
9). Nationalism can be conceived as part of an “ongoing liberal hegemonic project 
that works to link people into elite defined visions of national development”, argues 
Connors (2003:434).  Further analysis of the rise of a bureaucratic - monarchical 
arrangement based on incorporating paternalistic rural development strategies and 
various forms of nationalism, including agricultural nationalism and irrigationalism 
are examined in the following sections.   
 
5.3.1 Emergence of a Thai-style agricultural nationalism  
 
At this point, it might be instructive to enquire as to what extent general notions of 
agriculture and irrigation are integral parts of Thai national identity constructions? 
Where do they fit in relationship to the well recognized ideologies of nationalism 
and royalism in shaping discourses of development in Thai society? Thailand has 
been described historically as a “rice-growing society” (e.g. Ishii, 1978; Sirisai, 1990) 
and the country is still regularly perceived by commentators as an agriculturally-
based nation. Chattip Nartsupha (1999:9), for example, begins his influential book 
The Thai Village Economy in the Past with the simple statement, “Thai peoples are 
rice-growers”, followed a few sentences later by a quote from the 12th century 
Chiang Rung chronicles, “wherever there is water, there are the Thai”. Nartsupha’s 
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writing has been interpreted to promote primordial notions of an endogenous 
“community culture” (wattanathaam chumchon) ideology in Thailand, where the 
village as a unit remains defiant, but ultimately powerless, in the face of intrusions 
by a rapacious state and market-based capitalism (Rigg and Ritchie, 2002). 
According to Rigg and Ritchie (2002), Nartsupha’s arguments were embraced not 
only by the NGO community, but also latterly, many in the Thai establishment, 
radical academics and middle classes as a template image of traditional rural 
communities that can be used to create a contemporary “self-sufficient economy” 
(sethagit phor piang)
 70
, in which wet rice farming and communal water resources 
management play a defining role in the imaginary rural idyll.  
In his book, Thai Agriculture: Golden Cradle of Millennia, Falvey (2000) argues for 
the centrality of rice-based agriculture to understanding the emergence of the Tai 
cultural norms that fostered the development of the pre-modern nation. Control of 
rice fields and the resident tax paying population provided the early state with the 
vital resources of food surpluses, revenue and manpower to permit military 
expansionism, he notes, supporting the interpretations of a number of other authors 
(e.g. Yano, 1978; Cohen, 1992; Brummelhuis, 2005). Rice cultivation is still seen as 
playing a central role in community formation, development of civil leadership 
amongst water managers and forming the foundations of national administrative 
structures. Falvey (2000:84) notes, “(t)o belittle the links between wet rice culture 
and Thai culture leads to an erroneous interpretation behind agricultural and 
developmental change, and even the Thai world-view”. He highlights the range of 
ceremonies and beliefs in the Tai culture (many of which endure to the present day) 
that are related to the assumed links between a productive agricultural system and 
water management, some that are more closely derived from animism and 
Brahminism than Buddhist traditions. Yano (1978) has conceptualised Thailand, not 
simply as a rice-growing society (Ishii, 1978), but as a “rice-growing state”, and 
argues that the complex of traits inherent in such a classical state have partially 
survived into modern times, if one accepts the presumption of a continuity of history. 
Scott (2009) goes further and argues that fixed-field grain (i.e. wet rice) agriculture 
promoted by the state has historically been the basis of its power. 
                                                   
70 This utopian philosophy espoused by the king has been systematically incorporated by state 
planners as a prominent part of the national development vision over the last decade. It is discussed in 
further detail below.  
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This historical continuity with the past is tangible through interpretations of  the 
“Ramkhamhaeng Inscription” 71, an iconic symbol of Thai nationhood, taught to 
every primary school child as a literal description of thirteenth century society that 
retains contemporary relevance (Mulder, 1997). As a passage from an official 
biography by The National Identity Board (2000:55) states, “the basis for the great 
respect shown to Thai sovereigns was laid with the loving paternalistic nature 
ascribed to the great monarch of the period, Pho Khun Ramkhamhaeng”. The most 
famous passage from the stone inscription reads:  
“In the time of King Ramkhamhaeng, this land of Sukhothai is thriving. 
In the water there is fish, in the fields there is rice.”  
This apocryphal passage is frequently adopted by a variety of actors
72
 in public 
discourse, appearing in official publications, books, speeches, TV shows, radio 
programmes, etc, as historical metaphor for an innately productive agricultural Thai 
kingdom, linking the categories of water, rice and national prosperity together, under 
a benevolent patrimonial monarchy. Read as an ideological treatise, it provides the 
backdrop for more modern interpretations of the fundamental nature of Thai history, 
culture, state governance system, the monarchy and ultimately, notions of Thai-ness. 
It has been interpreted as Thailand’s “first constitution” (Pramoj, 1990), and used by 
elite ideologues to build an image of ancient liberality, where relative freedom, 
commerce, welfare and responsive government prevailed (Connors, 2008). Yet the 
provenance of the inscription has been called into question by some historians in 
recent years to challenge what Rigg and Ritchie (2002:361) described as, “a central 
column in the edifice of Thai nationhood”, and the mere suggestion that its historical 
authenticity might be questionable led to threats of litigation, deportation and 
physical harm against the scholars (Reynolds, 2006). 
Building nations around idealized visions of an agriculturally-based society under a 
benevolent king and ruler has ancient precedents in China, where according to 
Sellman (2002:76) “the means by which the early sage kings led their people was to 
put agriculture before all other affairs.....the reason why Hou Ji undertook agriculture 
                                                   
71 The Ramkhamhaeng Inscription refers to text found on a stele discovered in Sukhothai during the 
reign of Rama IV (1851 – 1868), supposedly dating back to 1292.  
72 These have ranged from government officials, Thai academics, to staff of domestic and 
international NGOs engaged in Thailand (personal observations). Rigg and Ritchie (2001) maintain it 
adorns the opening pages of more books on Thailand than any other single quote, a position I would 
be inclined to concur with. 
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was because he considered it to be the root of instructing the masses”. Associated 
with peasant utopian communitariansim and egalitarianism in early Chinese agrarian 
philosophy, the ideology of “agriculturalism” has also been termed the School of 
Agrarianism (Deutsch and Bontekoe, 1997). It was based upon a notion of “people’s 
natural propensity to farm” and resonates with associations of irrigated agriculture to 
civilization and a moral ideal of farming, noted in several other examples by Molle 
et al. (2009d:331). I would argue that under King Bhumibol’s symbolic, spiritual and 
paternal guidance, the Thai state has shown a strong preponderance towards 
ideologically advocating a return to agriculturalism, despite an empirical socio-
economic divergence from its past, of which irrigationalism is a vital component. 
The primordial elite fascination with constructing an imaginary agricultural nation is 
tangibly expressed in many contemporary state programmes and policies, perhaps 
the most profound of which has been the royal-backed philosophy of Sufficiency 
Economy
73
, which has been incorporated into the last three National Economic and 
Social Development Plans (Intravisit, 2005; National Economic and Social 
Development Board, Undated), but also includes a bias towards promoting a 
irrigation development paradigm. Further, I would posit that irrigational worldviews 
form an indispensible link with utopian agriculturalist visions, with implications 
towards collective national self-identity and the public imagination regarding 
development pathways (cf. Anderson, 2006). 
Indeed, elite constructed images and narratives of irrigated rice farming in Thai 
society as a morally virtuous and indispensable part of the national psyche are 
commonplace (Rigg and Ritchie, 2002). For some scholars, this is not just a case of 
“the state imposing its own notion of people’s identities on rural inhabitants”, 
however, as often urban dwellers working in a factory or hotel throughout Southeast 
Asia will identify themselves as rice farmers and villagers, points out Rigg 
(2003:197) allowing for an agency-related explanation. Indeed, I encountered a 
version of this phenomenon during fieldwork, when taxi drivers and other industrial 
or service sector workers met in Bangkok, still described themselves as chao naa 
(rice farmers) or kasetagon tamada (ordinary farmers), even when they had not sown 
or harvested rice for many years and their main connection with the village was an 
                                                   
73 For critiques of the Sufficiency Economy philosophy both practically and rhetorically, refer to 
works by Walker (2010), Isager and Ivarsson (2010) and Intravisit (2005). 
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annual trip “home” over New Year holidays. However, a more structurally oriented 
analysis might suggest that the individual’s identification as a rice farmer, even when 
patently not their main occupation, could be explained by the existence of a 
dominant ideology producing an “imagined community” of primordial rice farmers 
as part of a distinctly nationalist discourse. 
 
5.3.2 Muang fai irrigation and Thai nationalism 
 
Irrigated agriculture is one of the “stereotypically core elements of Thai national 
culture”, asserts Walker (2003:943). Perhaps there is no other agricultural 
technology and social practice in which constructions of Thai nationalism are more 
clearly articulated than in narratives surrounding the system of irrigation found in 
northern Thailand known as “muang fai”74. As argued in Chapter 2, these have often 
been idealized as evidence of an unbroken record of community-based irrigation 
practices stretching back over seven hundred years, when the nation’s first irrigation 
laws and regulations were codified in what Surarerks (2006) refers to as “Mangrai 
Sart” 75, after the monarch of the day. Present day laws and regulations known as 
“sanya muang fai” are supposedly descended from the older codes, detectable in the 
wording of the People’s Irrigation Act of 1939 and the National or State Irrigation 
Act of 1942
76
, maintains Surarerks (2006). They are portrayed, in Surarerks’ (2006) 
description, as localized and democratic decision-making systems that symbolize an 
innate and ancient Thai skill and ability in water resources management, that offer 
reassurance about local communities holding out against the advances of 
modernization. According to Ounvichit (2005), the muang fai weirs and water 
distribution canals were built and maintained communally because investment in a 
weir was beyond the capacity of an individual household and therefore communal 
cooperation and coordination over water allocation decisions was a necessity.  
                                                   
74 Refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2, for an articulation of debates over muang fai governance systems 
with respect to hydraulic society theory. 
75 Punishments for certain offences were reportedly severe. For example, “non-participation in the 
cooperative work of maintenance of the irrigation system while secretly taking water for private use 
was considered a grave crime against society and was punishable by the state. The prescribed 
punishment for a first offender was clubbing about the head or a fine of 110 ngoen; for a second 
offence it was death. Such was the state authority in the management of irrigation” (Ishii, 1978:23). 
76 Both these laws, although updated somewhat since, form the basis of Thailand’s present irrigation 
legal code. 
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In the modern context, the muang fai  model of irrigation has frequently been 
portrayed as a resilient example of “polycentric governance”, community 
cooperation, local wisdom and social cohesion (e.g. Tan-Kim-Yong et al., 2005); 
masking a more complex reality, argues Neef (2008). In contrast to the popular view 
concerning devolved muang fai systems, Cohen (1992) argues that the state has 
substantially intervened in controlling this form of irrigation and circumscribed 
peasant autonomy to extract surplus at various times, particularly during the 
nineteenth century on royally accumulated lands. Hirsch (1997) asserts that muang 
fai narratives act as an “ideological base” for indigenous environmentalism, given its 
identification with local, traditional and ecologically-sound approaches to natural 
resources management.  Perversely, the narratives have also been co-opted by 
elements within the hydrocracies seeking to strengthen legitimacy claims for a 
historical monarchical role in national irrigation development. In this way, the 
discourse tends to feed nationalist sentiments of a latent Thai superiority in 
decentralized water resources management practices that closely matches the 
dominant ideology of irrigationalism. As Molle (2003) contended, there has been a 
tendency by defenders to extrapolate the scale, geographical setting and historical 
context of muang fai systems to other locations, even including large state-run 
irrigation schemes, leading to misconceived analyses.  
Thus, I would argue that muang fai irrigation systems represent the epitome of 
utopian constructions of Thailand being an agricultural nation at heart and Thai 
people essentialized as default communitarian wet-rice irrigators, that remains one of 
the core worldviews of officially-sanctioned Thai-ness. Simultaneously with the 
widespread promotion of an imagined traditional past and constructed present based 
on elite claims of farmers forming the “backbone of the nation”77, is enacted the 
apparently contradictory state project of modernization and development. In the late 
twentieth century, nowhere was this repeated elite claim more apparent than in the 
“arid and impoverished” Northeast region (more detailed discussion is provided in 
Chapter 5), where it was ordained that modern development, symbolized most 
forcefully by roads and irrigation infrastructure construction, would “increase 
                                                   
77 According to Rigg and Ritchie (2002), Thai children are taught from their earliest years in school 
that farmers represent “the backbone of the country”, along with the special character of farmers, 
farming and rural areas. They give two salient examples in northern Thailand of post-productivism 
and consumption of rural landscapes by urban elites to recreate an idealised past for modern corporate 
profit. 
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production and make the farmers happy” (Chaloemtiarana, 2007:168). I now turn 
considerations of how the modern state mission of “development” expressed itself 
through adoption of an irrigation development discourse within a broader ideology 
of development. 
 
5.3.3 Rise of a development ideology – developmentalism 
 
This section offers some brief reflections on how Thai-style developmentalism 
emerged as an important state ideology in the latter half of the twentieth century, and 
more specifically, some reasons for the enduring primacy of an irrigation 
development discourse within the wider ideological framework. I begin by sketching 
possible historical origins of “developmentalism” in modern Thailand. It has been 
proposed by Nartsupha (1999) that modern developmentalism in Thailand 
commenced during the regime of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, a period 
characterized by “developmental authoritarianism” that served the interests of a 
“parasitic capitalism”. Similarly, London (1977) argued that the state’s strategy in 
the Northeast provided a prime example of what he called “development as social 
control”, defined as a form of “neoparasitism”, reflecting the dominance and needs 
of a Bangkok-based elite in defining and determining what kind of development was 
provided to the periphery. Sarit promoted development “both as an economic goal to 
be pursued and an ideology on which the legitimacy of the government was based”, 
in the words of Keyes (1989:76). The two basic ideological tenets of Sarit’s regime 
were the notion of pattiwat (loosely translated as “revolution”) and pattanaa 
(meaning development or modernization), argues Chaloemtiarana (2007). Sarit’s 
pattiwat, however, was at variance to Western concepts of revolution that involve 
major social, political and economic reforms, but was more closely equated to 
“reactionary”, insofar as it was used to encourage political atavism. A new political 
orthodoxy emerged under Sarit, based on a three-tier socio-political system defined 
in terms of rat/rattabaan (state/government), khaaraatchagan (bureaucracy), and 
prachaachon (the people). Sarit’s policies and development programmes became 
part of a political system, “aimed at maintaining the boundaries between hierarchical 
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sectors while the process of pattanaa was applied; pattanaa was meant to reinforce 
pattiwat” (Chaloemtiarana, 2007:9).   
A number of scholars have given prominence to the influence of a strongly state-led 
“developmentalism” ideology on cross-scalar societal transformation in rural 
Thailand. Hirsch (1990), for example, believes that it supported the penetration of 
the village by the state and capital that precipitated a reorientation of power 
structures and changes in the relations of agrarian production. He argues that apart 
from a traditionally virulently anti-communist stance, the most obvious element of 
the Thai state’s development ideology was a rhetorical call for modernization78. In 
agriculture, this implied a shift from subsistence oriented production towards more 
capital and external input-based farming, which included the intensification of 
irrigation use and a shift away from an ill-defined, rain-fed agriculture
79
. Hirsch 
(1990:12), adopting the language of neo-Marxism, summarized state rural 
development ideology as one, “that promotes capitalist transformation and state 
penetration as a path from poverty to prosperity, from isolation to integration, from 
backwardness to civilization.” An emphasis on water resources development 
strategies has been at the forefront of the state’s rural development ideology for over 
a century, argues Sneddon (2000). He takes a stance that the Thai state’s prevailing 
philosophy with regards to regional development is one that privileges rapid capital 
accumulation (primarily at the national and trans-national levels) and enhances 
government legitimacy. As a result of state-initiated development’s penetration into 
the village sphere, there has been a fundamental transformation of village institutions 
and social relations, laying the groundwork for adoption of state functions and 
monetized relations. In some respects, development in Thailand assumed the 
discursive mantle of “civilization” and became a master trope - “a master discourse 
with its theory, practice and institutional location”, argued Turton (1991:5) 
  
 
                                                   
78 Modernization theories usually outline development in terms of a progressive transformation 
towards technologically more complex and integrated forms of modern society (e.g. Long and Long, 
1992).  
79 What the state defines as “rain-fed agriculture” would quite closely align with Wittfogel’s 
definition of hydroagriculture, which may include many types of small-scale irrigation, essentially 
ignored by the state’s narrow purview, as noted in Chapter 2.  
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5.3.4 Sarit and water resources development 
 
In this section I argue that under the self-styled autocratic and paternalistic “pho-
khun” regime of Field Marshall Sarit, a model of development was promoted that 
stressed above all else the construction of roads and water resources infrastructure, 
supposedly for alleviating rural poverty and modernizing the nation. The same 
ideological model has more or less remained intact ever since the early 1960s and 
still essentially forms the basis of national and local development policies and 
practices for the rural periphery. The resilience and longevity of the associated 
discourse is quite remarkable under the circumstances and it is suggested that its 
foundations are grounded in the same elite constructions of Thai nationhood alluded 
to in the previous sections.  
Sarit devoted much of his early Prime Ministership to drafting and promulgating a 
National Economic Development Plan (NEDP) and made it clear in public speeches 
that his “revolutionary” government was committed to national development, albeit 
conditioned by a highly conservative outlook on Thai society, notes Chaloemtiarana 
(2007). Following an initial inspection tour of Northeast Thailand between 28 March 
to 12 April, 1960 “to see for myself the true conditions of the country” 80, Sarit 
returned to Bangkok convinced that the two most urgent needs of the population 
were increased water resources and road infrastructure. Chaloemtiarana (2007) states, 
“[I]n all his other speeches made after inspection tours, these two necessary 
conditions for development were always mentioned.” Regarding the importance of 
water resources and linking it to imperatives of local health and prosperity, Sarit 
declared: 
 “Water is a very important problem. I have noticed that in provinces 
where there is an abundance of water, the people in those provinces 
have bright faces, fresh and clean skins, and plants and food flourish, 
resulting in the prosperity of that province.”    
(Speech by Sarit Thanarat on April 12, 1960, cited in Chaloemtiarana, 
2007:153) 
                                                   
80 It should be noted that this visit coincided with the height of the hot and dry season when visible 
water resources would naturally have been at their most scarce, and the impression gained would have 
been quite different from a visit made a few months before or after. 
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Interpreting this narrative of inter-linked water abundance and prosperity (and its 
corollary), one could easily picture how the desiccated provinces of Northeast 
Thailand, viewed through the distorted lens of a late dry season visit, would have 
presented a stark contrast to the green, fertile and water-rich lower Chao Phraya delta, 
or indeed much of the Central Plains, the South and the North of Thailand for 
members of an urban-based, bureaucratic elite (see Chapter 6 for more detailed 
analysis of water scarcity constructions of the Northeast). Turton (1991) observed 
that development in Thailand is often equated with notions of “civilization” 
(khwaam ben sivilai) and “prosperity” (khwaam jaroeun), and that an isolated rural 
village lacking good roads, electricity, telephone links, tap water system and a 
modern irrigation system, would represent the corollary of these material indicators. 
Moreover, Sarit was well known for his rhetorical love of “cleanliness and 
orderliness” (Wyatt, 2003:280) and issued several edicts designed to instil these 
desirable characteristics in the population (Yano, 1978). Hence, it is not difficult to 
envisage that orderly, straight canals and hierarchically-managed irrigation systems 
of the Central Plains in which everyone contributed according to their ordained 
station, would have been emblematic of a higher aesthetic for the nation than chaotic 
hydroagricultural systems that dominated in the Northeast (cf. Scott, 1998). Simply 
stated, scientific, double-cropped rice irrigation methods provided a vision of order, 
progress, civilization and productivity over the chaos of uncultivated wetlands, 
jungle (paa thuan) and uncivilized unproductive “rainfed” or upland rice farming 
practices predominating in the Northeast; similarly reflected in early twentieth 
century Western visitors’ regional narratives (see Chapter 6, Section 6.5).  
Regarding agricultural development priorities, Sarit expressed few doubts that the 
government’s development policies and plans should concentrate on nurturing 
contented peasant farmers to play the vital roles of feeding and propping up the 
nation from the bottom rung of the social hierarchy. Constructing larger and greater 
numbers of state irrigation systems was an integral part of a strategy to achieve his 
utopian goals. Below is an excerpt from a speech Sarit made to members of the 
Farmer’s Youth Organization: 
“In the past, we held the belief that the life of a farmer is a lowly lot, 
without any chance for progress or wealth. But now, conditions have 
changed immensely. The study of agriculture has progressed to the 
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point where farming can produce wealth and happiness. The world has 
given agriculture more prestige; nations attest that farmers are the 
most important sector of society constituting the nation’s backbone, 
the nation’s nourisher......The government, and myself in particular, 
have given great consideration to the farmer, we are improving and 
supporting agriculture by carrying out irrigation and water supply 
programs, by improving and creating transportation facilities, 
improving public health, and carrying out community development 
projects to increase the return farmers earn from their labor.”    
(Speech by Sarit Thanarat on 4 May, 1960, cited in Chaloemtiarana, 
2007:153) 
As previously noted, narratives constructing farmers as the “nation’s backbone” have 
remained commonplace to the present and may be heard in the speeches and texts of 
state leaders, bureaucrats, politicians and local leaders; and indeed were occasionally 
encountered during fieldwork interviews (see quote in Chapter 8, Section 8.5.2). 
However, Sarit’s views were not simply an expression of home-grown nationalist 
fervour for modernization, progress and prosperity by extending benevolent state-led 
developmentalism out to the margins. They should also be understood in the context 
at the time of a growing national and regional securitization discourse, embedded in 
the ideological and material concerns of Cold War geo-politics and the politics of 
foreign development aid.  
 
5.3.5 United States influences on Thai developmentalism 
 
Thailand, of course, was not an island and Sarit’s regime coincided with the rapid 
expansion of economic and strategic interests of the United States and Western allies 
in promoting a dogma of free-market capitalism, accompanied by efforts to contain 
perceived threats posed by the spread of communism across East and Southeast Asia. 
After the end of World War Two, the US government cultivated Thailand as a close 
regional ally and client state within the “free world” camp of nations. To maintain its 
regional hegemony, it concentrated on reviving and strengthening military rule in 
Thailand, which had faltered during the domestic political instability of the late 
114 
 
1940s and early 1950s
81
, with the frequent leadership changes raising questions 
about the loyalties of certain factions to liberal democracy and Western values 
(Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). Sarit, in contrast to his fascist-leaning predecessor 
Phibun, promised a more Western-oriented regime by welcoming a World Bank 
mission to Thailand soon after his first coup. The World Bank, through its 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) arm, became a key 
player in securing US interests by financing development aid programmes and 
designing a parallel plan to that of the Thai government’s National Economic 
Development Plan (1961-1966). It was instrumental in establishing a new 
bureaucratic structure for promoting development, including a planning board (the 
Board of Investment), a budget bureau, investment promotion machinery and a 
restructured central bank. The Thai ruling circles were quick to realize that their 
previous strategy of regional exploitation and neglect was potentially counter-
productive and they turned to embrace the international ideology of 
developmentalism as much out of self-interest as any welfare concerns towards the 
subjects of development in the Northeast (London, 1977). It did imply, however, that 
the periphery was no longer seen as marginal to elite interests and a greater degree of 
reciprocity resulted. 
While Sarit’s initial vision for national development emphasized achieving gan 
pattana through public welfare and infrastructure development projects focused 
primarily on “roads and water”, as the security situation in Indochina changed, so 
Sarit’s government felt more obliged to accommodate the regional concerns of the 
US government, both as an ideological ally, but also as a willing recipient of vast 
quantities of development and military aid (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005; 
Chaloemtiarana, 2007). Hence, there was a discernible shift in the national 
development plan from a primarily domestic orientation to laying far more emphasis 
on national and regional security in light of the spread of communism. Thus, the 
previously neglected Northeastern provinces facing Indochina subsequently became 
the areas receiving greatest state attention, with improvements in communications 
and water resources infrastructure a top priority. Much of the aid was initially 
channelled to and through the Thai armed forces (Chaloemtiarana, 2007), and 
                                                   
81 Between August 1945 and April 1948 alone, there were seven changes in Prime Minister and nearly 
as many coup d’états. 
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implemented under the guise of “rural development”, which was then used to 
support a government programme of suppression, stabilization and 
counterinsurgency (London, 1977).  
Examining the spending priorities in the government’s national economic 
development plan and that of the IBRD (see Table 5.1), it is interesting to note how 
the plans differed in several key aspects, with apart from the significant difference in 
spending on “Industry” (the US preferred the private sector to lead industrial 
investment), perhaps one of the most striking disparities being a three times greater 
proportional budget allocation request for the “Agriculture and Irrigation” sector in 
the Thai NEDP. While some sectors were roughly similar (e.g. Communications and 
Social Welfare), the Thai planners evidently placed far more emphasis on the 
importance of agriculture and irrigation investment than their IBRD counterparts, of 
which the vast majority would surely have been invested on irrigation infrastructure 
development (as is the case in the present day with RID which still secures 
approximately half of the MoAC’s annual budget)  
Sector IBRD % 
Thai NEDP 
(1961-66) 
% 
Agriculture and Irrigation 255 9 542 28 
Industry 50 2 267 14 
Energy 620 22 - - 
Communications 1,035 38 617 33 
Social welfare 483 17 346 18 
Public works 330 12 128 7 
TOTAL 2,773 100 1,900 100 
(Source: Adapted from Chaloemtiarana (2007:169) 
Table 5.1  Comparison of IBRD and the Thai government’s Six Year 
Plan for expenditure, 1962 (in millions of US dollars
82
) 
According to Chaloemtiarana (2007), 52 % of the United States Operation Mission 
(USOM) funds between 1951-1962 were spent on roads, compared to 9.5 % on 
agriculture / irrigation, while Thai government counterpart funds were primarily 
targeted towards “social welfare” (49 %), followed by “agriculture and irrigation” 
                                                   
82 Chaloemtiarana’s (2007:169) Table 5 from which this data is taken gives the budgetary unit as 
“thousands of dollars”, which is likely to be far too low by several orders of magnitude, so I have 
adjusted this to millions of dollars, which I believe more truly reflects the budget figures indicated. 
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(28 %), matching the proportional figure in the NEDP data above. By 1964, with 
increasing influence over Thailand development strategies by the US government
83
, 
spending on communications had slumped to just 1 % of the total, while the top two 
priorities became social welfare (51 %) and community development (39 %), with 
“agriculture and irrigation” slipping to just 7 % of the total budget funds 
(Chaloemtiarana, 2007). Nevertheless, data provided by Floch et al (2007), shows 
that a US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) “Northeast Thailand Tank Project”, which 
ran between 1951 – 1963 building storage reservoir irrigation systems in conjunction 
with the RID increased irrigable area from near zero to about 40,000 ha in the space 
of twelve years. 
One strand of regional developmental critique has linked the rise of irrigational-type 
thinking in Thailand to the hegemony of the United States hydraulic mission, in 
particular the USBR and the Army Corps of Engineer’s efforts to regulate the 
Mekong mainstream, whom it is claimed, “transplanted their ‘culture of irrigation’ to 
Asia, particularly to Thailand where American influence was greater” (Molle et al., 
2009a:271). However, such a position would presuppose that such a “culture of 
irrigation” did not already exist in Thailand and the US technical and financial 
assistance was the precursor of a societal appetite for irrigation technology and 
discourse. This may well be the case, at least as far as the technological possibilities 
of irrigation expansion opened up by US assistance and the seemingly limitless use 
of water resources provided by the vast hydraulic schemes of the American West 
(Reisner, 1986; Worster, 1992),  but taking a less Occidental view of history, might 
suggest that the Thai irrigational ideology had much stronger links with Indian and 
Chinese variants of hydraulic society and irrigationalism that far predated any mid-
twentieth century Western ideological imports. Indeed, these are the states which 
nurtured two of the cradles of hydraulic society proposed by Wittfogel (1957) and 
historically have been far more influential to Thai society in terms of culture.  
This is not to dismiss or underestimate the impact that several decades of Western 
cultural, technological and economic hegemony had on fervently nationalistic 
leaders during the post-World War Two decades of developmentalism, but it does 
                                                   
83 Between 1950 and 1970, Thailand was reported receiving $615.7 million in foreign loans, of which 
the World Bank was the largest donor (56.3 %) and the US government the largest bilateral donor 
nation (15.9 %). Against this, the US government provided $403.6 in technical assistance to Thailand 
or 78.2 % of all grants in the same period (Floch et al, 2007).  
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raise questions about the degree to which irrigationalist thinking was “transplanted” 
from outside Thailand’s borders or was already a latent force that just required the 
right catalyst (mostly a mixture of political will, capital and technical expertise) to be 
realized. Perhaps it would just be fair to surmise that the US-exported variant seeds 
of hydraulic society and irrigational discourse fell on fertile ground when 
transplanted to the awakening hydraulic state of Thailand, given its historical past, 
especially given the cover that the Indochina War and threat of communism provided 
to the Bangkok-based elite to cement their control in the Northeast, partly using 
irrigation development “to win hearts and minds”84  (cf. Biggs, 2006). 
 
5.3.6 A static discourse in a changing world 
 
Interestingly, if the Cold War era economic development data is compared with 
contemporary budgetary spending priorities at both central and local government 
levels some recurrent patterns emerge, albeit set within quite different geo-political 
and economic contexts. To illustrate the point, I refer to aspects of the national 
budget allocation patterns of the 2008 - 2011 coalition government of Prime Minister 
Abhisit Vejajiva
85
. The Democrat Party-led government introduced an economic 
stimulus programme, known as the Thai Khem Kaeng Programme (see Footnote 12, 
Chapter 1), that was anticipated would kick-start the faltering economy by 
channelling funds to both local development projects in the provinces through 
various ministries and to large-scale infrastructure “mega projects”, principally 
transportation, water resources and energy development. The entire scheme, 
reportedly worth over US$ 30 billion in May 2009
86
 (see Table 5.2), required the 
government to borrow funds from domestic debt markets and by entering into 
public-private financial partnerships, supplemented by the regular national budget 
funds (Asian Development Bank, 2010). In rural areas, a rapid expansion of roads 
                                                   
84 This phrase is most closely associated with Lyndon B. Johnson (US President 1963-69) who 
frequently used it in speeches to indicate that America should use soft power techniques, including 
infrastructural development programmes, alongside tools of violence and coercion to bring Third 
World citizens under its sphere of control.  
85 Abhisit Vejajiva, as leader of the Democrat Party, rose to the Prime Minister’s post after a 
prolonged period of political instability, following the military coup of September 2006 and a series 
of short-lived premierships marking the return of the military to prominence in political affairs.  
86 By October 2009, the stimulus package was reported to have increased to 1.43 trillion baht (c. 
US$ 42 billion), which represented 5 % of GDP per year, according to an Asian Development Bank 
report (Asian Development Bank, 2010) 
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and irrigation projects was seen as a top priority for providing a short-term 
employment fillip and a long-term boost to productivity, thereby boosting GDP 
growth and reducing poverty. Water resources and agriculture projects received the 
second largest share of the planned budget, and although it was uncertain exactly 
how much funding was earmarked directly for irrigation projects, other proxy 
indicators at the macro and micro-scales suggest it was probably most. Such 
budgetary allocations tend to validate the timeless nature of Sarit’s narratives 
concerning the importance of water resources and roads for national development, at 
least in the discourse and practices of national scions, whether in the executive or 
legislative branches. 
Economic Sector 
Budget allocated 
(million baht) 
$ equivalent
87
 
(million US$) 
% 
Transport and logistics 
projects 
571,523 16,329 53.6 
Water resources and 
agriculture projects 
238,515 6,815 22.4 
Education projects 137,975 3,942 12.9 
Public Health projects 99,399 2,840 9.3 
Basic tourism infrastructure 
development 
18,537 530 1.7 
Total budget 1,065,949 30,456 99.9 
(Source: Website of Krungthep Thurakit: 
http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/2009/05/07/news_28695623.php?news_id=28695623 
Accessed 7 May, 2009 and translated by author)  
Table 5.2. Approved government expenditure for the “Thai Khem Kaeng” 
Economic Stimulus Programme, Phase 2 (2009-2012), listed by economic sector. 
Such budgetary priorities biased towards infrastructure development is not solely 
restricted to the national level, but is mirrored right down to local levels of 
government, especially the Sub-District or Tambon Administration Organizations 
(TAO)
88
, with roads tending to attract an even greater proportion of the overall 
budget. Such a characteristic is not in the least anomalous with the structure of a 
hydraulic society, but indeed was regarded as a defining feature by Wittfogel, where 
                                                   
87 The currency conversion is based on an approximate rate of 1 US$ = 35 baht in May 2009 
88 TAOs (Ongkan Borihaan Suan Tambon) are local government entities that were established under a 
national agenda of decentralization following the 1999 Decentralization Plan and Transition Act. 
TAOs are tasked with administration at the sub-district level, made up of elected legislative and 
executive branches that reports to the Local Administration Department, under the powerful Ministry 
of Interior. 
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the agro-managerial state as a whole were seen as “great builders” of both hydraulic 
and non-hydraulic structures (see Chapter 2). To illustrate this significant hydraulic 
society-oriented characteristic (and I believe the pattern is broadly reflective across 
rural Northeast Thailand), I have selected one out of the three sub-district localities 
in which my research was situated as an example, namely Naa Hua Bor Sub-District, 
Phanna Nikhom District, Sakon Nakhon (Table 5.3). The category headings shown 
are used by local authorities (TAOs) in accordance with nationally determined 
priority strategies, with the category “Basic infrastructure development” used to 
denote infrastructure construction projects. In Naa Hua Bor Sub-District 65.5 % of 
the entire planned 86 million baht budget for 2009-2012 was devoted to the 
construction of such projects, with “Management of good local development” 
(12.1 %) and “Public health development” (6.2 %), coming in a poor second and 
third places respectively. “Natural resources and environment development” projects 
were allocated a paltry 0.4 % of the budget by comparison. Every strategy is couched 
in terms of gan pattana (development), which often implies some form of physical 
construction is required to be considered genuine gan pattanaa, in the mindsets of 
local officials and politicians (refer to Chapter 8 for examples).  
Strategy Number of 
projects 
Budget 
(million baht) 
US$ 
equivalent
89
 
% 
Basic infrastructure 
development 
214 56.603 1,664,794 65.5 
Poverty eradication 55 2.666 78,412 3.1 
Economic development 30 2.530 74,412 2.9 
Human resources 
development 
148 4.771 140,324 5.5 
Tourism development 50 3.772 110,941 4.4 
Management of good local 
development 
67 10.455 307,500 12.1 
Public health development 41 5.347 157,265 6.2 
Natural resources and 
environment development 
8 0.330 9,706 0.4 
TOTAL BUDGET 613 86.474 2,543,353 100 
(Source: Naa Hua Bor Sub-District Administrative Organization, 2010) 
Table 5.3. Naa Hua Bor Sub-District Administration Organization (TAO), Sakon 
Nakhon province, strategic budget plan for period 2009-2012 
                                                   
89 Based on an exchange rate in June 2009 of approx. 34 B / US$ 
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Within the category “Basic infrastructure development”, when disaggregated (Table 
5.4), the proposed projects for budget allocation locally indicated that 70.8 % was 
ear-marked for building roads, associated drainage structures and their maintenance, 
followed by “water resources development” (including both agricultural and 
domestic supplies) at 15.5 % and “electricity and telecommunications system” 
development at 13.7 %. It should be stressed that examination of the TAO budget 
plans for all three case study sub-districts reflected similar spending priorities. 
Development target Number of 
projects 
Budget 
(million baht) 
US$  
equivalent
90
 
% 
Road and drainage pipe 
construction and 
maintenance  
92 40.092 1,179,176 70.8 
Electricity and 
communications system 
development 
48 7.760 228,235 13.7 
Water sources development 
for agriculture and domestic 
consumption 
74 8.751 257,382 15.5 
TOTAL 214 56.603 1,664,794 100 
(Source: Naa Hua Bor Sub-District Administrative Organization, 2010) 
Table 5.4  Naa Hua Bor TAO budget plan for implementing the “Basic 
infrastructure development” strategy (2009-2012) 
An overview of the water resources development projects listed in the sub-district 
development plan for Naa Hua Bor TAO indicated that the majority were described 
as “dredging projects”, apparently to widen and deepen streams, ponds and other 
water sources for consumptive use, that ranged in cost from 100,000 baht up to two 
million baht per project, and the construction of a number of “weirs”, identically 
priced at 200,000 baht each (Naa Hua Bor Sub-District Administrative Organization, 
2010), suggesting none of these projects had been actually field surveyed or 
quantified in advance of inclusion in the plan, but followed an external agency-
driven logic of one-size fits all cost estimation where the environment is required to 
accommodate a given technology, irrespective of suitability and “fit” (see Chapter 8, 
Section 8.5 for an example of this policy in practice).   
                                                   
90 Based on an exchange rate in June 2009 of approx. 34 B / US$ 
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The similarity in development sector spending priorities of government 
organizations from national down to local levels indicated in the cases above reflects 
a certain determinism in development discourse and practice that reinforces claims 
of a certain fixity or atavism in state approaches to development. And as pointed out 
by one civil society critic of state water resources development policies, local 
officials tend to share the same mindset as those at the centre, so it makes little 
difference to the development outcome which agency implements the project, as the 
actors all share the same basic ideology.   
“....concerning water issues, decentralizing power from the centre to 
Tambon Administration Organisations, up to now has only occurred to 
a certain extent; that is only with regard to small-scale water resources. 
But this has provided no benefits at all, as following decentralization, 
TAO officials still think exactly the same way as people at the central 
level. That is, the TAOs have projects in villages, right, but if they still 
are unable to develop small water resources according to the needs of 
local villagers in the local area, it makes no difference whether it’s the 
TAOs work or that of a central agency. It’s still the same.” 
Souce: Montree Chantawong, Project for Ecological Recovery, 
Interviewed 19 November, 2009 
This phenomenon would tend to support a view expressed by Jacobs (1971) that 
Thailand is a state that has modernized, without undergoing genuine “development” 
(i.e. meaning in the civil society and political spheres). Although this analysis was 
made forty years ago and clearly Thailand has undergone massive socio-economic 
transformations since that time, in terms of water resources development it would 
appear the old values and beliefs concerning state-centric development prioritized 
towards roads and water resources infrastructure (particularly irrigation) 
development, have stubbornly persisted. Seen as “technologies of power” (Foucault, 
1980) both roads and irrigation systems have played a crucial role as key tools of 
control used by rulers of hydraulic society in strategies to capture the hearts and 
minds of the “Others within” (Winichakul, 1995) under a strong, unified paternalistic 
developmental state, that extends beyond any utilitarian or productive functions they 
may possess.  
State-led irrigation is a technology par excellence for furthering the project of state 
simplification and legibility (Scott, 1998), especially when employed in combination 
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with road construction and assorted technologies of agricultural intensification and 
modernization foisted on the periphery from the centre. However, there is a key 
difference in the intrinsic nature of these technologies. While roads are generally 
used by a large proportion of the population at whatever scale they are constructed 
and so could be conceived as relatively democratic technologies in terms of access 
(with some exceptions where they may be exclusive), the same cannot be said for 
state-built irrigation systems. Irrigation systems, due to topographic and hydrological 
limitations and the facts of land tenure patterns, inevitably will generally only ever 
supply water to a proportion of the rural population and then often highly inequitably 
amongst users due to a plethora of factors concerning the realities of water allocation 
(e.g. Burns, 1993; Molle, 2003; Mollinga, 2003); irrigation systems can appear to 
represent the antithesis of roads in terms of access and equity. In the vast majority of 
cases of state irrigation systems the author has witnessed throughout Northeast 
Thailand (and all systems may be considered state systems, regardless of scale), 
irrigation can be considered a rather exclusive technology, with more people 
excluded from access than included (see case studies in Chapter 8 for examples). The 
dominance of the irrigation development discourse perhaps remains all the more 
surprising and challenging to explain in rational instrumental terms, without recourse 
to alternative explanations including societal power relations, given the profound 
agrarian shift that has patently occurred and is still ongoing in Thai society, noted by 
Rigg (2001, 2003; 2005), Hirsch (2002) and others. 
 
5.4 Irrigation constructed as “chonla-prathaan” – free water 
gifted from the king  
 
An important conceptual issue that affects the societal status of irrigation and 
understandings thereof, regards the semantics of irrigation development discourse, 
namely that the term commonly used to refer to “irrigation” within Thai society - 
“chonla-prathaan” – and its links to the monarchy (Molle, 2003). Chon or chonla, is 
a noun derived from the Pali-Sanskrit language meaning “water”, while prathaan is 
a royal verb meaning “to give, offer or bestow” (Rigg, 1992). Irrigation water is 
popularly understood for many Thais as a royal handout, given with characteristic 
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benevolence from the monarch to the people
91
, with the state agencies just an 
intermediary. However, this nomenclature for public irrigation is a relatively modern 
state construction. In the early part of the twentieth century, irrigation was known in 
Central Thai as thot-nam, and indeed the irrigation department after 1910 was known 
as grom thot-nam up until the 1930s, when it became the present grom chonla-
prathaan or Royal Irrigation Department (Brummelhuis, 2005). This modern 
linguistic construction has had far-reaching implications about how irrigation is 
perceived by the mass populace and partly explains how the hydraulic bureaucracy 
has been able to command the irrigation discourse and material practices, why 
people are so reluctant to pay a fee for irrigation water (as opposed to domestic water 
supplies, for example) and why irrigation development remains a social domain that 
is closely associated with a benevolent monarchy. The gifting element also implies 
that there must be some reciprocity, whether in terms of gratitude shown to the gifter 
(and his proxies) or more complex forms of power relation inherent in patron-client 
relationships that will become more apparent later (see Chapters 9 and 10 for further 
discussion). The roots of this relationship between gifter and giftees can be traced 
back to pre-modern times. 
According to Molle (2003:229), providing water in Thailand is “traditionally the 
prerogative of the king, who mediates its supply from supernatural forces.”  This 
relationship can tentatively be traced back to the “theocratic hydraulic” regime of the 
Angkor Empire, which was an influential antecedent of the Sukhothai kingdom in 
Thailand, in which water was controlled more for domestic and symbolic or religious 
purposes than for irrigated agriculture (van Liere, 1980; Falvey, 2000). Van Liere 
(1980) draws attention to the efforts of the Khmer kings as incarnate deva raajaa  to 
recreate heaven, as conceived in Indian cosmology, on earth. From a replica of 
Mount Meru at the centre (Angkor) surrounded by a complex of temples and moats, 
the divine kings were able to mobilise pools of labour to build a vast network of 
canals, reservoirs (baaray) and roads, seemingly undeterred by local undulations in 
topography. Where water supply was scarce, it would have likely been reserved for 
sacral purposes and local people had no automatic right to the water, but rather it was 
                                                   
91 One interviewee, a former provincial head of the Nakhon Phanom Agriculture and Cooperatives 
Office, described it thus: “Irrigation in Thai, if you translate directly in Thai, means ‘free’. Because 
‘chonla’ is the water and ‘prathaan’  is the free gift. It’s a gift from the Royal Family. Gift from the 
King. So, ‘chonla-prathaan’ means free. Free water” (Source: Interview with Sansonthi 
Boonyothayan, 24 November, 2009).  
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gifted to them from the king as a symbolic resource, as in the case of Tamil Nadu 
(Mosse, 2003). Following Mosse’s (2003:55) interpretation, “understood in terms of 
kingly acts of gifting, royally instituted grants and privileges, this landscape of tanks 
and channels is a representation of order and authority in rural society; a spatial order 
like others such as modern public buildings or urban spaces imbued with power and 
also the potential for conflict.” 
Water control was central to the development of the Thai state and led to the 
evolution of central governance to manage reliable food surpluses, which “in turn 
allowed political development in religious and/or military guises”, maintained 
Falvey  (2000:74), taking a neo-Wittfogelian position. As Wittfogel himself noted, 
"[A] society which provided unique opportunities for the growth of the governmental 
machine left no room for the growth of a politically and economically independent 
dominant religion. The agro-managerial sovereign cemented his secular position by 
attaching to himself, in one form or another, to the symbols of supreme religious 
authority. In some instances his position is not conclusively theocratic, but this is 
more the exception than the rule. In the majority of all cases hydraulic regimes seem 
to have been either theocratic or quasitheocratic" (Wittfogel, 1957:92). As argued by 
Fong (2009) and others (e.g. Handley, 2006), the present monarchy has been skilled 
at manipulating primordial simulacra derived from the Siamese empire, Buddhism 
and resurrected royal ceremonies, many of which originated from earlier 
Brahmanical rites and have helped to strengthen the king’s status as a modern day 
dhamma-raajaa and deva-raajaa amongst his subjects (see Chapter 10, Section 
10.3). Perhaps the most vivid example was provided by the revival of the Royal 
Ploughing Ceremony (Phuet Mongkhon) under Sarit’s regime in 1960 (see Footnote 
67), enacted by the king whom it is believed could influence the weather patterns 
and crop abundance for the coming agricultural season, as a valuable new source of 
constructed magico-divinity for the throne (Jackson, 2010).  
The symbolic value of royalty, religion and water control is not lost on the main 
modern hydraulic bureaucracies. It can hardly be coincidental, for instance, that 
every member of the present royal family has a large water storage dam named after 
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him or her, with three of them located in the Northeast
92
. A visit to any RID office in 
the provinces or capital will confirm that it places high stock on its royal credentials, 
with images of the king and queen occupying prominent positions on the walls of 
almost every room and outside space, with liberal use of the king’s maxims and 
ideas incorporated into the physical surroundings
93
, as well as official documents and 
reports. Meanwhile the RID’s website is constructed to appear as a virtual shrine of 
homage to King Bhumibol Adulyadej
94
, disseminating and reinforcing popular 
narratives about the relationship between the king as sacral and prophetic “Father of 
Water Resources Management” and the RID as the institutional priests and 
protectors of the hydraulic mission and official doctrine of irrigationalism.  
 
5.5  Officially defined irrigation 
 
As part of its pre-eminent role as official arbiter and mediator of irrigation discourse in 
Thailand, the RID provides the official definition of irrigation and which practices are 
allowed to pass for “chonla-prathaan” (see Box 5.1). The RID makes a simple gross 
distinction between “rainfed” and “irrigated” land and water management practice and status. 
To be considered “irrigated”, the land must lie within the command area of one of the RID 
or another state agency’s constructed schemes, either past or present. The RID system 
implies that land outside an official scheme is by default classified as “rainfed”, regardless 
of its actual status. This, in effect, is a self-referential programme of perpetually 
accumulating total irrigated areas, creating a false impression that ever more “rainfed” land 
is being brought under irrigation, feeding a developmentalist utopian fantasy of continual 
progress and productivity (see Figure 1.1 in the Introduction and Table 5.5 below). Once 
officially classified as “irrigated”, the land apparently never reverts to its former (and 
inferior or less-civilized) “rainfed” status, even if no actual irrigated agriculture takes place 
on the land and crops rely on rainfall for the main water source. Thus, from the perspective 
of official datasets, there would appear to be a gradual, ineluctable historical progression of 
                                                   
92 In Northeast Thailand, the three large dams are named after one of the princesses: Ubon Ratana 
Dam in Khon Kaen province (multipurpose); Sirindhorn Dam in Ubon Ratchatani Province 
(multipurpose); and Chulabhorn Dam in Chaiyaphum Province (hydropower). 
93 An example, was the siting of a large scale model of an idealized “Sufficiency Economy” village 
near the front entrance to the provincial office at the Nakhon Phanom RID and the display of plaques 
citing quotations taken from the king’s speeches regarding water management principles. 
94 For example, visit the following RID webpage (accessed 28 April, 2012): 
http://www.rid.go.th/eng/Irrigation%20Project.html 
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land from “rainfed” to “irrigated”, a trend the hydrocracies seem determined to maintain and 
even accelerate through the promotion of irrigation mega-projects (Chapter 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 1941 1950 1961 1975 1985 1995 2003 2007 
Irrigable area 
(000 ha) 
362.6 612.9 1,580 2,419 3,822 5,004 4,986 6,415 
Irrigated land 
(% of total 
cropland) 
n.d. 10 8 15 19 24 26 34 
Sources: Wijeyewardene, 1973; Department of Water Resources, 2006; Falvey, 2000:150; FAO 
AQUASTAT 2010 website: 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/factsheets/aquastat_fact_sheet_tha_en.pdf, Accessed 5 June 
2012)  
Table 5.5 Data showing officially irrigable areas and percentage of total 
agricultural land under irrigation in Thailand between 1941 and 2009. 
Further, the RID irrigation classification scheme makes a simple functional 
distinction between water source (i.e. “gravity fed” and “pumped”) and the scale (i.e. 
small, medium and large) of system (see Table 5.6 below). RID’s scalar distinction 
simply categorizes according to the theoretical command area of each system and 
Box 5.1  “Irrigation” definitions in Thailand 
The Royal Irrigation Dept (RID) loosely defines irrigation on its website as follows: “Irrigation means the 
supply of water for cultivation to meet crop water requirement. Irrigation work shall consist of two elements: 
it shall be the work carried out by any person to make use of water and such water shall be used for 
cultivation”. Therefore, by its own definition, irrigation practiced by farmers independently of state projects 
should still be categorised as being “irrigated”, yet it fails to recognise their practices and methods in its 
documents, merely accounting for its own projects, no matter whether anyone is in fact utilising them or not, 
or whether any water is delivered in practice. However, it seems that in practical terms RID interprets 
“irrigation” according to the definition laid down by the State Irrigation Act (No. 4) B.E. 2518 (1975), 
“where ‘Irrigation’ means any undertaking carried out by the Royal Irrigation Department to procure water 
or to retain, store, reserve, control, supply, drain or allocate water for agriculture, energy, public utilities or 
industry and includes the prevention of damage caused by water as well as navigation within the Irrigation 
area”. From this definition, it is clear that it has no direct interest in irrigation or wider water management 
practiced outside its own purview and control. This more recent definition of irrigation contradicts older 
ones, such as that expressed in the People’s Irrigation Act B.E.2482 (1939), which states, “’Irrigation’ means 
all kinds of work carried out by any person to supply water from any waterway or any source of water, such 
as, rivers, streams, creeks, swamps, canals, marshes, for cultivation and includes those made for the purpose 
of protecting the cultivation from damage due to water.” Thus, it is apparent that not only is the chief 
irrigation planning and implementing agency using a rather narrow, self-referential and confusing set of 
definitions of irrigation, these definitions are significantly at odds with internationally applied definitions of 
“irrigation”, with the implication that a variety of agricultural water management practices in Thailand are 
poorly understood and overlooked by the RID and other agencies (domestic and international) that rely on it 
for irrigational information. 
(Source of definitions: http://www.rid.go.th/eng/main2_eg.htm, accessed 12 October 2011)  
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certain other criteria, such as cost, length of construction and reservoir capacity. This 
classification system overlooks the wide diversity of de facto irrigation scales, 
practices and technologies employed by farmers in Thailand, which naturally are 
dependent on a wide range of local socio-ecological criteria and choices employed. 
As previously mentioned, within the officially classified “rainfed” areas, there is no 
attempt by the RID to establish actual agricultural water management (AWM) 
practices
95
, which inevitably implies that where farmers are practicing a variety of 
irrigation methods drawing from their own resources (all of which would qualify as 
“irrigation” according to the People’s Irrigation Act definition provided in Box 5.1), 
they are not recognized as irrigators and so remain ineligible for RID water supply 
subsidies, enjoyed by their compatriots under an official chonla-prathaan project.  
Description / 
Category 
Small-scale 
system 
Medium-scale 
system 
Large-scale 
system 
Feasibility study Desk study Full study Full study 
Budgetary approval RID NESDB NESDB 
EIA requirement No Yes Yes 
Construction cost < 100 M baht 100-1,000 M baht > 1,000 M baht 
Construction period 1-2 years 2-5 years >3 years 
Reservoir capacity < 20 Mm
3
 5-100 Mm
3
 >100 Mm
3
 
Irrigation area 0-1,000 rai 1,000-80,000 rai >80,000 rai 
O & M responsibility TAO/PAO Provincial RID O & M central RID 
Acronyms: NESDB = National Economic and Social Development Board; EIA = Environmental 
Impact Assessment; TAO = Tambon or Sub-district Administrative Organization; PAO = Provincial 
Administrative Organization; O & M = Operation and Maintenance 
Table 5.6   RID categorization of irrigation projects in Thailand, based on a 
number of administrative, scalar and budgetary criteria 
Hence, a two-tier classification system for land and farmers has developed in 
Northeast Thailand, which means a small minority of overall farmers located inside 
officially “irrigated” areas generally receive a relatively high level of state subsidy 
for their water supply, while the vast majority classified as “rainfed” farmers are 
excluded from such benefits. Whether the chonla-prathaan farmers do benefit in 
practice varies from project to project, with the larger projects receiving the highest 
relative subsidy. But given the attractive state subsidies for irrigation system 
construction and subsequent operation and maintenance (O & M) costs in addition 
(at least in the case of large and medium systems), and the promise of essentially free 
                                                   
95 Molden (2007) argues that, “it is time to abandon the obsolete divide between irrigated and rainfed 
agriculture”, and instead use the more inclusive term “agricultural water management” to encompass 
a whole range of agricultural water management practices that go beyond this simple polarization. 
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water delivery with a royal cachet attached, then it is hardly surprising that many 
villagers outside the state sanctioned chonla-prathaan systems aspire to be 
incorporated as a recipient of “royally gifted water”, given the discursive power of 
irrigationalism in Thai society.   
Officially recognized “irrigated” areas once calculated by the RID, are subsequently 
uncritically adopted by other state agencies, international organizations and 
commentators. To illustrate one outcome of this tendency, I point to Table 5.2 in 
Mirumachi (2012:90), which shows projected areal data of irrigation areas from 
National Economic and Social Development Plans (i.e. normative targets), itself 
adapted from an RID official’s interpretation, and another table titled “The existing 
irrigation projects located in Mekong Basin” in a report by the Thai National 
Mekong Committee (2009:6), which shows a vast discrepancy (i.e. up to 450 %) 
exists between estimates of numbers of irrigation projects sources from data 
provided by the RID, the DWR and the MRC. One conclusion that can be drawn 
from these observations is that no one agency in Thailand appears to be able to 
accurately quantify: a/ how many irrigation projects exist; and b/ the areal extent of 
land actually irrigated, as opposed to theoretical irrigation command areas.   
 
 
5.6 Irrigation development in practice – lost in translation 
 
As a consequence of the RID’s monopoly of the definition and classification of 
irrigation in Thailand, understandable confusion exists amongst all actors about what 
is and is not allowed to be defined and understood as “irrigation” in practice. This 
became apparent during field interviews - when I mentioned the term “chonla-
prathaan” meant in the general sense of irrigation used in English language, it was 
frequently interpreted in a far narrower sense according to the RID official definition 
(Box 5.1). For example, when I interviewed the District Chief of Agriculture in Sri 
Songkhram District, he assured me there was absolutely no irrigation in the district
96
, 
even though I knew in reality there was plenty of irrigation practiced in the District, 
                                                   
96 The same terminological confusion arose during an interview with Mr Boonhong Chaibin, 
Chairman of Tha Bor Songkhram TAO, on 20 July, 2010.  
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covering several different technologies and spread over a large area
97
. Had I not 
possessed prior knowledge of irrigation semantics and local practices, I might well 
have taken him at his word and written off the existence of irrigation in the district, 
as official data provided by the RID would confirm. When pressed on the issue and 
invited to clarify his response, he tried to explain that what he actually meant was 
that there were no official RID irrigation projects presently in the district, and he had 
interpreted my question in the formal and official sense of the word “chonla-
prathaan”.  He clarified that farmers’ own irrigation methods did not qualify as 
chonla-prathaan and thus did not count as “irrigation” according to the state 
definition:  
“..... there is no water pumping for farmers under a chonla-prathaan 
system, because there are no canals yet. If there was a chonla-prathaan 
system, then you would see another system; there would be reservoirs, 
there would be canals for the farmers. But in the case of Sri Songkhram 
District, there is just pumping water from natural water sources up to the 
area of farmers’ paddies directly. There is not yet a main canal system or 
small distributor canals [khlong sai gai] as such.”  (Source: Interview 
with Jeddy Khotamit, 19 July 2010) 
The implication of this response and subsequent discussion was that farmers 
practicing a variety of agricultural water management methods relying on their own 
initiative and resources (or state-built small reservoirs), were considered outside the 
state-sanctioned irrigation definition of chonla-prathaan, and thus Sri Songkhram 
District was considered still to be fundamentally lacking this symbolic indicator of 
development and progress. Jeddy seemed to believe that it would automatically 
benefit the district’s farmers if they were furnished with supposedly free and 
unlimited water promised by the development of RID-funded chonla-prathaan 
projects, such as the long-planned Nam Songkhram Project (Chapter 8, Section 8.4). 
In effect, such outright denial of the existence of individual or communal farmer-
based irrigation practice from official data and narratives of local irrigation
98
, serves 
                                                   
97 Data for the 2009-10 dry season, indicated that farmers had planted about 7,120 ha of naa prang 
alone, which would be impossible without the benefit of supplementary irrigation (see Chapter 8, 
Table 8.3). 
98 This observation was noted in an unpublished “irrigation scoping study” of the Lower Nam 
Songkhram Basin that identified eight categories of AWM, which found the most sustainable forms of 
irrigation were individual farmer practices where farmers bore the entire costs of water extraction 
themselves, although none of these were acknowledged by RID officials as constituting “irrigation” 
(Promphakping, Piansak and Pholsen, 2005).  
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to silence and exclude empirically-based knowledges and de facto practices which 
might provide viable alternatives to the dominant state mode of irrigation 
development. Such politics of knowledge issues reach to the heart of irrigationalism 
and the power of RID and other hydraulic bureauacracies to construct and 
manipulate irrigationalism as a dominant ideology in Thai society.  
 
5.7 Contemporary political expressions of irrigationalism 
 
Contemporary irrigationalism in Thailand can be conceived as enshrining a set of 
widely held beliefs and values that appear to have fundamentally influenced and 
driven the irrigation development paradigm over the past half century. Superficially, 
as a commonsensical and normative notion about how Thailand ought to develop, it 
appears to bridge class, ethnic and regional divisions, but on closer consideration 
embodies and legitimates the interests of elite groups, thus helping to maintain their 
dominance over subordinate groups and the problematic periphery of the kingdom.  
Irrigationalism has proved to be a powerful state instrument for effectively 
subjugating and simultaneously tantalizing the mass rural populace with an utopian 
vision of a prosperous irrigated rural idyll awaits, most vividly expressed in the 
discourses and imagery of irrigation mega-projects (see Chapter 7 for an example), 
extended by hydrocracies and state policies traditionally, but in recent years has also 
been included in party political manifestos and slogans (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
below for contemporary examples of the continuing prominence of irrigation 
development ideology in national politics
99
). Under the rationale of creating an 
irrigational utopia, the dominant groups benefiting most from the ideology are 
content to use various means to manipulate popular perceptions, including the 
consistent propagation of political media that associate happiness and prosperity with 
irrigated agriculture, demonstrated by several parties in the July 2011 election 
campaign. One political party (Bhumjaithai Party) made extravagant promises of an 
irrigation project in every sub-district and the wealth that would follow to farmers 
from a national irrigation provision programme (Fig. 5.1), while another main 
                                                   
99 Heywood (1992:13) argues that at an operative level, ideologies may take the form of broad 
political movements “engaged in popular mobilization and the struggle for power. Ideology in this 
guise may be expressed in sloganizing, political rhetoric, party manifestos and government policies.”  
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competing party (the Pheua Thai Party of Thaksin Shinawatra’s political network) 
made the promise of constructing a transnational water grid if elected, that would 
banish drought and floods from the nation (Fig. 4.2). It seems the mass rural voters 
of contemporary Thailand have in a way substituted for the labour masses controlled 
under Wittfogel’s ancient hydraulic societies, that while not being forced by corvee 
to dig canals, are still nevertheless being manipulated through more subtle means to 
enable demand for irrigation infrastructure. For the present, it seems Thai engineers 
will continue to imagine there is little they cannot do.  
 
 
5.8  Summary 
 
The Thai form of irrigationalism, as defined here, may be seen to share certain 
conceptual parallels with other identified ideologies based on irrigation development, 
such as Adams’ (1992) irrigationism in African nations and Hamilton-McKenzie’s 
(2009) “Irrigationist Philosophy” in Australia, albeit in a distinctive geopolitical and 
cultural context. The unique traits include an elite fascination with promoting notions 
of “Thainess” that includes irrigation-based farming as an integral part of the 
historical imaginaire; the quasi-religious authority of a paternalistic king sitting at 
the apex of a strongly hierarchical society, combined with the royal gifting aspect of 
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water resources, that show parallels with the historical tank systems of Tamil Nadu 
(Mosse, 2003). In Thailand’s case, irrigationalism may be interpreted as a dominant 
ideology of the central elite that is applied to the periphery or “others” as a means of 
state simplification, legibility and control. It is closely allied to the better recognised 
dominant ideologies of developmentalism, royalism and nationalism; and thus 
incorporates elements of willing consent and hegemony, as well as more sinister 
coercive aspects, in its application.  
Despite the wide allure of following irrigation development pathways, a cornucopian 
application of irrigationalism has by and large failed to deliver on its promise of 
improved water resources management outcomes, it stubbornly persists as a 
dominant ideology through the first decade of the twenty first century in a country 
that was once proud to have joined the ranks of Newly Industrialised Countries 
(NICs) (Bello et al., 1998; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005) demonstrating its allure, 
strength and resilience as an ideology. Wiener (1972:64) provides partial explanation 
for the resilient nature of irrigationalism when he states that the “test proofness” of 
ideological systems is a major obstacle to change, “since no observational or 
theoretical evidence is ever accepted as disproof of an ideological set, and whoever 
attempts to disprove such a set is branded as a revisionist, a deviationist, a paid agent 
of the opposite ideology, or an amateur”. As such, it can be regarded as a particularly 
powerful ideological tool of the hydraulic society elite groups (incorporating state 
and non-state institutions), and in particular through the close association with and 
legitimation provided by the present king and reproduction via a range of state 
apparatuses of power (e.g. hydrocracies and militarized bureaucracies), highlighting 
complex power relations to be explored in later chapters. 
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Chapter 6  “Isaan haeng laeng” – 
social constructions of regional water 
scarcity, received wisdom and 
development narratives 
 
“You see, for us Nakhon Phanom people, when it’s the rainy season it 
floods, but in the dry season all the water flows into the Mekong River 
and leaves us with drought; and cracked, arid land everywhere.” 
(Source:  Comments by H.E. Khun Suppachai Phosu, MP for 
Nakhon Phanom and Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
Interviewed 27 June, 2010) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate how the popular perceptions of naturalized 
water scarcity in Northeast Thailand have been discursively constructed by certain 
actors in a way that serves to problematize the region. Through claims to historical 
legitimacy and scientific authority, elite groupings within Thai society have 
constructed or “manufactured” dominant and popular narratives concerning water 
resource scarcity
100
, in a manner similar to that noted by Mehta (2001) in Gujarat, 
India. A major difference being, however, that the Northeast of Thailand enjoys 
three to seven times more annual rainfall than Gujarat
101
 and is in a semi-humid 
tropical zone, rather than semi-arid. The assumptions on which the narratives are 
based may superficially appear quite commonsensical and self-evidential, but on 
closer examination, such truth claims often obscure alternative and competing 
interpretations of the region’s socio-environmental conditions. As such, this chapter 
examines the historical origins of regional problem framings, the actors that have 
propagated them and how such framings have led to certain standardized, top-down, 
                                                   
100 The chapter title refers to a ubiquitous Thai phrase associated with the Northeast – Isaan haeng 
laeng (translating as “arid Isaan”) - which I contend is an environmental orthodoxy, based on a mix of 
true and false representations of environmental belief and experience (Forsyth, 2003) 
101 Mehta (2000) indicates that Kutch District, the location of her research, has annual average rainfall 
of 367 mm. The driest parts of Northeast Thailand average over 900 mm rainfall per annum, while the 
wettest districts in the Nam Songkhram basin experience over 2,800 mm per annum. 
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hydraulic engineering-oriented solutions. As with similar examples identified in 
contexts in Africa (Leach and Mearns, 1996), the received wisdom has generated 
programmatic development solutions, but has not necessarily addressed the 
underlying social problems of the region which remain obscured or unidentified, and 
moreover, has led to misguided and fundamentally flawed regional development 
policies being adopted. Where development failures occur (and in the case of 
irrigation development projects in Northeast Thailand, I would maintain that failure 
is the norm, rather than the exception), the development community has tended to 
blame the failures on such factors as recalcitrant or uneducated development subjects 
(e.g. an “ignorant farmers” narrative), poor implementation procedure by the agency 
concerned, unsuitable technology or poor policy formulation. Dove (1999) asks the 
pertinent question, “to what extent are ‘unintended’ development failures in fact 
‘intended’ (in some structural sense)?” and therefore related to underlying power 
relations of that society. In keeping with post-structural political ecology approaches 
to deconstruction, it does not attempt to supplant one version of social truth with 
another (Blaikie, 1999). 
The chapter begins by looking at the basis for a separate cultural and ethnic regional 
identity constructed for the Northeast, as a way of placing it in context of the wider 
Thai state. Using discourse analysis approaches to explore dominant and popular 
knowledge constructions of water scarcity, this chapter traces the archaeology of 
some dominant narratives back to the early twentieth century and links them to 
certain powerful actors, which I argue have been influential in determining the 
evolution of later regional development solutions. Additionally, it examines 
contemporary perceptions of Isaan’s water resources development issues amongst 
members of the general public, drawn from a fieldwork survey, which appear to 
show that there is a general congruence between the dominant ideological tenets of 
the centre and popular perceptions. Such story-line analysis allows a more 
historically and culturally situated understanding of different actors’ voices (Forsyth, 
2003). The findings suggest that the dominant regional development narrative that 
makes strong associations between drought and poverty is largely a social construct, 
continuously reproduced at the national, regional and local scales (involving 
processes of naturalization and universalization) that benefits the interests of certain 
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dominant elites involved in promoting irrigation pathways. The chapter partially 
addresses the following research sub-questions: 
SQ1: What are the probable discursive roots and origins of irrigationalism 
in Thai society? 
SQ2: What are the main development narratives driving irrigationalism, 
framed by different actors, both historically and in the present context? 
 
SQ5: To what extent are understandings of water scarcity socially 
constructed and whose interests are served by drought narratives? 
 
6.2 Northeast Thailand as a peripheral region  
 
I begin this chapter by providing some historical context and perspectives on the 
specific region of study, Northeast Thailand, to give a sense of its marginal status in 
relation to the core and what this has implied to its development trajectory. The 
Northeast, or Isaan
102
 as it is commonly referred to, lies almost entirely within the 
Mekong Basin, covering an area of about 160,000 km
2
 and a population estimated at 
over 21 million, which was about one third of the nation in 2008. It has been 
described as a peripheral region, both geographically because of its physical 
separation from the rest of the kingdom by the Dong Phya Yen mountain range
103
, 
but also structurally through supposed past isolation from national development 
processes, historically low economic investment, widespread poverty, scarcity of 
natural resources, political disenfranchisement of the people and exploitation by a 
parasitic and rapacious core centered on Bangkok (London, 1977; Parnwell, 2005). 
Culturally too, it is distinct from the centre, as Northeast people are predominantly of 
Lao ethnicity and speak variants of the Lao language (pasaa Isaan)
104
 as their 
                                                   
102 The anglicized spelling of Isaan varies and may be variously written as Isan, Isarn, Esarn, Esan in 
different sources.  
103 These mountains form a dividing range along the western fringes of the Northeast and have in the 
past provided a geographical barrier to easy communications between the regions; although today 
they are dissected by numerous highways and the main railway link between Bangkok and 
Northeastern cities.  
104 McCargo and Hongladarom (2004) make it clear that there is no one “standard Isaan” language, 
but rather there are a variety of Isaan dialects spoken in different parts of the region on a Lao-Thai 
“dialect continuum”.  
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mother tongue (McCargo and Hongladarom, 2004), but is a region of considerable 
ethnic diversity (Yukio, 1999), where historically minorities have often been 
discriminated against or “othered” by the Central Thai majority and Bangkok-based 
elite (Winichakul, 1995, 2000a).  
The gradual process of assimilation and homogenization of the culturally diverse 
region into a Bangkok-centric polity began during the nineteenth century. Although 
the Northeast was nominally ruled from Bangkok since 1827, the capital’s rule was 
quite patchy until the latter part of King Chulalongkorn’s absolutist regime began to 
lay the foundations for today’s heavily centralized administration system. In 1899, 
the Bangkok administration under the Interior Ministry changed the names of the 
administrative regions of the Northeast from Huamuang Lao Phuan and Huamuang 
Lao Khao, to Monthon Udon and Monthon Isaan respectively, thereby removing 
ethnic linkages to Lao from the official regional names, in a process of etymological 
cleansing, described by Fukui (1993) as “very symbolic”. Around the same period, 
central Thai became the only language permitted to be taught in state schools 
following centralization of provincial education (McCargo and Hongladarom, 2004). 
This was a period of rapid military, bureaucratic and political expansion of the 
central state to establish administrative dominion over the newly mapped territories 
of the kingdom (Winichakul, 1995).  
A number of academics, including Keyes (1967), London (1977), McCargo and 
Hongladarom (2004), and more recently, Phattharathananunth (2006),  have 
highlighted the strong sense of regionalism found in Isaan, implicit in the regional 
name. Keyes’ (1967) central thesis postulated that the region was politically ignored 
and economically under-developed relative to the rest of the nation, and that a sense 
of ethnic identification, regional awareness and political fractiousness resulted from 
repressive policies imposed on the population by Central Thai elites sent to 
administer the region. Throughout the twentieth century, there were sustained 
periods of resistance by Northeasterners against control and domination from the 
core, including occasional armed rebellions that were invariably brutally suppressed 
by the state forces, such as the Phu Mi Bun Rebellion of 1901-02; the Nong Makkeo 
Rebellion of 1924; the maw lam Noi-Chada Rebellion of 1936; the Sila Wongsin 
Rebellion of 1959, and other more localized uprisings (see Keyes, 1967; Phongphit 
and Hewison, 2001; Phatharathananunth, 2006). Phongphit and Hewison (2001:78) 
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argue that the defeats of these and other acts of resistance by Isaan villagers to the 
Thai state and exploitative economic relations, encouraged villagers to “project a 
passive face in their politics.” However, regional rebellion and dissent by 
Northeasterners continued in pockets throughout the twentieth century up to the 
early1980s, when many disaffected villagers took up arms against the government
105
, 
with the region seen as a key strategic and ideological “battleground” in the US-
supported fight against communism given its proximity to Indochina, portrayed as a 
potential “domino” on the verge of toppling (Molle et al., 2009a). The ruling powers 
in Bangkok and Washington framed the Northeast resistance in  terms of addressing 
a “Northeastern problem”, that securitized the region as a threat to the continued 
existence of the government, the monarchy and indeed, Thailand itself (Keyes, 1967). 
This discourse justified the channeling of vast resources into ensuring the cultural, 
political and ideological integration of the Northeast into the folds of a Bangkok-
centric parasitic core – in a relationship that was both exploitative and neglectful 
(London, 1977). Hence, Isaan regional identity has always been subservient to more 
dominant national constructions of  “Thai-ness” (as articulated in Chapter 5, Section 
5.3), an ideology consistently cultivated by the political elite to the extent that it has 
become a “system of truth”, according to Sattayanurak (2005), drawing on a 
Foucauldian term.    
Both McCargo and Hongladarom (2004) and Myers (2005) agree that the modern 
Isaan identity is a problematic political construct that reflects subtle ambiguities of 
self-expression by the Northeast people themselves. The first two authors maintain 
that Northeasterners are engaged in an internal negotiation concerning their split 
Thai-Lao identities and external negotiations about, “relationships fraught with 
cultural, social and political ramifications” (McCargo and Hongladarom, 2004). A 
key element of this process of identity morph, I would maintain, has been a gradual 
assimilation of central Thai notions of a supposed natural superiority of irrigated rice 
cultivation over pre-existing land-waterscape management regimes, which in turn 
have gradually been rejected in favour of centrally constructed notions of 
agricultural development and modernity, including the ideology of irrigationalism. 
This in turn has weakened grassroots movements and civil society attempts to resist 
                                                   
105 Phatharathananunth (2006) notes that when the communist insurgency reached its peak in 1978, 
there were 14,000 armed insurgents nationwide, of which roughly half were based in the Northeast, 
and all but one of the region’s provinces had a guerilla base. 
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the Bangkok-centric projects of territorialization and ideological domination, 
through processes of social reproduction and co-evolution. However, in frontier 
development arenas such as the lower Nam Songkhram Basin where isolation from 
the core has somewhat helped ameliorate natural resources degradation until 
relatively recently, there has been proportionately more resistance to top-down state 
development programmes (see Blake, 2006; Blake et al., 2009) and the process of 
central domination has been marginally slower than elsewhere in the Northeast. 
 
6.3 Isaan development narratives: a quest for siwilai? 
 
As part of mainstream development discourse, there are a number of popular 
development narratives that constitute “received wisdom” or “environmental 
orthodoxies” for framing the region’s problems. Most prominent amongst these, I 
argue, is a regional water scarcity narrative that has permeated modern Isaan 
development discourse and problem framings for at least a century. I maintain that 
this narrative can be traced back to regional descriptions from the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century, when Siam was still an 
absolute monarchy and the ruling elite in Bangkok relied partly on Western advisors 
to feed back notions of modernity and progress for adaptation as potential 
development policies, strategies and projects. The government hired European 
technical advisors and administrators in certain key departments and ministries, 
particularly in the fields of education, transportation, communication and agriculture, 
including irrigation (e.g. Homan van der Heide to set up the first Irrigation 
Department (Brummelhuis, 2005)). Sons of the Siamese nobility were sent to the 
West to receive an education, as part of a quest to instill notions of modernity (thaan 
samai), progress (jaroen) and civilization (siwilai) in the next generation of elite 
state-makers and rulers (Winichakul, 1995, 2000b). Winichakul (2000b:546) stresses 
the quest for siwilai was part of an elite desire “to avoid the disgrace of inferiority” 
for being perceived as less civilized by other nations, which included spatial 
strategies to make the “others within”, the less civilized rural folk (chao baannok) 
such as the Lao people of Isaan, become more like the civilized people of the city 
(muang).  
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As alluded to in the previous section, in the eyes of elite, Isaan people were made to 
feel that their local culture and livelihood patterns were considered inferior to those 
of the dominant Central Thai majority (Keyes, 1967). Irrigation practices and 
techniques (such as the much hyped muang fai system) of the North and Central 
Plains of Thailand, were notably absent in the Northeast, adding to an aura of 
agricultural backwardness and need for development from the centre. As well as 
defining the qualities of “Thai-ness” as the new national identity, the Bangkok elite 
sought to create discursive and symbolic enemies as an important function of the 
nation state in maintaining dominance and control over the periphery. Winichakul 
(1995:168) stated, “[T]o confirm Thai-ness, it does not matter if the enemy is 
relatively abstract or ill-defined. The enemy is always present”. I argue that drought 
in Isaan has become one such loosely-defined, abstract enemy that has been socially 
constructed as an ever-present threat to national security and the well-being of the 
greater Thai nation (see Section 5.4 below). The propensity for dominant discourses 
surrounding particular “water crises” to empower the actors which construct and 
perpetuate them has been discussed elsewhere, amongst others, by Trottier (2008), 
Mehta (2001), and Williams (1997). Interestingly, Michael Dove (1999) has 
suggested that the physical characteristics of dry areas has contributed to their 
political marginality, which in turn has led them to become epistemologically 
marginal as well.  
 
6.4 The demonization of drought as a national enemy 
 
Manufacturing popular perceptions of water scarcity by the state and other 
institutions amongst the general public is not solely restricted to “developing” 
nations, but can also be detected in “developed” countries, including Australia (West 
and Smith, 1996); the United States (Reisner, 1986); and the United Kingdom 
(Haughton, 1998; Bakker, 1999a). The case of Australia is particularly illustrative of 
how an ill-defined concept of “drought” can be demonized by certain sectors of 
society. Taking a Durkheimian approach to conceptualizing the role of drought, 
West and Smith (1996:97-100) have proposed four reasons why drought may be a 
useful resource for constructing moral solidarities and boundaries, namely: 
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1. The “phantom objectivity” of drought – drought tends to be understood by most 
actors as something objective rather than socially constructed, lying beyond the 
reach of party politics of ideological manipulation, something which “really 
happens”. Thus, drought “is potent as an enemy precisely because it is 
misrecognised as a natural fact rather than correctly perceived as a socially 
constructed fact.”  
2. Drought is mute – national discourses frequently identify moral enemies that 
threaten the “national way of life”. However, human “symbolic enemies”, such as 
those in marginalized groups like immigrants, racial minorities or even, football 
hooligans, are capable of organizing coherent counter-narratives which may upset 
the totalizing or solidaristic nature of the mainstream discourse. By contrast, natural 
phenomena such as drought, “are more functional in that they provide for a 
discursive field that is monological, less contested and less ambiguous, but thereby 
inclined towards resolution and narrative closure.” 
3. There is always a drought somewhere – because of the size of the continent of 
Australia and the statistical inevitability that there will generally be one or more 
areas experiencing below average rainfall at any given time, droughts tend to 
“constitute an immediately available resource through which threats to moral and 
national communities can be constructed” by national leaders and powerful groups 
in society. 
4. Drought is a key symbol in white Australian mythology – through multiple media 
channels, “the mythological role of the harsh and drought-afflicted landscape has 
been to temper the national character through struggle”. The authors suggest that 
drought has a high level of “retrievability” (Schudson, 1989) and is a symbolic 
resource that resonates with the core beliefs and foundational narratives of the 
Australian people. They believe it is remarkable that the symbolic power of drought 
endures, even as it becomes a more economically diverse, urbanised and 
multicultural society.    
The authors base their claims on an extensive, qualitative study of media, political 
and popular discourses of drought in Australian culture over the span of a century. 
They found that even with a declining relative importance of the agricultural sector 
in the Australian economy, there was a steady media interest in drought, which had 
been relatively autonomous from both meteorological and economic determination. 
West and Smith (1996) argued that drought remained a potent symbol in Australian 
society for invoking moral discipline and social unity, seen as a natural “adversary” 
for the entire nation to fight, despite Australia’s erstwhile transformation into a 
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highly urbanised and post-industrial society. Development narratives that demonize 
and naturalize an ill-defined notion of “drought” while linking it as a cause of 
poverty are an integral theme in the modern history of Northeast Thailand and serve 
similar purposes for the nation’s elite, I argue. In the following section, a selective 
narrative history from a variety of sources is traced from the turn of the twentieth 
century down to the present day, illustrating a certain consistency and immutability 
in the drought discourse. I do not attempt to distinguish “fact” from “fiction” or 
determine a realist, quantitative account for drought measurement (for example by 
examining rainfall or hydrological records). Nor is it my purpose to attempt to create 
an alternative or competing narrative, but rather just provide a partial record noting 
the development of a dominant narrative and identify some of the key associated 
actors.  
 
6.5 Early twentieth century regional narratives 
 
6.5.1 A “poor, dry and jungly region” 
 
In the absence of a tradition of systematic record-keeping of the socio-economic 
condition of the emerging nation-state, the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Siamese court in Bangkok must have been partially reliant on the written 
reports of various Westerners in its employment for a parallel conceptualization of 
certain aspects of the more remote tracts of the kingdom to Thai cosmologies. Unlike 
the Central Plains and parts of the lower North which were relatively well served by 
navigable rivers, travel to and within the Northeast involved a slow and arduous 
overland journey between Bangkok and the main provincial administrative centres, 
until the advent of a limited railway network made access slightly easier
106
. All the 
rivers of the Khorat Basin essentially drained eastwards towards the Mekong River 
and most were only navigable during the wet season and even then were often 
located some distance away from the main centres of population. According to the 
                                                   
106 The railway from Bangkok reached Nakhon Ratchasima (also known as Khorat) in 1900, but did 
not reach Ubon Ratchatani until 1930 and another line to Khon Kaen until 1933 (Naewchampa, 1999). 
This line was later extended to Udon Thani and Nong Khai in the late 1930s to link up with the 
French Indochina capital of Laos at Vientiane. 
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early twentieth century visitor Kornerup (1999), it would have taken more than a 
month to travel between Ubon Ratchatani and Khorat by bullock cart in the 1920s, a 
distance of about 320 km. Travelers to the region often took copious observational 
notes concerning the peoples, cultures, economy, environment and geography, which 
were later shared with related government departments. Take for instance, these brief 
excerpts from the diary report written in 1901 by a French legal advisor to King 
Chulalongkorn’s government named Emile Jottrand, and reproduced in Yukio 
(1999:187-188): 
“Few paddy fields around the region. Almost everywhere the 
unproductive jungle reigns supreme, the region is very poor…….There 
is hardly any province poorer that Korat .….. The roads are fissured, the 
shallows where there is usually water permanently are dry and arid. It’s a 
real calamity……..the rice fields are rather uncommon…….. 
Consequently, the countryside is wild and deserted.” 
Similarly, Cecil Carter
107
 editing a book a few years later for the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s display at an Exposition in St Louis in the United States, made the 
following observations during his visit to the northeastern Siamese territories Carter 
(1904:53-54): 
“The Korat Plateau and the Talesap plain are poor regions. In the rainy 
season the country is largely a swamp; a great part of the higher lands 
have a barren, laterite, sandy or stony soil (in the Korat plateau) or 
contain too much salt to be cultivable, so that in general only the belts 
of deposits along the rivers are fit for cultivation. Moreover, these 
regions only are fit for settlement, because in the dry season the 
country is nearly waterless, as only a few of the rivers contain a 
glimpse of dirty water that gathers in pools in the deepest places, 
whilst the ground-water, if obtainable, is generally too salt [sic] to be 
drinkable……..It is certainly no surprising fact that under such 
unfavourable circumstances the inhabitants are poor and backward 
compared with the Siamese of Lower Siam, and that the sanitary 
conditions of the people are worse than anywhere else in Siam. Enteric 
disease (dysentery and cholera), fever, and small pox are very 
common in these regions.”    
                                                   
107 Carter worked for the Ministry of Education and was appointed Secretary-General of the Royal 
Commission that was tasked with the job of writing a book on Siam for the pavilion of the Ministry of 
Agriculture presented at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in 1904. 
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It can be deduced from these descriptions that both Jottrand and Carter visited the 
Northeast during the dry season and were essentially judging it against the 
hydrological and socio-economic conditions found around Bangkok and the lower 
Chao Phraya delta during the same season as a yardstick for relative water scarcity, 
poverty, and indeed, notions of progress and modernity. It is highly probable that the 
five to six month dry season is when the majority of visitors, both domestic and 
foreign, would have traveled to Isaan prior to the arrival of the railway network and 
improved road communications post World War Two. Travel in the wet season 
would have been far more problematic, hazardous in terms of disease risk and prone 
to delay, using bullock carts or riding horses along unmade roads and tracks with few 
bridges across waterways. The dry season (i.e. November or December to April), 
although frequently hot and dusty during the latter few months, was the most 
practical, accessible, healthy and certainly more pleasant time of year for visiting 
dignitaries, state officials, advisors, surveyors, and proto-tourists to leave the relative 
comforts of Bangkok to visit the “arid, poor and backward” Northeastern provinces.  
Thus, it seems fair to surmise that the popular received wisdom surrounding Isaan 
formed by the governing elite in Bangkok and early foreign visitors was influenced 
by a strong seasonal bias (see Chambers, 1993), by choosing a time of year when 
inevitably surface water resources were scarce, there would have been little or no 
agricultural activity occurring (people were likely engaged in livelihood activities 
largely invisible from the roads and villages, such as harvesting forest products and 
wetlands foraging, which often involved migrations to distant locations), leading to 
unfounded conclusions about the perceived poverty and “backwardness” of the 
people being linked to its apparent aridity
108
 and that the extensive forests 
observed
109
 were little more than “unproductive jungle”. It is from such seasonally-
skewed narratives of the Northeast, I contend, that the later dominant discourse 
emerged and adopted by subsequent generations of external agents, influencing the 
mindsets of Bangkok-based bureaucrats, foreign aid donors, development consultants 
and the popular media. These knowledge brokers were content to reproduce 
                                                   
108 A further complicating factor is that the landscape appears more arid than its rainfall and climatic 
parameters might suggest, due to its underlying sandy geology, native vegetation and surface 
hydrological features, maintains Toshikazu (1999). 
109 Few accurate historical forest cover data appears to exist from pre-Second World War for the 
Northeast, but Vitayakon et al (2004) claims it was 90 % in the 1930s; but by1961 there was 
reportedly just 53 % forest cover, which had been reduced to 25 % by 1998 (Azimi et al, 2000). 
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commonsensical narratives of chronic natural resources scarcity, perennial aridity, 
dire poverty, backwardness, etc. that remain prevalent in regional accounts a century 
later.  
 
6.5.2 Swamps, floods and “nomadic” people 
 
Those exogenous visitors that did venture to the region outside of the dry season 
would have witnessed the obverse of the Northeast’s natural meteorological and 
hydrological pattern, namely prevalent seasonal flooding, which often persisted on 
the broad and slow draining floodplains for several months. While tending to make 
most crop-based agriculture a risky proposition in these locations, this was 
compensated for by extensive and productive wetlands environments (the 
“interminable swamps” in Carter’s (1904) view), a regional characteristic frequently 
overlooked by dry season external observers. However, observers often noticed the 
mobility of the people and a tendency to migrate internally according to the season to 
take advantage of variable abundance in natural resources and livelihood 
opportunities. Later on, this propensity to “nomadism” of Isaan people has invariably 
been interpreted by state elites as an aberration to the natural order of things. 
“This part of Siam is often so hot and water so scarce that people leave 
it and go eastward. Turn nomad. But only for a time; then they come 
back again. Sometimes, too, it rains so overwhelmingly here that the 
country is inundated. In the dry season the rivers are narrow; in the 
rainy season they are unable to drain these gigantic stretches, as there 
is only a slight slope. This is the most thinly populated part of Siam, 
yet it is a country that could be utilized if canals were dug and dams 
built ” (Kornerup, 1999:125) 
In the1920s written account above we start to see not only the region problematized 
seasonally along hydrological lines, but also the kernel of an idea towards future state 
hydraulic infrastructure interventions, both as a way to populate the region and 
sedenterize the wandering people (perhaps so they could be made more visible, 
enumerated and taxed?). The author of this narrative was a wealthy Danish tourist on 
his first visit to Siam who was presented to upcountry officials as a guest of HRH 
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Prince Nagara Svarga
110
 and whose impressions of the Northeast were based on little 
more than a few days stay in each of five provincial, garrison towns. He travelled 
primarily by light aircraft between these administrative centres during March, when 
dry season temperatures were reaching their maximum and surface water would be at 
its minimum. Despite such a fleeting bird’s eye encounter, he not only claimed to 
understand the region’s problems, but further, felt qualified enough to offer solutions 
to the prince. A similar pattern of superficial problem identification and solution 
prescription seems to have been the norm for subsequent foreign development 
“experts” who flew in for temporary periods to provide technical and managerial 
advice about regional development to state elites for much of the rest of the twentieth 
century.    
 Between 1930 and 1931, as the end of the era of absolute monarchy was nearing and 
radical change was sweeping through Southeast Asia on the tail of the Great 
Depression, a Harvard University economist conducted what was described as the 
first nationwide survey of the Siamese rural economy (Zimmerman, 1999). 
Zimmerman visited each region of Thailand in the company of a team of state 
officials to collect data on behalf of the Ministry of Commerce and Communications, 
in order to provide a snapshot of the socio-economic state of the country. From the 
book’s preface, one learns that he could not have conducted this survey without a 
“Royal Letter of direction to the local officials”, issued by “His Royal Highness 
Paribatra, the Prince of Nagor Svarga”111, with further acknowledgement for 
facilitation assistance given to several other princes and nobility in senior positions of 
government (Zimmerman, 1999:xv). As well as documenting contemporary socio-
economic practices, Zimmerman considered it his duty to offer the Siamese 
government advice on future agricultural development, even in fields of specialist 
knowledge he almost certainly would have had scant or partial understanding of, 
including water resources management in socio-ecologically complex tropical river 
basins.  
Under a section headed “Irrigation and Drainage” of the Northeast, Zimmerman 
(1999:151) stated: 
                                                   
110 Kornerup (1999:114) describes this member of the royal family as a “brother to the King of Siam, 
field-marshal and chief of the general staff” 
111 This is almost certainly the same member of the monarchy that previously hosted Kornerup, but 
with a slightly different transliteration of his name. 
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“Water is plentiful in the rainy season, but in the dry season there is no 
water except in the swamps and some rivers such as the Nam Mool, 
Nam Chi and Nam Songkram. Their tributaries do not begin in the 
mountains as do those of the rivers in the northern section, so there is 
little supply in the dry season. One way to remedy this shortage is to 
deepen the old swamps and make them reservoirs. All small streams 
should have sluices at the places where they join the larger ones. If 
sluices are built, more crops and animals can be raised in this section.” 
Zimmerman similarly perceived that the Northeast’s greatest problems were 
under-population, poor health of the population and poorly developed water 
resources infrastructure, “particularly for drinking and bathing” (Zimmerman, 
1999:295). Significantly, he does not specifically mention agricultural drought 
and his greatest concerns were for the primitive state of domestic water supplies, 
principally earth wells, which he believed were a major contributor to the health 
problems of the people and high mortality rates. His data suggested that the 
average yields of rice in Northeast Thailand were higher on average
112
 than those 
in Central Thailand, even though the latter was considered Thailand’s “rice bowl” 
for domestic and export rice. In Zimmerman’s account, it was recommended that 
along the west bank of the Mekong River where tributary rivers entered the main 
river, the government should consider building “small flood gates” at the village 
level to control the level of water held in back-swamps following the rainy 
season. These were to be used by villagers for fishing, as a domestic water source, 
for watering livestock and “as dry season rice fields for the poor of the village”. 
He advised against blocking the major channels entering the Mekong, on the 
grounds it would be both expensive and go beyond the ability of individual 
villages to maintain. Significantly, Zimmerman’s assessment of the water 
resources “problem” for provinces bordering the Mekong River, such as Nakhon 
Phanom and Nong Khai, and the practical guidance he offered for engineering 
solutions to be undertaken by the state, seems to have influenced Thailand’s 
fundamental small and medium scale water resources development strategy for 
                                                   
112 The 1930 economic survey in Northeast Thailand found that the rice yields for wet season rice 
varied between “14 to 32 tangs of 20 litre per rai” (Zimmerman, 1999:154). Assuming one tang 
weighed 12 kg, this would equate to a range of 168 to 384 kg/rai. The present-day average yield for 
Northeast Thailand wet season main rice crop was recorded as 318 kg/rai (Agriculture Information 
Centre data, cited in Turral, 2008) for comparison, indicating regional rice yields have not 
significantly risen in over 80 years, even while irrigation investment and coverage has risen 
continuously over the same period. 
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the Northeast over the past four decades. However, eventually the hydrocratic 
planners could not resist the temptation to block the main Mekong tributaries as 
well, leaving only the Nam Songkhram as the last river to remain unblocked, 
although even this may not be the case for much longer (see Section 8.4 in 
Chapter 8).  
  
6.6 Late twentieth century regional development narratives 
 
Despite vast socio-economic changes and massive environmental transformations 
within Thailand during the twentieth century, the Northeast’s dominant development 
discourse around water resources seems to have remained essentially static over the 
past century. The dominant state narrative has consistently characterized Isaan as a 
chronically poor, underdeveloped and backwards region that is perennially water 
scarce as a result of low and intermittent rainfall patterns that lead to worse droughts 
than other regions. Perversely the droughts are interspersed with occasional wet 
season floods, which are usually portrayed as being destructive to crops and property 
(see Lebel and Sinh, 2007). It is a region painted in the popular imagination as being 
“hostage” to a problematic hydrology (cf. Grey and Sadoff, 2007), that hinders its 
agricultural potential and general economic development. Moreover, water scarcity 
and poverty linkages have come to define the region for many, so ubiquitous are the 
narratives that connect them as a regional development trope. For instance the 
following regional descriptions, drawn from a range of sources over the past four 
decades, provide a representative indication of the ways in which the Northeast is 
rhetorically constructed in general sources, some showing more hubris than the early 
twentieth century descriptions: 
“Geographically, the Northeast is a dry flat plateau, with sandy infertile 
soil, still largely under forest or scrub, and with insufficient water for 
effective agriculture or even for domestic needs. In consequence, the 
region is poor and its villages are largely isolated from the more 
prosperous central region of Thailand, and even - for lack of roads - from 
one another.” (Girling, 1968) 
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 “Because of its unfavourable climate conditions and depleted 
environmental conditions, the Northeast has become the poorest and most 
backward region of Thailand over time.” (Hirunruk, 1999) 
“Overall the impression is of dryness, quite unlike the general image of 
Asia as hot and humid. The impression is of the African savanna, where 
lions rest in the shade of sparse trees.” (Fukui, 1993:19) 
 “The first thing that strikes visitors to Thailand's far Northeast -- a vast 
plain of stunted trees, spindly tussocks and grazing water buffalo -- is its 
dryness. It seems impossible that a landscape whose main features are 
salt pans, brackish ponds and devastated forests could support any form 
of animal or vegetable life, let alone human communities.” (Mansfield, 
2000)  
Increasingly in the last few years, a slightly re-adjusted development orthodoxy 
based on climate change discourse has emerged, that emphasizes scenarios of 
worsening floods and droughts in the region, further underlining a sense of crisis and 
urgency surrounding the Northeast’s water situation, which in turn adds endorsement 
to the present hydraulic mission type approaches to mitigate perceived impacts. For 
example, at an August 2010 conference on climate change adaptation in Khon 
Kaen
113
, several of the papers presented stated that droughts and floods were causing 
worsening damage to rural communities and farmland in the Northeast, without 
providing any empirical evidence to support this claim. Climate change is widely 
accepted uncritically in Thailand as a real phenomenon already negatively impacting 
the nation, providing an a priori cause of perceived increases in flood and drought 
natural disasters
114
, at the expense of other more nuanced accounts of causality. 
Other bio-physical problems stressed in the popular regional discourse include a 
problematic topography for water storage infrastructure, an unfavourable or harsh 
climate; forest degradation and loss; unproductive soils related to acidity, salinity 
and low inherent levels of nutrients; sandy soils that have poor moisture retention 
capacity and are easily erodible. These combined natural resources deficiencies and 
human-induced environmental degradation (especially deforestation) are frequently 
linked as causal factors for widespread and endemic poverty. The region’s 
                                                   
113 I attended this International Conference Workshop on “Livelihood and Health Impacts of the 
Climate Change: Community Adaptation Strategies” on 24-25 August 2010, sponsored by a number 
of international development and climate research institutions. 
114 In the Questionnaire Survey conducted, it was found that of 144 respondents who thought drought 
was worsening in Thailand (Question 7), 39.6 % of respondents perceived this was due to “climate 
change” or “global warming”, which ranked as the second most common answer. 
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economical prospects are commonly perceived as being handicapped by the bio-
physical disadvantages mentioned above, combined with less visible surface water 
than other regions, a low water storage capacity, under-developed irrigation systems 
and general isolation from the rest of Thailand. At its most extreme, drought is seen 
as an issue damaging national economic and food security, supposedly impeding the 
entire country’s development, as illustrated by the following crisis narrative in an 
academic paper that failed to provide any evidence to support the claim: 
“In Northeast Thailand, drought has the most profound effect on the way 
of living and regional economy. It is also a major menace to regional 
food supplies. By its severity and duration these events can be disastrous 
not only locally but for the whole economic structure.”  
(Source: Mongkolsawat et al., 2001) 
 
6.6.1 Popular narratives of water scarcity and poverty  
 
In mainstream developmental discourse, the Northeast is invariably portrayed as a 
region occupied by small-holder farmers, struggling to eke out a living on poor, 
sandy and infertile soils forever plagued by recurrent droughts and occasional floods. 
However, narratives linking water scarcity and poverty in the Northeast are not 
solely restricted to official reports or general media articles alone, but also may be 
found in a range of mass culture, art, music and literature sources that further 
popularize and entrench the dominant narrative. The hugely popular Central Thai 
rock band Carabao, for instance, has often sung about the interconnections between 
the fickle climate, drought, rural poverty, urban migration and the need for all people 
in the nation to unite as Thais to overcome natural adversity. In a hit song titled “Big 
Sieow”115, the opening lyrics proclaim: 
“Isaan has been drought stricken for so many years, 
Brothers and sisters, this is no lie. 
(This is the whole truth) 
That day I saw it with my own eyes, 
That’s why I have to sing it to anyone who’ll listen 
Soil like this…..oh-ho…….it’s cracked and dried 
                                                   
115 “Sieow” is a colloquial Lao Isaan term for close friends, who are bonded for life through friendship. 
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Some of it is red dust, like laterite. 
Alack-alas! Why is it like this?”  
 
Tellingly, the band sang this song at a nationally broadcast fund-raising concert for 
Isaan drought-relief hosted by the Royal Thai Army in its own Bangkok stadium, 
entitled “Kindness Flows to the Green Northeast”. Attended by tens of thousands of 
fans, the concert in December 1987, was held just nine months after the official 
launching of the so-called “Green Isaan Project” (khrong-gan Isaan khieow), a 
region-wide scheme inspired by the king and managed by the military to 
permanently rid the region of drought through the planting of fast-growing 
commercial tree plantations, promotion of agro-industry and construction of water 
resources infrastructure at multiple scales, including trans-basin diversion (see 
Chapter 7 for detailed discussion of this project). Given the underlying objectives of 
the concert and the Green Isaan Project, the words of this (and other songs in the 
same genre) cannot simply be interpreted in a politically neutral way, but suggest an 
ideological intent. 
In popular literature, a widely-read example published in both Thai and English 
languages that pivots on a descriptive story of chronic climate and natural resources-
induced poverty in the region is the novel, “Child of the Northeast” (‘Luk Isaan’) 
(Boontawee, 1987), based on the life of a young boy growing up in rural Isaan 
during the 1930s and the hardships his family faced. The American translator 
reinforced a stereotypical view of the region, designed to induce equal feelings of 
pity and admiration in the reader for the powerless subject in his constant struggle 
against the vicissitudes of drought (the mute enemy), but overlook other possible 
sources of his poverty:  
“In Bangkok, the very word “Isan” is almost a metaphor for poverty. For 
centuries Isan has been baking under a merciless sun, growing steadily 
drier and poorer – with just enough rain, just enough good years along the 
way, to give its people an unshakeable faith in the power of prayer, hard 
work and virtue to extract blessings – or, if not blessings, then pity – from 
the fickle spirits that control sky, earth, water, life, and death.”   
Source:  Susan Fulop Kepner in Preface to English translation 
(Boontawee, 1987:8) 
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It is remarkable that while the book’s narrative identifies a distinctly malevolent 
climate and seasonal dearth of natural resources as the underlying key factor 
accounting for regional poverty (i.e. naturalization), the author avoids consideration 
of a wider historical and socio-political context pertaining at the time, such as an 
underlying structural inequality in Thai society to causally explain the protagonist’s 
poverty. In 1982, the book was adapted for film and reached a wider audience, using 
a promotional poster that helped further entrench the timeless image of an Isaan 
peasant’s livelihood (see Fig. 6.1 below), so beloved of the Thai elite and detectable 
in more recent narratives that construct romanticized images of the Thai countryside 
for exogenous and urban consumers, ignoring processes of deagrarianization (Rigg 
and Nattapoolwat, 2001; Rigg and Ritchie, 2002).  
 
 
6.6.2  Drought – the “rotten root of other problems” 
 
As the key meta-discourses of irigationalism (especially the “poor and arid” 
narrative) for the Northeast have remained essentially static, so there has been a 
perceptible widening adoption of the rhetoric of justification (Molle et al., 2009a), 
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from a rather narrow bureaucratic, royal and military elite and strategic allies 
(domestic and foreign) of the pre-1980s to include regional and national politicians 
and a networks of allies, further enhancing the strength of the Isaan drought 
discourse, as in a sense this has “democratized” it, through their claim to electoral 
legitimacy. A particularly vivid case of this shift in source of rhetoric source (but 
also analyzed in the Green Isaan Project narratives of Chapter 7), was seen in the 
promotion of the Khong-Chi-Mun (KCM) Project by a powerful group of Northeast 
politicians and a handful of government ministers in the 1990s. One of the key actors 
within the political clique promoting the KCM Project was an MP for Udon Thani, 
Prachuab Chaiyasarn116, a wealthy businessman whose constituency was located at a 
major construction focal point of the KCM Project. As the Minister for Science, 
Technology and Energy responsible for the Department of Energy Promotion and 
Development (DEDP) in the General Chatchai Choonavan government (1988-91), 
Prachuab fervently promoted the project on behalf of DEDP during a period when it 
had not yet been approved by the budget committee via a glossy brochure, seemingly 
aimed at a broad audience, that used a variety of rhetorical techniques including 
catastrophic drought themed poetry, prose and artwork (see Fig. 6.2) to repeatedly 
stress the underlying causality of various socio-economic problems in the Northeast 
stemmed from drought: 
"Drought is the rotten root of other problems that occur in Isaan. 
Whether it is the problem of poverty or the problem of labour 
migration; because if Isaan lacks water, cultivation will not bear fruit, 
agricultural production will be depressed, farmers' incomes will also 
be depressed, and in the end, Isaan people will have to leave their 
homes for Bangkok"  
Quote attributed to Prachuab Chaiyasarn, Minister of Science, 
Technology and Energy. Source: (Ministry of Science Technology and 
Energy, No date)  
Such essentalist problem framings by politicians show a strong convergence with the 
bureaucratic, techno-centric and populist perceptions, pointing to the depth and 
resilience of the dominant development narrative. They also illustrate the tendency 
                                                   
116 Prachuab, son of a gamnan in Kumpawapi District, Udon Thani, made his fortune from building a 
successful labour export business, sending workers from the upper Northeast to Middle Eastern 
countries, especially Saudi Arabia, during the 1970s and 80s, following the withdrawal of US troops 
and funding from bases in the Northeast. 
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for Isaan drought to be constructed as a silent, symbolic, non-human enemy of the 
nation, that forms an indispensable part of the regional development orthodoxy and 
nation-building ideologies (cf. West and Smith, 1996). Through such stigmatization 
of Isaan as a “poor and dry” land (never a wetland!) and other perceived deficiencies 
of the natural resources and people, has allowed national (and formerly international) 
agencies to introduce prescriptive hydraulic development solutions, which are 
introduced below (Section 6.8) and are discussed further in Chapter 8. 
 I now proceed to consider whether such environmental myths and development 
orthodoxies are commonly held perceptions society-wide or principally restricted to 
the realms of elite actor worldviews. 
 
6.7 Local perceptions of water scarcity and regional 
development – strong resonance with dominant narratives 
 
Thus far, I have presented the dominant problem framings of Northeast water 
resources development drawn from a variety of sources, including news media, 
music lyrics, art, popular literature, official reports and academic papers, showing a 
remarkably consistent storyline. But these reveal little about the perspectives of the 
subjects of development, or ordinary Thai people, whether living in the region or on 
the outside looking in. How do they perceive the region, frame its problems and view 
the solutions, both generally and specifically in terms of water resources issues? And 
do their perceptions match those expressed in the dominant ideology or development 
orthodoxy for Isaan? Thus, to address this apparent gap in research, an attempt was 
made to elicit the views held by certain representative sub-sections of Thai society, 
garnered through the vehicle of a targeted questionnaire based survey conducted at 
three separate locations during the early part of 2010 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3). 
A small selection of the findings of this survey (undifferentiated by location or other 
variables measured) are interpreted below
117
, although a more complete tabulated 
version of survey responses by location are provided in Appendix C.  
                                                   
117 I choose to discuss only a fraction of the results in the interests of brevity, for what would 
otherwise take up a great deal of space to fully elicit. 
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In response to the first question, “When you hear the word ‘Isaan’, what does it 
make you think of?” (Table 1, Appendix C), 22.6 % of respondents included 
“drought” in their answers, which placed it equal importance to “language” in fifth 
place in terms of association. The common regional name sparked the strongest 
correlation in people’s perceptions with “food and eating” connotations (59.9 %), 
followed by “culture and traditions” (34.1 %), and “agriculture and farming 
livelihoods” (30.9 %) in third place. By comparison, immediate association of Isaan 
with “poverty” was only mentioned by 4.5 % of the respondents, suggesting a weak 
linkage for most people, but there was a relatively strong correlation for “drought”. 
The top responses given tended to be positive associations, so the fact that over a 
fifth of people answered “drought”, seems to be of significance. It was noted that the 
level of association with drought was higher in the Bangkok and Khon Kaen sample 
groups than in the Nam Songkhram village surveyed, even though the latter was 
mostly composed of people directly involved in farming livelihoods. 
By contrast, when respondents were asked “What do you think are the most 
important development problems that affect the Isaan region?” (Table 2, Appendix 
C), the most popular response was “drought and water scarcity” (43 %), well ahead 
of the next two categories “education” (35.5 %) and “poverty and low income” 
(34.2 %) in second and third places respectively. This indicates a strong positive 
correlation between regional perceptions of water scarcity and poverty problem 
narrative framings at both the central (elite) and local levels. Significantly, 
respondents in the Nam Songkhram floodplain village responded most positively to 
perceiving “drought and water scarcity” (53.8 % of respondents) as the most 
important regional development problem, perhaps responding to concerns of 
immediate self-interest, given that the survey took place during the dry season when 
local competition for irrigation water for use in dry season rice cultivation was at its 
maximum (see Table 4, Appendix C for apparent confirmation of this). The only 
place where “drought and water scarcity” (30.4 %) was not the top category was in 
Khon Kaen, where it was a distant second to “education” concerns (53.4 %), again 
suggesting a degree of self-interest by respondents in this university city. 
Interestingly, perhaps, “water resources management” issues were not considered an 
important problem in any location and only 2.7 % identified this category, putting it 
slightly ahead of the last category of “culture, religion, morality and family” related 
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issues in twelfth place. This suggested that concerns about water supply far outweigh 
any concerns about its management in people’s perceptions, which again matches the 
dominant discourse, which is supply oriented. 
When the question was narrowed to “What do you think are the most important 
development problems related to water resources management in Isaan?” (Table 3, 
Appendix C), once more “water scarcity problems” (including both agricultural and 
domestic water) was easily the most common response at 48.6 % of respondents, far 
ahead categories of  “poor water management practice / knowledge at the local level” 
(27.1 %) and “poor irrigation and water delivery systems” (26.1 %) in second and 
third places respectively. Again, perceptions of water scarcity and drought being 
most important were highest (61.1 %) in the Nam Songkhram village, which 
relatively-speaking is a village blessed with abundant water resources. That such a 
high percentage identified water scarcity as the most important issue in all three 
locations, above other water resources management issues which an external 
perception might identify as being serious (e.g. “demand-side problems and conflict” 
or environmental decline and degradation”) again tends to suggest an ideological 
process at work. The second placed category of “poor water management practice / 
knowledge at the local level” again fits in with the dominant state ideology, which 
consistently blames the water end users for management failures (e.g. an ignorant or 
uneducated farmers’ narrative) and fails to consider more structural causes of failure 
further up the hierarchy.  
Interestingly, when people were asked what they understood by the term “drought” 
(Table 5, Appendix C), most people responded that they understood it to mean a 
shortage of water for domestic consumption (35.2 %), with slightly fewer people 
overall understanding it to mean “insufficient water for agricultural usage” (29.6 %), 
although in the Nam Songkhram village this figure was much higher at 48.1 % of 
respondents, suggesting a strongly utilitarian narrow view of drought, rather than a 
more nuanced definition including meteorological or hydrological factors. A 
surprisingly high number of people responded that they associated drought with 
destruction of natural resources, especially forest loss (29.3 %), (i.e. a cause, rather 
than a symptom of drought), which suggests the popular perception has a strong 
correlation with the official state and elite-backed narrative linking water scarcity 
with forest destruction (see Forsyth and Walker, 2008). The fourth most popular 
156 
 
response coincided more closely to standard meteorological drought definitions i.e. 
“rain does not fall according to season or low rainfall” (25.7 %), which corresponds 
closely with official definitions proposed by RID officials I interviewed. Amongst 
people who perceived that drought in Isaan was worsening over time, the most 
commonly perceived reason explaining this phenomenon by a large margin was 
“deforestation and forest fires” (80.6 %) (again matching the dominant state 
narrative), followed in distant second place by “climate change and global warming 
(39.6 %) and a general anthropogenic category of “caused by humans” (31.3 %) in 
third place (see Table 7, Appendix C). Again, such answers coincide with the 
dominant elite-propagated environmental orthodoxies concerning causes of 
perceived water scarcity in Thailand, which places primary blame on villagers for 
deforestation in the uplands and rarely considers changes in sectoral water demand 
(Hirsch, 1997; Walker, 2003) 
When I posed a similar question regarding the popular notion of Isaan being 
considered the driest region of Thailand to the Chairman of Tha Bor Songkhram 
TAO
118
, and whether this was a fair or accurate description either regionwide or in 
locally in the lower Nam Songkhram basin, he provided the following answer: 
“It’s true! It’s so arid. In the dry season there’s virtually no water in the 
lakes or wherever. It’s dry, drought! Who will come and help? The 
government doesn’t! The MP doesn’t! We have a representative, but 
there’s almost no budget coming down to us…… Dry; it’s so arid!  We 
just sit and wait for the rains. And when the rainy season comes, we still 
await the rains. In the dry season, who can we ask for rain as there isn’t 
any water? Nobody comes to help us! When it’s dry, it’s so arid….like in 
the past, I saw the MP and he said, “Hey, I’ll give you a pump for 
pumping out of the lake”. But that’s all we got……”  
Source: Boonhong Chaibin, Chairman, TAO Tha Bor Songkhram Sub-
district, Nakhon Phanom Province. Interviewed 20 July, 2010. 
Regarding the causes of drought in Isaan, another local politician offered the 
following response, concurring with the primary cause identified by the king and 
state officials as well as ordinary citizens in the survey (Table 7, Appendix C), 
illustrating how dominant narratives are reproduced from the centre to the periphery.   
                                                   
118 Tha Bor Songkhram Sub-district is located in the middle of the lower Nam Songkhram Basin 
wetlands which experiences average rainfall of about 2,000 mm per year and has some of the most 
abundant water resources in the whole of the Northeast. 
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“Looking at the drought situation, the people now understand that 
cutting trees and destroying forest causes drought. Rain doesn’t fall 
according to its season anymore. This is the truth.” 
Source: Sgt-Major Amphon Khamwongsa, Deputy Chairman of the 
Na Hua Bor TAO, Phanna Nikhom District, Sakon Nakhon. 
Interviewed 25 June, 2010 
Such responses by local leaders underline the extent to which the dominant narrative 
around regional water scarcity and drought has come to define perceptions within the 
Northeast, even in areas like the lower Nam Songkhram Basin considered nationally 
important wetlands with relatively abundant annual rainfall and multiple local 
natural and artificial water sources (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a; Blake et al., 
2009). It also indicates how constructions of scarcity are reproduced by local elites 
and ordinary citizens at the margins, closely reflecting the ideological discourse of 
national elites. Mr Boonhong was a strong advocate of more state-supported 
infrastructure development irrespective of scale it transpired, including the Nam 
Songkhram Project (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4) and national Water Grid project, and 
his views should be compared with those of the Sri Songkhram MP he was 
criticizing (without naming him) quoted at the start of this chapter, illustrating the 
discourse is related to power and authority. The findings of the survey resonate with 
findings from Lipchin (2007) using a similar methodology in Israel, which indicated 
through a questionnaire survey of kibbutzniks that Zionist-inspired ideological 
values around the importance of agricultural development as an integral part of state 
security at the national level were reproduced at the local level. 
 
6.8 State solutions to dominant problem framing discourse 
 
Having established the basis of the problem-framing “meta-discourse” leading to 
particular irrigational approaches to development (the “solution”) as being first and 
foremost the “poor and dry” narrative (Molle and Floch, 2008a; Molle et al., 2009a), 
I now briefly highlight several other secondary meta-justifications previously 
identified by Molle et al (2009a): food self sufficiency, national security, 
“modernization” and ill-defined “fights against poverty”, readily adopted by national 
politicians. A further consistently employed narrative used to justify a standard state-
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centric approach to irrigation development, relies on making comparisons of the 
Northeast’s ostensibly low irrigation coverage with other regions. The argument runs 
that because of the region’s naturalized water scarcity problem and an “unsuitable 
topography” for water storage reservoirs and gravity-fed irrigation, only limited 
irrigation development has been possible compared to the North and Central regions. 
The total present irrigable area amounts to half the national average and one seventh 
of the Central region (see Table 6.1 below), and therefore, much more effort and 
budget deserves to be directed towards hastening regional irrigation development, 
but by employing novel and different technologies and approaches than in the past, 
including stepping up attempts to tap the “unlimited” water resources available in the 
Mekong River mainstream (see Section 6.8.1). It has sometimes been portrayed as a 
kind of moral imperative for the entire nation to help the impoverished and rainfed 
agriculture reliant Northeastern people catch up with their wealthier compatriots in 
other regions (see Carabao song lyrics above), by urgent state-led introduction of 
irrigated agriculture to thousands of drought-struck villages (e.g. Hirunruk, 1999), in 
a version of “let the desert bloom” syndrome (Molle et al., 2009a). 
Region Farm Area (ha) 
Irrigated Area 
(ha) 
% area irrigated 
Central 2,449,600 1,801,600 73.5 
North 4,400,000 900,800 20.4 
East 1,676,800 328,000 19.6 
South 3,062,400 539,200 17.6 
Northeast 9,240,000 932,800 10.1 
Total 20,844,800 4,502,400 21.6 
Source:  (Adapted from Turral, 2008:24) 
Table 6.1 Total cultivated area and irrigated area by region in Thailand 
State development narratives have almost invariably focused on promoting supply-
side solutions to the perceived problem of water scarcity, a pattern that can be traced 
back over many decades to an entirely different geo-political era, itself often drawing 
on narratives that were mixed up in competing ideologies and interests, that relied on 
foreign “expert knowledge” which on examination often turns out to be based on 
little substance or understanding of local conditions, but reproduced earlier 
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orthodoxy. Take for example, the quote below extracted from a RID report justifying 
the need for the Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project in Sakon Nakhon (see Chapter 8, 
Section 8.3), that used as its “guarantee” of appropriate development, an FAO study 
from eighteen years before: 
“Since there is insufficient flow during the dry season and too much 
flow during the rainy season, so the cultivation in this region can 
hardly be successful without storage reservoirs. The Royal Irrigation 
Department has been considering small reservoirs and irrigation tanks 
as the most suitable and most effective means of water conservation. It 
is the policy designed to achieve raising the income and living 
standard of the Northeast people by providing sufficient water for 
irrigation and domestic use, by minimizing flood damage, and by 
increasing thereby the value of cultivated lands. This plan of 
development as laid down and practiced by the Royal Irrigation 
Department was checked and assured by the F.A.O. Mission to be the 
most practical mean [sic] as shown in their report in 1948.”   
(Source: Royal Irrigation Department, 1966) 
Molle et al (2009a:271) have argued in a detailed review of the “remarkable 
regularity” in the promotion of large-scale water resources development in the 
Northeast linked to the pervasiveness of political and ideological interests over the 
last half century, that the RID “created a culture in where floods and droughts 
automatically translated into proposals for more dams and more irrigation schemes.” 
To illustrate a range of rhetorical devices that a powerful bureaucrat may call upon to 
justify further infrastructure development, I refer to parts of an interview with an ex-
Director General of the RID, Chulajata Roongrueng, cited in Molle et al (2009a:265-
6): 
“At present, the quantity of water is not sufficient because of an 
increase in the population which has led to more demand for 
water……And because many forests have been destroyed, water 
cannot be retained. So it became necessary that we build a big 
reservoir to retain water for the dry season…..The increased 
population has led to more agriculture and more demand for water. It 
would be good if people were not born. But since the population has 
increased, everything has been affected. 
However, water is a necessity. When there is a water shortage it is the 
RID which is responsible for it. We have tried to propose every 
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solution to solve the problems……Nowadays, in the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] era, the population in Bangkok has 
decreased because some people have gone back to agriculture. But 
they would not have water if the RID did not provide them with water 
sources. How could we survive? Luckily, the RID has prepared for 
this. 
I think we are lost. Many people have imitated foreigners. They want 
to preserve resources without them being fully developed. It is 
necessary to develop everything to its full capacity before preserving it. 
If we preserved our natural resources, what could we use? Would you 
want to buy them from elsewhere?...... Many people ask why we want 
to do it [inter-basin diversion project]. It is because it is a duty we 
have been assigned. We have learned to find water for you, not for 
ourselves. You live well right now because of what we have done in 
the past.” 
 
Adopting neo-Malthusian narratives about population growth and resource scarcity 
fear mongering as a way to justify further development is not uncommon amongst 
elites, nor is the nationalist and xenophobic argument that water resources problems 
have arisen because Thailand has tried to “imitate the West” in its governance 
system, such as conserving (“preserving”) natural resources, before they have been 
fully exploited/developed. This narrative is often inserted alongside the idea that 
Thailand is somehow a bastion from the evils of globalization through pretending it 
does not already rely on imports of numerous raw materials, drawing heavily from 
the king’s “Sufficiency Economy” narratives. The irony of this argument, however, 
is that several of the RID’s largest and most hyped development projects appear the 
antithesis of “Sufficiency Economy” philosophy projects, as they will depend on 
water imports and transfers from neighbouring countries or transboundary rivers (e.g. 
the Mekong and Salween). However, the RID is not alone as a bureaucracy in 
working towards a goal of looking beyond Thailand’s borders for additional water 
supplies to slake its insatiable thirst for irrigation development (Floch and Blake, 
2011). 
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6.8.1 Future irrigation development imperatives based on a static discourse  
 
There has long been a sense amongst Thailand’s development planners, both 
domestic and foreign, that the Mekong River holds the key to the hydraulic 
development of the region, as a means to unlock a latent prosperity. Ever since the 
late 1950s, when formative studies by the United States Bureau of Reclamation 
(USBR) and the Army Corps of Engineers were conducted along the middle and 
lower reaches of the mainstream Mekong and drew up plans to replicate the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) model of river-based development
119
, there has 
been a strong belief evident amongst senior Thai state technocrats and bureaucrats 
that the future prosperity of the Northeast region was dependent on damming the 
Mekong. The studies indicated that there was the potential to construct a cascade 
series of ten to twelve large dams, which would facilitate the hydraulic control and 
water abstraction possibilities for hydropower, irrigation, flood control and 
navigation purposes. The Mekong was perceived as a “sleeping giant” and “river of 
promises”, and its development “required effort to convert the wasted and 
destructive powers of the Mekong untamed, into a giant tamed and harnessed to the 
uses of mankind” (Molle, 2008a; Molle et al., 2009c). The “flagship” dam of the 
cascade was to have been the gigantic Pa Mong Dam, planned for a stretch of river 
between Thailand and Laos which would have an installed capacity of 4,600 MW 
and have the potential to irrigate two million hectares of farmland in the Northeast 
(Molle and Floch, 2008a). Bureaucratic agencies were created with foreign 
development assistance to assist in turning this dream into reality, such as the 
National Energy Authority (NEA) (Sneddon, 2003b). The following quotes extracted 
from a paper by Sneddon, capture the hubris with which powerful American and 
Thai actors at the time injected into political imperatives to dam and divert the 
Mekong. 
 “Of all the four countries situated in the lower basin of the Mekong, 
Thailand is the one that has the most urgent need for the development of 
irrigation in its northeastern region……If large-scale cultivation of crops 
requiring a significant quantity of water is contemplated ….. the only 
                                                   
119 This model called for “comprehensive”, “integrated” and “efficient” river basin development for 
the Tennessee River, as the best route to promoting “grassroots democracy” (Molle et al. 2009).    
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way of assuring such supply will be to tap the flow from the Mekong” 
(USBR, 1956, cited in Sneddon, 2003b:2238) 
 “It is truly the Mekong River itself that holds the key to the prosperity of 
the northeastern part of Thailand as well as to our national power supply 
in the coming decades. Our interest in, and support of, the Mekong 
Committee is firmly rooted in that premise.” (Dr Boonrod Binson, quoted 
in Mekong Committee, 1972, Sneddon, 2003b:2239 ) 
“In the long run, Thailand’s well-being will depend in no small measure 
on the Mekong. One single dam, such as Pa Mong could provide a 
massive block of power to meet essential needs….in the future only 
Mekong water, stored behind a mainstream dam, could sustain the 
irrigation development needed for that region to produce enough food, 
rather than becoming a liability to the rest of the country.” (Mekong 
Secretariat, 1977, cited in Sneddon, 2003b:2240)  
However, even back in the 1960s, doubts about the wisdom of these hydraulic 
engineering dreams surfaced and questions were raised whether the countries 
of the Lower Mekong Basin could “stand the luxury of monolithic concrete 
structures whose immediate return is inflation of national ego” (White et al., 
1962). Yet, despite the growing emphasis on narratives from a variety of 
sources expressing environmental and social concerns in the intervening years, 
the old developmentalist discourse and irrigationalist visions remain alive and 
well, “entrenched in narrow conceptions of sovereignty” and, “only marginally 
swayed by contestation”, according to (Molle et al., 2009c). Recent narratives 
have repeated the old storylines, made more powerful by politicians either 
seeking election as a pork barrelling tactic, or once in office, using 
irrigationalist rhetoric to appeal to win over party colleagues, factions and most 
importantly, finance committees with the authority to approve funds, as a way 
to justify the imperative of the proposed pet mega-projects. This points to a 
perceived need to look beyond the agency of the hydrocracies alone to 
“mobilize funds and resources within the country on the premise of regional 
planning, rural development and irrigation development” (Mirumachi, 2012:92), 
but to also consider other political actors integral to pursuing the goals of the 
hydraulic mission. Below are two examples of politicians’ narratives of the 
desire to extend beyond Thailand’s borders to secure water, one relating to the 
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KCM Project (Prachuab Chaiyasarn) and one for the trans-basin Water Grid 
Project (Samak Sundaravej). 
“The problem of drought in Isaan occurs because Isaan has little water. It 
can be compared to a person with little blood. The treatment method for 
someone with little blood is to give additional blood to the body. Isaan at 
the moment has big veins; that is the Chee River and the Mun River. 
Both rivers have little water. Therefore, it is necessary to find water 
elsewhere to add to them, such that the water source that is best for this 
transfusion is the Mekong River.”    
Quote attributed to Prachuab Chaiyasan, Minister of Science, Technology 
and Environment. Source: (Ministry of Science Technology and Energy, 
No date) 
 
“Mr Samak said the project was realistic, given what Israel had done 
by turning its arid areas into fertile farmland, and vowed to make it 
possible even though he could possibly face criticism from 
environmentalists. 
‘I am not too ambitious. State agencies involved, especially the Royal 
Irrigation Department, must seriously help us undertake it,’ he said. 
‘Were I not prime minister, I would not have an opportunity to push 
for this project,’ he added. He said he did not care about opposition 
from non-governmental organisations.”  
Source: (Charoenpo, 2008) 
 
The second citation above is taken from a February 2008 news report in the Bangkok 
Post, quoting newly elected Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej who vowed his 
government would spend at least 500 billion baht (c. $16.3 billion) on mega-projects, 
including resuming a project started by ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the 
main financier of the People’s Power Party (Phak Palang Phrachaachon) he headed, 
namely a national water pipeline project using water diverted from the Mekong river, 
formerly called the Water Grid Project. Samak drew as his comparative model the 
example of Israel, and repeated a “desert bloom” narrative, underlining once more 
the ideological nature of the discourse; and true to his bombastic and confrontational 
past, stressed that he had little concern about any civil society criticism, while 
underscoring his authority.  
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While the Water Grid Project has yet to be implemented, like its historical precursors, 
the discursive legacy of these projects is still very much alive in the rhetoric of the 
present government, now headed by Thaksin’s younger sister, Yingluk Shinawatra, 
who has announced plans to spend $11 billion on a “comprehensive water 
management system” for the country at a Water Management Exhibition she opened 
in Bangkok in late August, 2012 (Royal Thai Government, 2012). This 
announcement is almost certain to stimulate optimism amongst engineers and 
technocrats within the Department of Water Resources and Royal Irrigation 
Department that their blueprint plans to divert water from the Mekong or Lao PDR 
into the Northeast may yet come to fruition (Floch and Blake, 2011).  
 
6.9 Summary 
 
This chapter has illustrated how powerful state-aligned actors have framed the 
problems of Northeast Thailand in particular ways, to create “off-the-shelf narratives” 
(Fairhead and Leach, 1997) or “received wisdom” (Leach and Mearns, 1996), that 
simplifies socio-ecological ambiguity and uncertainty to help facilitate the political 
goals of certain dominant actors and are used to justify certain techno-centric 
developmental solutions. The region’s orthodox development discourse has 
conflated regional economic poverty with natural resource scarcity, in particular 
placing a strong emphasis on an ill-defined narrative of water scarcity, which has 
taken on the status of a “received wisdom” and integral part of the popular regional 
lexicon. An “Isaan is arid” (Isaan haeng laeng) cliché is found to be almost 
ubiquitous throughout popular media, art, music, numerous academic accounts and 
state agency-generated literature, thus appearing commonsensical and beyond 
question, especially when backed up by the authority of the king and prime ministers. 
Communist insurgents and foreign invaders may have been successfully quashed in 
the communal imagination of the nation (Anderson, 2006), but Isaan’s naturalized 
and universalized drought remains a static, perennial and unvanquished enemy, 
against which a war must be indefinitely waged. The reach of the development 
orthodoxy was highlighted by results obtained from the questionnaire survey that 
indicated the Northeast was closely associated with narratives of drought and water 
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scarcity in the worldviews of ordinary people in Bangkok, Khon Kaen and the Nam 
Songkhram basin. Despite every conceivable technological intervention having been 
tried and tested over the decades since the development era began (Molle et al., 
2009a), seemingly all with the same disappointing results when set against aims of 
their proponents, yet still the elusive quest for a regional irrigation development 
utopia to overcome scarcity continues unabated, constantly pushing towards the goal 
of diverting the waters of the Mekong river or rivers in Lao PDR. The next chapter 
follows the discursive fortunes and ideological struggles of one such “mega-project”. 
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Chapter 7  Greening Isaan - irrigation 
mega-projects and development discourse 
 
“The idea of transforming the Northeast into a ‘promised land’ where poor 
farmers can grow rice and other crops and raise livestock to make enough 
money to sustain a traditional livelihood without having to travel to the city 
to make a living every dry season has never faded far from the minds of 
some caring north-eastern politicians.” 
Source:  Editorial in the Bangkok Post. 28 July, 2003. (Prateepchaikul, 2003) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter attempted to demonstrate how the development discourse in 
Northeast Thailand has traditionally privileged certain dominant narratives and 
knowledge constructions. This discourse has given rise to widespread social 
perceptions that the region suffers from more severe poverty than other national 
regions mainly as a result of chronic natural resources deficiency, in particular 
perennial drought and water scarcity, which has been demonized in the popular 
consciousness. The default developmental solutions offered by the  hydrocracies in 
response to the orthodox problem framing has principally focused on privileging 
public irrigation infrastructure expansion across the region at all scales of 
intervention and use of multiple technological interventions over the past sixty years 
(Floch et al., 2007). A range of other supporting meta-justifications have been 
utilized for these projects, but the “Isaan haeng laeng” narrative and its supposed 
negative impacts on the livelihood of “poor farmers”, has been the most stable and 
reliable discursive device for closing debate by proponents of irrigationalism, as after 
all, who would claim to be against poverty alleviation? Numerous Thai leaders have 
used this meta-justification to their advantage in the past as an effective means to 
stifle opposition (Molle et al., 2009a). 
These projects represent material and symbolic embodiments of the ideology and 
discourse of irrigationalism in Thai society, both revealing and concealing stories of 
unequal power relations, struggle and contestation. To illustrate how the hydraulic 
development discourse proceeds in practice at the regional and national levels during 
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one particular critical phase in recent Thai history, in this chapter I draw on the case 
of one specific pan-regional scheme (the Green Isaan Project) and apply a historical 
narrative analysis from its genesis to the nominal demise of the scheme, based on a 
critical examination of media coverage of the project in the English language daily 
press
120
. As such, this chapter starts to explore some of the dynamics of control over 
development between the actors and actor groups involved, both in support of and 
opposition to the scheme, and thereby attempt to address the following research 
questions:  
SQ2: What are the main development narratives driving irrigationalism, framed by 
different actors, both historically and in the present context? 
SQ3: Which actors appear to determine control over irrigation development at 
multiple scales, using what discourses and pathways? 
SQ5: To what extent are understandings of water scarcity socially constructed and 
whose interests are served by drought narratives? 
 
7.2 Regional irrigation mega-projects – a recurring syndrome 
 
There is an underlying assumption supporting the large-scale projects proposed for 
the Northeast that irrigation development, as an ideological goal in itself, can 
contribute to regional poverty eradication and national security (See Figure 1.1 in 
Chapter One). The meta-discourse and some of the principal actors involved in these 
projects and programmes have been previously identified by Floch et al. (2007), 
Molle et al. (2009a) and Sneddon (2000), and so I shall only briefly refer to the main 
projects here to give a sense of their continuous and recurrent nature. Starting with 
the proposed Pa Mong multi-purpose dam project on the Mekong mainstream 
conceived in the 1950s, to the Green Isaan Project of the 1980s, to the Khong-Chi-
Mun Project of the 1990s, to the Water Grid Project of 2003-06 and most recently 
the competing twin variants of essentially the same scheme proposed by the RID and 
the DWR (refer to Fig. 7.1 below and Chapter 9 for further discussion), national 
                                                   
120 For an evidence base, I relied primarily on the analysis of a collection of 64 scanned press cuttings 
taken mostly from The Nation and the Bangkok Post daily newspapers, dated between March 1987 
and October 1989. I am indebted to Dr Kevin Hewison for providing this archive.  
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leaders have never failed to have a hydraulic development “mega-project” blueprint 
plan to call upon to claim the long term solution to the Northeast’s water woes was 
at hand and the arid land would be transformed to a lush, green oasis (Molle et al., 
2009a). The principal variables that appear to distinguish these instrumental, agro-
managerial projects are their given name and the particular confluence of actors and 
organizations whose commercial and ideological interests will be closest served by 
the project.  
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In this chapter, I have selected the Green Isaan Project primarily because it has been 
comparatively less scrutinized than subsequent major water resources development 
project variants, such as the Khong-Chi-Mun Project (Sneddon, 2003b) and the more 
recent Water Grid Project (Molle and Floch, 2007; Molle et al., 2009a), yet offers a 
stark and illustrative case study of the political actors involved, their narratives and 
practices of discursive contestation that emerged. As Sneddon (2000) has argued, 
water resources development programmes embedded within the wider state regional 
development trajectory have often been at the root of social conflicts in the Northeast, 
Fig. 7.1 Chronological timespan of the major large-scale water resources development projects 
proposed (and in some cases partly implemented) in Northeast Thailand, starting from the late 
1950s up to the present day, illustrating the remarkable continuity of the regional hydraulic 
mission. 
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but are frequently overlooked by social scientists as important arenas of political 
struggles over the environment, compared to forests or land rights issues for instance. 
As such, it offers a historical window into the rationale, justifications and discursive 
practices that were utilized by dominant players in a bid to ensure its ideational 
continuity as a development trope for the region, even when it was not physically 
constructed in the short term. In addition to the mainstream narratives, I also attempt 
to identify some of the counter-narratives that emerged to challenge certain aspects 
of the project and led to political in-fighting between interest groups. 
 
7.3 The Green Isaan Project – discursive roots 
 
“What's important to understand at the political level here is to 
understand that the north and northeast of Thailand is and always has 
been the poorest region of Thailand, the driest region of Thailand and 
there's a certain pork barreling aspect here of securing votes in 
northeastern Thailand by promising to green the northeast, just as the 
army used to say when it was looking at a similar type of scheme some 
twenty years ago.” 
(Dr Philip Hirsch comments in ABC Radio interview quoted in 
Werden, 2008) 
 
According to Molle et al (2009a), it was recognized during the Mekong Committee’s 
reconnaissance early surveys of the Northeast, that the internal topography and 
general hydro-ecological conditions were ill-suited to the kind of grand development 
scenarios that had first been envisioned by basin planners wanting to enact a TVA-
type hydraulic mission in the Lower Mekong Basin. By the 1980s, as the chances of 
implementing the Pa Mong Multipurpose Development Project with foreign donor 
funding became ever less probable with waning interest in the region from the USA 
as geo-political priorities changed, so the Thai government increasingly began to 
consider hydraulic mission options within its borders that did not require damming 
the Mekong (Molle and Floch, 2008a). Simultaneously, the government was 
attempting to shed an autocratic image as a “security state” gained under successive 
military regimes and encourage a gradual shift to a more liberal, participatory 
parliamentary democracy based system, where private enterprise and civil society 
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had more of a role to play, albeit under a system of what Connors (2003) termed 
“democrasubjection” of the citizen by the national elites. It was in such a changing 
context of governance discourse that the regional development scheme alluded to by 
Hirsch in the quotation above emerged, premised on combined discursive concerns 
about national security, poverty alleviation, development and export-led agri-
business growth, and later became known as the “Green Isaan Project” (Khrong-gan 
Isaan Khieow). 
References to a project conceived to help fight poverty in the “arid” and “drought-
stricken” region121 first appeared in media articles in late March 1987, during a 
temporary period of localized water scarcity in some rural parts of Northeast 
Thailand
122
. At this time, the country was run by an unelected regime comprised of a 
mix of military and civilian elites close to the palace and headed by General Prem 
Tinsulanond
123
, who led Thailand through a period of prolonged economic growth 
and relative stability. The government tokenistically responded to this “critical” 
water shortage situation by sending a convoy of military trucks loaded with water-
filled tanks from Bangkok
124
 (Bangkok Post, 1987h). Draped along the sides of each 
truck were large banners bearing the message: “Generosity from the King” (nam 
prathai
125
 jaak nai luang), (Bangkok Post, 1987f:1). A news report a few months 
later suggested that the project concept had been born on March 25
th
 1987 at a 
funeral ceremony at a temple in Bangkok for soldiers killed while defending 
                                                   
121 A total of 28 from 64 newspaper articles examined for the period 30/3/87 to 7/11/87 indicated that 
“arid” and “drought-stricken” were the most frequently used adjectives to describe the Northeast 
(both appeared in eight articles), with “drought hit” appearing three times, and “drought affected”, 
“parched” and “persistent drought problem” appearing once each. 
122 Early reports suggested the effects of the drought were mainly limited to four provinces, namely 
Nakhon Ratchasima, Khon Kaen, Mahasarakham and Roi-Et. 
123 Prem Tinsulanond (1920 - ) is a career army officer originating from Southern Thailand who 
climbed through the ranks to become commander of the Second Army, a division heavily involved in 
fighting communist insurgency in the Northeast from 1977 onwards. He was quickly appointed army 
commander in 1978, having become a favourite royal confidante, known for his loyalty. In return for 
royal patronage, he strengthened the role and position of the monarchy in society, both financially and 
symbolically (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005).  
124 Each of the 69 trucks were reported to be carrying 3,600 litres of water, i.e. a total of 248.4 m3. 
This quantity of water would theoretically satisfy the domestic demands of approximately 468 people 
(i.e. the size of a typical Northeastern village) for 10 days, assuming an average usage of 53 litres 
/person/day (Biwater, 1987). The population of Khon Kaen province alone was reported to be 
1,627,000 persons in 1989 (National Statistical Office data). This illustrates the symbolic and 
tokenistic nature of the project from its start, which nevertheless managed to capture plenty of 
uncritical media attention in the English language press as if this rather absurd exercise would 
genuinely make any difference at all to rural water scarcity, real or imagined.  
125 “Nam prathai” (น ้ ำพระทยั) here takes on a double meaning, as “nam” (น ้ ำ) means by itself “water”, 
but as a conjunction with “prathai” (พระทยั) means “generosity” or “kindness”. 
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Thailand’s borders126, attended by the king who had “confided” to General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh (the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army) that he was 
personally concerned about the drought situation in the Northeast (The Nation, 
1987e). The king was reported to have suggested that, “the army, with its readily 
available vehicles and manpower, should take immediate action to alleviate the water 
shortage and co-operate with other government agencies in finding long-term 
solutions to the drought problem" (The Nation, 1987e:5).  
Initially the project was simply portrayed as a short term and localized relief effort 
under the direction of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), through a combination of direct 
supply of domestic water to drought-hit areas and indirectly through artificial rain-
making operations. In early April, General Prem himself reportedly oversaw water 
handouts to villagers (Bangkok Post, 1987g) and soon after ordered the formation of 
an RTA-managed “Centre for Directing Assistance to the People under the Royal 
Initiative”, with responsibility for “drafting the master plan for the development of 
the Northeast during 1988 -1992” (The Nation, 1987e:5). An Army spokesperson for 
the Centre stressed that it had a “constitutional duty of participating in national 
development”, and that its role was merely one of coordinating and facilitating the 
implementation of the “master plan”. Other government agencies were expected to 
be the actual implementers of the project, with the RTA merely taking a coordinating 
position. Nevertheless, the Army felt obliged to underscore that it was in an ideal 
position to implement aspects of the project, due to its particular expertise and 
resources. For example, the Army Engineering Regiment was reportedly assigned to 
“conduct several experiments to help the development plan” which included using 
explosives to “dig a water hole” and “experimenting with rain-making rockets” at its 
weapons manufacturing centre (Bangkok Post, 1987c).  
 
 
                                                   
126 In 1987, the Thai Army engaged Vietnamese soldiers in fighting on several occasions along the 
Cambodian border and with Lao and Vietnamese troops along a disputed part of the Thai-Lao border 
between December 1987 and February 1988, which became known as the Ban Rom Klao incident. 
Some estimates claim a thousand lives were lost in this short war (Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thai%E2%80%93Laotian_Border_War. Accessed 24 May 2012). Gen 
Chavalit was much criticised for his seminal role in this border spat, which may have been 
precipitated by a dispute over rights to logging by military-linked concessions. 
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7.3.1 An army-backed “master plan” appears and the project mushrooms 
 
The RTA conceived “master plan” rapidly ballooned from a localized (but headline-
grabbing) government response to what appeared a normal, seasonal water scarcity 
situation into a multi-million dollar, pan-regional development scheme within a 
matter of months. When it was first mooted, the estimated budget for the project was 
a rather modest 300 million baht (approximately US$ 12 million), said to be paid for 
from savings made by the military through a reduction in the number of military 
personnel and restraint in the purchase of “300-400 new vehicles” (Bangkok Post, 
1987a). Between April and June 1987, the predicted project budget multiplied 46 
fold to 14 billion baht (approximately US$ 560 million) and it was no longer simply 
a drought relief project in four or five provinces, but now envisaged a transformation 
of the entire Northeast from an arid and unproductive wasteland into a prosperous 
and fertile “green belt” (Bangkok Post, 1987c). The project master plan was 
presented to the Prime Minister and governors of the seventeen Northeastern 
provinces at a conference in Khon Kaen on July 4 1987 (rather ironically, this 
meeting on drought-relief was held in the middle of the rainy season). Prior to the 
meeting, Gen Chavalit (in characteristic melodramatic style), was reported to have 
told reporters that, “if he failed in the task on behalf of the people of the 
impoverished region, it would be better for him to be dead than alive" (Bangkok Post, 
1987e). 
The conference to launch the project, chaired by General Prem, was described as 
“the largest turnout of government leaders, military brass, senior officials, politicians 
and leaders of local mass organizations in the history of this Northeastern province” 
(The Nation, 1987i). In his opening address, Prem reminded the participants that 
cooperation between the people, the government and the military in the past had 
“succeeded in overcoming the communist threat”, and emphasized, “I hope every 
one of you here is ready to work for the well-being of the poor people in this region” 
(ibid.). The implication being that those expressing any opposition to this project 
would be obstructing the centrally-defined solution to regional poverty and thereby 
pose a threat to national security (i.e. securitizing the narrative). General Chavalit, 
given overall responsibility for drafting the master plan, told the gathered delegates 
that the sub-projects proposed under it “were basic things that needed to be done and 
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must be completed in order to achieve all the goals”. In order to allay fears that the 
project was to be an entirely military run affair and that the plan had endorsement 
from the very top, General Chavalit added, “The army will merely facilitate the 
implementation of these projects as a response to HM the King’s wish” (The Nation, 
1987i) (a rhetorical device employed to close or silence debate). 
The master plan initially envisaged spending two billion baht (US$ 80 million) on 
“urgent” water resources development projects between 1987 and 1992, including 
digging and dredging ponds and water courses; constructing dams, reservoirs and 
irrigation canals; and drilling over 2,800 artesian wells (The Nation, 1987e). Next it 
classified “medium-term solutions” including, “developing small to medium-size 
sources of water, forming a special rain-making task force for the region, and 
establishing tap water systems for villages” (ibid.). Longer term solutions proposed 
the development of large-scale “water sources” (read: building major storage dams) 
on the upper Chi and Mun rivers and developing electric pumped irrigation schemes 
using water from the Mekong mainstream and other large tributary rivers. The 
combined costs of the medium and long-term projects were estimated at just over 
five billion baht (US$ 200 million). The remaining budget for the project (i.e. 6.8 
billion baht or US$ 272 million) would be spent on “forest conservation” activities127, 
with the ultimate goal of increasing forested areas in the Northeast from 14 % to 25 % 
by 1992 (ibid.). Thus Chavalit and the RTA were essentially presenting a fait 
accompli that offered little room for negotiation or compromise where the duty of 
Isaan politicians, local leaders and state agencies was essentially to pull together, 
settle their differences and start implementing the top-down plan without delay.   
The choreographed manner in which General Chavalit presented the blueprint plan 
of “greening” the Northeast to his mentor and patron, General Prem as the Prime 
Minister, must have made it appear to those gathered that there was no real 
alternative to the project (a case of “TINA” (see Mehta, 2001)) and to oppose it 
would have appeared to be obstructive and running counter to the king’s wishes. 
After all, who could be against such noble aims and justifications as reducing 
poverty and fighting drought, so any avenues of rhetorical objection to the dominant 
narrative would have to incorporate alternative modes of resistance. An effective 
                                                   
127 For a detailed critique of the forestry aspects of the Green Isaan Project and its successor, the much 
reviled Khor Jor Khor programme (1990-92), refer to Pye (2005). 
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narrative “problem closure” (Forsyth, 2003) had been achieved at the meeting 
through clever use of calls to national security, a sense of fighting a common 
national enemy to replace the vanquished and “unThai” communist ideology, plus 
use of the indisputable trump card of presenting a royal prerogative. Despite this, 
immediately after the meeting tentative opposition to the plan emerged from 
politicians who felt they were being excluded from the centrally planning and 
implementation process, with its potential feast of construction contracts, plus pork-
barreling, voter legitimacy enhancement and rent seeking opportunities missed. 
 
7.3.2 Overt criticism of project emerges from Northeast politicians 
 
Over the days following the conference, a number of Northeastern politicians outside 
the government voiced scepticism about the army’s motives for taking the lead on 
the project, the likelihood of corruption and doubts whether the plan was realistic in 
solving the region’s poverty. One MP, Piyanat Watcharaporn (Ruamthai Party - 
Sisaket), argued that “most of the projects to develop the Northeast in the past failed 
because of corruption” and said that the government should be “ashamed” that the 
plan was army initiated (The Nation, 1987g). Another MP, Suwit Khunkitti
128
 
(Social Action Party – Khon Kaen) claimed to welcome the role of the army in 
implementing the plan, but thought the government should first have conducted a 
study to ascertain how past water resources projects had benefitted the people of the 
region and suggested “suppressed prices of agricultural products” was the main 
problem they faced (ibid). A third politician, MP Direk Lakkam (Democrat – Udon 
Thani), the Chairman of a “House Committee for the Study of Aridity in the 
Northeast” recommended that the project concentrate mostly on developing water 
resources through expanding “ponds”, digging irrigation canals, and “constructing 
dams to keep the water in the two rivers for agriculture instead of letting it flow into 
the Mekong River” and suggested increasing the budget to 50 billion baht (US$ 2 
billion) (The Nation, 1987k). These comments indicated that the regional politicians 
were on the same page ideologically as the royalist military, but merely that they 
                                                   
128 Suwit went on to become one of the leading architects and advocates of the Water Grid project 
under the Thaksin Shinawatra government of 2001-06, when he was Minister for Natural Resources 
and Environment, a position  he later temporarily regained in the Democrat-led coalition government 
(2008-2011), as leader of the For the Motherland (Pheua Paendin) Party. 
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were upset about not getting a big enough slice of the cake under the present plan. 
They took the military to task for consuming over a quarter of the national budget, 
surpassing the amount spent on health and education, and branded it just another 
self-serving political party using state funds to maintain its power base (Handley, 
2006). To illustrate this point, cartoons appeared in The Nation daily newspaper 
around the same period depicting sardonic and cynical images of the hidden 
transcript behind the project, that were not apparent in the text of the main news 
reports (Figure 7.2 below).  
 Fig. 7.2  Cartoons by the cartoonist “Aroon”, featured in The Nation newspaper 
between 29 June and 30 July, 1987, mainly lampooning the role of the military in the Green 
Isaan Project. The figure portrayed in the top right hand image is Army Commander-in-
Chief General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who has remained the actor most synonymous with 
the Green Isaan Project.  
The murmurings of dissent surfacing from opposition parliamentarians were met 
with refutations from RTA spokesmen and new actors emerged to offer their support, 
giving stronger affirmation of the palace’s involvement in the project. For example, 
Dr Sumet Tantivejakul
129
, close royal advisor and Assistant Secretary-General to the 
                                                   
129 Sumet Tantivejakul has been a close confidante of the king for decades, in his role as chief of the 
Royal Projects Development Board and past member of the National Security Council (Handley, 
2006). He moved on from the NESDB post to become Secretary-General of the Chaipattana 
Foundation, an institution regarded as the king’s personal rural development organization (see 
Chapter 10 for more detail). He is also, reportedly, the current President of the Thai Rice Foundation 
under Royal Patronage (see http://www.thairice.org/). 
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NESDB came forward to defend the army’s involvement in the proposed project, 
which he viewed as “a positive factor” and hinted that those who opposed it might be 
regarded as not playing a constructive part in national development. Responding to 
politicians’ criticism, he added, “[S]ome skeptics may see it as a political move. But 
I think we have to be objective and broadminded to appreciate what the army is 
trying to do” (The Nation, 1987k). Prime Minister Prem also resolutely defended the 
army’s involvement through the claim that with more easily mobilized manpower 
and equipment than other government agencies, only the RTA was uniquely placed 
to tackle the most urgent development projects (The Nation, 1987h). A government 
spokesman and staunch royalist, Mechai Viravaidya
130
, commented that the master 
plan could be viewed as, “a good example of cooperation among government 
agencies in working towards a common goal” (ibid). General Chavalit was 
characteristically dismissive of the project criticism, stating, “I don’t care what 
others say. Let’s not worry about them…….I’m confident we can turn the Northeast 
into a green belt with this master plan” (ibid). Yet again he tried to close the debate 
by referring to the project as “HM the King’s Generosity Project”, and reiterated that 
it was the king’s wishes to see the plight of the poor Northeast farmers suffering 
from drought relieved (The Nation, 1987a).  
As at the start of the “crisis” in March, the RTA gathered a large fleet of military 
hardware in central Bangkok in a symbolic display of renewed zeal for the 
development mission and drought eradication. On July 11 1987, a reported 200 
vehicles and 1,000 soldiers were paraded before the media, prior to departure the 
following morning for deployment at the Third Army headquarters in Nakhon 
Ratchasima (Bangkok Post, 1987b). As if to underline the military’s superior 
technical ability to win the battle against drought, the mute enemy, a spokesman for 
the RTA claimed that 120 teams of army engineers would use 6,000 pounds of 
explosives in digging 300 reservoirs, “where heavy earth-moving machinery cannot 
be operated” (ibid.). Furthermore, the army claimed it wanted to “experiment” with a 
“new type of rainmaking missile”, which it hoped might prove cheaper than 
conventional aerial spraying techniques. However, Lt-General Charuay Wongsayant 
                                                   
130 Mechai Viravaidya, is a wealthy scion of the Thai elite with corporate business interests, past 
Minister of Public Health and chairman of the quasi-NGO, the Population and Community 
Development Association (PDA), and has been the UNAIDS ambassador for several years. He is 
married to the King’s Deputy Principal Private Secretary, M.R. Butrie Viravaidya (Stevenson, 2001). 
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(Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the RTA) estimated that the project would now cost in the 
region of 20 billion baht (US$ 800 million), although the actual cost would not be 
known until 1989, “after government agencies work out details and seek financial 
support from the government in that year’s budget bill” (Bangkok Post, 1987b). It 
now appeared that the earlier certainty over the budget costs and plans presented a 
week before in Khon Kaen was already in doubt and the project was actually being 
planned on an ad hoc basis with fungible planning targets and little clarity
131
.  
 
7.3.3 General Chavalit seeks new development partners for the mission 
 
It was beginning to appear that ensuring the implementation of the “Green Isaan”132 
master plan had become a personal crusade for General Chavalit. Reiterating earlier 
claims that failure was not an option, Chavalit stated in a TV Channel 9 interview, 
“[I]f (we) cannot develop the Northeast, (we) would rather die”133 (The Nation, 
1987b). In another article released the same day, General Chavalit stressed the 
importance of the Northeast region as “the frontline of democratic rule, the frontline 
of free trade, a frontline of not only Thailand, but also of the other countries in this 
region….” (Bangkok Post, 1987d). He emphasized political, economic and national 
security imperatives in a return to Cold War rhetoric of the past. When politicians 
again charged that the generals were merely trying to win political favour by 
implementing the project and the project’s scope was over-ambitious, Chavalit tried 
to dampen criticism by seeking another audience with the king (The Nation, 1987d). 
Denying any political motivation, he claimed his intention was only “to make people 
in the Northeast better off” and said the king’s main worry was the water shortage 
(ibid). This meeting with the king seemed to herald a new tactic to make the project 
                                                   
131 For example, as well as an increased geographical scope, the army were now predicting that the 
project would plant 850 million trees. If the 120 million rai (19.2 million ha) identified as degraded 
forestland in the Northeast was not sufficient for accommodating this number of trees, then the army 
claimed they would plant the remainder in other regions (The Bangkok Post, 12 July 1987).  
132 At this point there was a subtle change in official nomenclature, with the scheme no longer being 
referred to as the “Generosity of the King” project, but named the “Green Isaan Project”. This name 
shift suggested a conscious attempt to distance the project rhetorically from the royal institution, 
perhaps as an insurance plan against any negative fallout, should it fail to achieve its objectives and 
create national discord. 
133 It was not clear who the “we” referred to in Chavalit’s quote – just the army, the government 
generally or perhaps the entire nation? 
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more politically acceptable, by bringing forward various non-military actors, both 
domestic and international to lend verbal support to the Green Isaan Project. 
Firstly, the government recruited the cooperation of the Buddhist Ecclesiastical 
Council, which reportedly passed a resolution saying monks in the Northeast were 
ready to take part in the army’s green belt plan (The Nation, 1987f). A month later it 
was announced that the Israeli Embassy in Thailand had invited a renowned water 
management expert, Aaron Wiener
134
, to run a RTA organized workshop on water 
resources development in the Northeast for senior government policy makers from 
various water resources related agencies (Waring, 1987). Wiener reportedly 
suggested that the Thai government should become more goal-oriented, rather than 
resource-oriented in developing and managing regional water resources, and 
concluded it should, “focus on the integration of the rural population, not just on a 
limited area as past projects have done” (ibid). Shortly after, General Chavalit 
announced that China and “several other countries” had expressed an interest in 
assisting Thailand to implement the Green Isaan Project (The Nation, 1987j). 
Bizarrely, given his purported offer of help from China, few months later in 
November 1987 then started to openly court the “the rest of the Free World” for 
funding, using a thinly veiled threat that should foreign countries neglect to support 
the Green Isaan Project, then the Communist Party of Thailand would re-emerge to 
destabilize Thailand, and thus it was important to quickly “get rid of the remaining 
germs of future trouble” (The Nation, 1987c). He claimed a sum of 10 billion baht 
(US$ 400 million) had been pledged from abroad, with Japan, Italy and “a few other 
countries” supposedly having offered to provide “soft loans” at an interest rate of 
1.5 % per annum (ibid.). It also emerged that the UK government and private sector 
was heavily involved in the project, suggesting a number of other motivations for 
these nations’ involvement beyond drought and poverty relief (see Section 7.3.4 
below). 
Besides claiming the support of foreign bi-lateral or multi-lateral donors for the 
Green Isaan Project, the RTA fund-raisers also campaigned for donations from 
domestic corporations, stressing its royal credentials. Some appeared eager to help, 
                                                   
134 Aaron Wiener is an ex-academic and chairman of Tahal Consulting Engineers Ltd (Tel Aviv), a 
company involved in exporting Israeli expertise and technology in water resources management to 
developing nations. 
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perhaps sensing positive publicity and wider business opportunities arising from the 
association. Chaliao Yoowitthaya
135
, for instance, donated a reported 50 million baht 
(US$ 2 million) to support the project. He justified his donation by stating, “[P]eople 
in the Northeast are poor and helpless. If they don't get some help, they will always 
live in hardship. But if they become stronger, they will have more purchasing power 
and that, in the end, will have a positive effect on the overall economy” (Thanyasiri, 
1988:21). Other companies seemed to perceive similar potential rewards from 
publically supporting this project, both materially through cash donations and giving 
credence to the popular justifications. Peter Scharnell, General Manager of the Thai-
Swedish Plantation Co Ltd, urged that no time should be wasted in commencing the 
project, “before the degeneration of soil in E-sarn gets worse due to the lack of water 
resources and appropriate conservation” (Khantong, 1988). Echoing the king’s 
concerns, Scharnell recommended that the solution to greening the region was the 
widespread cultivation of commercial eucalyptus plantations, as it could produce 
“more wood per acreage than other species under this tropical climate”, while 
cautioning that the tree might need more water than local species (ibid.). Other 
companies mentioned in the same article as sponsoring commercial wood plantations 
through the Thai-Swedish Plantation Co Ltd, included the Siam Cement Group
136
 
and the Shell Company of Thailand Ltd. Even commercial rock bands joined in to 
publically support the RTA’s goals and raise money for the Project (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.6.1). 
 
7.3.4 Involvement of UK interests and an “aid and trade for arms” scandal 
 
The international commercial and national security aspects of the project took on an 
interesting dimension in 1988, when it appeared that the UK government, royalty 
                                                   
135 Chaliao was a multi-millionaire owner of a beverage company producing the energy stimulant 
drink Grathing Daeng or “Red Bull”. Coincidentally, perhaps, Grathing Daeng was also the name of 
one of the most brutal and feared Thai right-wing vigilante groups of the 1970s and 80s, which 
participated in the bloody crackdown against student protesters at Thammasat University in October 
1976 (see Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005) 
136 The Siam Cement Group (SCG) is described as one of Thailand’s leading companies and in 1986 
was the largest industrial conglomerate in Southeast Asia (Handley, 2006; Ouyyanont, 2008). It has 
long held direct interests in the pulp and paper industry and promoting commercial production of the 
raw material, especially eucalyptus. SCG is largely owned by the Crown Property Bureau and in 2005 
was valued at 87.8 billion baht (US$ 2.16 billion) (Ouyyanont, 2008). 
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and corporate business interests were embroiled in the scheme. It emerged that the 
British engineering consulting company Biwater Limited had been hired by the 
NESDB to write a development “master plan” for the Northeast, which later 
morphed into the Green Isaan Project. Curiously, Biwater’s involvement in the 
project planning process pre-dated the first public announcement of the project, 
according to anecdotal evidence from a handover speech for an exhibition on the 
project held in Khon Kaen during May 1988 (The Nation, 1988c), suggesting the 
RTA’s first drought relief mission to the four provinces in March 1987 was merely a 
convenient front for a plan the government had been hatching for some time. It was 
reported that the exhibition had been officially opened by HRH the Prince of 
Wales
137
 in February 1988 at the Regent Hotel in Bangkok. Dick Bourton, director 
of Biwater, noted, “[I]t was some two years ago that we first had discussions with 
the NESDB regarding E-Sarn. During the second half of 1987, Biwater carried out 
an intensive study of the region and prepared a strategy for development covering all 
sectors relating to land and water resources, at peak involving 100 British and Thai 
consultants, engineers, specialist advisors and technicians” (ibid.). By the opening of 
the exhibition, the company had already submitted a 13 volume report
138
 to the 
NESDB that stressed “the need for precise integration and coordination of the sectors 
- agriculture, water supply, irrigation, forestry, fisheries and especially agro-industry” 
(ibid.).  
Biwater’s (1987) report privileged the development of agro-industry alongside 
irrigation, arguing it would: 
“......produce the processed goods for regional export, create 
employment opportunity in the urban areas and create the demand for 
agricultural products.....Irrigation, required to produce raw materials 
for the agro-processing industry, will create wealth and job 
opportunities in the rural areas.”  
                                                   
137 Prince Charles was officially in Thailand to attend the king’s 60th birthday celebrations. This link 
to the British monarchy further underscores the depth of involvement of the Thai monarchy in the 
Green Isaan Project and the complex entanglement of geo-political, military, economic and 
ideological interests in this scheme. 
138 Despite the high level of effort and resources that had been put into preparing this report, it 
subsequently became a rather elusive document, and extremely difficult to access. I obtained a copy 
of the Executive Summary from the Department of Water Resources library, but efforts to locate any 
of the reportedly “13 volume” report directly from Biwater itself suggested it had been buried. Email 
replies from company staff suggest that they could not find physical copies of this report and there 
appeared little collective memory of the study’s existence remaining (Cliff Stone, personal 
communication 7 January, 2011). 
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(Biwater, 1987 cited in Molle et al., 2009a:264) 
However, Biwater’s blueprint strategy for hydraulic development and agribusiness 
promotion in the Northeast apparently hid a slightly darker motive that perhaps 
explained the non-transparent nature of the planning process. It emerged that the 
United Kingdom was one of the “other nations” approached by the Thai government 
to financially support the project with grants and loans. The UK Conservative 
government assigned the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) to consider the Thai 
request for bilateral aid. In November 1989, Lynda Chalker, the then Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs, responded to a parliamentary question 
about the government’s relationship regarding the project that: 
 “The Government have indicated to the Government of Thailand its 
readiness in principle to provide aid and trade provision support for the 
Green E-Sarn development programme. This has involved discussions 
with Biwater who are actively pursuing contracts associated with this 
programme. The Green-E-Sarn project, while originally put forward by 
the Thai military authorities, is a civil project for rural development in 
north-east Thailand, and is the responsibility of the National Economic 
and Social Development Board of Thailand: there are thus no military 
implications for the Department to assess”  
(Source: House of Commons Hansard debates written answers: 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989-11-14/Writtens-2.html 
Accessed 29 March, 2012)  
However, it appeared that it was not only Biwater that was “actively pursuing 
contracts” on the back of the Green Isaan Project bandwaggon, but several other 
British transnational arms business interests were intimately involved (Molle et al., 
2009a), a matter that had originally prompted the parliamentary question to the 
Minister. It transpired that in July 1988, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
139
 had 
visited the Defence Asia exhibition in Bangkok in the company of her Defence 
Minister, Lord Trefgarne (The Nation, 1994). An article in the Sunday Times of 6 
March, 1994 reported that Britain and Thailand were negotiating a military 
assistance programme that involved a consortium headed by British Aerospace and 
                                                   
139 Her visit to Thailand happened to coincide with a regime transition between General Prem’s 
royalist-military government and General Chatichai’s elected government, so she was actually greeted 
by both leaders (Source: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108221) 
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GEC-Marconi (ibid). Thus, it could be construed that General Chavalit’s motives in 
November 1987 for stressing the national security imperative to justify the army 
taking the lead on the Green Isaan project obscured a far more complex picture. In 
1989, a soft loans protocol under Aid and Trade Provisions (ATP) was signed 
between the two countries prior to the British commitment “in principle” to offer 
funding for the Green Isaan Project, noted by Chalker in the quote above. Molle et al 
(2009a:269) reported that “Thatcher’s government was ready to grant US$100 
million and provide a loan of US$500 million for the project if agreement was found 
on a major package of military equipment purchase”. In the event, Thailand declined 
to purchase British arms, instead opting to sign an agreement with the USA for 
fighter jets and other hardware (ibid). In 1990, a report in The Daily Telegraph 
confirmed that support for the Biwater bid had been linked to an arms deal (Hewison, 
1994), in a manner not dissimilar to the better publicized Pergau Dam scandal in 
Malaysia. A report on the Pergau Dam Inquiry conducted by the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee found that there was a common pattern of linking aid and 
arms deals by the British government, through the ATP, in a number of different 
countries across Asia and elsewhere (World Development Movement, 1995).   
The entire Byzantine episode suggested that there was a pre-existing agenda behind 
the Green Isaan Project that had been systematically obscured from the public up to 
the point of the public announcement in mid-1987. The interests involved seem to 
trace back to a strategic group consisting of royalist-military elites and its close 
strategic allies in business (some through the Crown Property Bureau), foreign 
corporate capital (particularly the arms export and hydraulic construction industry), 
bilateral aid agencies, highest echelons of the British political establishment and 
even incorporating the monarchies of both nations. This alliance of elite interests, 
tends to support the concept proposed by McCargo (2005) of a dominant political 
network operating in Thailand between 1973 – 2001 that he calls a “network 
monarchy” (this concept is explored in further detail in Section 10.10, Chapter 10). 
However, it seems that the dominant group pushing the Green Isaan agenda, had not 
quite anticipated the level of resistance from Isaan politicians and an increasingly 
vocal civil society, both of whom perceived that they had been excluded from the 
negotiations, planning and implementation of the project and resented the RTA’s 
monopolization.  
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7.3.5 Local opposition and resistance to the project emerges  
 
Concurrently with the Prem government’s promotion of the Green Isaan Project, 
generous state subsidies were being offered for agribusiness to relocate to the 
Northeast (Bello et al., 1998; Pritchard and Burch, 2003), tempted also by promises 
of cheap land, labour, tax incentives and subsidized irrigation infrastructure; so 
indications of widespread local unrest and opposition to the project were appearing. 
Not only private companies, but a variety of state enterprises (many of which were 
loss-making) and companies under royal patronage involved in agribusiness 
promotion received state subsidies for moving to the Northeast and stood to profit 
further from the Green Isaan agenda in both water and forest resources development. 
In mid-March 1988, it was reported that villagers’ frustration at being forcibly 
relocated by state agencies from state forest reserves to make way for commercial 
eucalyptus plantations had boiled over, and a group of about 4,000 protesting 
villagers burned down a Forestry Department tree nursery and cut down eucalyptus 
trees in Buriram province (The Nation, 1988h). Pye (2005) notes that by the end of 
1989, an estimated 500,000 rai (80,000 ha) of industrial pulpwood plantations had 
been established, by both private companies and a state enterprise, the Forestry 
Industry Organization (FIO). A whole wave of local protests dogged these 
commercial plantations in several Northeastern provinces between 1987 and 1990 
period. This served to highlight the close affinity and collaboration between the 
military, high-ranking politicians, bureaucrats and corporate interests, including 
those tied to the Crown Property Bureau, described by Pye (2005) as forming 
“strategic groups”140. At the same time, a counter-strategic group emerged, bringing 
together local village and farmer movements “into an alliance with student- and 
middle-class-based NGOs, which were campaigning on various environmental issues” 
(Pye, 2005:107), including dams, land-rights issues, mining and illegal logging in an 
era of growing domestic environmentalism (Hirsch, 1997). This was also a period 
marked by a re-emerging political consciousness and activism within civil society, as 
the internal conditions of freedom improved somewhat after years of repressive 
                                                   
140 “Strategic Groups” are explored in more detail in the context of irrigation project development in 
Chapter 8. 
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military dictatorship and armed struggle following the 1976 Thammasat University 
massacre (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). A broad mix of ideologies existed 
amongst a burgeoning NGO sector, with the more radical amongst them supporting 
continued community resistance and direct confrontation with state authorities, while 
others believed the best approach was to work with the state to effect positive change 
and development (Phatharathananunth, 2006).  
From early 1988 onwards, local opposition steadily gathered momentum against the 
commercial forestry and land rights aspects, but appeared less united or resolute in 
opposing the water resources sector developments
141
, although there were occasional 
reports that many of the army-dug ponds and reservoirs were failures due to being 
located at unsuitable sites on porous soils. A Thai academic observer I interviewed 
commented that many ponds and reservoirs in Northeast Thailand dug under the 
Green Isaan Project had been nicknamed by villagers as “bor lom” (literally meaning 
“air ponds”), referring to their inability to retain and supply water for irrigation 
(Vaddhanaphutti, interview, 8 March 2011). Overall, it appeared much of the 
opposition and conflict concerning the project was primarily focused on land rights, 
commercial forestry and forced resettlement issues, perhaps because most of the 
water resources projects carried out under it were relatively small-scale, as the 
government failed to raise the necessary funds to implement the longer term, large-
scale projects recommended in the Biwater master plan (Fig. 7.3), including 
diversions from the Mekong River (Floch et al., 2007). It appeared that political 
contestation over control of funding was to become the major impediment to project 
progress and source of conflict between individuals and agencies vying to implement 
the project. 
                                                   
141 This is not to deny that during the same period there were also multiple state-society conflicts over 
water resources development projects occuring elsewhere in Thailand, but the Green Isaan Project 
involved a discursive struggle between factions over the scale of water resources development 
interventions recommended, rather than open or violent conflict as with the forest programme.  
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7.3.6 Budget struggles over control of the Green Isaan Project 
 
From an early stage, it has been noted, there was varying forms of resistance 
expressed against the project by regional politicians and civil society opposed to the 
royalist-military strategic group that had assumed a controlling role (partly reflected 
in the cartoons in Fig 7.2). They objected to the military interfering in matters of 
internal development that they saw as the rightful business of civilian government 
agencies and the elected representatives of the people in a democratic country. The 
politicians perceived that the army was claiming undue credit for projects nominally 
implemented under the Green Isaan Project banner, but were actually projects that 
were funded out of the budgets of regular bureaucratic development agencies. One 
Ubon Ratchatani MP taunted the Prime Minister saying, “it was ridiculous that the 
Fig. 7.3 Map illustrating the extent of the Green Isaan Project plans in NE Thailand, illustrating that 
inter-basin water transfers from the Mekong to the Nam Songkhram Basin was an integral part of 
the Biwater masterplan (Source: (Floch et al., 2007).   
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army has to organize concerts in order to get money for the project” 142, which was, 
“a slap in the face for the Prem government because it simply shows that the 
government cannot get the necessary money to develop the northeastern region" 
(The Nation, 1988i). The project was also opposed by Student Federation of 
Thailand representatives who made an explicit link between state-built dams and 
associated forced relocation of affected people to infertile resettlement sites leading 
to a self-perpetuating vicious cycle of poverty (The Nation, 1988r).  
At the end of March 1988, following an annual progress review, the NESDB 
announced that it would take a role in monitoring the project, which according to an 
anonymous source, was viewed as, “an attempt to curtail the role of the army in the 
project” (The Nation, 1988m:2). A report a few days later, noted that all activities 
under the Project would henceforth be overseen by the National Rural Development 
Board (NRDB), an agency under the Prime Minister’s Office, which according to 
General Prem, “would speed up rural development programmes” (The Nation, 
1988j). This was rather ironic rhetoric, given that the original justification given by 
the royalists for assigning the project to the RTA was a supposed lack of bureaucracy 
and efficiency in achieving tasks assigned. However, it seemed to temporarily 
placate some previous critics who imagined it would boost public confidence in the 
project by giving elected politicians a greater role. “Now they know who the boss is. 
The government is supposed to be in the driver’s seat because it has been doing the 
job from the beginning”, claimed MP Terdpong Boonyarit (Chart Thai Party – 
Nakhon Ratchasima (ibid). However, the RTA rapidly countered this attack on its 
legitimacy with a statement by the Army Chief of Staff rejecting the notion that it 
had failed to competently execute the project plan. General Charuay Wongsayan 
claimed, “[T]he government is not snatching the Green E-Sarn master plan away 
from the army as reported by some newspapers. To be exact, everything will go on 
as before, except that now all government agencies involved will cooperate more 
closely” (The Nation, 1988g:2).  
General Prem lamented that public speculation about the ultimate control of the 
project was aimed at “driving a wedge between the government and the army to 
create disunity” (ibid), rather succinctly illustrating a royalist elite view that the 
                                                   
142 This refers to the Carabao and other pop concerts organized in Bangkok to raise funds for the 
Green Isaan Project (see Chapter 6, Section 6.6.1). 
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military and the government were distinct institutional entities, who should rightfully 
take their lead from the monarchy, rather than parliament as one might expect in a 
constitutional democracy
143
. A few weeks later Prem made another announcement at 
a meeting of the Joint Public/Private Consultative Committee that the army was 
considered just one of several agencies assigned to implement the project and he 
urged the private sector to help contribute to the project, which was simply, “in 
response to HM the King’s desire to see the northeastern region develop” (The 
Nation, 1988k:2), once again trying to use the king’s name as a means to silence 
critics. 
Having been berated by Prem for failing to achieve national unity in his management 
of the project, General Chavalit returned to the fray with a fresh salvo against his 
detractors, indicating that he was reluctant to transfer the Green Isaan Project’s 
control over to the bureaucracy without a struggle first. At a press briefing held 
within the Second Army Region’s base, Chavalit defended the army’s role in the 
project, explaining that while the army’s prime duty was to protect the country 
against external aggression, it also “had committed itself to defending internal peace” 
(The Nation, 1988d:3). “We are not content with our capability to merely defend the 
country”, Chavalit continued, “What is the use of sovereignty if many people all 
over the country are still deprived of their basic needs?” (ibid). He announced that, 
“a random survey conducted by the army showed that the project greatly benefitted 
the northeastern people”, and that parts of the region had “become fertile” as a result 
of the project (ibid.). The next day in Mahasarakham province, Chavalit 
accompanied by several senior generals, told thousands of villagers he would 
complete the Green Isaan Project “no matter what happens” (The Nation, 1988f). 
“The army will continue with the project until it is accomplished. We will fight to 
the end. We will have more money”, he bullishly proclaimed (ibid). 
The following month it appeared that Chavalit may have achieved his wish, as 
following a meeting of the NRDB chaired by General Prem, the Prime Minister’s 
                                                   
143 Prem has long been seen as a leading advocate of this binary division between the executive and 
legislative arms of the government on one hand, and the superior hierarchical status of the military 
and monarchy on the other. For example, on July 14 2006, Prem officiated at a graduation ceremony 
at the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy and in his speech used an equestrian metaphor to 
explain the relationship between the monarchy, the government and the army thus, “.....the soldiers 
belong to His Majesty the King, not to a government. A government is like a jockey. It supervises 
soldiers, but the real owners are the country and the King”. Two months later the military staged a 
coup d’etat (Pathamand, 2008). 
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Secretary-General Sqr Ldr Prasong Soonsiri announced that the Board had decided 
to seek 55 billion baht (US$ 2.2 billion) in funding for the Green Isaan Project to be 
shared by six ministries over five years (The Nation, 1988b). The ministries 
scheduled to benefit from the funding included Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
Interior, Public Health, Education, Industry and Commerce, but pointedly did not list 
the Ministry of Defence. The project was no longer described as a “drought-relief” 
scheme, but now claimed to be, “aimed at reconditioning the environment, upgrading 
living standards and boosting incomes”, and developing irrigation was just one of a 
number of sectoral projects included in the overall rural development programme. 
On the surface, it appeared the army’s political control and agency was dwindling 
just as a national general election was looming on 24 July, following eight years of 
“semi-democracy” (see Connors, 2009) under the Prem government. Significantly, 
however, before the elections the NRDB “agreed to set up a scrutiny committee, 
headed by Lt Gen Panya Singhasakda - deputy chief of the Policies and Planning 
Dept of the Royal Public Relief Centre, to work out the finer details of the projects to 
suit particular localities” (The Nation, 1988b:3). Theoretically, the NRDB was to 
coordinate the work ministries at the national level and the Royal Public Relief 
Centre
144
 and provincial development boards would direct the work at the regional 
and provincial levels respectively. This arrangement effectively re-opened the door 
for the royalist-military power nexus
145
 to retain ultimate control of the project, 
thereby ensuring the bureaucracy, politicians and civil society would remain 
subservient to a palace-determined agenda into the foreseeable future. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
144 This obscure agency appeared to temporarily provide a direct link between the bureaucracy and the 
monarchy through this seminal project scrutiny role that was created for it in the late 1980s, but 
subsequently disappeared from view or was disbanded, as there does not appear to be a public record 
of its existence today as far as I can determine from various inquiries. 
145 This nexus is said to incorporate a clique of senior military figures with close connections to the 
monarchy allied to significant corporate business interests, particularly through its Crown Property 
Bureau (CPB) investment arm, and key sections of the senior bureaucracy, which benefits financially 
from the fruits of these state-controlled projects (see Pathmanand, 2008). These actors help make up 
the conceptual patronage network known as the “network monarchy” (McCargo, 2005), further 
elaborated in Chapter 10. 
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7.3.7 Military dictatorship or elected government - the song remains the 
same 
 
Following the July 1988 general election and appointment of General Chatichai 
Choonhavan
146
 as Prime Minister of a multi-party coalition government, there was a 
temporary news hiatus surrounding the Green Isaan Project, suggesting it was not a 
priority scheme. For several months it was unclear who had overall control of the 
project, but by October it became apparent that the army was still nominally 
implementing the project, but were forced draw on Ministry of Defence funds to 
finance it. General Wanchai Ruangtrakul, Deputy Army Commander-in-Chief 
quickly denied the news story and said that the project was actually being financed 
by “a government budget and donations from the public” (The Nation, 1988a). In 
November 1988, it became apparent that the military had never actually relinquished 
control of the overall project and was still acting as coordinator, after the House 
budget scrutiny committee proposed an entire restructuring of the project, “to enable 
the government to effectively monitor the project’s progress” (The Nation, 1988q:2). 
MP Chamni Sakset (Progressive Party – Nakhon Sri Thammarat) said, “committee 
members concerns over a possible failure of the project followed reports that the 
work, particularly the improvement of water sources, has been unsuccessful so far" 
(ibid). The governance problems concerning a lack of coordination between 
implementing agencies and duplication of work were once more raised, with army 
representatives invited to testify before the committee and in return offering a 
promise “to do better in future”. Two days later, Chavalit was photographed at a 
meeting with the chief of the World Bank’s mission in Thailand, and admitted that 
the RTA was considering requesting a loan for 20 billion baht (US$ 800 million) to 
finance the Green Isaan Project. He offered assurance that any such request would 
first have to pass the scrutiny of the NESDB and the Finance Ministry (The Nation, 
1988e). The Bank’s representative in Thailand was reported as being “more 
interested in smaller development projects” (ibid). The last sentence of the same 
article was particularly revealing about his intentions: “Chavalit has been trying to 
                                                   
146 General Chatichai came from a powerful military family, but had resigned from the army in 1957 
to follow first a diplomatic career and later business interests in textiles and finance from his 
stronghold in Nakhon Ratchasima. He became a MP in 1975 and was a co-founder of the Chat Thai 
(Thai Nation) Party, and with his wide experience in business, military and business circles, cultivated 
a patronage network that was mostly outside the old royalist clique, according to Handley (2006).  
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solicit support from foreign governments for the Green E-Sarn Project – the success 
of which is seen as crucial to the army chief’s political future” (The Nation, 1988e:2). 
However, nothing further was heard about the World Bank funding, or the other 
foreign aid requests, and it is assumed that by this stage foreign lenders were getting 
rather cautious about Chavalit’s reliability. 
No doubt smarting somewhat from the rising wave of peasant protests against the 
industrial tree plantation promotion and forest conservation measures enacted under 
the Green Isaan Project during the Prem administration (Pye, 2005), the new 
coalition government gave the impression it wanted to learn from its predecessor’s 
mistakes in enacting a development vision for Isaan, by listening to the populace. 
For example, both Chavalit and Chatchai joined a seminar in Nakhon Rathchasima 
titled “The Development Problems in E-Sarn”, jointly organized by academics and 
an NGO coalition body (The Nation, 1988n). It was attended by 300 representatives 
from villages across sixteen Northeastern provinces. Instead of recounting tales 
about water scarcity, lack of irrigation infrastructure and drought-induced poverty to 
the government leaders in accordance with the dominant state narrative, the villagers 
mostly complained about a lack of land rights, problems with enacting local 
livelihoods and eviction from national forest reserves. The villagers chiefly blamed 
local government officials, whom they claimed, “frequently initiated legal action 
against villagers who continued to cultivate the registered land, adding that many 
were attacked by state employees when they attempted to file their complaints 
against the officials” (ibid). The Prime Minister responded to these complaints with 
an explanation that the government planned to “propose an amendment reducing the 
area of national forest reserves in the next session of parliament”, but in the 
meantime he suggested that villagers could, “help to maintain forests and cease 
cutting trees, so that the region is not threatened to such an extent by drought” (The 
Nation, 1988n:2). Drought once more was restored to its position as a perennial 
regional enemy. 
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7.3.8 The monarchy expresses dissatisfaction with project progress  
 
In December 1988, General Chatichai announced that the government would 
incorporate the Green Isaan Project in the half-completed Sixth National Economic 
and Social Development Plan (1987-1991), “as it was crucial to Thailand’s future” 
(The Nation, 1988l:4). In his statement to a meeting of the Association of Thai 
Executives, he claimed that “a fertile Northeast would bring export-oriented 
industrialization to the region” (ibid), reiterating the justifications used in the 
Biwater (1987) masterplan, despite growing local opposition to this development 
paradigm (Sluiter, 1992). Tellingly, Chatchai failed to provide any timetable for the 
integration of the Project with the national development plan as earlier recommended 
by Prem and Sumet, and there seemed to be a growing dissatisfaction in the palace 
about the slow pace of project implementation and absence of success stories to 
point to. In a piece of pure Machiavellian theatre, General Chatichai and his wife, 
Khunying Boonruen, plus the Armed Forces chiefs were invited to a dinner hosted 
by the king’s 88 year old mother, HRH the Princess Mother at her Chiang Rai hilltop 
palace
147
 (The Nation, 1988o). She is reported to have told the small elite gathering, 
“I’m longing to see the Northeast green” and requested the Prime Minister, “to 
ensure that all work is being done to hasten the implementation of the Green E-Sarn 
Project” (ibid). While General Chatichai responded that the government and the 
military were “closely cooperating on the project” he humbly expressed doubt about 
his ability in his job, stating, “I think I’m still not good enough” (ibid). This 
remarkable public dressing down of the elected Prime Minister could only be 
interpreted to mean one thing – the king was seriously concerned about the fate of 
his brainchild since the departure of Prem - but had to be careful not to be publically 
seen directly interfering in government affairs so as at least to maintain a pretence 
that his position remained “above politics”.  
This royal interference concerning the faltering progress of the Green Isaan Project, 
failed in the event to stop a growing groundswell of opposition to the project 
emerging from various quarters, especially villagers adversely impacted by the 
                                                   
147 According to Handley (2006), Doi Tung Palace was built by the army for the king’s mother and 
required the appropriation of 37,000 acres of land from hill tribe villagers who lacked land title and 
citizenship, and was subsequently turned into a farming operation and tourist attraction, with the 
evicted ethnic minorities employed in the manner of “an old feudal estate”. 
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forestry programme (see Pye, 2005). At the end of 1988, whilst receiving traditional 
New Year’s well-wishers from amongst his patronage base in Nakhon Ratchasima, 
General Chatichai confirmed that the government would continue undaunted with 
the Green Isaan Project “despite criticism that it would definitely flop” (The Nation, 
1988p:2). He reassured army officers, provincial officials and villagers and stressed 
that the military would continue to take a leading role in project implementation, 
claiming, “[T]o turn the Northeast green is not impossible as many people said. It is 
highly possible” (ibid). 
As the 1989 dry season came around, the RTA resorted to its familiar tactic of 
declaring a drought crisis said to “be killing large areas of crops” and “rushing” a 
fleet of water trucks out to the Northeast from military bases to “help farmers” (The 
Nation, 1989d). This time, however, the news coverage was notably more muted 
than in previous years, suggesting a degree of media ennui to the annual military 
drought relief roadshow mission had set in.  A couple of weeks earlier it had been 
announced by General Wanchai Ruangtrakul
148
 that a 4.8 billion baht (US$ 192 
million) budget had been requested for the coming financial year to implement 
reforestation and irrigation system development work (The Nation, 1989g). The 
same article noted that “twenty seven government and foreign agencies are involved 
in carrying out the development programme this year”, which was to be concentrated 
in eleven provinces considered most drought-impacted. As the year progressed, it 
became gradually more apparent that the army’s control over the project was 
withering under the Chatichai regime
149
, and as Handley (2006:329) notes, 
“[P]oliticians and the civilian government were going to take credit for 
development”, which piqued the traditional royal-military elite. While the 13 volume 
Biwater (1987) Green Isaan masterplan for “comprehensive” regional development 
was already gathering dust in the NESDB, its ethos and embedded irrigational 
developmentalism lived on as Northeastern MPs who had criticized Green Isaan 
were hatching their own rival grandiose scheme that would surpass its forerunner in 
scope and cost.  
                                                   
148 Who was now Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and still apparently remained 
coordinator of the Green Isaan Project 
149 Chatichai’s most famous slogan was to “turn battlefields into marketplaces”, signifying the end of 
military involvement in the Indochina region, supposedly heralding a new era of neo-liberal 
regionalization and democratization.  
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The Chatichai administration enacted the novel idea of holding “mobile Cabinet 
meetings” in major provincial cities, as a show of decentralization. The first meeting 
was held in Hat Yai in the South, while the second was scheduled for Khon Kaen in 
the heart of the Northeast on April 8, 1989 (Suksamrarn, 1989:8). This meeting gave 
the chance to Northeastern MPs from all major parties and factions to offer their 
development visions (or “pet projects”, in the words of The Nation reporter) to the 
Cabinet for consideration (ibid.). The three main coalition parties with the largest 
MP voting bloc in the Northeast
150
, were in the strongest position to push their 
favoured development projects for government funding. The SAP proposed a 
populist programme of land reallocation for landless farmers, while the Chat Thai 
plan concentrated on industrial development in key regional centres. The Democrats, 
however, lobbied the government with a proposal to build a large-scale water 
diversion project from the Mekong River for irrigation purposes in provinces along 
the border with Laos, estimated to cost 1.8 billion baht (US$ 72 million) 
(Suksamrarn, 1989). The politician pushing most strongly for this project was Udon 
Thani MP, Prachuab Chaiyasarn, deputy party leader of the Democrats and 
successful regional businessman (see Chapter 6, Section 6.6.2).  
Buoyed by a more liberal political climate, civil society groups linked to certain 
political-business factions also began to forward proposals for regional and 
provincial level development, which increased a sense of competition with the Green 
Isaan Project’s royalist-military group’s agenda. For example, a coalition of MPs, 
community leaders, academics and representatives of provincial chambers of 
commerce from seven lower Northeast provinces held a seminar in Ubon Ratchatani 
Province to decide on a common development agenda prior to the mobile Cabinet 
meeting in Khon Kaen (The Nation, 1989b). The delegates agreed that, “as the first 
priority, the government provide sufficient water for drought-hit Northeastern 
provinces by digging more irrigation canals and drawing water from natural sources” 
(ibid). Superficially, this seemed like a straightforward request for continuation of 
one of the fundamental pillars of the Green Isaan Project. It differed though in one 
major respect – the proposed scale of intervention. Whereas the Green Isaan 
Project’s strategy had popularly been perceived as prioritizing widely dispersed, 
                                                   
150 The Chat Thai party had 30 MPs, the Democrat Party had 16 MPs and the SAP had 29 MPs 
elected in the Northeast 
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village-level, mostly domestic water resources development projects, at the expense 
of large-scale projects to provide universal water supply across the region, this new 
project sought to overturn the small-scale focus image
151
. Following the regional 
Cabinet meeting, a resolution was passed to invest 20 billion baht (US$ 800 million) 
in four major projects to divert water from four Northeast rivers, including the 
Mekong. Seemingly pouring scorn on the Green Isaan Project, an editorial stated, 
“[D]rawing water from the rivers is certainly more reliable than waiting for the rain, 
which when it does come to the Northeast, is never enough to turn the region into a 
green belt” (The Nation, 1989h:8). Even respected human rights lawyer and civil 
society advocate, Thongbai Thongpao, appeared to support the new regime’s large-
scale development proposals, writing in a column in the conservative Siam Rath 
newspaper: 
 “E-sarn doesn't need the annual mobilization of water-trucks to 
distribute water in drought-stricken areas. What E-sarn needs are dams 
to divert water from the four rivers for irrigation. Don't waste time on 
making earthen jars or digging wells or reservoirs because they are 
useless when there is no water to keep" Source: (The Nation, 1989f)  
Thus, the key dominant narrative of undertaking a transformational “greening” of the 
“underdeveloped and drought-stricken region” into an irrigated utopia, based on 
comprehensive hydraulic development is shown to be a discourse that crossed state 
and non-state actor boundaries, and was adopted as readily by actor groups in civil 
society, pointing to the dominance of irrigational ideology in Thai society.  
 
7.4 Green Isaan Project’s political demise and replacement 
 
Despite the growing loss of confidence in the royalist-military clique’s legitimacy, 
this group persevered with their plans seemingly oblivious to the widespread 
criticism, local protests, change of government and bureaucratic non-cooperation. In 
May 1989, General Wanchai Ruengtrakul boldly declared that the project should be 
extended for a further five years, given that the scheme “had been successful in 
                                                   
151 This image was actually misplaced, as the Biwater (1987) masterplan illustrated (Fig. 7.3), but the 
Prem government never managed to communicate this plan to the public as it had been so wrapped up 
in political intrigue and opaque backroom deals. 
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easing the hardships facing the local people” (The Nation, 1989i). He stated, 
“[A]nother achievement of the project is growing faith and confidence among the 
local people in the government and the military”; and emphasized, “several countries, 
mainly the United States and China, have sent equipment and experts to help support 
the project” and that, “many other foreign countries have expressed interest in 
making contributions to the project……among them are West Germany, Australia, 
Israel and Japan" (ibid). It is noteworthy that few public records appear to confirm 
any of these nations’ contributions, bar perhaps the earlier tentative interest from 
Israel and UK, plus a donation of an $80,000 pump from a Florida based company 
called M & W Pump Corporation, that was reported to have close links to the 
incumbent Republican Party (The Nation, 1989a:15). The President and CEO of M 
& W, David Eller, claimed at a press conference to officially hand over the pump to 
the Thai government, “the ‘Greening of the Northeast’ is one of the largest and most 
important water development projects in the world today” (ibid). 
As 1989 progressed, Green Isaan Project media references dwindled and if it was 
mentioned at all, it would mostly be by an army spokesman attempting to re-inject a 
semblance of credibility into the ailing programme. For instance, Lt Gen Issarapong 
Noonpakdi
152
 spuriously claimed in an interview that the project was a success on 
the whole and under the project, “all villagers in the Northeast now have access to 
clean drinking water” (Kalthisa, 1989). In a sign of just how far the project’s 
direction had deviated from its original goal of alleviating local domestic and 
agricultural water scarcity and “greening” the landscape, General Wanchai 
announced that the RTA had decided to seek “a major role” for the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand (TAT) in the Green Isaan Project and would “allocate Bt 163 
million for northeastern tourism promotion” (The Nation, 1989e:2). In one final bid 
to retain a shred of public legitimacy, in October 1989, Lt Gen Issarapong, whom by 
then had been promoted to Deputy Army Commander-in-Chief, told the press, 
“(T)he army will step up efforts to achieve the goal of turning the barren Northeast 
into a fertile region under the Green E-Sarn development project by the end of 1992” 
(The Nation, 1989c:3). He expressed confidence that in the nine driest provinces the 
                                                   
152 Issarapong Noonpakdi was a key member of the so-called Class 5 royalist-military clique that 
toppled the Chatichai government in a 1991 coup d’etat under the name the “National Peace-Keeping 
Committee” and played a pivotal role in the 1992 suppression of pro-democracy protesters calling for 
the withdrawal from politics of the military junta.  
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army had identified, “the chronic drought situation there should be fundamentally 
eradicated.......About 70-80 per cent of the budget for the Green E-sarn scheme has 
been earmarked for reafforestation, soil quality improvement and water resource 
development, while the rest would be spent to create jobs for villagers and to 
improve their quality of life” (ibid.).  
In the event, after October 1989 the Green Isaan Project was scarcely heard of again 
in the media and appeared to be quietly dissolved by the government, presumably to 
minimize embarrassment for the sake of its powerful patrons and designer. Besides, 
by this time the discursive justifications and goals of the project had already been 
incorporated into the “Khong-Chi-Mun Project” under a rival strategic group of 
political-business interests, as the new panacea to Isaan’s problems, thereby making 
it counter-productive to criticize the Green Isaan Project too harshly. In any case, all 
major groups seemed to be behind the irrigational aspects of both projects and it was 
the forestry and land rights aspects that were more contentious in society. Thus, after 
three years of fairly sustained promotion through a wide variety of media of the 
utopian promise of greening the Northeast through a universal irrigation 
development paradigm, the old discourses supporting developmentalism and 
irrigationalism around since the days of Sarit had been more firmly entrenched in the 
hearts and minds of the rural electorate, perhaps even more strongly now that it was 
elected politicians promising the vision, as well as unaccountable bureaucrats and 
military men. Interestingly, even in 2010 I could still encounter villagers in the 
Northeast who would nostalgically talk about Chavalit and regretted his inability to 
create the Green Isaan nirvana, often blaming other “selfish” politicians.  
Table 7.1 below offers a brief summary of the evolution of the Green Isaan Project 
from its original conception as a geographically limited project to its final mention in 
the newspaper reports reviewed, giving an indication of the project’s spatial 
ambitions, proposed implementation budget, the main coordinating agency 
responsible and narrative objectives. It should be noted that narrative justifications 
given were quite fungible depending on the narrator’s underlying vested interests, 
although the overall dominant development paradigm of fundamentally transforming 
the Northeast into a green, fertile, prosperous and irrigation-based agrarian utopia 
remained a discursive constant throughout and irrespective of the actor. 
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Time point Scale of project Planned 
Budget (Baht) 
Main 
coordinating 
agency 
Main narrative 
justification 
Public launch 
– March 1987 
Limited areas in 
four “drought-
stricken” provinces 
of Nakhon 
Ratchasima, Khon 
Kaen, Roi-Et and 
Mahasarakham 
300 million from 
RTA 
Royal Thai Army 
(RTA) 
Relieving drought-
hit villages and 
supplying water 
through short term 
and long term 
measures 
Middle - July 
1988 (pre-
general 
election) 
Entire NE Thailand 
(all 17 provinces) 
55 billion (c. 
US$ 2.2 billion) 
from multiple 
sources, including 
state budget, 
donations and 
foreign aid or 
loans  
National Rural 
Development 
Board (NRDB) 
under the Prime 
Minister’s Office, 
with NESDB 
oversight 
Turn the NE into a 
“green belt” and 
fertile region, by 
“reconditioning 
the environment, 
upgrading living 
standards and 
boosting 
incomes”. 
End – 
October 1989 
All NE Thailand, 
but focusing on 9 of 
driest provinces 
Not specified, as 
funding gradually 
withdrawn by 
coalition 
government. In 
November 1988, 
Chavalit had 
reportedly been 
negotiating a loan 
with the World 
Bank of 20 billion 
baht for the 
project. 
RTA  Turn the “barren” 
NE into a fertile 
area by 
reafforestation, 
soil quality 
improvement and 
water resources 
development. 
Eradicating 
drought and 
tourism 
promotion?! 
 
Table 7.1.  Summary of the Green Isaan Project’s claimed scalar intervention, 
budgetary plans, main coordinating agency, and main justification narrative 
evolution at the beginning, middle and end of the scheme. 
 
7.5 Included and excluded voices 
 
When considered solely on the basis of the English language newspaper articles 
which may or may not have reflected the coverage of Thai language newspapers and 
other media, it is apparent that only a relatively narrow range of actors’ voices were 
ever presented regarding the Green Isaan Project. From the beginning of the project, 
the best represented voices were those of a handful of senior military leaders, the 
Prime Minister and elite bureaucrats. This bias speaks to power relations and in 
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particular, who is allowed to speak and who is silenced in the development process. 
The actor who perhaps became most synonymous with the Green Isaan Project was 
General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who clearly used the scheme as a vehicle to further 
his career, both in and later, out of the military. His authority seemed to stem to from 
his claim that the king had privately expressed a desire to him at the 25 March 1987 
funeral see the problems of the “drought-stricken” Northeast’s problems banished 
and had handpicked Chavalit to be the frontman to carry out the royally-entrusted 
goal. From that moment on he publically constructed it as a “do or die” mission for 
him and the military, while simultaneously deliberately working towards a post-
military career as a national politician, believing in the potential of the Green Isaan 
Project brandname as a rural vote winner.  
Phatharathananuth (2006) suggests that Chavalit had long harboured a burning 
ambition to become prime minister at some point. Always a consummate political 
opportunist, and able to draw on a wide network of contacts he had built up during 
years spent in counter-insurgency and military intelligence operations, Chavalit 
sought to co-opt a range of parties (including ex-CPT members and grassroots 
farmers groups) in the Northeast to his own cause and vision of greening of Isaan, 
almost identical in content with that of the king and Bangkok-based elite. General 
Chavalit took retirement from the military in October 1990 and almost immediately 
formed and led the New Aspiration Party (NAP), which became a political force in 
the Northeast for many years
153
, relying heavily on a rhetorical tactic of turning the 
Northeast green though eradicating drought and poverty
154
. He campaigned by 
building an image of himself amongst the rural populace as a “champion of Isaan”, 
ready to make the region “prosperous”, argues Phatharathananuth (2006). His rather 
unconventional style of leadership in the military and politics occasionally left him 
open to criticism about his motives and some questions surfaced now and again 
                                                   
153 Although born in Nonthaburi near Bangkok to a military family, Chavalit claimed his political 
base in Nakhon Phanom Province after many years spent based in the Northeast working in signals 
and intelligence, as the RTA’s chief “architect of political strategy against communism” (Baker and 
Phongpaichit, 2005). 
154 Chavalit regularly called upon a positive collective memory of the Green Isaan Project as an 
effective campaigning tool in the Northeast as a way to drum up support for the NAP, which 
demonstrates that local opposition was relatively isolated. Indeed, many villagers I have met fondly 
remember “Big Jiew’s” (his popular nickname) election promises to resurrect the Green Isaan Project 
and rued the fact he was never able to turn them into reality. While taking cabinet posts in various 
coalition governments, he did eventually become Prime Minister for a year between November 1996 
to November 1997, a period that coincided with the Asian Economic Crash, and a rapid decline in his 
political fortunes.  
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about his loyalty to the throne
155
. However, (McCargo, 1997) argues that the NAP 
was a major vote buyer at the 1995 elections and relied on traditional Thai political 
techniques involving “amnat” and “ittiphon” (power and influence) to win seats in 
parliament, suggesting vision alone was not enough. In his political heartland of 
Nakhon Phanom, he was recognized as a godfather (jao pho) of lesser provincial and 
district jao pho, controlling cross-border trade with Laos, illegal logging, a brokerage 
role for lucrative state construction projects and oversaw a network of local 
politicians extending down to the village level (personal observations, 2004-07). 
Appearing slightly less prominently in the media as a staunch defender of the Green 
Isaan Project was Prime Minister, General Prem, known as the king’s handpicked 
proxy and close confidante (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005; McCargo, 2005; 
Handley, 2006). His role was one of a frontline, “hands-on” approach during the 
initial April 1987 “disaster relief” phase, where he was seen alongside military and 
civilian personnel, paternally overseeing the distribution of domestic water to 
villagers, prominently displayed as a gift from the king (Bangkok Post, 1987g). Later 
on, as criticism arose from politicians within parliament, he took a less prominent 
role and appeared more concerned with managing the public image of the project to 
ensure minimal negative fall-out for the monarchical institution arising from the 
slow progress in implementation; internal discord between the military, state 
agencies and politicians; and the growing grassroots and civil society opposition to 
the project. For example, when the RTA appeared to be receiving political flak 
within parliament for mishandling the coordination of the project amidst allegations 
of corruption, Prem recommended that two hitherto obscure agencies (the NRDB 
and Royal Public Relief Centre) under the Prime Minister’s Office be brought in to 
coordinate the project nationally and locally respectively (The Nation, 1988b). This 
move appeared to be a smokescreen for placing the project more directly under the 
control of the royalist-military Bangkok-based inner circle, and away from the hands 
of Chavalit’s military clique. This institutional meddling by Prem proved 
unacceptable to Northeast politicians, who disliked the interference of the military in 
what they considered, as legitimate representatives of the populace, a development 
                                                   
155 While General Chavalit partly owed his rise to Supreme Commander of the military to the 
patronage of General Prem, later he became more of a liability to the royalist elite, and was 
occasionally tainted as a “communist sympathiser” and “republican” by his political enemies, after his 
attempts to form a “Revolutionary Council” with ex-Communist Party of Thailand members 
backfired (Kevin Hewison, personal communication, January 2012).  
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task to be undertaken by themselves. Their disdain of the Bangkok-based royalist 
elite was made apparent following the July 1988 electoral defeat of Prem and his 
replacement by General Chatichai, who drew his core support from a more Isaan-
centric group of MPs who had competitive political and business interests. 
Chatchai’s rise to power opened up an opportunity for a rival project (KCM) to be 
hatched and compete with the Green Isaan Project for funding, albeit based on an 
identical ideology and set of narrative justifications.  
Another staunchly royalist establishment figure prominent in supporting the Green 
Isaan Project throughout was Sumet Tantivejakul (see Footnote 129), an economist 
who ran the Royal Projects Development Board (RPDB) from within the powerful 
NESDB. According to Handley (2006), Sumet had spent time in Vietnam studying 
the links between rural discontent and insurgency, prior to working in the 
government’s planning bureau division that dealt with natural disasters and war. He 
is cited in Handley (2006:290) as referring to the RPDB as, “an integrated service for 
His Majesty the King and Royal Family”, and it was used as a vehicle to bypass 
normal bureaucratic procedures, profligacy and tardiness to expedite rural 
development projects where they were needed. Under Prem’s stamp of authority and 
Sumet’s guidance, government spending on royal projects increased tenfold after the 
RPDB was established, building six royal development centres around the country to 
practically demonstrate the king’s ideas and theories, including small-scale water 
diversion, flood control and water storage projects for irrigation and hydropower. Dr 
Sumet, in keeping with other conservative monarchists, seemed to possess an 
ideological worldview supporting the pre-ordained nature of Thai hierarchical 
society under the guidance of a semi-divine monarchy protected by the military, and 
his comments concerning the Green Isaan Project should be considered in this light. 
For example, when politicians questioned the involvement of the military in 
implementing the project, Sumet was reported to have viewed the role of the army as 
“a positive factor” which would accelerate the development process (The Nation, 
1987k:2). He reportedly said, “[S]ome skeptics see it as a political move. But I think 
we have to be objective and broadminded to appreciate what the army is trying to do” 
(ibid.). Sumet stepped forward on several subsequent occasions to defend the project 
against criticism, especially from politicians claiming it duplicated regular 
development programmes already underway. Sumet denied this charge and said the 
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Green Isaan Project complemented the National Economic and Social Development 
Plan, describing it as a master plan towards “the complete and total operation plan 
for systematic economic and social development of the Northeast” (The Nation, 7 
November 1987). This statement illustrated how far the project had moved from its 
limited drought-relief roots in four provinces, to a totalizing scheme of state-led 
regional control, as conceived by a minute elite group. 
Other voices elevated in the media reports in occasional support of the project were 
drawn from a mix of regional and national politicians, private business and corporate 
interests, multi-lateral aid donors and lenders (e.g. a member of the World Bank 
mission), international consultants (e.g. Biwater representatives), a few senior 
national technocrats (e.g. Mechai Viravaidya), and a handful of representatives from 
mainstream civil society groups and academia. The businessmen interviewed seemed 
to seek media publicity gained from donating gifts (cash and products, such as 
pumps) to the Prem government, no doubt aware of the ideological source of the 
project. While the industrial forestry and commercial plantations aspects of the 
project were implemented on a large scale, giving opportunities for private interests 
to profit, by comparison water resources development projects were mostly rather 
localised and dispersed, with much of the groundworks being handled by the RTA 
operators, undoubtedly to the chagrin of Northeastern construction contractors 
originally anticipating a dam-building bonanza under the Green Isaan scheme. This 
could be another plausible explanation for the low enthusiasm shown by many 
Northeastern politicians with close personal connections to construction and earth-
moving businesses that had anticipated state-awarded contracts from this project. 
Witnessing army machinery constructing water resources development projects 
equated to a loss of income for the private sector, but just as crucially, it reduced rent 
seeking opportunities for politicians and bureaucrats. Furthermore it reduced the 
traditional opportunity for politicians to secure votes through promising water 
resources development projects political patronage networks and the later payback 
from awarding contracts; a factor General Chavalit would surely have been acutely 
aware of when planning his future political career. In other words, viewed 
retrospectively, it was hardly surprising that the royalist-military group received such 
poor cooperation from strategic groups that allied politicians, construction 
entrepreneurs, chambers of commerce and certain key bureaucratic line agencies. No 
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matter how hard the royalist-military elite attempted to capture the hearts and minds 
of the local populace by piecemeal digging of wells, weirs and small reservoirs, or 
making paternalistic public shows of water handouts to a few villages each dry 
season; they could not compete with the increasingly powerful patronage networks 
of the new regional politician-business elites, who recognized that the KCM offered 
them far better prospects for enrichment and legitimacy. 
By contrast, some voices were almost entirely absent from the media’s public 
transcript throughout the entire Green Isaan Project debacle, especially the supposed 
recipients of the project the Northeast. These were supposedly the subjects of the 
development discourse; the villagers presented as in need of state assistance to 
overcome water scarcity, bio-physical adversity and grinding poverty. As far as I can 
discern from my examination of 64 news articles, there was not a single direct quote 
or comment garnered from a local actor concerning the Green Isaan Project. The 
only people interviewed, were relatively powerful members of society, whether in 
support or opposition to the project. Sub-alterns were notable by their absence, only 
appearing as passive recipients of royally gifted water doled out from army trucks by 
soldiers and state officials. This may be as much a reflection about contemporary 
journalistic style in Thailand as it was about the top-down and autocratic nature of 
the scheme’s planning and implementation. Garden and Nance (2007) highlight the 
Mekong regional  media’s tendency to “speak for”, rather than “listen to” those 
groups at the margin, in privileging state narratives of water resources governance 
over alternatives. Local people were seemingly regarded as mere passive recipients 
of paternalistic state and donor-provided development largesse by the bureaucrats, 
military leaders, business executives and foreign aid agency officials, reflected in the 
interviews, photographs and reporting style of the mainstream media. Even when 
there was a report of forced evictions of villagers from National Reserved Forest in 
Buriram and a subsequent violent protest (The Nation, 17 March 1988), no local 
person was quoted directly about their views as to why they took this action
156
. All 
actors were effectively portrayed as acquiescing to the dominant problem framing 
for the region, but only disagreed about who should legitimately lead the fight 
                                                   
156 This may alternatively be interpreted as a desire by journalists to protect local people from 
subsequent recriminations by state authorities, as there is a history of village leaders and 
spokespersons being directly intimidated or subject to violence, when they have spoken out directly to 
the media about harmful development projects. Hence, anonymity is assumed to be the safest and 
option for the least powerful societal groups. 
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against drought and some of the methods. The main area of contention between 
dominant actors was over who controlled the budget and the institutional framework 
for implementation; rather than a debate over the utility and accuracy of the 
dominant problem and solution narrative framing itself. However, this situation was 
perhaps of little surprise given the intellectual origins of the regional water scarcity 
and “greening” narrative and dominant ideology of water being a “royal gift”, rather 
than a right.  
 
7.6 Summary 
 
The Green Isaan Project may be perceived as just one key instalment in a series of 
near clone-like regional development mega-project plans, that stretch unbroken 
across a chronological period spanning over half a century, that point to a state-
centric hydraulic mission. This remarkable historical continuity suggests a state 
constantly concerned with supply-side, control-oriented, utopian solutions to 
manufactured problem framing of the Northeast (with water scarcity the key 
justificatory narrative). This challenges the notion of distinct evolutionary stages of 
an irrigation development paradigm in Southeast Asia proposed by Barker and Molle 
(2004), whereby the pathway suggests a gradual shift to demand-driven, farmer-
oriented and decentralized strategies for public irrigation models post-1990 
(classified as “the era of globalization”). Instead, what can be empirically drawn 
from the case of Northeast Thailand is that each state mega-project is closely 
predicated on the meta-justifications, ideology and design of its predecessor, which 
points to a combination of characteristics more closely matching Barker and Molle’s 
(2004) Colonial Era and Cold War era categories. What mainly differentiates each 
mega-project proposed by the state are the primary actors that strategically cluster 
around and promote their “pet project”, rather than an evolving discourse, which is 
essentially static. The actor alliances involved in the case of the Green Isaan Project 
were seen to be a strategic grouping of monarchical, military, bureaucratic, political 
and business interests. The integral involvement of the military and the monarchy 
elite groups differentiated it somewhat from subsequent schemes, where Northeast 
regional politicians that had been excluded from Green Isaan took on leading roles 
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and were able to more successively sell the projects to their local constituencies 
through political networks.  
Such networks point to a more complex pattern of power distribution in late 
twentieth century hydraulic societies than a simple state-village binary understanding 
would allow, although Wittfogel recognized that competition between competing 
factions was a characteristic of hydraulic societies. Interestingly, some of the key 
actors to emerge from media reports promoting the utopian project were all close 
proxies and allies of the king, embedded within a monarchical network (cf. McCargo, 
2005). Indeed, interpretation of the public transcripts suggests that in the early stages 
of project formulation, the dominant force behind the project was the king himself, 
personally instrumental in providing the narrative justifications, problem framing 
and deterministic solution setting agenda, subsequently enthusiastically adopted by 
other elite actors in rival projects. Moreover, interpretation of the news reports 
indicated that a number of hidden agendas and subtexts were at play, that went 
beyond simple national security narratives concerning project motives. The most 
egregious subtext revealed by the research was the apparent Machiavellian web of 
links between the state’s public desire to construct the Green Isaan Project and a 
secret arms for development aid deal enacted between the Prem Tinsulanonda and 
Thatcher governments, that bears all the hallmarks of the better documented and 
contemporaneous Pergau Dam scandal, but escaped the bad publicity (The Nation, 
1994; World Development Movement, 1995). This, perhaps more than any other 
individual issue raised in the course of this research, demonstrates that water 
resources development, state ideology, elite power, knowledge constructions and 
financial corruption are frequently intertwined bedfellows.  
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Chapter 8  Competing development 
narratives and conflict at the river basin 
level – multi-scalar cases in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined in detail the case of just one of six pan-regional 
development projects that have been proposed (and in some cases, partially 
implemented) in the Northeast over the past half century. It examined some of the 
principal political actors, their narratives and political strategies used to support or 
oppose the Green Isaan Project, which ultimately was abandoned. It demonstrated 
how this utopian project, with a strong hydraulic development component, was 
closely aligned with a group comprising of military and royalist figures, whom 
strongly depended on the narrative problem framing and symbolic support extended 
by the king for its initial legitimacy. Ultimately, however, the project experienced 
opposition from a broad range of regional political actors and actor alliances, 
including national politicians and their regional patronage networks struggling for 
control over the budget with military factions and secondly, civil society and 
grassroots groups opposing the project on the basis of environmental and social 
justice concerns. Sometimes operating synergistically, the oppositional groups 
managed to block full-scale implementation of the project during the latter period of 
the Prem royalist regime, using a variety of discursive tactics and on the ground 
resistance and violent struggle against state forces (Pye, 2005). However, as soon as 
Prem was ousted from power, a different elite strategic group (under the patronage of 
General Chatichai Choonavan) proposed a rival hydraulic development scheme 
under the “Khong-Chi-Mun Project” rubric. This scheme adopted almost identical 
discursive justifications for large-scale basin water transfers and universal irrigation 
coverage as its predecessor, eventually leading to renewed opposition and conflict 
over development pathways (Sneddon, 2003b).  
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Based on the earlier contention that universalized and naturalized narrative 
justifications around resource scarcity and poverty are routinely employed by 
dominant groups for the production of blueprint irrigational solutions are a recursive 
regional phenomenon, this chapter will direct the analytical lens to the Nam 
Songkhram river basin level. It takes as a starting point a view that the Nam 
Songkhram Basin can be seen as a political arena of periodically intense conflict and 
struggles between strategic groups or actor coalitions over the course of many 
decades, that involves complex intersecting local, regional and national interests 
(Blake et al., 2009). This chapter will explore aspects of the irrigation development 
discourses, politics and practices from a small sample of projects, ranging in scale 
from the macro to the micro, encountered during the course of fieldwork as 
interesting “cases”. It will attempt to identify some key actors and strategic groups 
associated with promoting or opposing these projects and the main narratives utilized, 
while examining some of the micro-politics of each case. The data is derived from a 
mix of empirical fieldwork findings (e.g. interviews and direct observation) and 
analysis of secondary sources. This chapter attempts to address the following 
research questions: 
SQ3 Which actors appear to determine control and access to water 
resources at multiple scales, using what discourses and pathways? 
 
SQ4 What are the important power relations mechanisms at work across 
various scales, such as “discourse coalitions” or “strategic groups”? 
 
8.2  Case Studies of Basin Hydraulic Development  
 
This section examines a sub-set of four empirical case studies that ground the Nam 
Songkhram Basin case in a historical setting and highlights a long history of political 
contestation between actors and interest groups. The first two large-scale irrigation 
projects considered (the Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project and the Nam Songkhram 
Project) were already broadly familiar to the author during previous work in the 
basin (e.g. Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a, b; Blake et al., 2009), while the two 
small-scale projects (Nong Saeng and Huay Wang Rua) were revealed as interesting 
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cases during the course of fieldwork, and I believe do not represent uncommon or 
exceptional cases of irrigation development. The relative locations of the four 
projects are shown in Fig. 8.1.  
 
8.3 The Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project 
 
8.3.1 Roots of project in regional ideological struggles 
 
The Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project (LNOIP) nominally arose out of regional water 
resources development plans hatched in the offices of the Bangkok-based Mekong 
Committee during the 1950s, as part of the proto-hydraulic mission for the Northeast. 
The area where the project is located, in the shadows of the Phu Phan hill range in 
Sakon Nakhon Province, has a history of local resistance against both Central Thai 
state and foreign domination (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005) that pre-dated LNOIP, 
but had significance to later events. During the Second World War, the Phu Phan 
hills were a nexus of armed resistance against the imperial Japanese Army by the 
Seri Thai (Free Thai) Movement. Some of the Seri Thai fighters emerged as post-war 
left-wing political leaders committed to educating the peasants, raising political 
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consciousness, promoting collective action and building “progressive, anti-Bangkok 
dictatorial government networks”, notes Phatharathananunth (2006:41). The most 
notable amongst these leaders was Tiang Sirikhan (known as the “General of Phu 
Phan”) and later following his death, Sakon Nakhon-born school teacher, Khrong 
Chandawong. Khrong founded the Sammakkhitham (Solidarity) Movement which 
reportedly attracted thousands of members and would have posed a threat to the 
hegemony of the Bangkok government over the Northeast as it grew into a strong 
peasant-based organization. Khrong was repeatedly arrested and spent five years in 
detention on charges of separatism, being a traitor and communist instigator under 
the dictatorial Phibun Songkhram regime in the 1950s.   
Khrong’s release during the subsequent Sarit Thanarat regime failed to stifle his 
political activities in the upper Northeast and along with a colleague, was re-arrested 
and summarily executed on 31 May, 1961, by a police firing squad in a Sakon 
Nakhon paddy field
157
 near his home under the direct orders of Sarit (Baker and 
Phongpaichit, 2005). In a letter to the king, Sarit justified his actions by claiming the 
pair were attempting to separate the Northeast from the Thai nation and unite it with 
Laos, and thus posed a threat to “national security and the Throne”158, according to 
Chaloemtiarana (2007). Following his execution, there was a period of brutal 
persecution by state security forces against members of the Samakkhitham 
Movement, who were forced to go underground and eventually went on to form “the 
backbone” of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the upper Northeast, which 
was recognized as the “strongest base” nationally during the early period of 
revolutionary struggle (Phatharathananunth, 2006). Indeed, armed hostilities between 
the CPT and the Thai state officially broke out not far away in Nakhon Phanom 
province in August 1965 and the following year a well known young historian and 
                                                   
157 In August 2010, I visited the site of the execution in Sawang Daendin District, Sakon Nakhon, in 
the company of Khrong’s son, Khun Vithit Chandawong.  
158 According to Thai historian, Somsak Jeamteerasakul, Sarit alleged in a letter written a day after the 
execution to justify his decision to King Bhumibol, that Khrong had personally attacked the king and 
queen. The allegations were such that Somsak felt the need to self-censor the reproduced letter in his 
posting to a discussion board on Thai politics. Source: 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/05/20/khrong-chandawong-remembered/ Accessed 12 
January 2012. 
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poet named Jit Phumisak
159
 who had joined the CPT was shot dead by a state agent 
in the Phu Phan hills, just to the west of the LNOIP dam site. 
The purpose of this historical preamble on political struggles is to stress the strategic 
importance of this particular part of the Northeast to national and regional security 
concerns of both the Thai state and the US government. The Phu Phan hill range, 
quite isolated, clad in thick forest and with rugged terrain, figured prominently in 
Cold War narratives concerning ideological and military supremacy for the “free 
nations” and the dangers of communism spread in mainland Southeast Asia (Keyes, 
1967; Stevenson, 2001). There was clearly a growing sense of unrest and 
dissatisfaction amongst local people about Bangkok’s rule and perceived injustices 
and persecution by state forces, which combined with the general state of economic 
under-development compared to Central Thailand would have fed into a growing 
sympathy for the CPT that concerned the US government, which was pouring ever 
greater sums of money into winning over the “hearts and minds” of Northeasterners 
to the ideological causes of development, modernity and capitalism, alongside its 
military programme. It is against this background that an irrigation project was 
proposed in Sakon Nakhon as part of the Northeast Development Plan (1962-66) 
initiated under Sarit Thanarat’s regime (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5) and submitted 
to the US government for funding assistance. 
 
8.3.2 Construction during insurgency 
 
An initial feasibility study for the project was submitted by the Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID) to the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in November 
1963, with the report stating that a “substantial irrigation development plan” had 
been requested from “farmers’ representatives”, who had “to live in the constant fear 
that a drought or flood may arise to demolish their crops” (Royal Irrigation 
Department, 1966:2). After review, the RID submitted a revised feasibility report in 
                                                   
159 Jit Phumisak is best known for his book “Chomna sakdina Thai” (The Face of Thai Feudalism), 
written in 1957 under a pseudonym. Ironically, in 1953 he had been hired by the US Embassy in 
Bangkok to translate the Communist Manifesto from English into Thai. After becoming disillusioned 
with mainstream Thai politics he joined the outlawed CPT in the Phu Phan hills, but did not take up 
arms. (Source: Wikipedia webpage: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chit_Phumisak Accessed 10 April 
2012) 
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July 1966, which was subsequently accepted for loan approval by USAID (Wildman, 
1970). The planning process coincided with an escalation in political violence in the 
Northeast and the increased militarization of the region by US and Thai forces, with 
major airforce and military bases being established not far away in Nakhon Phanom 
and Udon Thani to prosecute the Indochina War (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005) 
The LNOIP was built between 1967-73 at an approximate cost of $72 million, with 
USAID offering a 25 year low interest loan of $3.5 million to the Thai government 
for purchase American machinery and technical assistance. A USAID progress 
report provided some illuminating context to the project’s underlying motivation and 
urgency: 
 “[T]his project has been high on the priority list projects for 
development of the water resources of Thailand…….Added impetus 
was given to this project by the interest of the US and RTG in counter-
insurgency measures. The project area was considered the second most 
active insurgent area in Thailand, at the time the loan was made.”  
Source: Wildman (1970:1) 
The same report further stressed the benefits that an irrigation project with its 
associated infrastructure would bring to improved accessibility, surveillance and 
security functions for state forces in bringing the local populace under its control:  
“[T]he provision for access roads to the dam site, and roadways provided 
by the canal berms, will provide increased mobility for security forces in 
the project area, which is in the heart of the insurgency area” 
 Source: Wildman (1970:2).   
This internal view of the project’s short-term political origins, suggesting economic 
justifications were secondary, was supported by an American agricultural consultant 
to the project during the 1980s: 
“Development of Lam Nam Oon through the promotion of irrigated 
agricultural production was pursued by the central government as a 
political device, aiming to assert central government rule in the area, but 
also with the longer term objective to promote food self-sufficiency, 
alleviate extreme poverty, and demonstrate Bangkok’s commitment to 
economic development and modernization in the area.” 
211 
 
(Source: Tony Zola, interviewed on 3 August, 2010, Bangkok. Emphasis 
added)  
 
8.3.3 A switch in rationale to an “Integrated Rural Development Project” 
 
Progress in project construction and implementation of any actual irrigation 
provision proved incredibly slow. While the dam structure was completed in 1973 
and the reservoir flooded an area of 85 km
2
 (forcing the resettlement of an estimated 
1,500 households
160
), progress towards completing the canals, roads and water 
delivery infrastructure to project farmers across a 32,000 ha command area was far 
slower in practice. In 1976, the RID requested a second USAID loan of $4.5 million, 
in order to provide: 
 “....some equipment essential to Operations and Maintenance work on 
the installed system and technical assistance to design and test on-farm 
water delivery systems as well as establish an integrated mode for 
planning and delivering inputs to the Lam Nam Oon area by seven 
different departments of government”  
Source: Dalton (1981:15). 
USAID and RID employed a US consultancy company (Engineering Consultants 
Inc.
161
) to provide technical advice in implementing the project, which was now seen 
by the foreign donors as less of an irrigation development project per se and more of 
an “Integrated Rural Development Project” (LNO-IRDP) targeted towards wider 
development concerns in the command and resettlement areas above the reservoir, 
although preparations for this new phase took a further three years to negotiate. 
However, it appeared that this shift in focus towards cross-departmental sharing of 
responsibility, on-farm development, farmer training, community participation and 
development integration goals, did not necessarily appeal to the RID that was fixated 
on implementing an engineering-oriented, irrigation infrastructure development 
project that it alone had controlled up until that point (Tony Zola, personal interview, 
3 August 2010). RID as the main partner agency was reportedly uncomfortable with 
                                                   
160 The actual number was nearer 1,800 families, some of whom were still struggling for 
compensation in November 2009, when I observed a meeting of project-affected persons. 
161 This company later changed its name to Louis Berger International Inc. and kept a small technical 
advisory team at LNOIP until 1991 
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the loss of control over decision-making authority and dragged its heels in 
implementing reforms, but as it was an irrigation project without any demand for its 
water from farmers at that stage (contrary to pre-project assertions), there were few 
lateral canals built
162
 and minimal irrigation occurring in practice, perhaps RID felt 
obliged to play along with the American demands for the project’s second phase. 
By the early 1980s, the Northeast’s communist insurgency was all but over 
following an amnesty offered by the government to CPT members, the withdrawal of 
funding by China and the return of US forces from military bases with a concomitant 
decrease in development aid budgets and strategic interest in the region. The 
project’s economic performance proved to be far below expectation and by 1982, 
USAID were keen to close the project. In a mid-term evaluation, USAID consultants 
were fairly gloomy about the economic outlook for the project and its prospects for 
achieving benefits for the target beneficiaries or returns to the lenders,  
“[T]he fundamental economic problem is that the project will not be 
able to produce sufficient economic return on the investment to cover 
the cost………When the assumptions regarding future costs are varied, 
the Project, in all cases produces benefit/cost ratios of less than one, 
negative net present values and internal rates of return of less than 
three per cent”  
Source: Schoux et al (1981:4).  
A separate donor evaluation found that virtually none of the non-infrastructure 
construction target indicators for integration activities had been reached, and “only 
about 20 percent of the area intended for dry season irrigation had actually received 
water after four seasons of system operation” (Muscat, 1982:vi). Furthermore, a 
large fraction of the canal outlets were reported non-functioning due to deterioration, 
faulty design, and deliberate locking due to the absence of farm-connecting 
distribution channels. The same author noted that contrary to conventional wisdom 
regarding rural labour in the Northeast being underemployed in the dry season and 
supposedly desperate for the agricultural opportunities provided by irrigation, 
“farmers do have other income earning opportunities” (Muscat, 1982:vii), and 
concluded that “mere provision of water cannot be assumed to be sufficient to induce 
farmers to cultivate”. 
                                                   
162 On-farm construction of ditches and dykes and land consolidation did not actually begin until 1978 
(Dolinksy, 1995) 
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By the end of the LNO-IRDP phase (1979-1985) of USAID support, external 
evaluations had become far more upbeat about the project’s prospects than four years 
earlier, despite there still only being a relatively small proportion of the overall 
irrigable land actually being cultivated in the dry season, despite plentiful water 
(Morgan et al., 1986). The project now had built most tertiary canal infrastructure 
and consolidated on-farm holdings, yet the development consultants were frustrated 
by how few villagers were using the system in the dry season. In the opinion of 
Morgan el al (1986), they perceived that the main obstacle was poor market 
development for cash crops, not water deficiency, and set about the task of 
introducing high value crops to the farmers, improving extension services and 
linking farmers to markets and vice versa. Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond was 
credited with boosting the project’s fortunes by making a timely public 
announcement on national television and radio channels that state agencies should 
work more closely with the private sector and the government would promote the 
establishment of foreign agribusiness companies in the Northeast via state subsidies 
and other incentives (Tony Zola, personal interview, 3 August, 2010). 
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8.3.4 Switch from irrigation to agribusiness promotion project – a “success”? 
 
Given the show of support from Bangkok, the project altered its raison d’être again 
to be framed as less irrigational and more agribusiness in its objectives. By the end 
of the LNO-IRDP, buoyed by higher interest from farmers in using at least some of 
the water for crops other than rice (mostly groundnuts) and changes in Thai state 
macro-policy towards a more “pro-business and export-oriented” outlook (Dolinsky, 
1995:5), USAID regained an interest in the project and looked on it as a potential 
testing ground for introducing a Western agribusiness and contract farming model. 
Thus, the US government stepped forward again to fund a third project phase titled 
the Agriculture Technology Transfer Project (1986-88), which was followed 
immediately by another project along the same lines, but this time fully funded by 
the Thai government, named the Integrated Agro-Production and Marketing Project 
(IAMP) (1987-91). Between 1985 and 1990, the number of agribusinesses operating 
at Lam Nam Oon, both foreign and domestic, increased from three to thirteen 
(Dolinsky, 1995). At its peak in 1993, the number of families involved in contract 
farming reached about 4,000 and the value of farm production had increased 24 fold 
on 1983 values. Consulting for USAID, Dolinsky (1995) believed that prospects for 
further agribusiness and contract farming expansion in the area were favourable, due 
to the plentiful water, technologically competent farmers and agribusiness friendly 
local environment. Lam Nam Oon was considered a remarkable success story 
amongst an otherwise quite poor record of irrigation development performance in 
Northeast Thailand and was used a “model” for other projects to follow (Sansonthi 
Boonyothayan, Interviewed 24 November, 2009). Indeed, the project was awarded 
the title of, “Outstanding Irrigation Project in all of Thailand” by the Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID) in 1990 (Skogerboe and Merkley, 1996) and it was widely 
considered a model for other irrigation projects to follow (Royal Irrigation 
Department, 2003). But was the project the unqualified success claimed by 
proponents and was it sustainable? 
While, the short-term prospects for the project may have seemed rosy in comparison 
to other irrigation projects in the Northeast where farmers had voted with their feet 
and left the land in droves, but perhaps USAID was being over-selective in its 
narratives and only considering part of a wider story (Rigg, 2001; Floch et al., 2007). 
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In the longer term, the model promoted was in effect sowing the seeds of its own 
demise, by failing to take sustainability issues seriously enough. According to civil 
society campaigners, the “Green Revolution” farming methods promoted in the 
Northeast, required large quantities of agro-chemicals that were unsustainable, 
leading to serious environmental and human health impacts, as well as leaving 
farmers in debt (Sluiter, 1992; Bello et al., 1998).      
By 2009, it seemed apparent that Dolinsky’s positive projections about agribusiness 
trends had not materialised and the early 1990s hubris about the project appeared 
overblown. Contract farming continued with nine companies still remaining in the 
area, but the number of households involved had reduced to 1,547 households 
cultivating an area of just 695 ha of high value cash crops in the 2009 dry season 
(Sansonthi Boonyothayan, personal communication, February 2010). The area 
reportedly increased to over 1,200 ha of cash crops in the 2009-10 dry season, but an 
area double this was devoted to naa prang (dry season rice) (Irrigation Office No. 5 
Udon Thani, 2010), a crop the USAID project had tried to phase out due to its 
marginal value and high water demand. For the first time since operations began 
apparently, the LNOIP experienced a shortage of water in the 2010 dry season and 
had to ration water supply to farmers
163
, partly resulting from poor rains the previous 
rainy season and the soaring demand for water from naa prang cultivation, as 
attempts to limit the area of rice grown had failed. It was apparent, however, from 
my assessment of the project based on direct observation and interviews with 
numerous stakeholders that it was being run as neither an integrated rural 
development project nor was agribusiness at the centre of RID’s concerns, after 35 
years of being conceived primarily as an irrigation development vehicle by RID.  
 
8.3.5 The legacy of the USAID agribusiness model 
  
Rather than greater numbers of farmers attracted by rising incomes and economic 
security being attracted to contract farming of high value crops, as anticipated by the 
USAID model, I found a picture of caution, uncertainty and cynicism amongst many 
villagers I interviewed, both present and past contract farmers. Many families had 
                                                   
163 This involved alternating water releases between the two main canals on a weekly basis, 
essentially allowing each farmer seven consecutive days of water access per fortnight. 
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tried contract farming but given up, due to a range of negative experiences, both 
financial and technical. Common complaints involved being cheated by agents who 
either stole money or paid farmers less than the agreed amount, often claiming crops 
were sub-standard quality, and with no independent adjudicator, the farmers felt 
powerless and had to accept whatever amount they were offered. To pay for required 
inputs, the farmers had to borrow on credit terms from the company
164
, with the debt 
attracting accumulating interest. Sometimes they would make a profit, but other 
times the crop would fail and the farmers would end up owing the company money. 
This would lock many into a cycle of dependency with the company, as they would 
be obliged to carry on growing its crops the following season until the debt was 
repaid. Sometimes family members would be obliged to leave the village and work 
off-farm to earn money to repay the debt, which caused them to be reluctant to 
resume this form of farming on their return. The farmers were clearly the chief risk 
bearers in this form of exploitative agriculture that was poorly regulated by the 
state
165
, replicating a scenario found in many other developing country situations 
post-Green Revolution (Shiva, 1998).  
As farmers gradually turned their backs on contract farming at LNOIP, the industry 
itself started to feel the impacts and there was a general improvement in contract 
conditions in a bid to keep producers. Added to which, the farmers themselves 
became wiser to the tricks of the agents and were perhaps less naive and more 
demanding of the companies than in the past. As time went by, the companies had to 
share greater risk with the farmers and offer them more incentives to remain loyal 
producers, compared to a decade or two before. Even so, there were still serious risks 
inherent in the basic monoculture, high-risk, high-reward/loss model of intensive 
agriculture practiced, that had little to do with water scarcity. For example, in the 
2009-10 dry season there was a widespread failure of the seed tomato crop from 
disease, and all farmers I spoke with in Ban Non Rua made little or no income from 
their cropping. Some farmers made no money at all on their four month labour 
investment and the companies did not try to claw back their cash investment from 
                                                   
164 For the average family, this would involve buying seed, fertilizer, pesticides, growth hormones, 
and plastic sheeting from the company on credit terms, and often borrowing a cash sum too to pay for 
labour and tide them over until harvest, at which point it would be deducted from the value of their 
crop. 
165 To be fair, not all companies were reported to be exploitative and the problems were often located 
to the level of the semi-autonomous agents, but it was apparent that there was enough bad practice 
going on to taint the sector in the minds of many villagers. 
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the farmers as in the past, but bore the loss themselves. However, some farmers 
decided to exit contract farming, unwilling to work for little or no reward, especially 
as there were far better and less risky employment prospects off-farm, as farming in 
general appeared less attractive, especially for younger people in the village. 
There was another, perhaps more persuasive reason, why people were unwilling to 
adopt or continue with the intensive contract farming model beyond financial risk 
and off-farm options alone. From interviews with numerous villagers, the principal 
reason given for ceasing dry season intensive cropping was due to environmental and 
public health concerns, as a result of pesticide use. Indeed, Dolinsky (1995:61) in her 
report had flagged this issue as one of potential future concern under “Lesson 10: 
Incorporate preventative measures to protect the populace from the hazards of 
pesticide sprays”, and thought failure to adequately address this issue by the state 
authorities and private sector, “could grow to undermine the project over the 
medium-term” but seemed to assume it would somehow be addressed by a vague 
rhetorical commitment to IPM by relevant government agencies and agribusiness. It 
seemed this had become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as numerous respondents I spoke 
with in Ban Non Rua and neighbouring villages told me they or family members had 
taken blood tests and were told that they had “high” or “dangerous” levels of 
pesticides in their bloodstream and were concerned about practicing contract farming. 
Curious about this finding, I approached the local (sub-district) and provincial public 
health authorities for more information and the data tended to confirm the villagers’ 
fears were well founded. Data provided by the Tambon Naa Hua Bor Health Centre 
collected in 2009 from conducting Cholinesterase
166
 blood tests on a general 
population sample of 301 villagers in 10 out of 19 villages in the Sub-District, 
suggested that 6.6 % had “normal” levels, 38.9 % had “safe” levels; 45.5 % had “at 
risk” levels; and 9.0 % of the population had “dangerous” levels of pesticide in their 
bloodstream. Similar Cholinesterase tests conducted in 2004 by the Sakhon Nakhon 
Provincial Public Health Office on 137 villagers directly involved in contract 
farming in Ban Non Rua (Moo 3) indicated that 10.9 % had “normal” levels; 13.1 % 
had “safe” levels; 23.4 % had “at risk” levels; and 52.6 % had “dangerous” levels of 
pesticide in their bloodstream (Bupsiri, 2005). Farmers who persisted with contract 
                                                   
166 Cholinesterase tests are primarily used to measure organophosphates and to a lesser extent, 
carbamates, in the blood of people tested. 
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farming were taking protective measures, but these appeared well short of the 
manufacturers’ recommendations, and the environmental impacts of pesticide use 
were an issue of concern amongst local observers, both state and non-state.  
 
8.3.6 The rhetorical myths of participation and decentralization 
 
The local management issues mentioned help to account for the lack of long-term 
success for the ideologically-inspired model of irrigated agriculture conceived by 
USAID for the LNOIP in a continual process of narrative re-invention and 
justification for what was originally billed publically as a project to solve the 
problems of drought and floods in the Nam Oon sub-basin. However, once USAID 
technocrats left the project, satisfied it was “a success” on the surface (Dolinsky, 
1995; Skogerboe and Merkley, 1996), control quickly reverted to the exclusive 
domain of the RID, who ostensibly managed the project through a top-down, 
authoritarian system from its Bangkok headquarters, via an intermediary regional 
office located in Udon Thani. Many of the reforms or “best practices” that USAID 
had tried to introduce appeared to be little more than rhetorical flourishes from a by-
gone era by 2009. For example, a lot of time and effort had been spent during the 
LNO-IRDP phase in trying to establish and strengthen Water Users Groups and 
above them, Water Users Associations (WUAs), as part of an international discourse 
of participation, co-management and decentralization in water management. As 
stated in one USAID report: 
“The establishment of viable Water Users Groups is the most difficult 
requirement to achieve, as it involves a major change in the culture of 
Lam Nam Oon residents. Sustaining this change will require the 
attention of all government agencies active in the project, as well as 
those designated under Land Consolidation Act regulations.”      
Source: Morgan and Dalton (1983:31) 
Although nominal Water Users Groups (WUGs) and Water Users Association 
(WUAs) were established during the LNO-IRDP phase and still existed on paper, 
(Irrigation Office No. 5 Udon Thani, 2004), it was apparent these had become 
largely RID-constructs to fulfil bureaucratic purposes, rather than genuine, active 
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and locally-managed institutions to manage water above the level of the tertiary 
canal. They organized simple tasks, such as occasional tertiary canal and ditch 
cleaning days and had a symbolic list of rules (standardised and written by RID) and 
members (which did not appear to have been updated in over a decade in the 
example I saw). My impression was that the WUGs fulfilled an illusory function for 
the benefit of senior echelons of RID management that the hydrocracy was actively 
practicing participation and decentralization in its irrigation systems
167
. The low 
institutional interest of RID in de facto participation and decentralization of decision-
making capacity to system water users and where the impetus derived from, is given 
meaning in the following comments from a past consultant to the project: 
“When I was working at Lam Nam Oon I was told repeatedly that the 
mandate of the Irrigation Dept stopped at the turnout. And whatever 
happened after that was none of their business; that was the farmer’s 
business. If they wanted to organize themselves, then they could. Well 
eventually, they did have a group within RID that would go out and 
organize water users groups. They didn’t like to do it, they didn’t think it 
was necessary, but because they were under pressure, because the donor 
gave them money to do it, they would do it.”  
(Source: Anthony Zola, interviewed, 3 August, 2012) 
This perspective has been noted elsewhere in Thailand, such as that of Shluter 
referring to large-scale systems in Central Thailand who argued that the situation 
was characterized by “inefficient or non-functional water users groups on the tertiary 
level” and questioned whether the large budgets spent on encouraging “participation” 
had been worth the cost. The artificial nature of “fashionable” development donor 
terms Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) and Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT) when seen in practice, appear to cause a degree of confusion and 
suspicion to arise amongst consultants hired to reform the national irrigation sector, 
but with little opportunity to ground truth data (e.g. Turral, 2008). According to a 
civil society activist observer living nearby the project, the management of LNOIP is 
as far from decentralized model of water management as ever, and farmers have to 
accept a water release regime decided in Bangkok: 
                                                   
167 This perception was confirmed through an interview I conducted with the senior RID official 
responsible for irrigation decentralization and participation, Mr Manas Kamnertmanee, Director of the 
Public Participatory Promotion Office, at RID Bangkok headquarters on 4 August, 2010. 
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“Today, the water management regime of the Lam Nam Oon dam is still 
under the control of the RID..... The Water Users Groups only have to tell 
them [RID] how much water they will use, but do not even have power in 
the process of negotiating how much the agribusiness sector will get. The 
Water Users Groups at present are established to be nodes to coordinate 
the distribution of news, rather than build capacity about how to gain the 
most benefit from water usage. The RID itself still gives them a low 
priority. This causes membership to decline and the utilization area does 
not expand, which causes production problems.” 
Source: Laothai Nilnuan, interviewed 15 December, 2009. 
Farmers do not pay a direct water usage fee, which leaves the RID in a powerful 
position as they do not regard themselves as a service provider, but a deliverer of 
water granted out of the kindness of the king to subjects (chonla-prathaan).As such 
the RID feels it can act in a non-transparent and unaccountable manner to water 
users and external parties, as one might expect from a “black box” institution. I was 
surprised to find that the LNOIP and Sakon Nakhon provincial RID offices had 
relatively little contact with other government line agencies, who regarded it as aloof 
and inscrutable, as its chain of command went up through a hierarchy to RID 
headquarters and did not extend laterally to other provincial agencies under the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. One senior provincial agricultural official 
told me that I should not be too concerned about the difficulties in obtaining data 
from LNOIP, as they too often experienced similar problems in extracting 
information from the provincial RID office, which was considered in their view a 
“special case” agency168. 
Borne out of Cold War regional securitization ideological roots, but ostensibly built 
to cure “floods and droughts” and solve local poverty, the LNOIP never quite lived 
up to the ideological promise of any of its subsequent makeovers and reinventions, 
whether as an “integrated rural development project or an “agribusiness” promotion 
project, although these did breathe life temporarily into an otherwise moribund 
project with no real demand for its water up until the early 1980s (Muscat, 1982). 
The project seems less “integrated” with other state agencies and non-state 
                                                   
168 The Sakon Nakhon Provincial Irrigation Project Office is physically isolated from the other 
provincial government departments, located out of town in the shadow of the Phu Phan Royal Palace. 
Like the LNOIP, it is not formally integrated into the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
Departmental structure at provincial level, as it reports to and takes orders from an exclusive 
established hierarchy within the RID itself. 
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stakeholders now, than during the USAID era of technical assistance, suggesting a 
regression in irrigation reform and management practices. Perhaps this demonstrates 
in part a “clash of cultures” and ideological visions between the more “social 
engineering paradigm” of USAID, and the resolutely old fashioned “engineering 
paradigm” of the RID, who treated the “participatory turn” as something of an 
elaborate charade, and as soon as the foreign consultants had packed their bags and 
left, were content to return to the “business-as-usual” approach of controlling the 
project from Bangkok at the hydraulic core. The project raises interesting questions 
about the degree to which the roads built by RID were an as important tool of state 
control and rendering the human landscape legible and amenable to control as the 
canals that run parallel (see Scott, 1998). LNOIP qualifies as an examplar of 
hydraulic agriculture. 
 
8.4 The Nam Songkhram Project 
 
8.4.1 A notional hydraulic project over many decades 
 
The Nam Songkhram Project bears many discursive and practical similarities to the 
Green Isaan and its successor the Khong-Chi-Mun Projects, but differs in scale, 
being smaller in extent and has a somewhat longer track record of attempted 
implementation by the state under the same basic name (see Fig. 7.1, Chapter 7). It 
provides an exemplar of a hydraulic project that has existed discursively as a 
notional entity for over four decades, but has thus far failed to make the transition 
into material reality, despite a prolonged period of planning, promotion and 
advocacy by Thai state hydrocracies, politicians and allied private sector interests. 
Unlike the LNOIP which was relatively rapidly transformed from a discursive plan 
into a material socio-ecological object on the ground, given the shared security 
concerns around the Phu Phan hills, the Nam Songkhram Project has thus far only 
existed on paper in numerous reports and in the minds of its powerful proponents. 
This section critically analyses the project’s evolution through various stages from 
its genesis up to the most recent attempts at implementation by the RID, by 
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considering the dominant actors and narratives in support of and opposition to its 
development.  
Like the LNOIP, the Nam Songkhram scheme discursively emerged out of US-
sponsored Mekong Committee investigations into “developing” various Mekong 
tributaries in the 1960s and 70s for hydropower, flood control and irrigation 
purposes. Ever since Zimmerman (1999) recommended regulating Mekong 
tributaries in the 1930s (see Chapter 6), state planners have perceived that the 
“peculiar” flood-drought hydrology of the Nam Songkhram Basin and connectivity 
with the Mekong mainstream presented challenges that were slightly more 
problematic than other low gradient tributaries draining the Khorat Plateau (The 
Secretariat, 1977). This seasonal flooding phenomenon was regarded by 
developmental planners as the biggest obstacle to increased agricultural productivity 
of the lower Nam Songkhram Basin and problematized it as a natural disaster 
(“utokapai”), that logically had to be overcome through hydraulic engineering and 
environmental modification approaches (Blake et al., 2009). The other familiar 
problem identified as needing a solution in every single state-commissioned report 
was the universalized issue of “drought”, seen as a root cause of local poverty, 
according to Breukers (1998). 
 
8.4.2 Solutions to a problematic hydrology – a familiar refrain  
 
In the early 1980s, the task was to “fix” the Nam Songkhram’s aberrant hydrology 
was assigned by the Thai government to the Interim Committee for Coordination of 
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (based in Bangkok), who hired a Dutch 
consultancy company with a local partner to conduct a “pre-feasibility study” to 
assess ways to increase agricultural intensification and solve regional poverty 
(NEDECO/TEAM, 1983). NEDECO/TEAM’s collaborative report investigated the 
possibility of constructing a series of low storage dams on tributaries and one large 
flow “regulator” (it declined to term the structure a “dam”) near the Nam 
Songkhram’s confluence with the Mekong (see Fig 8.1), in combination with the 
creation of large polder-like structures on the river’s floodplain. Borrowing from 
Dutch land reclamation principles, these polders would render “unutilized wasteland” 
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fit for cultivation and allow year round cropping to be implemented via means of 
“modern” pumped irrigation and water control methods. The “Nam Songkhram 
Basin Irrigation and Flood Control Development” project envisaged that a total of 
61,000 ha of land could be irrigated, scattered across several floodplain locations 
(NEDECO/TEAM, 1983). The project’s cost was estimated to be US$ 90 million, 
although significantly, it found that the regulator structure at the river mouth was not 
economically viable, as flood control benefits would be minimal against the 
construction costs incurred, a view later reiterated by Biwater (1987) in its Green 
Isaan Project Master Plan (which also included a short section on the Nam 
Songkhram Project). Interestingly, this critical finding was subsequently ignored in 
later reports by Thai hydraulic agencies and, moreover, the downstream flood 
“regulator” became the central component of the Nam Songkhram Project.  
 
8.4.3 Development hydrotopia meets resistance 
 
The chronology of the Nam Songkhram Project since the 1980s has been 
characterized by a series of attempts by state hydraulic agencies and allied political 
actors to turn the NEDECO/TEAM plan into reality. The project was awarded to the 
Department of Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP) under the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Energy to implement, as a sub-component of its much 
larger Khong-Chi-Mun Project portfolio (Sneddon, 2003b). In the early 1990s, 
Thailand’s agricultural policies were considered “probusiness” and there was a 
strong governmental drive to boost export-oriented agribusiness in this part of the 
Northeast, as noted by Dolinsky (1995) and recommended in the conclusions of 
numerous development master plans (e.g. Biwater, 1987). The government offered 
generous subsidies and tax incentives for agribusiness companies willing to relocate 
to the Nam Songkhram Basin and invest in modern, Green Revolution type 
agriculture and processing facilities, with part of the lure being the promise of 
irrigation infrastructure provision, extension services for farmers and market support. 
Indeed, ahead of the trend was the nearby Royal Development Study Centre in 
Sakon Nakhon that had established a tomato processing factory in the mid-80s 
(Pritchard and Burch, 2003), and several other agribusinesses were encouraged to 
move to the region in the late 1980s. In theory, farmers would no longer have to 
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migrate out of the Northeast to find work, but would be able to find employment 
locally, either on their own land as modern farmers or in the agribusiness plantations 
and factories. 
The development hubris in the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin was exemplified by 
the growth of one company’s activities, namely the Sun Tech Group Ltd169, that 
steadily acquired about 9,600 ha of low-lying, flood-prone, formerly public or 
common ownership land using nefarious means in the late 1980s (Blake et al., 2009). 
Sun Tech concentrated its main agricultural activity on growing intensive tomato 
monocrops for processing in its own factory built in Sri Songkhram District and 
eventual export as canned tomatoes and tomato paste. It employed a diesel pumped 
irrigation system, using water abstracted from the Nam Songkhram, and had built an 
elaborate drainage system to avoid waterlogging. Due to alleged illegal acquisition 
of public land
170
, pollution of local water sources from the heavy use of pesticides 
and forcible exclusion of local villagers from its land holdings, Sun Tech became the 
subject of local conflict and resistance against its activities by an alliance of local 
and national civil society groups, the most prominent being the Project for 
Ecological Recovery and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance 
(PER/TERRA) (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). The NGO movement 
concentrated on researching local culture, livelihood and environmental issues, 
including project impacts on one hand, and conducting advocacy work for impacted 
villagers and organizing local resistance against the project, by building a grassroots 
movement on the other. Civil rights lawyers pursued a legal case against Sun Tech 
Company in the provincial court for illegal purchase of public land, that eventually 
led to a conviction against the company and an order by the judge to return the land 
to the village (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). 
Thus, when the DEDP announced in 1995 that it intended to construct the Nam 
Songkhram Project to irrigate a planned 90,400 ha of land at a projected cost of 
US$ 400 million, the civil society organizations already had a network formed on the 
ground with a good knowledge base and were well prepared to resist the dam 
                                                   
169 It parent company was a Thai owned conglomerate with multiple business activities in Central 
Thailand and became the largest producer of canned tomatoes in Thailand in the mid-1990s. 
170 Sun Tech Co Ltd was later challenged in court for illegally buying public land from villagers in 
Ban Dong San, and required by the court to return it to the community (Laothai Nilnuan, interview, 
15 December 2009). 
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(Breukers, 1998). This hydraulic development utopia had at its heart a large, shallow 
reservoir inundating 255 km
2 
of floodplain land
171
, from which would radiate electric 
pumped irrigation systems via distribution canals to water farmers’ fields, based on 
an assumption that the energy to power the pumps would be cheap and abundant due 
to hydroelectricity production from damming the Mekong
172
. But civil society 
groups were in a relatively strong position to counter the Project and mobilize multi-
scalar resistance against it (i.e. at the local, provincial and national levels), using 
experienced learned at other dam projects around Thailand gained since the 1980s, 
when a wave of anti-dam activism and environmentalism first started to sweep 
Thailand (Hirsch, 1997, 1998). A particularly valuable test case which helped hone 
the skills and strategies of civil society activists, academic campaigners and 
grassroots movements against the construction of high socio-environmental impact 
state infrastructure projects was the well-documented Pak Mun Dam struggle 
between 1992 - present (Hirsch, 1998; Foran and Manorom, 2009). 
 
8.4.4 The project is cancelled (or merely postponed?) 
 
A major hurdle that DEDP came up against in advancing the Nam Songkhram 
Project to implementation, beyond the wide-ranging civil society and grassroots 
opposition, turned out to be other sections of the bureauacracy, in particular the 
National Environment Board (NEB) and the Office for Environmental Policy and 
Planning (OEPP). The NEB was responsible for ensuring that state infrastructure 
projects complied with the Environment Law of 1992, which required large projects 
like this had to submit an Environmental Impact Assessment (Breukers, 1998). On 
several occasions the NEB rejected DEDP’s EIA and requested further studies to be 
conducted before it could be acceptable. Each time the DEDP would hire a new 
group of consultants, at first from private engineering companies and latterly from 
Thai universities, delaying the process considerably. A public hearing held in 
December 1997 revealed further serious flaws with the DEDP’s arguments for the 
project (Lohmann, 1998). Aside from the ecological and social objections noted 
                                                   
171 The reservoir footprint, incidentally, would have included much of the Sun Tech landholdings and 
would have required the state to pay the company compensation, if they could prove ownership 
172 For many years through the late 1980s and 1990s, Thailand had a considerable excess of power 
production capacity, due to over-development of the sector. 
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above, the public transcript of the counter-narratives included concerns about 
archaeological and cultural heritage that would be lost to the nation, should the dam 
project proceed. Added to the long list of objections against the project, the 
opponents charged the economic argument for the project did not appear to to be 
sound and there were too many questions left unanswered by DEDP; it seemed the 
odds were stacking up against the project’s approval, despite strong political support 
from regional politicians
173
 (Breukers, 1998). Without approval from the NEB, the 
project went into a period of dormancy and it was not until March 2002, just prior to 
the DEDP’s dissolution, that the Cabinet under Thaksin Shinawatra’s premiership 
finally decided to cancel the Nam Songkhram Project (Blake et al., 2009). 
Like many such notional irrigational projects
174
, however, the blueprint for the 
project was not discarded, but merely transferred to another hydrocracy for dusting 
off when the time was right. In the case of the Nam Songkhram Project, it took just a 
few years for the project to re-emerge, this time in the hands of the RID. In August 
2005, with the lower Nam Songkhram in normal rainy season flood conditions, 
Thaksin and a few close members of his Cabinet flew over the floodplain in a 
helicopter, landed at Sri Songkhram town and declared the situation a “natural 
disaster” (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). In his speech to gathered townsfolk 
and government officials he called for the urgent construction of a large dam on the 
Nam Songkhram mainstream, as the only way to solve basin floods and provide 
water for dry season irrigation to farmers (personal communication with an IUCN 
colleague who attended). With him nodding her head in agreement was the Minister 
for Agriculture and Cooperatives, Sudarat Keyuraphan, also crucially with oversight 
responsibility for the RID. 
While Thaksin’s government did not remain in power long enough to see the project 
to fruition, that visit seemed to provide the greenlight needed to set the bureaucratic 
wheels in motion once more, and rumours of a new dam on the Nam Songkhram and 
Nam Oon rivers started to circulate around Sri Songkhram District in 2006, when I 
                                                   
173 The DEDP was partly controlled by a relatively small group of politicians from the North and 
Northeast, allied to the Chart Thai and Social Action Parties, who viewed it as a vehicle for their 
political aspirations. 
174 A better documented example of a large hydraulic project that refuses to go away, but periodically 
returns to the limelight every few years after being dropped for implementation by the previous 
government, is the highly controversial Kaeng Sua Taen dam project in northern Thailand (Handley, 
2006; Lebel et al, 2009) 
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was still living there. The RID seem to have approached the task of ensuring its 
construction in a rather different manner to DEDP, using a process that appears even 
less transparent and more Machiavellian than previous attempts, perhaps learning 
from some of the earlier mistakes. A key tactic employed has been the fragmenting 
of the project into a series of smaller hydraulic projects (classified as “medium-scale” 
projects) spread across the lower Nam Songkhram Basin, four of which appear to 
circumvent the need to produce an EIA due to their size being below the legal 
requirement (see Table 8.1). This implies they will not have to satisfy the 
requirements of the NEB, a major stumbling block before. In its latest reincarnation, 
the project has been titled the “Nam Songkhram Basin Development Project” and is 
slated for construction between 2013 – 2020, on the basis of a discussion I had with 
officials in the Nakhon Phanom Provincial RID office and an RID document I was 
provided  (Office of Construction 3 (Nam Gam Project), 2010). The officials made it 
clear that they regarded the Nam Songkhram river as “the last undammed river in 
Isaan” (cf. Sasaki et al., 2007), and it was only a matter of time before it was 
regulated like every other river in the region. 
The stated objective of all five projects, keeping to the well-rehearsed script of their 
predecessors, is to provide water for agricultural purposes and relieve flooding as a 
natural disaster. What is perhaps most noteworthy about the project document 
mentioned above is the absence of detail and socio-economic justification for the 
projects, beyond the scantest technical description. The scheme presently assumes 
that there will be no reservoirs required at each dam, as the “regulators”175 will store 
water within the river channels of the Nam Songkhram and tributaries blocked
176
. In 
theory, water will be distributed to surrounding farmland by electric pumps and 
concrete lined canals, again sticking to a formula that has repeatedly failed across 
Northeast Thailand in the past (Floch and Molle, 2009a). Perhaps the most egregious 
change in strategies between the DEDP and the RID has been a far more stealthy 
approach adopted by the latter organization, now able to proceed with these projects 
                                                   
175 There has been a trend in recent decades to avoid referring to the Thai word for a dam (“kheuan”) 
in official narratives, due to the negative connotations it is believed to hold in public perceptions. 
Hence, dam project proponents will frequently prefer to refer to them by euphemisms such as “pratoo 
rabai naam” (water gates) or “fai” (weir), demonstrating the importance of identifying hidden 
meanings behind official labels and nomenclature for power-laden terms. 
176 Such low storage capacities raise questions about the dry season irrigable area potential of the 
projects actual feasiblity, although the RID never overtly concerns itself about such practicalities at 
other similar projects. 
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under the cloak of “participation”, by putting them through the rubber stamping 
process of the RBOs, which have no authority to block them, even if they were more 
representative in terms of state and non-state actor composition. Thus, there appears 
to be a distinct inevitability about the five new projects moving forward to 
construction without any meaningful external scrutiny or opposition. 
For example, the chief of the Sri Songkhram District Agriculture Office claimed he 
knew nothing about these projects, as his office was not directly informed about 
provincial irrigation development plans by the RID (Jeddy Khotamitr, interviewed, 
19 July 2010). The same was true for other villagers, civil society activists and 
government officials consulted during fieldwork, who professed little knowledge 
about the RID plans. In fact, I did not encounter any overt opposition to these well-
advanced plans (in marked contrast to the DEDP plans 15 years before), as nobody I 
spoke with appeared to be informed about their existence, beyond RID officials and 
the political patronage network of the Deputy Minister for Agriculture and 
Cooperatives and Nakhon Phanom MP, Supachai Phosu (see next section).  
Project location 
(river) 
Project Type Planned 
construction 
period 
Cost ($) 
Potential 
irrigable 
area (ha) 
Irrigation 
cost  
( $/ha) 
Baan Agaad Amnuay, 
Sakon Nakhon (Nam 
Yam) 
Wster gstes 
regulator & med-
scale irrigation 
2009-2012 14,516,129 800 18,145 
Baan Nong Bua, 
Nakhon Phanom (Nam 
Oon) 
Water gates 
regulator & med-
scale irrigation 
2009-2012 21,802,854 1,920 11,356 
Baan Huay Sai, Nong 
Khai (Huay Sai/Nam 
Songkhram) 
Water gates 
regulator & med-
scale irrigation  
2011-2014 43,974,061 12,128 3,656 
Baan Gor, Sakon 
Nakhon (Nam Yam) 
Water gates 
regulator & med-
scale irrigation 
2012-2015 12,690,745 2,400 5,288 
Baan Naa Phiang, 
Nakhon Phanom (Nam 
Songkhram) 
Water gates 
regulator & large 
scale irrigation 
2013-2020 226,743,552 44,112 5,140 
 TOTAL 2009-2020 319,727,341 61,360 5,210 
Table 8.1 Irrigation projects proposed under the RID’s Nam Songkhram Basin 
Development Project (Adapted from Office of Construction 3 (Nam Gam Project), 2010)) 
 
8.4.5 Political legitimation of latest project plans by RID 
 
As matters stood at the time of fieldwork, there was no discernible opposition to the 
projects as there was no apparent public knowledge about them, beyond a small 
rump of actors within the bureaucracy. The RID seemed to be following a logic of 
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picking the low lying fruits first and that once the first four smaller and cheaper 
dams were built on the tributaries, the field would be cleared for the final pièce de 
résistance, the Nam Songkhram regulator dam at Baan Naa Phiang costing over five 
times more than the next cheapest dam at Baan Huay Sai and over seventeen times 
the cost of the dam at Baan Gor. In constructing the smaller projects first, a minor 
army of RID-employed engineers and miscellaneous officials would be kept in work; 
contracts could be signed with external contractors; surpluses extracted and rent 
sought; local political elites could show they deliver on pre-election promises to 
deliver irrigation systems to voters; there would be temporary construction 
employment for a few; and villagers could temporarily believe that irrigational 
utopia was around the corner. (At least until the promises proved empty, irrigation 
development failed to solve any underlying problems and the system abandoned like 
at countless other sites across Northeast Thailand.)  
Perhaps the most critical factor dictating a strong likelihood that most if not all of the 
projects under the Nam Songkhram Basin Development Project plan will progress to 
implementation was the tacit support given to the RID’s hydraulic mission being 
extended by the Nakhon Phanom MP and Sri Songkhram District native, Supachai 
Phosu, who serendipitously was promoted to the position of Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives by a deft defection from the opposition benches to the 
government coalition in 2008
177
. This position gave him powerful influence within 
the Ministry to strengthen his political base in Nakhon Phanom and surrounding 
provinces, by delivering populist development projects to his homeland and playing 
the role of a benevolent paternalistic figure, following in the footsteps of numerous 
regional patron-wielding strongmen politicians before him. Indeed, in our interview 
conducted in the backseat of a police-escorted car en route to a political rally
178
, he 
                                                   
177 Supachai defected from the Phak Palang Prachachon (People’s Power Party) to the Bhumjaithai 
Party under Newin Chidchob, a powerful mafioso-like politician controlling a large clique of Isaan-
based MPs. In December 2008, his party helped the opposition Democrat Party to break an ongoing 
political stalemate and form a new government under Abhisit Vejjajiva. As a defector from the 
political party of Thaksin Shinawatra, Supachai was disliked by many in his constituency sympathetic 
to the Red Shirts movement and was physically attacked in late 2009, leading to extra police 
protection at the time I interviewed him in June 2010. 
178 At the rally for local womens’ groups, Supachai boasted he had already secured 5 billion baht 
worth of infrastructure projects for Nakhon Phanom province and would guarantee more budget if the 
people voted for him at the next elections.  
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confided to me that his political role model to emulate was Banharn Silpa-Archa
179
, a 
powerful politician infamous for nepotistically showering development projects on 
his home province in Central Thailand (Ockey, 2005). He claimed he wanted to 
assure Nakhon Phanom developed in a similar manner to Banharn’s Suphan Buri in 
the Central Plains, delivering new roads and irrigation development projects as the 
main engines of development, in shades of development rhetoric stretching back to 
Sarit in the early 1960s. 
Rather ironically, Supachai claimed to have opposed the Nam Songkhram Project in 
the 1990s when it was under the mantle of the DEDP, representing perhaps the 
majority views of local people living in villages that stood to be negatively impacted 
by the dam’s reservoir. He told me he believed it would have destroyed the paa 
boong paa thaam
180
 and harmed the environment, but he had now changed his mind, 
arguing that the local environment had already been destroyed by other state projects 
and villagers were no longer dependent on harvesting wetlands resources for their 
livelihoods, but rice farming instead. Villagers’ top priorities at present, he believed, 
were bringing rainy season floods under control and providing solutions to dry 
season drought; and fortunately he was finally in a position to solve their problems 
for the first time. To show he could deliver on his promises, Supachai boasted that he 
had been the main catalyst in building a new concrete bridge over the Mekong from 
Nakhon Phanom to Laos costing US$ 57 million and constructing new six-lane 
highways in the province during his short tenure. His next task was to bring 
prosperity to farmers by introducing widespread irrigation development across the 
province:  
“Hence, what I want to do because I have the luck to be a politician in 
this government - now I am a minister - is that streams, rivers, waterways, 
swamps everywhere should be dredged, should be improved as gaem ling 
projects to store water in the dry season. I want all the tributaries of the 
Nam Songkhram and the Mekong River in Nakhon Phanom to have 
water gates and weirs to store water for agricultural purposes. Wherever 
                                                   
179 Banharn Silpa-Archa (Prime Minister 1995-96) is known as the godfather (jao pho) of Suphan 
Buri province, which he has zealously controlled for two generations as a kind of personal fiefdom. 
He also has a reputation for wielding considerable influence over the RID in ensuring irrigation water 
is allocated first to his constituents’ farms in Suphan Buri province from the Chainat Dam on the 
Chao Phraya river, before those of less influential constituencies nearby (Molle, 2003). 
180 This is the local Isaan name for a type of freshwater wetland forest habitat which is able to tolerate 
long periods of flooding, followed by desiccation during the dry season. It is now thought to cover 
less than 5 % of its former range. 
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there are uplands, they should have electric pumping stations and 
irrigation systems built with pipes, canals or small feeder canals to cover 
the entire area. That would mean a better quality of life for Nakhon 
Phanom people.” 
(Source: H.E. Supachai Phosu, interviewed on 27 June, 2010) 
Supachai perceived that virtually the entire province could be developed for 
irrigation, transforming both water sources and agricultural lands, with a strident 
belief in the power of technology overcoming nature. He also was keen to promote 
the king’s discourse of “gaem ling” as a part of the solution and reproduced the 
belief that the investment in irrigation would improve people’s “quality of life”. This 
was not idle talk, as he pointed out several dams under construction on small 
Mekong tributaries that he had instigated, as we sped past them in the car. He told 
me he was a strong advocate of the “water gates” project shortly to be built across 
the Nam Oon less than one kilometre from Sri Songkhram township and estimated to 
cost $ 9.6 million, which had first been mooted in 2005 when Thaksin flew in to 
inspect the floods. Furthermore, one of the Bhumjaithai Party’s headline policies for 
the July 2011 election
181
 was to build an irrigation system in every sub-district 
nationwide (“neung tambon, neung chonla-prathaan”) (see Fig. 5.1, Chapter 5). The 
Nam Songkhram Project was given extra momentum with Supachai’s political 
muscle behind it.  
Locally in Baan Naa Phiang, I found a general antipathy towards the idea of the Nam 
Songkhram Project, perhaps borne from lack of knowledge and awareness about its 
imminence. There had been no government officials or civil society visiting to 
inform them about the project, either in a positive or negative light, so it was not yet 
a tangible entity like it appeared in the mind of Supachai, for example. If I 
mentioned it, people told me they had not heard about it and so had little clue if it 
would be a good or bad thing for them. Some part-time fishermen who had been 
opponents of the DEDP dam project told me they were worried it might affect the 
quality of fishing by blocking runs of migratory fish and alter water flows, while a 
few people were concerned it might lead to worse flooding and loss of bankside 
vegetation. The only person who seemed to possess a fair knowledge about the 
                                                   
181 In the event, the Bhumjaithai Party did rather poorly in the general election winning only 34 seats 
and Supachai was not re-elected in Nakhon Phanom, losing his seat to a Pheua Thai Party candidate, 
strongly supported by the Red Shirt movement in NE Thailand. 
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project was the ex-headman and respected village elder, pho yai Sanguan Phosu, 
who in conversation repeatedly stressed the fact that he was a relation of the Minister 
Supachai. Active as a vote canvasser for Supachai and would-be local politician 
himself, Sanguan had unsuccessfully stood for Chairman of the Tha Bor Songkhram 
TAO in 2009 and was also Chairman of the Sri Songkhram District Agricultural 
Cooperative. 
Like his patron, he expressed an opinion that was firmly in favour of the Nam 
Songkhram Project, believing it would stabilize water levels in the river and provide 
cheap and convenient irrigation for local villagers, reasoning that it would:  
“.......if it stores water in the Nam Songkhram river so that it’s full to the 
banks, then there will be no impacts, and actually it will benefit more 
people than at present, as there is little water in the Nam Songkhram...... 
If an electric pumping system is used, then it must be high voltage and 
will require a large budget. But if a lot of water is raised, then maybe it 
would need less energy to pump.” 
(Source: Interview with Sanguan Phosu, Baan Naa Phiang, 27 May 2010) 
Due to his longevity as headman, pho yai Sanguan was an influential figure within 
Baan Naa Phiang and could be considered a local elite still controlling one faction 
within the village with unsurpassed links to powerful individuals and groups outside 
the village.  He undoubtedly recognised there could be potential financial and 
political rewards to be gained if he could help swing village opinion towards 
favouring the project, or at least not opposing it. I detected there was some tension or 
competition between him and the present headman on this matter, and the village 
appeared divided over its stance on certain water resources development issues 
where the headman and Sanguan disagreed, most obvious in the case of Nong Saeng 
reservoir (see Sect 8.5 below). 
In summary, the rise, demise and return of the Nam Songkhram Project in a new 
guise suggests a truism in Thai hydraulic development, that no infrastructural project, 
once it becomes a discursive construct in the minds of powerful hydrocrats and their 
political allies, ever disappears entirely even when supposedly “cancelled”. Rather 
the plan may gestate a few years on the shelves of hydrocracies, but is perpetually 
ready to be dusted off and recycled at a later stage, when political conditions appear 
more favourable to its implementation. This interpretation was supported by the 
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words of an RID official interviewed by Lebel et al (2009:284) who was reported to 
have said: “‘[A] dam is a long-term project. It may take decades to overcome 
obstacles [to its building], but it will happen one day.' Promises shift with time and 
purpose.” Such irrigationalist and hydraulic mission thinking were crystallized and 
given discursive authority through Supachai’s narrative (see quote above), given the 
Minister’s potential to transform notional plans into material reality under a veil of 
populist democracy and participation enabled by Thailand’s present political 
landscape, but was actually good old fashioned political patronage networks in 
action. He ominously claimed he wanted to “develop” and improve “all” waterways 
in the province for irrigation, using a raft of technologies and hardware solutions. It 
seemed as if the earlier failures to implement the DEDP project had been a dress 
rehearsal, and with the experience gained from past obstacles and skirmishes against 
resistance, like a war strategist the RID was now better prepared to implement “the 
final solution” against the Nam Songkhram’s floods and droughts over the coming 
years. 
 
8.5 Nong Saeng, Baan Naa Phiang 
 
8.5.1 Small-scale swamp conversion by state agencies 
 
In contrast to the first two cases, this case examines a minor water resources 
development at the community level, located at Baan Naa Phiang, one of the case 
study villages. This village is located on the fringes of the lower Nam Songkhram 
floodplain, lying within a large meander of the river and surrounded by a variety of 
water sources (natural and artificial, ephemeral and permanent) and wetlands 
habitats (see Fig 8.4 below). Crop-based agriculture used to play a secondary role to 
fishing, livestock raising and harvesting forest and wetlands products as major 
livelihood occupations up until a generation ago, since when there has been a rapid 
expansion of the agricultural frontier into the surrounding wetlands habitat for crops 
and eucalyptus plantations (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a; Blake et al., 2009). 
Wet season rice cropping for subsistence purposes formed the mainstay of rice 
production, with the cultivation area constrained by the extent of annual flooding. 
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Villagers were not really interested in practicing dry season rice cultivation, beyond 
a minor amount of naa saeng
182
, as other resources were considered plentiful and it 
was not a village tradition (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). 
The state began to construct water storage structures locally in the mid-1980s and 
there are at least four artificial reservoirs around the village, located on former open 
access natural swamp sites using low dams. Of these water bodies, Nong Saeng is 
located nearest to the village and was originally an ephemeral body of water that 
flooded in the wet season and shrank to just a few rai of open water towards the end 
of the dry season and used by villagers as a common pool resource for fishing, 
livestock grazing, collection of wetlands products, etc. It was converted into a 
reservoir through a series of development projects in several stages over a number of 
years, funded by various state agencies including ARD and the Provincial 
Administration Organization (PAO). Up until a few years ago, with little demand 
from dry season agriculture, the water levels of the reservoirs was determined more 
by natural seepage and evaporation and nobody was concerned about water scarcity 
issues until a few years ago, according to villagers interviewed. 
 
                                                   
182 Naa saeng is a low intensity form of rice cropping in wetland swamps of the lower Nam 
Songkhram Basin that requires no direct irrigation but relies on receding floods and residual moisture. 
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8.5.2 An artificially-induced water scarcity “crisis” 
 
The 2009 wet season was unspectacular in terms of precipitation in Northeast 
Thailand and the Nam Songkhram river overtopped its banks for only a relatively 
short period, leading to less than average recharge for on-floodplain water sources, 
like Nong Saeng. As a result, at the end of the rainy season the reservoir was well 
below its normal level, which happened to coincide with a remarkable boom in dry 
season rice cultivation (naa prang) adjacent to Nong Saeng on newly reclaimed 
forestland. The area of naa prang cultivated in the 2009/10 dry season around Nong 
Saeng alone was estimated by the headman to be at about 550 rai (88 ha) farmed by 
45 households, a significant but unquantified increase on the previous year’s area183. 
This rapid expansion in naa prang cultivation locally over the course of just a few 
years, was mirrored by similar trends occurring in the wider district of Sri 
Songkhram
184
 (see Table 8.2) and other parts of the Northeast. Although the reasons 
for this boom are politically complex, a major contributory factor can be traced to a 
central government policy of providing guaranteed price subsidies for three key cash 
crops
185
, introduced in 2009 by the Democrat-led coalition government as a populist 
scheme to curry favour with the rural electorate (Arunmas, 2010). 
 2008/09 (unit: 
rai) 
2009/10 (unit: 
rai) 
% increase 
Sri Songkhram District 15,902 44,510 280 
Tha Bor Songkhram 
Songkhram Sub-district 
5,951 18,224 306 
Baan Naa Phiang (Moo 5) 722 1,207 167 
 
Table 8.2  Registered dry season rice production (naa prang) area cultivated in Sri 
Songkhram District and Tha Bor Songkhram Sub-district over two seasons (Source: Data 
provided by Sri Songkhram District Agriculture Office, 19 July 2010) 
                                                   
183 In previous years without a subsidy, there was less incentive to accurately measure and maximise 
cultivation area, so villagers were less apt to record area grown. 
184 In 2004/05 dry season, the total recorded area of naa prang grown in Sri Songkhram District was 
5,357 rai (c. 857 ha), nearly all glutinous rice production (Blake and Pithakthepsombut, 2006a), 
suggesting there has been about an 8-fold increase in naa prang and local water demand over just five 
years 
185 The three crops subsidized by the price pledging scheme above market rates were rice, cassava and 
maize. The scheme had led to a government glut of stored rice of over 16 million tonnes by 2012, 
which had cost the taxpayer a reported 300 billion baht in subsidies (Pongvuthitharn, 2012). 
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Rice Variety 
No. 
families 
Area planted (rai) Production 
(Tonnes) 
Yield 
(kg/rai) rai ha 
Non-glutinous 
rice (various) 
2,578 30,568 4,891 20,950 685 
Pathum Thani 451 5,598 896 3,843 686 
Glutinous rice 1,340 8,344 1,335 5,256 630 
TOTAL  44,510 7,122 30,049  
 
Table 8.3 2009/10 registered dry season rice production (naa prang) in Sri Songkhram 
District (Source: Department of Agricultural Extension database, 26 May 2010, provided by 
Sri Songkhram District Agriculture Office, 19 July 2010) 
As well as the political economy derived explanation driving dry season irrigated 
rice cultivation expansion, I also detected more cultural and ideological explanations 
at work. Having interviewed and surveyed a wide cross-section of villagers 
practicing naa prang cultivation, I found a relatively common explanation for the 
recent popular uptake of the practice was couched in terms of peer pressure and 
social stigma that placed a high importance on maximizing rice production as an 
expression of modernity and national patriotism. The social pressure emanated from 
a complex mix of national media, local leaders, politicians, government officials, 
family members and neighbours who had already adopted the technology. For 
example, I followed-up the case of two unmarried sisters with a reliable source of 
income from off-farm family remissions, who decided to try naa prang for the first 
time in the 2009-10 dry season on previously forested wetland they claimed basic 
tenure over. The investment in rice involved a high capital outlay to clear the 
remnant forest, level about 5 rai of land and convert it to bunded paddy fields, and 
dig an inlet canal, before any input costs of rice cultivation had been calculated. The 
investment costs for the venture were borrowed money from the Village 
Development Fund and partly lent by absent family members who wanted to share 
the rice produced. They recognized that it could be risky business, given a lack of 
previous experience in dry season rice growing and deficiency of household labour 
(just the two women). 
The sisters explained their investment decision was motivated by the exhortations of 
neighbours and family that naa prang represented modern and progressive 
agriculture, and they could potentially earn a lot of money, if it proved successful 
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and the government continued paying a guaranteed price subsidy. A propaganda 
campaign to promote naa prang cultivation was widely advertised through a variety 
of state media as a national project to keep Thailand as the world’s leading rice 
exporting nation. Farmers in the irrigated Central Plains were feted in official 
narratives for their ability to grow two or even three crops of rice per year, with an 
implicit sub-text understood by villagers in the Northeast that single cropped naa bee 
was one of the reasons the region lagged the rest of Thailand in terms of wealth and 
development. To not participate in growing extra rice for the nation would signify an 
unwillingness to help the nation’s rice exports and prove oneself as a modern farmer. 
To persist in cultivating just a single crop of rice would mark one out as “non-
progressive” (mai jaleun) amongst naa prang cultivating peers, so there appeared to 
be a kind of fear of stigmatization at play in the sisters’ rationale to invest.  
As matters transpired, the sisters’ naa prang gamble did not pay off. Due to a variety 
of factors, including inadequate crop maintenance, uneven irrigation, untreated pest 
damage and disease problems, their rice crop was poor quality and achieved a low 
yield. Straight after harvest, they sold the crop and ended up making a loss on the 
variable costs, let alone the paying down the capital costs for which they had 
incurred debt. Rather than cut their losses and exit, they rallied round family 
members in Bangkok to bail them out and decided to continue naa prang cultivation 
the following season, believing things could only improve. Indeed, in 2010 most of 
the farmers I interviewed in Baan Naa Phiang encountered serious problems from 
disease, pests and water scarcity and also made a loss from growing naa prang. If 
full labour input costs were factored into estimates of the investment cost of rice 
cultivation, then economic losses would be more serious than they commonly appear 
in reports
186
. Farmers I spoke to rarely calculated their own labour costs in the 
economics of rice. However, the sisters’ logic for continuation was evidently not 
based on economic considerations alone, so much as an ideological belief, reinforced 
by dominant social values, that growing two rice crops a year was superior to their 
previous single wet season cropping practice. Such beliefs are an integral part of 
irrigationalism. 
                                                   
186 Data provided by the Agriculture Information Centre and based on 2008 prices indicated that the 
Northeast’s standardized gross margins for main crop rice was -$49 /ha (i.e. a loss) and for second 
crop dry season rice was $29 /ha, according to Turral (2008).   
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An inevitable corollary of the increased naa prang production was a closely matched 
rise in demand for irrigation water, placing added pressure on local water sources. 
While some water sources had sufficient storage capacity to cope with the extra 
demand, for Nong Saeng, as a shallow reservoir with low storage capacity and many 
new irrigators made it particularly vulnerable to such a spike in demand for water. It 
transpired that Nong Saeng was one of the most seriously depleted water sources in 
the village and district and in early 2010, the water fell to its lowest level since first 
utilization for naa prang about six years before and was reduced to a puddle (see Fig. 
8.6). The situation prompted the headman, phu-yai Somboon (who owns rice fields 
relying on Nong Saeng for irrigation), to go to district authorities and declare a 
“drought crisis” (pai laeng). Once notified, the local state officials would record this 
artificially-induced event as a “natural disaster” and it would be passed up through 
the bureaucratic chain of command from the local level to Bangkok, along with 
hundreds or thousands of other villages in a similar predicament. All such de facto 
irrigated land in Sri Songkhram District growing rice (wet or dry season) was 
officially classified as “rain-fed” agriculture, which therefore made it eligible to 
receive future state-funded irrigation schemes, with such local declarations of 
“natural drought” acting as proof of the need for increased irrigation development. 
However, it was apparent that the most critical factor leading to local water scarcity 
was not meteorologically induced (although it may have been a mitigating factor), 
but could be attributed to a massively increased demand for irrigation that took no 
account of the limits of the system.  
The problem of meteorological water scarcity had been discursively fixed, so what 
was the solution? According to pho-yai Sanguan Phosu, the solution to the “crisis” 
was clear, the state should step in to construct more water resources development 
projects, which he saw as the duty of the current headman to lobby for from 
politicians and relevant state agencies. He outlined the problem and solution 
narrative thus: 
 “In my opinion at the present time, if we look at the state of the 
environment in the local area......there are many places that we must 
develop further with regards to water......the leaders must prepare projects 
to request release of budgets for development of water sources; we need 
much more development than before. Whether it is dredging ponds, 
where the removed soil is used to build up embankments to store water 
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that prevents water flowing away wasted in the rainy season; or whether 
it is streams flowing into big rivers such as the Nam Songkhram, then 
there are many highly suitable places where they can be blocked with 
embankments. If we don’t develop this water then it will cause heavy 
impacts on the people. Why? Because in Thailand, farmers are the 
backbone of the nation and make up 80 % of the country, leaving just 20 % 
that are merchants, contractors, government officials.” 
(Source: Interview with Sanguan Phosu, Baan Naa Phiang, 27 May 2010) 
The first point to note is the congruence between Sanguan’s narrative and that of MP 
Supachai in Section 8.4.5, with the sentiments expressed broadly mirroring those of 
many local leaders or state officials I interviewed, and coincide with the dominant 
discourse of state irrigation development imperatives, harking back to the era of 
General Sarit, who was also fond of calling farmers “the backbone of the nation” 187 
to justify paternalistic development policies (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5). Choice 
phrases such as rivers “flowing away wasted” in the rainy season and needing “much 
more development” and funds released for the task, mimic the powerful narratives of 
the political and bureaucratic elite.  
 
                                                   
187 This phrase has been repeatedly utilized in speeches by the king, national politicians and members 
of the military-royalist elite of Thailand, as a way to justify state intervention to paternally “protect” 
farmers from external threats. 
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8.5.3 Bureaucratic and politician top-down solutions to the “crisis” 
 
To address the water scarcity “crisis”, in December 2009 the villagers requested help 
from the provincial RID office, that promised to provide help with a temporary 
measure and eventually delivered an 8” diesel water pump to Nong Saeng in mid-
February of 2010. Groups of farmers clubbed together to pay for fuel, but it was used 
for less than two days before breaking down. The RID said they would send out an 
engineer to repair it, but one never arrived and about a month later when it was too 
late to help, the pump was quietly removed. In a bid to save the crop, villagers were 
obliged to use their own small pumps to pump the last remaining dregs from Nong 
Saeng or for tail-enders, to pray for rain to save their crops. As far as I could 
ascertain, nobody lost their crop entirely, but yields were depressed while costs had 
been elevated, especially for fuel to pump and pesticide treatments, which resulted in 
financial losses for most farmers I interviewed, when their labour was factored in.  
A supposedly more permanent solution to the problem appeared post-harvest in 
April 2010, with the sudden arrival at Nong Saeng of machinery to dig a second 
reservoir adjacent to the existing ARD one. In theory, the DWR planned project was 
designed to expand the water storage capacity through excavation of a rectangular 
reservoir in one corner of Nong Saeng. The DWR regional office responsible based 
in Udon Thani, had awarded the 1.4 million baht (c. US$ 42,420) contract to a 
Nakhon Phanom construction company, set against a project budget on paper of two 
million baht
188
 (c. US$ 60,610). The project had apparently been negotiated between 
the DWR and the village through the auspices of MP Supachai, who was also said to 
have been the political mediator for another 80 such “identikit” reservoir dredging 
projects throughout Nakhon Phanom. According to phu yai Somboon, he had first 
been approached about the Nong Saeng “improvement” project in 2009, but there 
were no design details available at the time, and he consented to it on the basis that 
farmers required more water storage for naa prang. However, the villagers were 
given no further say in the matter until the arrival of the contractor. 
                                                   
188 Inspection of provincial water resources development plans provided by DWR, indicated that all 
the “dredging projects” (khrong-gan kut lawk) executed by DWR during 2010 were budgeted at 2 
million baht each. 
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The lack of local consultation caused some consternation amongst sections of the 
village, after the contractor began to dig a hole in the ground and proceed to dump 
the spoil just a few metres away within the perimeter of Nong Saeng (Fig 8.7). Phu 
yai Somboon, his two deputies and others we spoke with wanted it dumped 
elsewhere in the village, such as on the school’s football field, in the temple grounds 
and raising the embankments around the wider Nong Saeng periphery. But the 
contractor had been instructed to dump it close to the reservoir on common grazing 
land, presumably to minimize his costs and maximize profits. One group adversely 
affected by this action were villagers who grazed cattle and buffalo on the public 
land used within Nong Saeng, who were a sub-altern group also not benefitting from 
extra water storage capacity. In an attempt to alter the situation, Somboon and his 
deputies tried to lobby first the contractor and then MP Supachai to dump it in the 
locations preferred by the villagers. They even offered to pay 100 B (c. US$ 3) per 
truckload of soil to help cover the extra costs, but the contractor claimed he wanted 
250 B (c. US$ 7.50) per truckload, which was beyond the means of the villagers to 
afford and considered unjust, so the dumping continued in situ. 
I detected three inter-linked discursive outcomes arose from this incident; 1/ internal 
leadership questions arose amongst villagers; 2/ doubts arose amongst the village 
leadership regarding their patronage relationship to Supachai; and 3/ murmurings of 
project corruption surfaced. Firstly, it resulted in some villagers perceiving Somboon 
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as being weaker than pho-yai Sanguan in representing their interests and began to 
compare him unfavourably with his more paternalistic predecessor. They recalled 
how Sanguan had been better able to negotiate with external patrons and ensure 
more direct developmental benefits flowed into the village, recalling the other water 
resources projects built during his tenure. Secondly, Somboon and his clique began 
to review their patronage relationship with MP Supachai and considered a shift in 
allegiance to another local strongman alliance (see Chapter 9, Section 9.5.1 for 
further discussion about this aspect of patronage network politics). Thirdly, without 
any prompting, Somboon and his deputy began to express their displeasure 
concerning the high discrepancy between the stated project budget on paper and 
supposed contract value, stating they believed the 600,000 B (US$ 18,180) anomaly 
would be split between the interested parties (i.e. the DWR officials involved and 
Supachai’s clique), as part of a normalized agreement applied to similar provincial 
state infrastructure projects. This perception of financial impropriety over Nong 
Saeng was repeated by several other people in the village, including the director of 
the village primary school, annoyed perhaps that the school had been denied an 
improved playing field.  
Confirming the suspicion that the project was not entirely above board, a further 
technical discrepancy came to light, unnoticed by the villagers, namely a difference 
between the officially stated volume of the new reservoir and my own estimate of 
excavated volume. The DWR signboard erected next to the reservoir after the 
contractor had left noted a volume of 45,575 m
3
, but my own estimate based on 
coarse field calculations indicated it was nearer 36,000 m
3
, a difference of about 
21 %. Taking the officially declared budget of two million baht and assuming a 
volume of 36,000 m
3
, this would indicate that the unit cost of excavation equated to 
55.6 B/m
3 
(or 43.9 B/m
3
 calculated at the higher DWR volume estimate). If 
compared to local commercial rates given for earth excavation of about 25 B/m
3
, 
such exaggerated costs suggest that the Thai tax payer was getting rather poor value 
for money for this project, irrespective of the other issues that arose. It should be 
noted that the project involved only excavating a rectangular hole in the ground and 
there were no ancillary irrigation features such as pipes, sluices or canals built for the 
benefit of the water users. 
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In summary, the case of Nong Saeng illustrates how seemingly local narratives 
creating demand for irrigation development are closely inter-linked and co-evolve 
with higher order basin, regional and national-level narratives and irrigationalist 
discourse, both spatially and temporally. Narratives traceable back half a century or 
more to a paternalistic despotic national leader (Chaloemtiarana, 2007) are still 
evident in the contemporary discourses of local leaders and politicians justifying 
irrigation development imperatives. As with the case of the large-scale Nam 
Songkhram Project analysed above, essentially the same powerful political actors are 
involved in driving forward large numbers of individual small-scale projects and 
materially profiting from the opportunities to control decision-making arenas, while 
project beneficiaries are essentially excluded from decision-making, even at the most 
basic of levels such as where to dump spoil. Nong Saeng highlighted the fact that the 
DWR, as a remote hydrocracy, was unconcerned about functional irrigation system 
provision for the farmers, leaving that to the users themselves or another state agency 
to complete, but only increasing water storage capacity as a goal in itself (even if it 
does exaggerate the quantity). The case also was a good example in the social 
construction at a local level of naturalized narratives of drought, which led to 
inappropriate national solutions to an imagined “crisis” as the problem gets distorted 
on its way up to the central bureaucracy and interpreted into policy and practical 
infrastructural responses, unchanging over time. This predictably leads to a recursive 
cycle of further irrigation development exacerbating the water resources demand 
situation, over-stretching water resources, worsening scarcity, precipitating a decline 
in wetlands-dependent livelihoods and stimulating temporary demand for more 
irrigation development, as highlighted by Molle (2008b) in highlighting why basins 
become closed and “enough is never enough”, irrespective of scale. 
  
 
8.6 Huay Wang Rua irrigation scheme, Baan Non Rua 
 
8.6.1 Created through royal petition 
 
This case represents another “community level” or small-scale irrigation 
development project, that bears many similarities to Nong Saeng in terms of the top-
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down, state-imposed nature of irrigation development planning, design and 
implementation, but varies somewhat in its history, key actors and process. What did 
not vary was that the outcome of the development process precipitated conflict and 
unintended consequences, showing the coercive nature of even localized irrigation 
development projects in the modern context, while singularly failing to address 
underlying water resources needs and issues locally. Like Nong Saeng, I was able to 
closely follow the case of Huay Wang Rua on a monthly basis from January to 
August 2010. 
Huay Wang Rua is an existing state “irrigation” project that traces its discursive 
roots back to a petition
189
 supposedly submitted to the king and queen during a royal 
visit to Sakon Nakhon in 1980, requesting assistance for an irrigation system to serve 
villagers whose land lay outside the LNOIP (Somboon Chaitamat, interviewed on 30 
May, 2010). When implemented the following year by the RID, a small storage dam 
and reservoir (< 2.5 ha surface area) were constructed to supply a gravity-fed canal 
distribution system for farmers below. The Huay Wang Rua project is situated about 
five kilometres south of Baan Non Rua, in an area where the land is mostly under 
Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) status, where land tenure was insecure 
until recently. The reservoir lies in the Phu Phan National Park and was considered 
when built a Royal-Initiative Irrigation Project by the RID
190
. The concrete-lined 
canal, however, collapsed during the first year and was subsequently abandoned after 
the villagers tried but were unable to repair it. Three families with land immediately 
below the reservoir benefitted from a secondary metal pipe outlet built below the 
level of the failed canal
191
 and were able to supplementary irrigate a small area of 
paddy in wet seasons with poor rainfall. One of the beneficiaries was an elderly 
couple who lived at the head of the canal in a basic wooden house on the edge of the 
forest overlooking their fields and the abandoned Huay Wang Rua canal. They 
                                                   
189 This form of seeking royal intervention is not unusual in modern Thailand and seems to have its 
roots in questionable historical narratives dating back to King Ramkhamhaeng’s time, when villagers 
could supposedly take grievances and requests directly to the king, by simply ringing a bell outside 
the palace. 
190 I found that most of the reservoirs built by the RID situated along the foot of the Phu Phan hill 
range were classified as “Royal-Initiative Projects” and most of them similarly failed to provide water 
to more than a fraction of the predicted command area, when I carried out an extensive inspection in 
April 2010. 
191 Apart from collapsing in the first year due to poor construction, the first canal was also badly 
designed, with its outlet drawing from too high a level from the reservoir, meaning its potential for 
irrigation was severely limited in any case. 
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moved out from Ban Non Rua about forty years ago to live independently on their 
land, living from what they could make, grow, raise, forage, fish, trap and hunt from 
the surrounding fields, forests, reservoir and wetlands, only occasionally returning to 
the village out of necessity or on social occasions. The couple’s lifestyle and 
livelihood might seem to all intents highly self-sufficient and represent the practical 
embodiment of what is often promoted as the Thai King’s “Sufficiency Economy” 
philosophy
192
. During the 2009-10 dry season, grandfather “Dtaa Mai”193 cultivated 
four and a half rai of groundnuts in paddy fields using water from the Huay Wang 
Rua reservoir, the sole farmer to utilize it for irrigation after 28 years of existence. In 
the previous dry season Dtaa Mai grew two rai of groundnuts and earned 10,000 
baht (c. $325), so he was expecting to double this income in 2010. He also grew a 
small plantation of chilli, using water drawn from the reservoir outlet pipe, which fed 
directly into his fields.  
 
8.6.2 Prolonged process of system rehabilitation 
 
Because of the dilapidated and unusable state of the original 1981 canal, in 1999 a 
handful of Non Rua villagers with land further along the canal from Dtaa Mai’s land 
decided they would like to rehabilitate the system and also gain access to water from 
Huay Wang Rua reservoir. When the project had first been built, the RID had 
established a water users group as was the mode of the day, and appointed a 
Chairman, Deputy Chairman and various other nominal titles, but without any water 
to use it had quickly become inactive. Still, on paper it appeared there were 56 
members with land along the canal, who in theory stood to benefit from any 
rehabilitation scheme. Their total combined land holding amounted to 2,600 rai (416 
ha) and this was recorded by the RID as the potential command area of the project, 
even though most of the land was actually situated above the level of the 1981 
irrigation canal and impossible to irrigate without pumps, even if there had been any 
water in the canal. The nominal WUG chairman and village leaders initially made a 
request to the Sakhon Nakhon Provincial Irrigation Office to rebuild the system, and 
                                                   
192 There is not space to critique this ideological response by the royal elites to Thailand’s economic 
woes, following the 1997 Asian economic crash, but the critical papers by Isager and Ivarsson (2010) 
and Walker (2010) are instructive in this regard. 
193 I have used a pseudonym to protect the identity of this septuagenarian farmer. 
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early signs were positive when RID officials later appeared to conduct a cadastral 
survey of land along the canal route, but then nothing was heard about the project 
from the state for several years. The villagers fearing they had been forgotten, 
followed up with the provincial RID, thereby setting an interminably ponderous 
bureaucratic process in motion that pushed them from one government agency to 
another, including the Provincial Governor’s office. The Deputy Chairman of the 
WUG recalled that they went to see the “CEO Provincial Governor” during the 
Thaksin premiership and at first it appeared that he had the authority to order the 
RID to come out and repair the system, but it was a false hope: 
“So we had a meeting in the Governor’s office, in 2004, if I remember 
correctly. And he said, ‘Yes, we can do it!’ But still nothing happened. 
It might be because that Governor was moved that year. I don’t know 
if the money was moved with him or not. I don’t know what really 
happened, but actually, he agreed verbally for the RID to build it. But 
it got buried, because the Governor moved that year from Sakon 
Nakhon. I’ve no idea where he went, nor that sum of money….. it was 
eight million baht you know he gave us…” 
Source:  Somboon Chaitamat
194
, Deputy Chairman of Huay Wang Rua 
WUG, interviewed on 30 May, 2010 
It was not entirely clear what caused the delay, but it seemed to be related to the fact 
that this was considered a “Royally-Initiated Project” and no single agency wanted to 
take responsibility. Perhaps its rapid failure and lack of resolution at the time caused 
some embarrassment further up in the hydrocratic hierarchy? But there also appeared 
to be an inter-bureaucratic dispute ongoing over the project between the RID and the 
Royal Forestry Department (RFD). I was informed by the Headman of Moo 13, 
Baan Non Rua, that the RFD had objected to the dam being built in the first place, 
but had eventually capitulated due to the king’s prerogative of prioritising water 
storage. But the RFD were apparently keen that no more forest should be lost in any 
scheme rehabilitation and that the dam crest should remain at its present level, 
thereby precluding any chance for increasing storage capacity.  
                                                   
194 While Somboon was nominally the Deputy Chairman, he acted as the de facto leader of the WUG 
as the actual Chairman was old and in poor health, and had passed responsibility to Somboon. 
Somboon already had close links with the RID office for LNOIP as a paid canal zoneman and 
“irrigation volunteer”. He regularly attended RID training sessions and was a strong advocate for the 
state’s position in the interview. 
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In 2009, RID officials came out to re-survey the land and requested all WUG 
members to sign a consent form agreeing to unconditionally hand land lying along 
the route of the proposed new canal to the state. Reportedly everyone signed 
(possible social pressure at work?), even though they had not seen any design plans 
for the project or had it explained how it would impact their land holding. The Moo 
13 Headman claimed he had not seen the RID plans and was surprisingly critical of 
RID’s modus operandi in project planning and implementation, whether in the case 
of the LNOIP or Huay Wang Rua:  
 “The project has been very secretive and they have not told anyone the 
budget; even the headman! No one dares ask the Royal Irrigation 
Department as they have royal protection. All their projects pass without 
scrutiny” 
Source:  Nattapong Thochalee, Headman of Moo 13, Ban Non Rua. 
Interviewed on 18 January 2010. 
Other local leaders who claimed to have been given no information about the project 
by RID, included the Gamnan of Naa Hua Bor Sub-District, who concurrently held 
the post of Headman of Baan Non Rua, Moo 3, and executive officials at the Naa 
Hua Bor TAO, supposedly responsible for natural resources governance in the sub-
district. In early February 2010, as with Nong Saeng, a private contractor turned up 
unannounced on Dtaa Mai’s land and started clearing vegetation along the new canal 
route line (see Fig 8.8). On the first day of operations, the contractor bulldozed an 
unharvested chilli plantation, flattened mature fruit and hardwood trees he had 
planted and removing paddy bunds. Dtaa Mai was angry, but his wife told him there 
was nothing he could do, as this was a state development project. He had tried 
fighting the state in the past over confiscation of his farmland and placing it in the 
National Park, but it had gotten them nowhere she reminded him. No RID official or 
state representative came to explain the project to them, while Somboon Chaitamat, 
who had been appointed the WUG-RID liaison person kept a low profile and 
avoided Dtaa Mai, suggesting his loyalties lay closer to the state than with fellow 
villagers. Over the next few days the contractor continued preparation work, 
destroying the small canals that Dtaa Mai had built and blocking the water flow to 
his groundnut crop. He was told the water supply would be interrupted for just 
twelve days, but when this was not honoured and his crop began to wilt. Angered 
again, he asked for compensation from the sub-contractor but was refused. In early 
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March, the sub-contractor temporarily unblocked the pipe and allowed Dtaa Mai just 
two days access to water, before it was re-blocked and the groundnuts remained 
unirrigated up until the harvest in mid-April. If it had not been for a few unseasonal 
rain showers, the crop probably would have been lost, but he managed to harvest a 
depressed yield that was just enough to cover his costs.  
The sub-contractor hired to construct the new canal and parallel roadway had no 
previous experience of building an irrigation system (Somboon Chaitamat, 
interviewed 30 May 2010). It appeared that the main contract for the project had 
been awarded by the Sakon Nakhon Provincial RID Office to a company called “Jai 
Jimee Udon Company” for 1.2 million baht (c. US$ 36,360), but this company 
(which did not actually own any earth-moving equipment) had sub-contracted the 
work to a much smaller company for 739,993 baht (c. US$ 22,420). Hence, this 
inexperienced sub-contractor was obliged to do the job as cheaply as possible and 
soon ran into a series of technical difficulties with the terrain. The sub-contractor 
complained that he would not make any money from this project and on March 21 he 
abandoned the project before the work was complete. I later learned from Somboon 
that the main contractor was obliged to hire two other sub-contractors to finish the 
work or risk being fined by RID for breach of contract. Apparently a dispute had 
arisen between the RID, the main contractor and sub-contractors about 
responsibility
195
, causing the work to be delayed by several months past its 
scheduled end of late April. 
To get an official perspective, I visited the Sakhon Nakhon Provincial Irrigation 
Office responsible for the project on two occasions. On the second visit I was given 
an interview with the Director, Sratta Rangrawd, and an assistant, Yuttaphoom 
Khamwan. Sratta claimed to know very little about this project, even though it was 
one of only three irrigation projects that his office was responsible for building that 
year. When asked about Huay Wang Rua, Sratta deferred to his assistant to answer, 
who claimed that the project was part of the king’s strategy to build as many small 
water storage reservoirs as possible around the edge of Phu Phan hills, and not to be 
too worried about water delivery systems, as they could be built later. He claimed the 
                                                   
195 The conflict situation deteriorated further apparently and was only resolved via threat of legal 
action by RID against the contractor, which led to the main contractor being fined 50,000 baht (c. 
US$ 1,515) for breach of contract, according to local reports.  
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Ban Non Rua villagers only came to ask for RID’s help many years after the 
reservoir was built, encouraged by the sight of the unused water sitting in the 
reservoir. But RID was not in a position to respond to the villagers’ request 
immediately, as it was considered a low priority project amongst the many requests 
they received for help each year.  
“They have requested for many years, but due to the budget we have, 
we have had to do other things instead. Because this is a small matter, 
a small-scale project, then it may not be really worth the investment. 
We had to work on other projects that were more beneficial first.... I 
am not sure, but they have requested help since before I moved here, 
which is more than five years now. This project has been in the queue 
since then at least. It is not that we were not interested, but it had to 
wait in a queue.” 
Source:  Yuttaphoom Khamwan, Engineer, Sakon Nakhon Provincial 
Irrigation Office, Huay Diek, interviewed on 29 April, 2010 
The Director claimed it was only this year that the RID had sufficient funds available 
to implement the project, by utilizing budget from the Thai Khem Kaeng scheme. He 
suggested the total project budget was 2,497,000 baht (c. US$ 75,667), although this 
figure contradicted an internal RID report which suggested the budget allocated was 
three million baht
196
 (c. US$ 90,910). The Director did not seem to be aware about 
the contractual problems with the project when asked and said the main 
responsibility for oversight lay with an RID sub-office located in Phanna Nikhom 
District. There appeared to be a serious disjuncture between the official narrative I 
heard from RID, the local narratives in Baan Non Rua and the empirical reality I 
observed unfolding on the ground. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
196 There were various other discrepancies apparent between the official figures provided in various 
RID reports and the observable reality. For example, the official data declared that the storage volume 
of the reservoir was 900,000 m3, which for a 2.5 ha reservoir would suggest it was on average 36 
metres deep, and the stated total available water for irrigation was 5.09 million m3, both of which 
were vast exaggerations. By contrast, the villagers informed us that the reservoir hardly overtopped 
the spillway for more than a few days, and its irrigation potential was very limited. Like the target 
irrigation area of 416 ha, these were mere imaginary figures that had no bearing to reality and 
suggested deliberate deceit in exaggeration of benefits.  
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8.6.3 History repeats itself 
 
In May 2010, as responsibility for completion of the part-built 1.6 km canal and 
roadway was still being disputed between the contractor and the RID, the first rains 
of the season started to erode the bare slopes of the poorly compacted structure
197
. 
By June, work resumed on cutting a canal trench and lining it with concrete with the 
work being conducted by a locally hired sub-contractor employing a handful of 
villagers on a daily wage (see Fig. 8.8). As the rainy season progressed, many days 
were being lost to bad weather, while local labour became scarcer as villagers chose 
to work on their own fields rather than for the RID project. Only about 40 % of the 
canal structure had been finished by late July, when it was observed that completed 
sections were already starting to collapse through poor workmanship, soft sub-soils 
and slope failure. We visited the project site on eight separate occasions and talked 
to numerous local people, but never once met or saw an RID official on-site. Yet, 
during my two visits to the provincial RID headquarters, I could not help noticing 
that there were dozens of staff sitting around in the comfortable air conditioned 
offices and resort-like surrounds. After the initial ground survey, it seemed the RID 
engineers did not feel their duty extended to monitoring project works or 
ascertaining impacts on local users during and after construction. 
On a final visit to the site on 11 August, an estimated 80 % of the canal had been 
completed and a new team of labourers had been brought in as an attempt to 
complete the project before the end of the rainy season. However, another inspection 
revealed that further sections of the new canal and roadway had washed out and 
serious deterioration was noticeable in several places (Fig. 8.9), suggesting that there 
was a strong likelihood the canal structure would have to be repaired before it could 
be ever be used. Even then there would almost certainly have to be ongoing repairs 
carried out, and the chance of abandonment again was high. 
                                                   
197 The canal line was built entirely using local soil, which was light, sandy and easily erodible. One 
might have thought this simple lesson would be learned from the initial canal that failed in 1981, but 
apparently not.  
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With such small-scale irrigation projects, once construction is complete the RID 
generally hand over the operation and maintenance responsibilities to the local users 
(peua chai prayot lae du-lae bam-rung raksa duay-gan – “To jointly use the benefits 
and maintain”). However, this was an improbable scenario at the Huay Wang Rua 
project, not just because of its poor condition and sub-standard construction, but due 
to the low likelihood of any water being available for more than a handful of the 56 
theoretical members of the Water User’s Group. Put simply, the RID engineer 
planners had vastly exaggerated the irrigable command area and therefore the 
beneficiaries, perhaps as a means to increase its attractiveness for funding. The 2,600 
rai (416 ha) command area assumed in the project justification was patently 
fraudulent, based on fanciful figures of reservoir storage capacity, water availability 
(Footnote 196) and land potential, as much of the area included in the estimate was 
above the canal. From a rough calculation of water storage capacity in the reservoir 
and based on Dtaa Mai’s local observations since the reservoir had been built, a 
more realistic estimate of potential irrigable land in the wet season would be about 
150 rai (i.e. 24 ha) and 12 rai (i.e. 2 ha) maximum in the average dry season for non-
rice crops.  
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Similar to Nong Saeng, this case study has illustrated a remarkable lack of 
accountability, transparency and willingness of the controlling hydrocracy to involve 
local people, including village leaders and TAO officials and elected representatives, 
at any stage of the planning, design and construction process, even with a small-scale 
project like this. Decision-making about the project occurred remotely, in hard to 
access RID offices, by faceless hydrocrats, seemingly unconcerned with project 
process or performance, even during the construction phase. Worse than this, it 
seemed none of the technical and procedural mistakes made in 1981 had been 
learned and were simply being repeated in 2010 – demonstrating a lack of 
competence in the one area that RID should be able to claim a degree of skill and 
knowledge. If ever subjected to external scrutiny by independent parties such 
projects would surely be dismissed as fundamentally uneconomic and technically 
unsound irrigational scams. More egregious perhaps, was the experience of voiceless, 
sub-altern actors like Dtaa Mai, whereby the person who should have benefitted 
most from the rehabilitated project, ended up its biggest economic loser and silent 
victim. Such effects speak to the latent coercive and violent nature of modern 
irrigation development on the powerless, as well as the more subtle effects of power 
revealed. What does this case say about irrigationalism in Thailand, beyond the 
seemingly untouchable and simultaneously out-of-touch nature of the RID machine, 
not only at the core in Bangkok, but amongst the acolytes and functionaries 
operating in their resort offices, where the reality of people like Dtaa Mai are filtered 
out? Irrigationalism is not only about creating tangible productive irrigation systems, 
where crops are actually grown and (some) people benefit, but it is as much about 
creating the illusion of irrigation (the idea), as seen vividly in this case where 
ultimately no actual irrigation may end up being practiced, beyond the self-serving 
reports of the RID.  
 
8.7 Irrigation development projects – all state property 
 
One common feature to emerge across all four cases and others visited during 
fieldwork was that regardless of scale, all irrigation development projects are in 
effect state property and are by default subsumed under effective state control, even 
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when they are supposedly transferred to the users/citizens/community to operate and 
maintain after construction by the state agency concerned. In the case of large-scale 
irrigation projects, such as LNOIP, this should be self-evident given the violent 
history of the project and present top-down control exerted from Bangkok over water 
allocation and scheduling issues, but for small-scale projects this is perhaps less 
explicit. It has often been assumed that smaller scales in water resources 
infrastructure signals greater devolution to local decision-making authority. There is 
clearly a wide divergence between the state’s normative discourse and how local 
ownership and responsibility for schemes plays out in everyday practice. For 
example, in response to my question as to whether the canals and other parts of the 
irrigation system belonged to the state or the water users, and local liaison person 
with RID, Somboon Chaitamat answered: 
“In reality, they are the property of the state, but they lend them to us, 
the people, to help take care of, right. They lend them to the likes of 
me, a farmer. I believe their goal is to provide water for us farmers so 
we can grow rice, but it’s the property of the state and us, meaning it’s 
up to us to take care of. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman and the 
members must take care of it according to the season. To clear 
vegetation along the canal embankments and the dam wall.....” 
Source:  Mr Somboon Chaitamat, Deputy Chairman of Huay Wang 
Rua WUG, interviewed on 30 May 2010. 
The notion that irrigation projects are state property and only on loan to villagers is a 
critical one, as it underscores the fact that the villagers had to sign consent forms to 
donate (without rights to compensation) their private land holdings to the RID for the 
roads, canals, etc, in order for it to build them an irrigation project, which then by 
default becomes state property. The state is then empowered, as owners and 
controllers of the water and land, to “lend” the system back to villagers – seems like 
a sleight of hand transaction has occurred where someone has rapidly changed from 
owner to debtor!  However, as the case of Nong Saeng and Huay Wang Rua 
demonstrate, regardless of scale, irrigation projects are colonised and dominated by 
state processes at every stage of the project cycle from conception to construction to 
eventual rehabilitation in some cases, confirming Kaida (1978). Thus, while the state 
agency upon completion of a small-scale project may erect a sign that states 
something like: “Given to the people to jointly use the benefits and maintain” (Fig. 
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8.11), means little or nothing to the local people who may (or may not) benefit from 
it, but have no intention of maintaining infrastructure that they had no role in 
creating, would cost them far more to maintain than they are ever likely to derive 
benefit from and do not own. Thus, the sign is a purely symbolic gesture and a 
discursive indicator of state conceit in believing that subjects will embrace an 
externally imposed ideology of irrigationalism in its entirety.  
 
As shown by the case studies, the empirical reality and implications of far-reaching 
state control is less palatable to swallow and so is ostensibly overlooked by most 
parties. A counter-view might posit small-scale irrigation projects, given their high 
maintenance costs and low benefits, are an equivalent of modern day white 
elephants
198
 gifted from the state to the people, in a bizarre metaphorical reversal of 
the old tradition (Fig. 8.10). But with an irrigation system white elephant, the people 
invariably choose not to look after it and essentially let it go wild, returning it to the 
forest. This in a sense is a form of resistance to domination. The water flow however 
is stored, controlled (to a degree) and brought into the realms of state property, given 
that all water by default belongs to the state and is merely “gifted” from the king to 
the people (chonla-prathaan). What these cases also suggest is the need to be 
cautious about interpreting where managerial control lies on the basis of technology 
                                                   
198 Meaning “something that is no longer of value to its owner [from the story that the kings of Siam 
made a gift of a white elephant to any courtier they disliked, the cost of maintaining one being 
ruinous]” (Definition in the New English Penguin Dictionary, 2000). 
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alone, especially when it is over seven hundred years old (cf. Stargardt, 1992; Stott, 
1992).  
The cases examined tended to highlight the minimal de facto role that water users 
play in water resources development and management decision-making and 
centralization of authority and power at the central level, although not with state 
agencies alone, but also a range of other actors that work in strategic alliances or 
discursive coalitions to further their interests (this theme is expanded upon in 
Chapter 9). At the same time, it was recognized that many villagers accepted with a 
fair degree of passivity the state’s agro-managerial and hydraulic control functions 
and did not express overt concerns about their lack of negotiating power resulting 
from being recipients of state and royal hydraulic largesse, (with water extended as a 
gift, not a right), as might be expected with an ideological formation. Molle 
(2003:256) noted how in the case of the Chao Phraya basin that “relationships 
between state agencies and farmers have long been marked by a degree of 
paternalism countered by a mixture of passivity and suspicion.” This is an important 
procedural element of irrigationalism in action, that brings Thailand gradually closer 
to being a more spatially uniform hydraulic society, drawing the hydraulic margins 
into the core, in a form of hydraulic territorialisation (cf. Vandergeest and Peluso, 
1995) and authoritarian state simplifications (Scott, 1998). 
 
8.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has drawn on empirical evidence from four irrigation development 
projects in the Nam Songkhram basin representing different scales and operating 
over different timeframes that illustrate the ideological discourses and material 
practices of irrigation development. It has demonstrated that a remarkably similar set 
of narrative justifications for irrigation development seems to be used by dominant 
actors in Thailand regardless of project size, and thus the dominant discourse 
supporting irrigationalism in Northeast Thailand can be said to be a non-scalar 
dependent ideology. While certain dominant narratives that drive irrigation 
development may vary little across time and space (especially the “arid region” and 
“poor farmers as backbone of the nation” narrative), some of the main actors 
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involved have altered over time, in particular the ruling national and regional 
politicians supporting constituency pet projects and pork-barrelling tactics with the 
electorate. Senior state officials in the main hydrocracies are less liable to change 
(not having to please an electorate) and appear more ideologically entrenched than 
politicians who tend to be more opportunistic, as seen in the switching of rhetorical 
positions regarding the Nam Songkhram Project shown by MP Supachai, as his 
political fortunes grew.  
While senior bureaucrats may be relatively entrenched in promoting the ideology of 
irrigationalism, this is not to say that bureaucracies are not subject to change. As was 
demonstrated by the case of ARD and DEDP, individual agencies supporting the 
hydraulic mission may rise and fall in periodic bureaucratic reform, such shakeups 
are usually to the advantage of the dominant hydrocracy with pre-eminent domain 
over irrigation development. In Thailand’s case this position is occupied by the RID 
which has had a constant organizational presence in the Nam Songkhram Basin 
during the historical period under examination, and enjoys a visible bureaucratic 
presence in every province and material involvement in projects across all scales. 
More recently, it has had to fend off a degree of competition over development plans 
from the DWR, which seeks to impose its own hydraulic development projects 
within the same territory as the RID. The processes and implications of such 
bureaucratic competition and dominance of certain agencies is examined further in 
Chapter 8. Furthermore, as pointed out by Molle (2003:260), reforms tend to 
“meddle deeply with the distribution of power in administration as well as in 
political circles, redefine relations between the state and citizenry, go against deep-
seated cultural representations of hierarchy and social roles, and potentially threaten 
those who tend to benefit from the existing patterns of water allocation.” 
Irrigationalism remains a central part of the discursive status quo and is unlikely to 
be seriously challenged by civil society for the time being.  
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Chapter 9  Flows of Water, Power and 
Capital within, across and outside the Nam 
Songkhram Basin 
 
“Irrigation system development, rehabilitation and improvement 
(modernization) is not a goal in itself, it is a means to achieve higher 
agricultural production, productivity and farm incomes. If the latter can 
hardly be achieved, the rationale for irrigation development disappears”    
Source: Brolsma (1996:134), referring to EU-funded Northeast Water 
Management and System Improvement Project (1991-1998) [underlining 
in original] 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the cases of four irrigation projects operating at 
various spatio-temporal scales and under the aegis of disparate state bureaucracies 
within the Nam Songkhram Basin. These included the four decades old Lam Nam 
Oon Irrigation Project and the notional Nam Songkhram Project, both of which 
emerged from an American-inspired vision of “full basin development”, where 
potent ideologies of modernism, technocentrism and instrumentalism were 
transposed onto an “undeveloped” blank canvas of the Lower Mekong Basin. The 
discourses supporting these ideologies were gradually absorbed and remodeled to fit 
peculiarly Thai political traits that incorporated aspects of nationalism, monarchism 
and developmentalism. It was observed from the cases that at whatever scale of 
implementation, irrigationalist actors displayed an indefatigable utopian, but 
seemingly never realized, faith in the benefits of communal irrigation development 
as a solution to rural poverty and water scarcity. Far from representing classic 
examples of “polycentric” models of water governance (Tan-Kim-Yong et al., 2005), 
all these cases highlighted a strongly state-centric model of water governance, where 
all public irrigation projects, regardless of scale, are subsumed under a top-down, 
control and command regime managed by the hydraulic bureaucracies and other 
interested elites. This observation would tend to further support the emergent modern 
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hydraulic society proposed by Wijeyewardene (1973), where the state hydraulic 
bureaucracies enjoy a pre-eminent position over nearly all aspects of national 
irrigation and water resources development discourse and practice.  
This present chapter attempts to weave together some of the disparate observations 
concerning irrigational politics from the preceding chapters into a coherent narrative 
of how flows of water, capital and power have been effectively captured and 
controlled by a central elite through networks that reach out to the peripheries of the 
Thai state. This exercise inevitably involves a discussion of the main actors and 
interest groups, the power relations and networks operating within and beyond the 
confines of the immediate river basin. As such, it may be partly speculative in nature, 
but is still firmly based on the interpretation of empirical observations and interviews 
made in the course of the fieldwork and prior professional experience working 
within water resources development paradigms in the Northeast (e.g. Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006a; Blake et al., 2009; Molle et al., 2009a). In particular, I am 
interested in dissecting how the modern hydraulic mission operates in practice, what 
are the general processes, and which are the principal actors involved, both 
individuals and organizations, either propagating or resisting the expansion of 
irrigation infrastructure. 
This adds further substance to answering the main research question and detail to 
answering the following research sub-questions: 
SQ3 Which actors appear to determine control over water resources 
development at multiple scales, using what discourses and pathways? and, 
SQ4  Which are the important power relations mechanisms at work across 
various scales, and can distinct “discourse coalitions” or “strategic groups” be 
identified? 
SQ6 How closely does Thailand fit Wittfogel’s characterization as an 
exemplar of a “hydraulic society” in the modern-day context? 
I begin the chapter by considering the main bureaucratic agencies that have shaped 
and guided the irrigation development discourse in the Nam Songkhram Basin and 
Northeast Thailand, more generally. I then consider how their interests may coincide, 
before discussing other important actors and organizations, both state and non-state, 
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and how these actors and groups may be linked through “strategic groups”, that 
compete or cooperate for access and control of scarce resources (Evers and 
Benedikter, 2009b). I go on to relate this concept to the paternalistic power relations 
that are critical to understanding irrigational discourses and practices at work across 
local to national scales.  
 
9.2 The hydraulic bureaucracy - changing actors and 
institutions, but the same basic mission endures 
 
A relatively small number of bureaucratic agencies and groups have dominated the 
Nam Songkhram’s hydraulic development arena and discourse in recent decades. 
While in the 1960s to early 80s period considerable assistance poured into the 
Northeast from abroad to support rural development, during the economic boom 
years of the late 1980s and early 90s this aid rapidly declined, which coincided with 
a shift of Western donors’ attention to neighbouring Indochina and away from 
Thailand as a “Newly Industrializing Country” and “Asian tiger” economy (Bello et 
al., 1998). This redirection of overseas assistance out of the Northeast in no way 
diminished the efforts of central government in directing national budgets towards 
supporting regional irrigation development programmes (Budhaka et al., 2002; 
Hoanh et al., 2009). Irrigation development expenditure was primarily channeled 
through three main bureaucracies, namely the Accelerated Rural Development 
Office (ARD), the Department of Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP) and 
the Royal Irrigation Department (RID); of which, significantly, only the latter 
agency has survived to the present. The ARD was a direct product of US government 
anti-communist insurgency assistance first funded during the Sarit era
199
, established 
under the Ministry of Interior as a developmental tool for winning hearts and minds 
in the struggle for control over the rural hinterland (Pye, 2005; Chaloemtiarana, 
2007). The ARD program had two principal aims; firstly to generate legitimacy for 
state development activities and secondly, to obtain intelligence reports regarding 
threats to the regime, maintains Chaloemtiarana (2007). It initially concentrated most 
                                                   
199 According to Frank Sheppard, a former USAID director, the ARD concept was, “...based on the 
assumption that bringing additional resources to the villages could and would increase identification 
of the villagers with his government.” (Quotation cited in Chaloemtiarana, 2007:172). 
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of its resources on funding road construction
200
, but after the gradual withdrawal of 
American financial assistance following the end of the Indochina War, drew on 
domestic budgets to diversify its activities into other sectors, in particular small-scale 
water resources development at the sub-district level, including domestic water 
supply, wells, irrigation weirs, reservoirs and fish ponds. There was abundant 
physical evidence of ARD’s local-level hydraulic legacy throughout the Nam 
Songkhram Basin, such as the first reservoir and embankments built at Nong Saeng, 
Baan Naa Phiang (see Chapter 8, Section 8.5), dredged water courses, countless 
collapsed concrete weirs and several abandoned pump irrigation schemes (personal 
observations, 2004-10).  
The focal area of ARD’s operations in the upper Northeast was principally border 
provinces along the Mekong River and areas in proximity to the US military bases 
classified hotbeds of communist insurgency, including the upper Nam Songkhram 
Basin close to Udon Thani. As Cold War national security concerns faded into 
memory towards the end of the 1990s, to be replaced by a more neo-liberal rhetoric 
of “turning battlefields into marketplaces”201, ARD’s role became increasingly 
redundant as its development operations duplicated the work of several other 
bureaucratic line agencies. As a result, it had a more difficult time justifying its 
existence within a modernizing Thai bureaucracy stepping into the twenty first 
century and was finally dissolved under the bureaucratic reform and restructuring 
process of 2002. Towards the end of its existence in the late 1990s, ARD proposed 
an “Upper Nam Songkhram Basin Development Project”, which had at its core the 
construction of six dams (euphemistically termed “weirs”) along the upper reaches 
of the Nam Songkhram river, four large storage reservoirs and six “canal dredging” 
projects, justified as usual by a narrative of solving problems of local agricultural 
water scarcity (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). Although ARD itself never got 
the opportunity to build all these projects, they were still built nevertheless, as its 
staff, infrastructure and project portfolio were transferred en masse to the newly 
established Department of Water Resources (DWR) (see Section 9.2.2).  
                                                   
200 ARD constructed a 17,000 km network of roads nationally, of which two thirds were located in 
Northeast Thailand, according to Bello et al, (1998). Improved communications networks were also a 
vital tool of state control over the periphery, as noted by Wittfogel (1957). 
201 This ideological aspiration for increased regionalization was expressed by Prime Minister Chatchai 
Choonavan in the early 1990s (Floch et al, 2007). 
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After its formation, the DWR wasted no time in implementing the inherited projects, 
including construction of the two largest dam structures built to date across the Nam 
Songkhram mainstream, completed in 2004 at a cost of 839 million baht (or 
approximately $30 million). Although DWR claimed they were built for dual 
purpose irrigation and flood control, several personal visits to the project sites 
between 2004 and 2007 indicated that the dams fulfilled neither of these functions 
and could be classed as development failures in every sense (Fig 9.1 and 9.2). Indeed, 
the flooding situation was aggravated upstream of the dams with multiple ecological 
impacts precipitated and no irrigation infrastructure had been installed (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). As a result, zero agricultural land was actually irrigated by 
the dams, against a pre-project target command area of 7,680 ha, while the dam 
structures themselves were essentially abandoned by the DWR soon after completion 
and showed signs of serious disrepair within a few years (personal observations in 
2005-06). Such failed hydraulic projects are quite common in the Nam Songkhram 
Basin, argues Blake et al (2009), and are visible (but silent) avatars of hydraulic 
society and irrigationalism. 
 
The second agency was no longer in existence, but played a decisive role in irrigation 
development during the 1980s and 90s, was the Department of Energy Development 
and Promotion (DEDP). Formed as a successor to the National Energy Agency 
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(NEA), it was essentially another ideological outcome of US and Western nation 
interference in the region during the Cold War. It was seen as an instrument to 
translate planned hydraulic initiatives on the mainstream Mekong into a Thai 
territorial context, starting with the massive Pa Mong Dam Project (Sneddon, 2003b). 
The DEDP represented Thai government interests at the multi-lateral donor 
supported Mekong Committee for many years and enthusiastically pursued hydraulic 
infrastructure expansion in Northeast Thailand (alongside several other agencies), in 
large part through the promotion of the flagship Khong-Chi-Mun Project (KCM 
Project), but also the smaller Nam Songkhram Project component (see Chapter 8, 
Section 8.4). While there was patently a negligible hydropower generating potential 
in the Nam Songkhram Basin (The Secretariat, 1977), the DEDP sensed an 
opportunity to utilize perceived energy over-production capacity elsewhere in the 
grid through promotion of electric pumped irrigation schemes (Keller et al., 1981; 
Floch and Molle, 2009a). For the state, pumped irrigation projects appeared to 
simultaneously address the perceived problems of poverty and low agricultural 
productivity, to allow dry season cultivation without the need for expensive and land-
extensive storage dams. 
Because of its primary orientation towards energy production and consumption, 
there was a preponderance of officials in the DEDP with civil engineering 
qualifications and few with the skills or experience to design, plan and execute 
complex agricultural development projects. Such technical skills and knowledge 
mostly resided with staff in various departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives. As inter-departmental cooperation within the same ministry was rare 
enough in the Thai system, let alone between departments in separate ministries, so 
the DEDP suffered from a technical knowledge credibility gap with other branches 
of the bureaucracy. Perhaps to overcome this deficiency, DEDP became quite 
dependent on contracting external consultancies for project design and planning, 
both Thai and foreign
202
. DEDP was also recognized as an agency prone to the 
political patronage of national and regional politicians
203
 linked to one or two parties, 
                                                   
202 For example, the British consultant Sir William Halcrow and Partners and a consortium of Thai 
and Japanese consultancy companies were hired to compile water resources development master plans 
for the scheme. 
203 Politicians that were closely associated with the KCM project included Prachuab Chaiyasarn (Chat 
Thai Party), Montri Pongpanit (Social Action Party), Yingpan Manasikarn (Social Action Party), Dr 
Arthit Ourairat (Seritham Party) and General Chatchai Choonavan (Chart Thai Party) 
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who viewed it as a route to securing future political and financial benefits, though 
the utopian promise of agricultural bounty it offered to voters (Sneddon, 2003b). 
Following the demise of the Green Isaan Project, the KCM Project was promoted as 
the new hope of the region to deliver agricultural productivity increases and poverty 
reduction by tapping the vast, “unexploited” water reserves of the Mekong 
mainstream via inter-basin transfers and networks of canals. It had a proposed 
budget of $US 9.1 billion to irrigate almost 800,000 ha over a 42 period including 
several phases, based on pumped water abstraction from the Mekong 
(Rojanapaiwong, 2000). Sneddon (2003b:2233) argues that the central power effect 
of the KCM project, was “the enrollment of a massive river basin (the Mekong) into 
its orbit of influence”, which empowered the actors supporting the project. However, 
when the original foreign consultant-designed KCM Project master plan essentially 
failed to win broad political support in the region, DEDP switched to hiring domestic 
consultants to write more feasibility studies, which essentially recycled the earlier 
plans to ensure they were more closely aligned to the requirements of their political 
patrons. A similar process of inter-departmental and inter-necine struggles was 
detectable in the Nam Songkhram basin in attempts to promote the Nam Songkhram 
Project, and both attracted civil society opposition to their implementation (Breukers, 
1998; Lohmann, 1998). Khamkongsak and Law (2001) argue that powerful interests 
backing the KCM project embarked upon a programme of “command, control and 
intimidation” against critics to ensure the project proceeded, which did not even 
spare the United Nations-appointed Executive Officer of the Mekong Committee
204
. 
Dr Prakob Wirojanagud
205, former Dean of Khon Kaen’s Faculty of Engineering, 
was reported to have declared that “the only demand for the project is among 
politicians and technocrats” (Khamkongsak and Law, 2001:28). 
 
 
                                                   
204 Chuck Lancaster, an American citizen, was reportedly given 48 hours to leave Thailand after he 
was accused of siding with downstream countries that wanted to veto the KCM project via the 
Mekong Committee (Khamkongsak and Law, 2001). 
205 Dr Prakob was one of the respondents I interviewed in his capacity as President of Ubon 
Ratchatani University, where he remained a strong opponent of the KCM project (and its 
descendents), claiming it was technically flawed, a fantasy project of a small clique and an expensive 
waste of money. 
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9.2.1 The Royal Irrigation Department 
 
As with the ARD, the DEDP was eventually considered redundant and dissolved 
during the 2002 bureaucratic shakeup by the Thaksin administration. Its large 
portfolio of irrigation development projects, including the stalled KCM and Nam 
Songkhram Projects, were transferred to the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) for 
future implementation. The RID was already an important hydraulic agency in the 
Nam Songkhram basin, with a large portfolio of small, medium and one large-scale 
irrigation (Lam Nam Oon) projects on its books and this inheritance provided new 
opportunity to further its hydraulic mission. Simultaneously, the RID acquired from 
DEDP another dormant blueprint plan for a large irrigation scheme in the smaller 
Nam Gam river basin, situated just to the south of the Nam Songkhram basin. 
Crucially, however, the Nam Gam basin had been pin-pointed several decades before 
by the king during an aerial reconnaissance mission as a river basin which showed 
potential for conversion to irrigated agriculture, assuming its natural flood cycle was 
tamed. Once in the possession of RID, it was assigned “Royally-Initiated Project” 
status (The Government Public Relations Department, 2012), recognized from 
previous experience as a symbolic tactic to speed the budget scrutiny process 
through and ensure minimum protest from civil society. The RID took about six 
years to construct the Nam Gam project, which was nearly complete in late 2009, as 
I commenced fieldwork. On completion of the civil works, a small army of RID 
engineers and allied construction contractors were preparing to move their camp to 
start building the Nam Songkhram Project suite of five “water gate” sub-projects 
(see Table 8.1).  
The Nam Songkhram Project, qualified as a large-scale irrigation project and thus 
was planned at RID’s central headquarters, but managed through a regional office 
based in Ubon Ratchatani province. When questioned, RID officials seemed to have 
few doubts that the project would proceed according to schedule, using the same 
damsite previously purchased by DEDP in the 1990s (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4.3). 
Finding out more than the scantest of details about the Nam Songkhram Project was 
problematic and RID deserves a reputation as a “black box” institution (Molle, 2005), 
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that is hard to access internally and closed to scrutiny by external parties; whether at 
the local, regional and national levels of operation. In addition to the large-scale 
projects, it has continued to build unknown numbers of small-scale irrigation 
projects, the vast majority of which are transferred to local communities or the TAOs 
to manage, with predictable results of failure, abandonment and decay at many sites, 
given an absence of communal irrigation management history and underlying 
economic realities (see Fig. 9.6).  
 
9.2.2 The Department of Water Resources 
 
Having been formed as an entity only since the 2002 bureaucratic reform process (in 
some respects, a watershed event for altering the political landscape of Thailand’s 
chief hydrocracies
206
), the Department of Water Resources (DWR), formed under the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), is an institutional 
newcomer to water resources development and management in the Nam Songkhram 
Basin. Emerging from a global and national discourse calling for greater 
participation and decentralization in natural resources governance, it was originally 
conceived that the DWR would primarily play a managerial and regulatory role 
(Molle, 2005). In theory, the DWR was established to avoid inter-agency 
competition and a lack of coordination over water resources development amongst a 
plethora of agencies located across different ministries involved in the water sector, 
by playing a supposedly neutral role to facilitate and direct water resources planning, 
policy making, regulation and coordination. The DWR states its primary mandate as: 
“[T]o be the core agency in proposing policy, master plan, and measures for water 
resources management, development, rehabilitation, utilization and problem solving 
as well as directing and coordinating the implementation” (Department of Water 
Resources, 2008). Theoretically, it would have leverage over other water-related 
agencies, including RID. The reality, however, appeared starkly different from the 
rhetoric.  
                                                   
206 Apart from the DWR and the RID, the other main hydrocracy not dealt with here as it is not 
directly relevant to the arguments, is the state electricity utility, the Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT), which builds and operates hydropower dams.  
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For example, from the perspective of someone who was chairman of the working 
group set up to establish DWR and so directly involved in its genesis, but residing 
slightly outside of the inner circle of the bureaucracy, Dr Apichart Anukarlamphai
207
 
was disappointed about the outcome of reforms he had encouraged. He had earlier 
attempted to establish a new apex body that would avoid duplication of the role of 
other agencies involved in water management, but would function strictly as a 
regulator and to formulate national water policy, and not become another 
implementing agency. Quickly, however, politicians’ and bureaucrats’ personal 
agendas in pursuing infrastructure development pathways, weak legislation and the 
reality of an agency dependent on a narrow professional and epistemological 
worldview, ensured that DWR morphed into another agency intent on unshackled 
pursuance of the hydraulic mission. He explained this phenomenon from the 
perspective of professional composition. 
 “...... because we took people from Ror Por Chor, you know, Accelerated Rural 
Development; we took people from the Public Works Department, the 
Groundwater Resources Department and from the Department of Public Health, 
from the groundwater section. We even had some people from the Land 
Development Department. We had some people from what before we called the 
Department of Energy Promotion and so on, which used to do a lot of pumping 
in Isaan. So the composition of the staff in the Department is from different 
agencies and most of them are engineers or previously engaged in project 
implementation. So it takes time for them to change their mindset....”  
(Source:  Dr Apichart Anukarlamphai, President of the Thai Water Resources 
Association, interviewed on 4 June 2012) 
Having abandoned any regulatory role over the sector and turned its attention to the 
planning and development of large-scale infrastructure projects and supply-led 
solutions, DWR increasingly came to be perceived as a rival hydraulic bureaucracy 
to RID and other state agencies primarily involved in engineering-based solutions to 
perceived water scarcity issues (see Section 9.2.3 below). Through the rhetorical 
adoption of IWRM as a management tool and the formation of River Basin 
Organizations (RBOs) within each of 25 river basins nationwide, DWR sought to 
                                                   
207 Dr Apichart has a background as an engineering lecturer at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) 
in Bangkok, but went on to become a consultant on a series of foreign donor-funded water resources 
development projects and advisor to the Thai government, including having a seat on the National 
Water Resources Committee for many years. He has been intimately involved with Thai water 
resources management policy reform processes and is a vocal proponent of IWRM in his present 
position as President of the Thai Water Resources Association (TWRA), part of the Global Water 
Partnership. 
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influence the water resources development planning processes in each basin. In the 
case of the Nam Songkhram basin, it commissioned a consortium of Thai and 
Japanese engineering consultancies to conduct an “integrated” development master 
plan for the Basin (Sanyu Consultants (Thailand) Ltd et al., 2006). Unsurprisingly, 
given their core business, most of the solutions and recommendations proposed 
involved infrastructural development approaches, perhaps with the expectation that 
they would be first in line for a contract, especially given a proposal by the DWR to 
link the Nam Songkhram basin to a much larger trans-national and trans-basin water 
transfer project from Laos to Northeast Thailand (see Floch and Blake, 2011). Dr 
Apichart (interview, 4 June, 2012) expressed disillusionment that the DWR was 
attempting to build large-scale irrigation supply systems in the Northeast, even 
though it had relatively little practical experience of implementing this kind of 
development.  
 
9.2.3 Hydraulic bureaucratic competition – Clash of the Titans? 
 
“In their work, these two departments must compete with each other 
because they do the same kind of work. They must try to compete with 
each other in order to receive a budget.” 
Source:  Montree Chantawong, civil society activist, interviewed 19 
November, 2009 
Molle et al (2009d) note that the supremacy of RID in the Northeast was challenged 
as long ago as the 1970s by the rise of the DEDP, and that rivalries between 
hydrocracies are not uncommon. The intense competition between the US Army 
Corps of Engineers and the USBR in building dams in the western United States is a 
well documented example (Reisner, 1986). Despite water for irrigation being by far 
and away the largest consumptive use of water in Thailand, in 2001 being estimated 
at 90 % of the total (Azimi et al., 2001), the DWR has apparently had very little 
leverage over the irrigation sector since its formation, allowing the RID to essentially 
operate almost entirely autonomously of DWR’s mandate to direct and coordinate 
water resources management (Department of Water Resources, 2008). Above both 
institutions there is an apex body, the Office of National Water Resources 
Committee (ONWRC), but it has a modest record, being dominated by state officials 
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and lacking a legal status
208
. According to Molle (2007b:19), “the committee’s 
outreach is constrained by limited staff and resources, and its lack of power when 
dealing with long-established line agencies.” The RID, perhaps due to its 
institutional longevity
209
 and strong royal linkages, seems to consider itself the true 
heir and rightful executor of all public irrigation development nationwide and retains 
an unshakeable belief in its superior technical prowess to other agencies. By contrast, 
the DWR has not been able to establish itself as a genuine hydrocratic competitor to 
the far larger, wealthier, better staffed and firmly established RID, which operates 
with a far greater physical presence on the ground than any rival (refer to Appendix 
D for a critical comparison of the two agencies). Therefore, it is questionable 
whether the institutional space exists for two powerful hydrocracies fighting for 
control over the same resources. Wittfogel (1957:337) noted how “[I]n all types of 
hydraulic society the members of the ruling class competed for power, prestige and 
income”, but that the patterns of competition were different from those under 
capitalism and post-feudal societies. The keen rivalry between the two hydraulic 
bodies was palpable during interviews with officials in both agencies and close 
observers of the reform process. 
For example, one senior civil servant directing the Thai National Mekong Committee 
(TNMC) Bureau of the DWR gave an opinion that RID’s aloofness was a function of 
its vastly superior annual budget, manpower and long-established technical capacity 
to construct and manage large scale hydraulic infrastructure. She sensed that there 
was little point in the DWR trying to compete with RID as another project 
constructor, especially at with large-scale projects. 
“The RID doesn’t care about the Dept of Water Resources, they don’t 
care! They get granted a budget of many tens of thousands of million 
baht a year. They’re not interested because they are not under it...... The 
RID has much greater potential [sakaya-phab] than DWR. The potential 
of the DWR itself is far lower, because mostly it comes from ARD which 
was previously involved with small-scale water resources.”  
                                                   
208 The Draft Water Act, designed to reform the Thai water resources sector by separating policy, 
management and O & M functions, and provide legal status to RBOs to decentralize decision-making 
over water (Molle, 2007b) has been though multiple revisions by the National Water Resources 
Committee, since first proposed in 1991 (Interview with Hannarong Yaowalert, 4 January, 2010). It 
has essentially been in limbo over many years with little apparent appetite by bureaucrats or 
politicians to pass it into law. 
209 The RID was established in 1903 and celebrated its 107th anniversary celebrations in June 2010 
with an exhibition of its accomplishments at its Bangkok headquarters. 
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 (Source: Pakawan Chofamanee, TNMC representative, DWR. Interviewed 4 
August 2010) 
Pakawan gave the impression that the two agencies were gradually moving towards a 
situation of mutually agreed territorial control over the Northeast’s water resources, 
where RID would assume control of the areas already classified as “irrigated” and 
DWR would settle for those parts of river basins in the non-irrigated areas and 
upland areas (classified as “watersheds”). Nevertheless, there are still vast areas of 
lowland agricultural land thought to be potentially irrigable, but not yet under state 
irrigation projects, and it is these areas that remain the subject of intense contestation 
for bureaucratic control. A senior RID official I interviewed was concerned by what 
he perceived as a patent conflict of interests on the part of the DWR, where it was 
acting as both a regulator and a developer simultaneously, and told me he much 
preferred the days of non-interference in RID’s affairs prior to DWR’s formation. 
“The DWR have turned to developing water resources themselves, 
making small-scale water resources, such that this is not in accordance 
with their assigned duty, according to the law. If you are asking whether 
the RID has any problems with the DWR or not, actually I must mention 
that in the past, there were more than thirty departments that worked on 
water issues and we did not have any problems, because each party did 
different work. But the DWR is different from the thirty departments 
there used to be over seven years ago, because it has acted as if, ‘I am the 
regulator, I will control you!’; while at the same time also doing 
construction itself. Do you understand? In some ways, they use the power 
of a regulator to interfere with the work of others. They use the fact they 
are an operator, to compete for development of construction work with 
other agencies.”  
(Source: Manas Gamnertmanee, Director of the People’s Partcipation 
Promotion Office, RID, Bangkok. Interviewed 4 August, 2010). 
I heard similar views expressed by other senior RID staff I interviewed in Khon 
Kaen, Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon during the course of fieldwork, 
confirming the impression that increasingly the two agencies are locked in a struggle 
over the same territory and this is leading to growing tensions, both locally and at the 
central governmental level. Reiterating Pakawan’s point, Manas mentioned that 
RID’s annual budget of some 40 billion baht (c. US$ 1.25 billion) dwarfed that of 
the DWR’s of a few billion baht, as if this was somehow proof of the absurdity that 
the subordinate agency (nong) should even consider challenging the seniority of its 
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vastly more experienced and wealthy elder brother (pii). He suggested that the best 
solution to the current problem was simply to remove any policy making and 
regulatory responsibility from the DWR’s mandate and allow them to compete 
directly as another infrastructure developer (or “operator” in Manas’s words). He 
suggested each agency would only be allowed to operate in clearly defined zones 
and so they would not interfere or overlap with the other’s work, as in past times. In 
other words, supporting a return to the institutional status quo of a hierarchical 
hydraulic society, where there is only room for one dominant hydrocracy, with 
others playing a supporting role. Although the exact nature and outcome of this 
hydrocratic struggle is a matter of pure speculation, it is at present not “a clash of the 
titans”, as they do not appear to be on an equal footing. 
 
 
9.2.4 Local expressions of the hydrocratic struggle 
 
Rather ironically, given RID’s existing plans for the Nam Songkhram Project 
(Chapter 8, Section 8.4), DWR has proposed that a large area of land in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin be irrigated via a pumped and piped water supply diverted from its 
planned trans-boundary diversion of water from the Nam Ngum River in Lao PDR 
(Blake et al., 2009). This DWR proposal appears to be substantially based on the 
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Biwater (1987) master plan for the Green Isaan Project, which estimated that 
440,000 rai (70,400 ha) could be irrigated in the Nam Songkhram Basin, partly via a 
transbasin link from the Huay Luang dam and reservoir in Nong Khai province (see 
Floch et al., 2007). This sub-component was later slightly modified in the Khong-
Chi-Mun and Water Grid projects
210
, the latter including a component that planned 
to divert 65 m
3
/s of water from the Huay Luang Basin via pipelines and network of 
canals in the dry season, in a plan drawn up by Japanese engineering firm Sanyu 
Consultants (Thailand) Ltd  (2006). This proposal was based on the simple 
assumption that water demand for irrigated agriculture would continue to grow into 
the future, irrespective of ongoing empirical trends regarding deagrarianization 
processes, such as rural out-migration and increasing labour scarcity (Floch and 
Molle, 2009a). The DWR also drew up plans to construct a series of large, on-
floodplain, flood retention reservoirs in the Lower Nam Songkhram comprised of 
both private and common land, inspired by the king’s “Monkey Cheeks” (gaem ling) 
reservoir principle. This advanced proposal, which I have seen in various internal 
DWR maps and reports, has not passed any consultation process with local 
stakeholders who would be impacted by these plans, as far as I am aware. In addition, 
there are already a large number of small-scale water storage projects in existence 
across the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin that would potentially be made redundant 
or destroyed by the larger projects, should either the hydrocracies’ proposals advance 
to implementation.  
 
9.3 Other state actors – bureaucracies 
 
In addition to the dominant role played by the afore-mentioned line agencies in the 
execution of the hydraulic mission in the Nam Songkhram Basin, a number of other 
state actors may contribute to the mission, albeit with more modest resources at their 
disposal and a narrower mandate in water resources management. These have 
included the Department of Land Development (DLD), the Agricultural Land 
Reform Office (ALRO), the Department of Public Works, the Royal Forestry 
                                                   
210 The Water Grid Project was promoted by the DWR as negating many of the problems earlier 
identified for the KCM project, by avoiding canal construction (which was portrayed as expensive in 
terms of compensation for land lost and disruptive to the environment) and replacing them with pipes. 
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Department (RFD), the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, the 
Provincial Administration Organizations (PAOs) of the four provinces, and the 
numerous Tambon Administration Organizations (TAOs). The irrigation projects 
these organizations have constructed have been on a more limited localized scale 
than the larger projects of the main hydrocracies. Additionally, the other agencies 
irrigation projects often form just one component in general rural development 
objectives, but cumulatively their impact on the socio-economic land-waterscape 
should not be underestimated (Blake et al., 2009). They may be considered to be part 
of a broader discursive coalition of state interests that coalesce around hydraulic 
development paradigms and officials within them are generally supportive of the 
basic tenets of irrigationalism, although there may often be an element of 
competition amongst them in firstly securing central government budgets and 
secondly, ensuring they have secured physical sites and a compliant population to 
enact the development project on the ground. The latter task is becoming 
increasingly more challenging in the Northeast, as the river basins become 
progressively over-built, while local-local, local-state and intra-state agency conflicts 
over water have grown in frequency (Molle, 2008b; Floch and Molle, 2009b).  
During the course of five decades of dedicated hydraulic development in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin, state agencies have already constructed almost every possible 
combination and permutation of irrigation technology. The field observations in the 
Nam Songkhram Basin mirrored findings made by Floch and Molle (2007) regarding 
the comprehensive range of technological options envisaged and (in some cases) 
implemented in the Northeast (see Fig 9.5). Wherever it is executed, the hydraulic 
mission has tended to follow the same relentless developmental logic that has 
become ever more divorced from any economic rationality, but follows its own 
internal discursive rationale that tends to defy easy characterization and explanation, 
allowing project failure to be piled on failure, impacts to be compounded, without 
ever being seriously challenged. No comprehensive independent evaluations of the 
regional irrigation sector have been carried out for years it seems
211
. Empirical 
evidence collected from the field tended to suggest that the only type of externally 
imposed public irrigation model that has persisted over a matter of decades, is the 
                                                   
211 Although not entirely independent, a number of quite thorough evaluations of the irrigation sector 
in Northeast Thailand were carried out by USAID-hired consultants in the 1970-1993 period, but 
since then there does not appear to have been any other reports. 
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top-down, centrally managed, large-scale gravity-fed irrigation schemes, of which 
there is only a single example, namely the Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project. Such 
hydraulic agriculture projects are entirely subsidized by the RID for O & M costs 
and are tightly controlled from the core in Bangkok. However, like with other RID 
large-scale dams, demand for the system’s water is gradually increasing from 
municipalities which require it for domestic tap water provision and users are 
prepared to pay a fee, signaling potential future inter-sectoral competition. By 
contrast, many small and medium-scale irrigation projects were found to be 
essentially abandoned and in an advanced state of disrepair. Private, household-level 
irrigation and hydroagriculture can be found in pockets all over the Northeast, where 
people are still willing to risk the vagaries of a semi-subsistence farming livelihood, 
without recourse to state subsidies.   
 
There are two other actor groups that lay outside the regular state bureaucratic 
structure and are not always clearly visible, so have tended to get overlooked in most 
critical analysis to date, but are still relevant to furthering the state’s hydraulic 
mission in the Nam Songkhram Basin, namely the military and the monarchy. The 
first is the military, or more specifically the Royal Thai Army, which continues to be 
an extremely powerful institution within Thai politics at both national and regional 
levels and is also peripherally involved in promoting water resources development 
274 
 
pathways. In Chapter 7, the RTA’s integral discursive and material role in promoting 
the Green Isaan Project were documented, and even though it has nominally stepped 
back from being a lead actor since then, its developmental influence can still be felt 
in the region. The RTA’s involvement in controversial state forestry programmes 
such as the Khor Jor Kor project as a social control mechanism are also well 
documented (Pye, 2005). Through various divisions, it maintains an active 
developmental arm in Northeast provinces, especially in border areas or areas within 
old communist insurgency zones (so-called “Red Zones”), such as the Phu Phan hills. 
Thus, I was not surprised to learn that there was a small RTA development base in 
Phanna Nikhom of Sakhon Nakhon that had approached village leaders and the TAO 
in Naa Hua Bor sub-district to seek their approval for a “dredging project” (khrong-
gan kut lawk) to be implemented on nearby streams. The RTA commanders 
apparently had received a significant central government budget for “dredging” 
streams in Sakon Nakhon province
212
 and they were anxious to carry out the 
development projects before the end of the financial year.  
The Ban Non Rua TAO representative, village head and gamnan seemed keen to 
allow the project to go ahead, believing it would bring benefits to the villagers by 
increasing water storage for agriculture. However, the village held a public hearing 
(prachakom moo baan) on 28 April 2010 to discuss the project in the temple at which 
I attended. It was attended by just nineteen persons (no women were present) and the 
gamnan  explained that the RTA would kut lawk a natural stream running nearby the 
village, dredging a channel 30 m wide for a length of  8 kms. At first, the villagers 
were silent and did not dare oppose the supportive view of the gamnan, but then one 
villager spoke up and said he was worried that it would cause the loss of the riparian 
trees and vegetation, which were important sources of food for villagers. Another 
said the birds, fish, animals and bamboo shoots found along its course would 
disappear. There was a murmur of assent and suddenly there were several people 
speaking out against the project. At the end of the meeting a show of hands went up 
and the majority voted the project down. Perhaps this development project was 
rejected solely on social and environmental grounds and was an expression of 
participatory governance. Or alternatively, it can be read as a reaction against the 
                                                   
212 Although I have no confirmation, I suspect this budget was granted under the “Thai Khem Kaeng” 
economic stimulus programme. 
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military in general by a village with strong sympathies for the Red Shirt movement, 
with the general image of the RTA being particularly poor at that moment in time
213
 
and concern for the ecological integrity of the stream was just a convenient excuse to 
snub the military with an act of resistance? 
The second quasi-state institution that I have only briefly mentioned so far and whose 
ubiquitous presence is often obscured or glossed over in most critical analysis of the 
water resources development, is the monarchy. I deal explicitly with the king and the 
monarchy’s role in promoting the national hydraulic mission and irrigationalism in 
the next chapter. Local evidence of the monarchy’s influence on the discourse and 
material practices was widespread, from the plethora of “Royally-Initiated Projects” 
of all types from small-scale storage dams and irrigation projects I encountered along 
the edge of the Phu Phan range (see Fig. 9.6), right up to the multi-million dollar 
Nam Gam Development Project nearby. The monarchy also maintains a physical 
presence locally in the Nam Songkhram Basin through Royal Development Study 
Centres, the Chaipattana Foundation, and various other Royal Development Projects 
implemented through the offices of various state agencies (refer to Chapter 10 for 
further detail). The monarch’s symbolic presence is tangible in all the hydraulic 
bureaucracy offices I visited, most especially the RID where the king is revered like a 
demi-god, judging by the prolific and prominent iconic imagery used and in terms of 
adoption of royal prerogatives into the working language and practices of the agency. 
For example, I encountered direct appropriation by state agencies of the king’s 
rhetoric (e.g. from birthday speeches) regarding recommended water resources 
development technology for the nation, such as gaem ling flood storage reservoirs; 
“fai maew” (small stream check-dams – see Fig. 9.7) built on upland watercourses to 
supposedly store water, recharge groundwater and regenerate the riparian forest (e.g. 
The National Identity Board, 2000); and other principles or inventions credited to the 
king.  
                                                   
213 Of the three villages in which I conducted my fieldwork, Baan Non Rua was the most overt in its 
support of the “Red Shirt” movement, which in late April 2010 was locked in conflict with the 
government in Bangkok, with thousands of protesters occupying large parts of the central business 
district and demanding new national elections. 
276 
 
 
The final group of actors to mention that have played an ever diminishing role in 
determining material outcomes on the ground over time, are bilateral aid donors, 
development agencies (e.g. USAID, MRC), multilateral development banks (e.g. the 
ADB and World Bank) and international consultancy companies that have supported 
the Thai government in promoting irrigation development in the past. They were 
seminal in providing grants, loans, technical assistance and technology to the RID 
and other state agencies since dissolved, but in recent years the economic progress of 
Thailand and changing regional geo-politics has dictated an ever-diminishing role for 
external development agencies (so I will not dwell on them in detail). Perhaps the 
one exception has been technical assistance in formulating large-scale trans-
boundary and trans-basin diversion schemes, such as the Nam Ngum Diversion 
project, but the World Bank and allied parties later withdrew their involvement 
following strong domestic and international criticism from civil society 
organizations (Middleton and Lee, 2007; Floch and Blake, 2011). Critics of the 
World Bank and ADB promoted Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy 
(MWRAS)
214
, essentially called for improved and more inclusive regional water 
governance approaches and pointed to these projects as the antithesis of worldwide 
                                                   
214 MWRAS was a short-lived attempt by these agencies to regain adegree of relevance in the fast-
changing regional development milieu by promoting cross-border cooperation between Mekong 
nations in developing large-scale hydraulic infrastructure solutions to poverty. 
277 
 
trends towards greater openness, transparency, accountability, etc, narratives 
(Kakonen and Hirsch, 2009; Molle et al., 2009c; Dore and Lebel, 2010). The 
Japanese government also, through the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC) and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), has been 
particularly active in supporting the discourse of trans-basin diversion of water for 
irrigation between Laos and Thailand in the past (Floch and Blake, 2011), but their 
present level of involvement is unclear.  
 
9.4   Strategic Groups 
 
The theoretical concept of strategic groups in the context of Thailand and Vietnam 
was elaborated in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3, in which groups of actors (rather than 
individuals) compete for access to and control of resources, which are by definition 
scarce. Evers and Benedikter (2009a:420) argued that “the management and control 
of the flow of water, its use for irrigation, aquaculture, river transport or industry 
provide a bundle of resources to which actors strive for access.” The authors stress 
that the actors are not individuals, but social groups. The benefits derived often 
include monetary gain (profit), but in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta case of modern 
hydraulic society may also include non-material goals such as institutional change, 
improved social status, political power and honour. In Thailand, as with the case of 
Vietnam, the hydraulic bureaucracies remain the prevailing authority in the planning 
and management of irrigation and other hydraulic works, maintaining a system of 
control that is closely aligned with certain other narrow interests, lying outside of the 
immediate bureaucracy, partly agreeing with Eisenstadt’s (1958) critique of 
Wittfogel. Evers and Benedikter (2009a) stress that besides those in power that shape 
the political and economic framework of society, it is also possible to identify 
counter-strategic groups that try to oppose or challenge the powerful group. They 
admit that when studying the strategic groups, “a highly diverse and dynamic 
societal portrait appears, embracing water related businesses, hydraulic 
bureaucracies or even certain professions like hydraulic engineers” that interact or 
compete with each other in an “arena centered on water” (Evers and Benedikter, 
2009a:420). This picture of complexity is no less true in Thailand than Vietnam. 
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9.5 The patrimonial politics of water resources development 
control 
 
Developing the theme of power relations further for Thailand, given that the main 
hydrocracies are basically competitive in nature, rather than forge strategic alliances 
amongst themselves, they are more likely to form alliances with non-state actors, 
including politicians, development consultancies, construction companies, 
international development agencies and civil society organizations that are 
themselves incorporated into a strategic group network of complex relationships, 
operating at various levels of the socio-political hierarchy. In examining the role of 
powerful groups promoting irrigation development, a factor that tends to be 
overlooked in more structural analyses, is the critical role that individual actors may 
play in influencing processes and outcomes. This is especially pertinent to Southeast 
Asian nations where, “the politics of entourages and cliques, of personal networks 
and associations, are critical for the building of coherent national power structures” 
(Pye, 1985:27). Pye contends that even normally rigid hierarchical institutions such 
as national bureaucracies and military establishments “tend to be facades for 
pyramids of informal, but enduring, patron-client groupings”. Whilst a number of 
studies have examined the influence that paternalism and patrimonialism has had on 
the modern political development of Thailand (e.g. Jacobs, 1971; Rakwijit, 1971; 
Chaloemtiarana, 2007), there appear to have been relatively few recent studies 
conducted concerning tendencies towards autocratic paternalism, which in the view 
of  Jacobs (1971), lies close to the heart of Thai social behaviour and state authority. 
He argued that Thailand provided a model of a patrimonial society, with “the 
patrimonial principle of superior appointers treating inferior appointees as members 
of a personal constituency, rewarded and punished on grace and by fiat, capriciously 
persists” (Jacobs, 1971:27).  
The Thai model of patrimonialism is highly paternalistic, maintains Jacobs (1971), in 
that rulers are commonly viewed as father figures, from the king at the apex of 
society (as a pho khun) right down to village leaders (pho baan or phu yai), a social 
phenomenon that is primarily benevolent and autocratic in form, rather than 
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absolutist or despotic. Although, as Chaloemtiarana (2007) argues, there tends to be 
periodic returns to despotism, such as during Sarit’s regime and later military junta-
run governments during the 1960s and 70s. Jacobs (1971) maintained that arbitrary 
decision-making by superiors is not only accepted by subordinates, but actually 
expected, and thus authority tends to be unitary, rather than differentiated, dispersed 
or autonomous. Within the bureaucratic apparatus, it is the authority of those few at 
the apex of the hierarchy alone that is vital, prompting Jacobs (1971:28) to argue (in 
apparent support of Wittfogel’s position), “effective opposition rarely arises beyond 
the summit of the political apparatus, and political change is characterized by palace 
coups rather than by major social upheavals involving ideological conflicts”. But this 
analysis was written four decades ago, which begs the question whether such 
strongly patrimonial relationships persist to the present day
215
?  
London (1977) argued that decision-making power was still concentrated in the 
hands of a relatively small, Bangkok-based elite, drawn from within the ranks of a 
hierarchical bureaucratic polity essentially beholden to no outside agent for 
regulation and checks to its power. Above all else, the patrimonial system is seen to 
be closed and cyclical in nature, highly resilient to external change and so may 
periodically be modernized, but rarely qualitatively developed for as long as the 
existing hierarchy is securely maintained in place. Rigg (1991) has claimed that 
hierarchical and paternalistic patron-client relationships act as a basic inhibitor to the 
success of grass-roots development in Thailand, calling into question the 
“community-culture” discourse oriented strategy of many NGOs (cf. Nartsupha, 
1991). In a more recent analysis of modern democratic development in Thailand, 
Ockey (2005) has argued that patron-clientelism is gradually weakening in Thailand 
as the country becomes more socio-politically pluralistic. But he noted, it was 
stronger in rural areas than urban areas and was “being shored up by institutional 
structures, particularly in the military and the bureaucracy, and, especially in rural 
areas, by generosity, often in the form of cash payments for participation in 
demonstrations or elections” (Ockey, 2005:8). Molle (2003:256), examining the case 
of the Chao Phraya Delta irrigation management politics, found that “MPs and other 
constituency representatives” wielded significant power to influence the allocation of 
                                                   
215 This theme is explored in more detail in Chapter 10, considering the role of “The Father of Water 
Resources Management”. 
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irrigation water, “as a way to act as patrons and gain political rewards in times of 
election”.  
 
9.5.1 The role of paternalistic local leaders and patron-client relationships  
 
To further understand the spatial dimensions of the politics of irrigation development, 
it is important not to overlook the local level and how power relations link across 
scale to the regional and national levels, rather than the conventional preoccupation 
with macro-level analyses. This suggests identifying some of the linkages between 
the “everyday politics of water resources management”, espoused by Mollinga 
(2008), as water control contestation shifts between and across different domains and 
scales. This could be loosely equated with Foucault’s micro politics of everyday life, 
where diverse plural centres, regimes of circulating power and discursive practices 
are viewed as linked (Layder, 2001). Antony Turton (1989b:66) argued that in 
understanding prevailing rural power relations of domination and subordination in 
contemporary Thai society, “the role of 'local powers' is crucially important: the 
local bureaucratic, commercial and 'developmental' beneficiaries of the state and 
state policies.” He noted an “array of central government policies and instruments 
for maintaining the status quo” designed to ensure uniformity of control and national 
stability (Turton, 1989b:67), although he did not consider the potential of water 
resources development to be an instrument of state control. Local powers are defined 
by Turton (1989a:93) as the “power blocs and coalitions which are seen as a crucial 
mediation, nexus, and localization of contradictions and conflicts between state and 
capitalist spheres on the one hand and the majority of rural producers on the other.” 
The rural majority in Thailand has an explicit importance to government and 
politicians in that they are sources of votes in times of election and are vital for 
achieving the centre’s ideological goals, such as the high priority “national security” 
or indeed, reproducing irrigationalism.  
Recognition of the pork barreling aspects of irrigation projects is well documented in 
other contexts (Reisner, 1986; Worster, 1992) as a political tactic for coralling the 
votes of so-called “yeoman farmers” (Molle et al., 2009d), and has also been 
recognized for Thailand’s Northeast by Philip Hirsch in an interview for Australian 
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radio (Werden, 2008) and the Chao Phraya delta (Molle, 2003). The latter author 
noted that due to the scarcity of water relative to demand, “MPs and other 
constituencies representatives have long mediated requests for water as a way to act 
as patrons and gain political rewards in times of elections” (Molle and Srijantr, 
2003:258). Likewise in the Northeast, rural voters are regarded by politicians as 
reservoirs of opportunity to be sequentially tapped and rewarded each election cycle 
(which can be frequent) for the access they provide to state funds216, as explained by 
Bruns (1991:86):   
“Irrigation projects are large and visible rewards that politicians can 
offer in exchange for support. Members of Parliament are active in 
lobbying RID for projects, at the request of their constituents. M.P.s 
and representatives in regional assemblies may be contractors 
themselves or have links to them and stand to gain from building 
projects funded by the Job Creation Program or Provincial 
Administration. At the national level there has been strong political 
pressure for construction of water resources projects. Construction 
represents a visible response to the problems of drought and poverty in 
the northeast.”   
Understanding the role of local leaders, politicians, state officials and construction 
contractors, and the often mutually reinforcing links between them through both 
strategic groups and actor networks for securing and controlling the local water 
resources development paradigm, is crucial to an appreciation of everyday politics 
and practices of irrigationalism. To illustrate the vital role of local powers in 
initiating and mediating water resources development, I point to some anecdotal 
evidence gathered during fieldwork. The case studies examined in Chapter 8 have 
already identified some basic relationships between various actors involved in the 
projects and their constituents, which I now intend to further elaborate on by 
examining the case of Baan Naa Phiang, Sri Songkhram District.  
It appeared the two most powerful people within the village during fieldwork were 
the present headman phu yai Somboon and his predecessor pho yai Sanguan, with 
both men nominally linked into a patronage network under the Nakon Phanom MP, 
Supachai Phosu. Supachai (nicknamed “Kru Gaew”) was born in a neighbouring 
                                                   
216 In the questionnaire survey, a fairly high proportion of people across the locations agreed with the 
statement “politicians are able to win votes by policies that promise new irrigation systems to 
villagers”. Broken down by location, it was found that 58.6 % in Khon Kaen, 56.1 % in Bangkok and 
46.3 % of people in the Nam Songkhram village agreed with the statement, with 41.7 % not sure in 
the latter location (see Table 11, Appendix C). 
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village, from the same ethnic group (Nyaw), was a distant relative of both men and 
shared the same surname, providing strong kinship links. However, following the 
Nong Saeng fiasco regarding the insensitive dumping of spoil, local conflict 
emerging and lack of reciprocal benefits being shared with the village (Chapter 8, 
Section 8.5), there was a sense amongst phu yai Somboon and his small entourage 
(including the Deputy Headmen) that they personally had been short changed by 
Supachai, as the person benefitting most from the DWR-funded project. They were 
not embarrassed to inform me that the standard financial skim from state 
infrastructure projects of this nature (including reservoirs, roads or weirs), was 30 % 
of the total contract value, which was normally split in fixed amounts amongst the 
interested parties, but rarely filtered down to the village elites, who were expected to 
be grateful for receiving the project and the credibility this supposedly engendered. 
The role of local elites and the nature of the patron-client relationship with Supachai 
over the Nam Songkhram Project were discussed in further detail in Section 8.4.5. 
A village headperson, his or her deputies and the village TAO representatives will 
often form part of a clique of local leaders, that are usually bonded in a patron-client 
relationship with a district-level strongman politician, who in turn is linked in a 
dependent relationship with a provincial-level politician and so on up to the national 
level. To be elected as headman, phu yai Somboon and two Deputies had formed a 
team, relying on an entourage of supporters within the village (mostly kinship based) 
to canvas villagers for their votes. They had reportedly spent about 500,000 baht (c. 
US$ 15,150) on their campaign
217
, most of which was spent in the final month when 
the candidates were out and about almost daily to meet villagers and in the words of 
Boonpaeng, Somboon’s deputy, “ready to buy whisky at every chance”. Such 
competitive campaigning involving financial and other material inducements to the 
electorate was understood to be replicated during elections for the village TAO 
representative, the Provincial Administration Organization and general parliamentary 
elections, and has been critiqued as representing the epitome of Thailand’s “money 
politics” (Laird, 2000; Ockey, 2005).  
                                                   
217
 A similar sum of money was reportedly spent by the successful candidate to secure the Headman 
position in Baan Nong Sa Pla, Moo 8, Udon Thani, where people admitted individual votes were 
bought for 500 baht (c. US$ 15) each.  
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Phu Yai Somboon’s team, disappointed by the lack of reciprocity displayed by MP 
Supachai over Nong Saeng, had already been approached by canvassers working for 
Itthipon Gaewboriboon (better known locally as “Gamnan Boy”, a local jao pho 
businessman), the other local strongman in Sri Songkhram district who ran a rival 
political network to Supachai’s, and seriously started to consider the pros and cons of 
defecting before the next general elections. One of the critical factors to consider 
would be what promises each patron could offer with regards to provision of more 
infrastructure projects, including water resources development, in return for 
delivering votes. The Baan Naa Phiang headman was considered to be in a strong 
position to bargain with a potential patron as the village offered relatively plentiful 
public land and streams for “development”, something pho yai Sanguan had 
apparently been adept at negotiating. There was another potential advantage to 
switching loyalties to Gamnan Boy, in that the current Chairman of the Tha Bor 
Songkhram TAO was already in Gamnan Boy’s phak phuak, and thus could help to 
channel more projects to the village.  
A long-term civil rights and environmental activist who had been elected to the 
chairmanship of his local TAO in the Phu Phan hills, Laothai Nilnuan, explained to 
me in an interview how local politicians and government officials typically become 
embedded in political networks, that reproduce the  malpractices common in general 
elections of vote buying and line agencies of institutionalized graft and rent seeking 
practices by budget skimming from infrastructure projects, a practice he reasoned had 
come at the expense of democracy and the ordinary citizen. The tensions and conflict 
that often arises between the elected executives and the permanent staff of the TAOs, 
especially the Palad Or Bor Tor (a legal executive position), who according to 
Garden et al (2010), have a tendency to stifle the ability of the Chairman and 
assembly to make decisions, due to their close relationship with the District Chief 
and Local Administration Department officials and a familiarity with the legal and 
administration system internally unavailable to the legislative branch. However, this 
intra-state official relationship needs to be set against the often close patron-client 
relationship the Chairman might enjoy with powerful local politician’s networks, 
who often collude to insert projects in the TAO plan that are of personal benefit, 
especially roads and water resources development. Laothai explained the local 
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political networking system as mimicking the practices of money politics from the 
national level:  
“Recently local politics has become connected to the national level; 
it is connected to the benefits; it is connected to the contractors; it is 
connected in using money to buy votes; it has become connected to 
the national political network system. The network works together 
to find things to consume [haa kin]. Therefore, they will do 
whatever earns them more “percentage” [dai percent], more money, 
rather than caring what the villagers actually need, as that would 
earn them less percent, less money, and so they never do it. With 
the exception of one TAO chairman, a local leader called Bamrung 
Kayotha
218
 who is a good example and takes no personal benefits. 
He is not scared of anyone…..[laughs]....”   
Source: Laothai Nilnuan, interviewed 15 December 2009 
One morning in February 2010, I witnessed the practical mechanics of a village-level 
water resources development project planning process. With my research assistant, 
we encountered phu yai Somboon, deputy Boonpaeng and one of the village TAO 
councilors sitting at a table in front of Somboon’s house, completing a set of project 
application forms. The village leaders had been asked to hurriedly (within a day) 
submit an application request for up to four local water resources construction 
projects, with each project stipulated to be in the range of 150,000 – 250,000 baht (c. 
US$ 4,545 – 7,576) and to be urgently implemented before the end of that dry season. 
The forms had to be submitted to the TAO Chairman, before being passed on to the 
District Chief and ultimately, the Deputy Governor of Nakhon Phanom Province for 
approval. The narrow timeframe given for the project proposal meant that there was 
no opportunity to consult the wider village, but this local elite troika took it upon 
themselves to decide where to locate the projects. There was no site visit, no 
quantification of soil volume to be moved, no estimation of costs or benefits, no 
consideration of environmental or social impacts or any other feasibility assessment 
undertaken – all four small barrage dam projects were written in a one-size fits all 
format within an hour and handed to the TAO representative to take into work that 
day. I suspect such is the manner in which most local level water resources 
development planning takes place across Thailand, as the villagers know from 
                                                   
218 Bamrung Kayotha is a well-known Northeast farmers’ leader and civil society activist who was 
Secretary-General of the Small Scale Farmers Assembly of Isaan during the 1990s.  
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experience that the state agencies will execute the project according to its own 
designs in any event, as with Nong Saeng.  
The discussion thus far has centred on the actors, strategic groups and discourse 
coalitions that have been influential in carrying out the hydraulic mission in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin over the last few decades. It has shown that some bureaucratic 
institutions are more powerful and hegemonic than others and since the bureaucratic 
reform of 2002, there has been growing competition and tension between the DWR 
and RID, with each courting a different political patronage network for legitimacy. 
The importance of paternalistic and patron-client politics, where individual actors 
and their relationships are crucial determinants of material outcomes is an enduring 
feature of Thai society, illustrated by upstream-downstream connections of actors 
and institutions linked to MP Supachai in Nakhon Phanom and the influence he has 
wielded in accelerating a provincial hydraulic development paradigm. Power and 
authority at the lower levels of the hydraulic hierarchy is not a given, but is 
constantly contested, much like the competition for control and legitimacy near the 
top of the hydraulic mission, such as that seen between the RID and the DWR 
(Molle et al., 2009d) or between Thaksin’s network and the monarchist network (cf. 
McCargo, 2005). Thus it can be seen how national political conflicts can play out at 
the local level and vice versa – the two levels are not dichotomous but intimately 
connected arenas of political domination and struggles for resources.   
 
9.6 Counter-strategic actors and groups 
 
Not all people automatically endorse the state project of irrigationalism and there are 
inevitably certain actors and actor groups that have opposed and resisted the 
dominant discourse of the hydraulic mission to varying degrees and for different 
reasons, by advocating alternative narratives. Some of these have been discussed in 
relation to the Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project and Nam Songkhram Projects in 
Chapter 8. Looking back to the period (late 1990s to early 2000s) when the Nam 
Songkhram Project was under the aegis of the DEDP, a broad coalition of actors and 
groups attempted to resist this and other regional large-scale water resources 
development projects. At that time, a relatively cohesive group of civil society 
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activists, grassroots movements and villager groups, university academics, media 
and indeed, some sections of the bureaucracy formed a loose coalition to oppose the 
irrigation project, portraying it as a major threat to the environment, local livelihoods 
and culture (see Section 8.4). Some of the counter-narratives and strategies adopted 
by civil society groups to resist large-scale state irrigation development projects are 
detailed in Floch and Blake (2011) and Blake et al. (2009), where opponents often 
express a belief that local ecological knowledge approaches to knowledge generation 
offer greater validity for understanding the complex human-nature relations than 
“scientific” tools favoured by state agencies in support of the project such as 
environmental and social impact assessments (EIAs and SIAs), illustrating the 
battlegrounds of knowledge and truth claims fought over hydraulic development 
paradigms in the Mekong Basin (Kakonen and Hirsch, 2009). 
Part of the effectiveness of civil society organizations (such as the Project for 
Ecological Recovery and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance 
(PER/TERRA)) opposition to such projects as the Nam Songkhram Project was 
adopting adaptive strategies to build informal alliances with local village leaders, 
supportive academics, and NGO activists to establish local grassroots networks and 
mobilize opposition though a variety of routes. Such strategic alliances proved 
successful in raising the profile of the Nam Songkhram River in the domestic media 
and rallying opposition to the Project at various regional and national public 
discussions (Lohmann, 1998). The DEDP usually responded to the criticisms of its 
decision-making process and shortcomings in its data, by just ordering more impact 
assessments from a different consultancy company. A repeated accusation aimed at 
project opponents by bureaucrats and politicians was that they were inhibiting 
regional “progress and development” by standing in its way, while in turn, the 
opponents pointed out that the proponents failed to take into account the project’s 
negative externalities and poor economical justification (Breukers, 1998).  
Significantly, it should be recognized that this was not simply a state versus civil 
society discursive conflict, but a number of state agencies also expressed concerns 
about the Nam Songkhram Project through their role as regulatory agencies (i.e. the 
National Environment Board (NEB)), or policy-setting bodies such as the Office of 
Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP) and its successor, the Office of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP), under the reformed 
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Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. These agencies were responsible 
for screening the EIA and other social and environmental safeguard documents 
required by Thai law to be submitted for large infrastructure projects prior to Cabinet 
approval of funding, and as such can constrain or enable the activities of 
hydrocracies. In the case of the Nam Songkhram Project, it appears there were 
sufficient doubts in OEPP about the project’s stated costs and benefits to cause long 
delays in project progress through having to carry out new studies before approval 
by the NEB could be granted. The discursive battle for the Nam Songkhram Project 
dragged on for almost a decade prior to its rejection at the Cabinet level in 2002 
(Blake et al., 2009). This demonstrates that the state should not be conceived as an 
undifferentiated and monolithic category, but needs to be understood as a diverse 
entity with multiple interests. But even the combined rhetorical objections of both 
state and non-state agencies could not undermine the idea of the project as a means 
to control drought and floods as natural disasters, nor the attractiveness of 
irrigationalism, so it was only a matter of time before it reappeared in a less 
transparent form, split into a series of smaller projects not required to undertake an 
EIA, under the black box guardianship of the RID.  
Following the creation of the DWR, claiming a rhetorical adoption of Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles and a basin management 
approach through the establishment of  river basin committees or organizations 
(RBOs), there was a degree of optimism amongst civil society actors opposed to the 
Nam Songkhram Project that this would lead to a reappraisal of the state’s 
preoccupation with large-scale water resources development projects, as in theory, a 
wider set of voices would have a forum to discuss sustainable basin development 
options. However, the rhetorical adoption of integration, decentralization and 
participation narratives at the centre, did not lead to any discernible changes in 
overall approaches to development, according to civil society representatives I 
interviewed, who were unstintingly critical of the unfulfilled promise of the RBOs 
and reluctance of the central state to cede control of water resources to the periphery.  
288 
 
For example, Laothai Nilnuan, as a civil society representative for the Khong 
Basin
219
 RBO (which incorporates the Nam Songkhram Basin) related that only a 
handful of non-state actors were members of each RBO and so their opinions were 
utterly marginalized against those of members from the hydrocracies
220
. He believed 
that this token presence of a few non-state players was a fig leaf to cover a lack of 
meaningful participation in a process specifically designed to approve the passage of 
water resources development projects. Because the RBOs are not empowered by 
national legislation to have any regulatory authority to alter or block projects, the 
RID and DWR can essentially ignore any individual objections to each agency’s 
project plans and continue regardless in practice. Hence, he was not surprised to see 
the Nam Songkhram Project back on the table again. Laothai remarked: 
 “…..the power for [project] approval remains under the old structure - 
from the department level, the ministry level, the cabinet level - but 
not at the level of the RBOs.”  
Source: Laothai Nilnuan, interviewed, 15 December 2009  
I had fully expected to hear such critical views from civil society representatives 
about the centralization of authority, but I was quite surprised to hear almost 
identical perceptions about the lack of meaningful stakeholder participation and state 
authoritarianism driving project construction being expressed by Pakawan 
Chofamanee as Director of the Thai National Mekong Committee (TNMC). She was 
scathing about the present water governance processes employed and thought the 
TNMC should play a bigger role in the Northeast’s water resources planning process, 
but it too had been marginalized by more powerful political forces acting at a higher 
level. She identified this insincere approach to meaningful participation as a main 
source of opposition to the state’s hydraulic mega-projects. 
“When the government develops a large project, they don’t think about 
these people. They just build it! Therefore, the TNMC should come and 
                                                   
219 This is not a discrete river basin unit, but is rather a conglomeration of many smaller river basins 
draining into the Mekong River within the northern provinces of NE Thailand and bunched together 
in an arbitrary manner, rather defeating the idea of a river basin organization. 
220 On 11 March 2010, I attended a Khong Basin RBC meeting as an observer, chaired by the Deputy 
Governor of Udon Thani, which appeared to be a theatrical exercise in rubber stamping literally 
hundreds of water resources construction projects valued at billions of baht in total, mostly proposed 
by DWR and RID. Only a handful of non-state representatives were present (8 out of roughly 50 
persons), and space to ask questions was extremely constrained, yet the process was described as 
“integrated” and “participatory” in the documents provided to participants. 
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address this process. Can you picture it? Use the process to encourage 
thinking, encourage participation. They like to use the words ‘public 
participation’, but does it have any meaning or not? Even when the 
government wants to build a large project, they hire a consultancy 
company and the consultancy company holds a villager meeting and they 
tell them it will be like this or that. Then they call that the process. But 
it’s not actually participation. It’s just a process of announcement, that’s 
all. Just a process of telling them, ‘you should do this’, that’s all. So 
that’s why there’s always opposition.”  
Source: Pakawan Chofamanee, Director of the Bureau of the Thai 
National Mekong Committee, Department of Water Resources, Bangkok. 
Interviewed 4 August, 2010.  
These points have provided a small selection of narratives raised by counter-strategic 
groups in opposition to large-scale water resources development projects, whether in 
the Nam Songkhram basin or elsewhere in Northeast Thailand. During the course of 
the research, it became apparent that most criticism of the Northeast’s hydraulic 
development paradigm has almost exclusively focused on the negative impacts and 
contested nature of large-scale development projects, such as the Nam Songkhram or 
KCM Projects. The implicit sub-text of this line of reasoning is that small or 
medium-scale projects are somehow more participatory, inclusive and 
socially/environmentally benign irrigation technologies than large-scale projects, and 
thus seem to escape criticism or opposition. Why might this be the case and is this 
position based on evidence? I provide below some brief perspectives to suggest that 
this “scale bias” may be related to the phenomenon of irrigationalism. 
 
9.7 Scalar polarity, narrative fixity and water control  
 
A lot of the recent debate concerning Northeastern irrigation development pathways 
has pivoted around questions of the scale appropriateness of hydraulic infrastructure 
development (i.e. large versus small-scale), technological issues (e.g. pumped or 
gravity-fed systems) and matters of governance (e.g. the degree and quality of 
“participation”). While widespread criticism has often been leveled by civil society 
actors towards a monolithic state unconcerned with the environmental and social 
impacts of large-scale water resources infrastructure projects, leading to many 
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instances of prolonged conflicts framed as state-local struggles (e.g. Foran and 
Manorom, 2009), few people appear to have examined the underlying logic of 
promoting small-scale and communally-based irrigation development approaches as 
an alternative development strategy or critically evaluated its record of success vis à 
vis large-scale irrigation technological interventions.  This has perhaps not always 
been the case, but the debate around scale appears to have become polarized in the 
past two decades of almost exclusive domestic funding support for irrigation 
development. Sneddon (2003b) argued that proponents in the Thai government 
tended to employ different scalar narratives to justify the KCM Project than those 
more localist narratives used by social movements campaigning against it on social 
justice and environmental grounds. 
Indeed, it might be said that there appeared to be a more active debate surrounding 
irrigation development pathways taking place a few decades ago, when foreign 
donor agencies were still providing substantial financial and technical support to 
Thai government agencies in the irrigation sector at all scales. Respective donor 
governments required a degree of external evaluation of the relative cost-benefits of 
such development assistance and commissioned occasional reviews of the sector. For 
example, a USAID report titled, Thailand/USAID Irrigation Development Options 
and Investment Strategies for the 1980s, noted that there was a “general awareness” 
that existing irrigation systems had “largely failed to deliver the planned for benefits” 
and pinned the blame chiefly on technical and managerial deficiencies such as “slow 
progress in completing on-farm distribution systems, difficulty in organizing water-
user groups for effective water management, inadequate maintenance leading to 
deterioration of the systems, and insufficient market inducements to diversified and 
dry season cropping” (Keller et al., 1981:vi). Nearly all subsequent reports produced 
by USAID in the 1980s during a period of declining funding for the Thai irrigation 
sector, similarly concluded that the problem with system failure and low adoption 
lay with poor management and technical skills within the line agencies and water 
users, and if these could be addressed with instrumental measures, then irrigation 
performance would improve. According to a report by Tantuvanit et al (1988) 
quoting official data up to 1984, out of 15,000 tanks (i.e. reservoirs) and 10,000 
weirs constructed, only 50 % were operable and being used.  The factors given for 
this state of affairs was a lack of feeder canals to fields, a lack of maintenance, 
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failure to develop local farmer organizations “to enhance project viability” and a lack 
of basic knowledge by the farmers themselves about effective water utilization and 
system maintenance.  
Even though such dynamics had been generally recognized by the donor community 
for some time, it was particularly telling that the last large donor-funded project to 
assist the RID in overcoming these constraints to irrigation system performance, still 
ended up spending fully 66 % of the entire budget on infrastructural items (e.g. 
buildings and roads, equipment and main system improvement), rather than through 
software items to overcome human and institutional constraints (Brolsma, 1996). 
This was despite the EU-financed project (titled the “Northeast Water Management 
and System Improvement Project”) having a stated main objective to “increase 
farmers’ net incomes on a sustainable basis” (Euroconsult and Minster Agriculture 
Ltd, 1998), it was apparent from the report’s subtext that the European technical 
advisors and their Thai counterparts were working at substantial cross-purposes (see 
quotation by Brolsma (1996) at the start of this present Chapter). Since the cessation 
of foreign aid to the Thai irrigation sector, there appears to have been minimal 
external evaluation apart from limited consultancies providing sectoral reform 
recommendations by FAO (e.g. Turral, 2008). Perhaps there is critical independent 
evaluation of the national irrigation strategy being carried out by domestic actors and 
published in the Thai language, but I was not made aware of any if it exists. I am 
aware of one critical publication in Thai of RID’s activities published by the Project 
for Ecological Recovery (PER), which has had a notable history of critiquing state 
development approaches in water, forestry, land rights, energy and natural resources 
fields.  
Most non-state actors and social science academics I interviewed professed to being 
rather skeptical of the top-down state model of promoting large-scale irrigation 
development. Past and present centrally planned, high cost, pan-regional 
development projects attracted the most criticism, as the antithesis of sustainable 
development. By comparison, there was a strong sense that small-scale projects had 
been more successful and it was the state’s reluctance to invest sufficiently at this 
scale that has led to the continued problems of water resources scarcity and resource-
based conflicts. They advocated for state agencies to focus on developing small-scale, 
community-managed, participatory irrigation systems, premised it appeared on 
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reproducing utopian models of muang fai-type cooperative water management at the 
community level. Typifying this view was, Dr Prakob Wirojanagud, who believed 
small-scale irrigation development to be inherently superior to solving water 
resources problems for rural needs. 
 “…… small-scale projects, by their nature, help solve the problems 
and serve the basic needs of rural families. But if talking about water 
for large-scale agriculture or for the city, I agree that large scale water 
resources are more appropriate. Due to the greater number of villages 
and farming families in rural areas, if we don’t build small-scale water 
resources but decide to build medium- or large-scale projects, they 
would then serve only a minority…….Small scale projects serve the 
majority of poor people.” 
Source: Dr Prakob Wirojanagud, President of Ubon Ratchatani 
University. Interviewed on 12 January, 2010.  
A colleague of Dr Prakob repeated a commonly held perception that small, 
community-led irrigation schemes show superior performance on the grounds they 
represent an inherently more participatory technology, as reflected in these 
comments: 
“Small-scale projects I think have performed well because of the issue of 
participation. People participate voluntarily. They volunteer themselves. 
They don’t have to wait to be told by the government what to do, but they 
know. They use simple technology. But the people have to support them 
too, like to provide some budget or give some information or some 
knowledge to maintain the scheme. So, participation is very important. 
With huge projects people do not participate. People just wait for the 
government to decide for them. This is not a good thing for water 
resources management.” 
Source: Dr Kanokwan Manorom, Director of the Greater Mekong Sub-
Region Social Research Centre (GMSSRC), Ubon Ratchatani University. 
Interviewed on 12 January, 2010. 
The narratives purporting small-scale irrigation’s supposed superiority, at least 
morally if not technically, corresponds closely with a popular ideology amongst Thai 
civil society promoting an ideal form of communitarianism, widely referred to as 
“watthanatham chumchon” (see Nartsupha, 1991). Several studies have lauded 
community-based irrigation management systems in Northern Thailand, emphasizing 
such qualities as its efficiency, sustainability, equity, participation and adaptation of 
293 
 
traditional wisdom (e.g. Surarerks, 1986; Tan-Kim-Yong et al., 2005; Surarerks, 
2006). Cultural beliefs in the benefits of communal irrigation are often linked with 
other normative notions in Thai rural life such as cooperative action, sharing of 
capital items, collective bargaining, community self-improvement and self-
sufficiency that have become enshrined in civil society approaches to rural 
development and have been incorporated into the king’s Sufficiency Economy 
principles (Falvey, 2000), thus gaining an indisputable air of authority and 
legitimacy, but with seemingly a limited basis in empiricism. Such descriptions have 
been criticized as rather static and tending to neglect the dynamics of such systems in 
different socio-political contexts over time (Neef et al., 2006). Mosse (2003:15) 
described a parallel phenomenon in southern India, maintaining, “small-scale surface 
tanks and water courses have provided fertile grounds for imaginative constructs of 
indigenous, local or community institutions, supportive of policy arguments within 
both environmentalist and devolution discourses.” He pointed out how indigenous 
water harvesting systems had been captured by ideological and policy debates on the 
environment and state, whether couched in narratives of lost tradition or institutional 
economics. In Kenya, Adams (1990) found that scale of system was not a good 
indicator of system “success” with both large and small scale schemes performing 
badly, but the degree of bureaucratic control was far more important a determinant to 
outcome. These findings were corroborated in studies by Moris and Thom (1990) 
and Gujit and Thompson (1994), both of whom stress how irrigation development at 
whatever scale tends to be promoted as a panacea. 
Despite popular perceptions amongst academic and civil society advocates, I also 
failed to find any documentary evidence to suggest that small-scale projects have 
performed any better than larger-scale projects. If anything, the performance of 
small-scale projects appears to be rather worse, on the basis data I obtained from the 
RID Provincial Office of Sakon Nakhon which indicated that in the 2009-10 dry 
season, only 0.99 % of irrigable land in the command area of all small-scale projects 
province-wide was actually being irrigated. I visited a selection of these  scarcely 
used projects in Muang and Phanna Nikhom Districts (Appendix E) and found most 
were in a poor state of repair, both at the damsite and along water delivery 
infrastructure, with little evidence of regular maintenance by water users or RID (e.g. 
Fig 9.6). This can be compared to RID data provided for the Lam Nam Oon 
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Irrigation Project which indicated that 12.1 % of the irrigable area was being 
cultivated in the 2009-10 dry season. The occasional, isolated case of small-scale 
irrigation systems believed to be “sustainable” or “successful” was mentioned by one 
or two people during the course of fieldwork, but I was unable to visit these 
exceptions to assess their status. For example, Laothai Nilnuan, found just two 
operational weir irrigation systems in a detailed survey he conducted of irrigation 
infrastructure in a river basin adjacent to the Nam Songkhram in Sakon Nakhon 
province, and identified some of the reasons behind the high failure rate. 
“Management of small and medium scale water resources from our 
study of over forty weirs in the Nam Phung basin, showed that the 
ability of the community to invest in maintenance of the weirs was 
insufficient. They didn’t have funds to maintain the weirs or hire 
people to open and close the gates, or other maintenance costs. The 
state just abandoned the water users groups and didn’t give them any 
support in water management. The state just constructed and then 
abandoned the weirs for the villagers to take care of by themselves. 
We saw that from more than forty dams, only two could be used in 
reality.”  
Source: Laothai Nilnuan, Interviewed 15 December, 2009. 
By the same token, neither did I find strong evidence to suggest that villagers 
themselves necessarily preferred small-scale projects over large-scale projects. 
Indeed, villagers responding to the questionnaire survey (see Table 11, Appendix 3) 
indicated that a high proportion were in favour of damming the Mekong to transfer 
water for irrigation into the Northeast
221
, although notably fewer were keen with the 
idea of transferring water from Lao rivers. There was also majority agreement in 
Khon Kaen (57 %) and the Nam Songkhram village (65.2 %) with the statement, “the 
job of planning and managing water resources is more the job of the people than the 
government”, but in Bangkok people were less certain about this proposition, with 
30.8 % disagreeing and 28 % not sure. The main point of this discussion is to suggest 
that irrigationalism is non scalar dependent, but is based on shared societal beliefs 
and values that communal-based irrigation development pathways are a superior 
default intervention for agricultural production pathways, which I argue is a cultural 
                                                   
221 In Baan Nong Batao the questionnaire-based survey revealed that 69.5 % of respondents seemed to 
be in favour of the idea of transferring water from the Mekong River to irrigate Isaan, with only about 
12 % not in favour of the idea. 
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phenomenon and constitutes an integral part of what the elite define as “Thai-ness”. 
For this reason it can also act relatively independently of rational or instrumental 
explanation, and allows development failure to be repeated over generations without 
serious reflection on the causes of that failure. And civil society actors can be as 
liable to seeing utopian futures in irrigation as their state counterparts. It could be that 
there may occasionally be no “right irrigation” (cf. Lankford, 2009) intervention 
above the household level in some contexts, if irrigation is exogenously derived and 
based more on ideological principles. 
 
9.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has further clarified the roles of some important state and non-state 
actors and the discursive processes to have emerged in the course of earlier chapters 
that are involved in the pursuit of the hydraulic mission. It has placed primary 
emphasis on the roles and relationships of the main hydraulic bureaucracies operating 
in the Northeast and considered some of the power relations and tensions between 
them as integral parts of the hydraulic state apparatus. Briefly considering the rise 
and demise of some past bureaucratic organizations now defunct (e.g. DEDP and 
ARD), it was shown that they were not truly agromanagerial agencies (merely 
interested in construction) and so were eventually superceded by the truly 
agromanagerial RID. However, the terrain of domination for the RID has been 
complicated since the establishment of the semi-regulatory DWR, which has 
threatened to remove some of the power and legitimacy enjoyed by the RID in recent 
years. By simultaneously attempting to regulate some areas of the RID’s domain of 
traditional control while also competing as another infrastructure construction agency 
in the same physical space as RID, there was palpable tension evident from officials 
interviewed in each. This situation of bureaucratic competition conforms with one of 
Wittfogel’s (1957) observations common in a hydraulic society. The potential prize 
for the dominant bureaucracy being less restricted access to the national treasury to 
continue unfettered with the hydraulic mission on one hand and unquestionable 
legitimacy conferred by patronage relations with the monarch at the apex, on the 
other. On present showing the RID is winning the two horse race on both counts, 
given its more established position and size, stronger royal patronage, and far 
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superior financial and political power it can draw upon; although this should not be 
an indicator of future status as the sands of Thai politics may shift.   
The chapter has also illustrated the critical role played by other actors and actor 
groups allied to the hydrocracies that benefit from operationalizing irrigationalism. 
For example, construction businesses, consultancies, politicians, and local elites that 
form strategic alliances with either DWR or RID (but rarely both) in a web of mutual 
interests. It has provided some examples from fieldwork observations that highlight 
the importance of both patron-client relationships and paternalism in sustaining and 
reproducing the tenets of irrigationalism within Thai hydraulic society. Local leaders 
assist in mediating and determining local water resources development outcomes 
sometimes directly with state agencies, although more often in practice they are 
members of a competitive political clique under patron-wielding politicians, such as 
MP Supachai. Politicians fulfill a critical role in irrigation development practices as 
mediators between the local elite on one side, state bureaucracies at each level of 
governance on another and friendly contractors on the third. Politicians are often 
judged by their ability to deliver water resources development projects to a locality 
and are rewarded for their efforts through lucrative rent seeking opportunities from 
their central power broking role. The construction companies form yet another 
indivisible part of the strategic group formation in maintaining the hydraulic 
society’s structure, as the state no longer undertakes all construction activities itself, 
as once was the case. Considering Brolsma’s (1996) quote at the start of this chapter, 
it would appear that he failed to appreciate, or perhaps was reluctant to admit, from 
the perspective of the hydraulic bureaucracies and their strategic allies, irrigation 
development patently was a goal in itself. It provides their raison d’être and 
ideological prop - they could no more abandon this element of their existence than a 
multi-national corporation is likely to abandon capitalism. 
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Chapter 10  “The Father of Water 
Resources Management” – role of the 
monarch in controlling water resources 
development discourse 
 
“The constructional, organizational, and acquisitive activities of 
hydraulic society tend to concentrate all authority in a directing center: 
the central government and ultimately the head of this government, the 
ruler......... Appearing as either a god or a descendant of a god, or as 
high priest, such a person is indeed a theocratic (divine) or 
quasitheocratical (pontifical) ruler.”  Source: Wittfogel (1957:90) 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
A core tenet of Wittfogel’s hydraulic society thesis was the existence of a totalitarian 
leader, a despot (Oriental or otherwise), sitting at the apex of an agro-managerial 
bureaucratic hierarchy, acting both as the chief ideologist and power broker of the 
state’s hydraulic apparatus. Based on the argument throughout this thesis that 
Thailand otherwise fits the fundamental profile of a modern day hydraulic society, 
then surely it would be worthwhile questioning whether such a powerful individual 
can be identified. Is there a Thai equivalent of the powerful ancient Chinese 
emperors, Sumerian kings, Angkorian kings or Egyptian pharaohs, but within the 
modern context of hydraulic development, control and statecraft? More specifically, 
does the present monarch, Bhumibol Adulyadej, fulfil any of the main characteristics 
identified by Wittfogel as an apex ruler of the hydraulic society? This question forms 
the basis of this chapter, and builds on the evidence presented in Chapter 5 and 
others that supports the notion of ideological explanations embodied in 
irrigationalism being a core driver of a state-centric irrigation development paradigm 
in Thai society. Earlier chapters have explored how the king’s symbolic, and 
occasionally material, influence is detectable at multiple scales in Thailand’s 
irrigation policy and practices, and how his name has repeatedly been symbolically 
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used to legitimise large numbers of infrastructure projects at multiple scales and 
thereby close debate, especially in the case of “Royally-Initiated Projects”. 
This chapter explores the discursive and material aspects of the current monarch’s 
role in water resources development and management, taking a historically cognizant 
perspective to the regional context of Northeast Thailand. It begins by considering 
some of Wittfogel’s criteria for a hydraulic despot before taking a critical look at the 
reign of King Bhumibol, through the discourse surrounding his links and 
involvement with hydraulic development. It attempts to disentangle the nature of his 
authority, whether it is more material or symbolic, and then goes on to consider to 
what degree the king’s power can be regarded as despotic or absolute, or whether it 
is more hegemonic and benign in nature, where ideological or non-coercive aspects 
of statecraft are brought to the fore, taking into account temporal considerations over 
the course of his reign. As such, it partly addresses the following research questions: 
 
SQ3: Which actors appear to determine control over irrigation development at 
multiple scales, using what discourses and pathways? 
 
SQ6: How closely does Thailand fit Wittfogel’s characterization as an exemplar of 
a “hydraulic society” in the modern-day context? and, to a lesser extent; 
 
 
10.2 Hydraulic society and tendency for the unchecked power of 
the supreme leader 
 
Wittfogel (1957:27) maintained that in any hydraulic society, there would generally 
be a supreme leader whose power was absolute and played “the decisive role in 
initiating, accomplishing, and perpetuating the major works of hydraulic economy.” 
In considering the nature of the power of the ruler, Wittfogel described it as “total 
and not benevolent” and noted an absence of effective constitutional checks and 
societal checks on its absolutism (see Chapter 5). As a consequence of this tendency, 
the ruler will tend to “expand his authority through alliances, maneuvers, and 
ruthless schemes until, having conquered all other centers of supreme decision, he 
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alone prevails” (Wittfogel, 1957:107). Wittfogel also refers to the existence of an 
organizational web for managing the hydraulic works covering the whole of the 
nation, or at least its “dynamic core”. As a result, he posits, “those who control this 
network are uniquely prepared to wield supreme political power” (Wittfogel, 
1957:27). 
King Bhumibol Adulyadej, whose name literally translates as, “one who holds 
incomparable sway over the land” (Office of the National Water Resources 
Committee, 1996) has ruled Thailand for over six decades and stands as the longest 
reigning monarch in the world. Born in the United States of America and educated 
mostly in Switzerland
222
, the king acquired the throne in June 1946 under mysterious 
circumstances, after his elder brother was shot and killed in the Grand Palace, 
Bangkok
223
. After returning to Europe to continue studies and careful grooming by 
court elders for the burdens of kingship, Bhumibol was crowned monarch in May 
1950 (Handley, 2006). This was a particularly turbulent moment in Thai history 
when the nation was emerging from the chaos of World War Two and was aligning 
itself in a new world order of Cold War politics, while serious domestic internecine 
power struggles between authoritarian military strongmen and more liberal, 
democratic reformers were being waged (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). Official 
biographies relate how Bhumibol was made acutely aware by palace advisors from 
an early stage in his reign of the vital importance of utilizing ritual symbolism, 
mysticism and religion in the job of ruling a deeply superstitious people (Stevenson, 
2001). 
In considering the role and impact of Bhumibol’s reign on the nation’s hydraulic 
development paradigm, I would begin with the observation that this aspect has been 
a relatively under-studied and poorly acknowledged element of statecraft and 
societal control in Thailand, and thus requires a historical and cultural perspective to 
make sense of the present socio-political milieu of development.  
 
 
                                                   
222 Bhumibol initially studied engineering at University in Lausanne, but later switched to political 
science and law, but never actually completed his degree due to the demands of kingship. 
223 There are various conspiracy theories regarding the cause of Ananda Mahidol’s death, ranging 
from accident to suicide to murder by one of several potential actors (Handley, 2006). 
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10.3 God King, Warrior King or “King of the Waters”?  
 
As alluded to in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4) , official state narratives often trace the deep 
reverence shown by the Thai people to the monarchy back to “the loving 
paternalistic nature” ascribed to the thirteenth century King Ramkhamhaeng, which 
has supposedly instilled an enduring “filial sense of respect and gratitude” amongst 
the citizenry to the royal institution (The National Identity Board, 2000). Such 
official accounts invariably stress the importance of superstitions and ancient 
religious beliefs surrounding the occult power of great Thai warrior kings that have 
been carried down through centuries of continuous benign monarchical rule (e.g. 
Tongyai, 1990). There is purportedly a lasting relationship between the Thai 
monarchs and divinity which has developed into “an established part of the national 
consciousness” (The National Identity Board, 2000). King Bhumibol’s cosmological 
roots claim inheritance from the Theravada Buddhist tradition of a virtuous dhamma-
raajaa
224
 warrior-king on one hand, and from the Hindu-Brahman culture of 
kingship rooted in the Khmer Angkor tradition on the other, in which it is believed 
the sovereign was a living sacral deva-raajaa, or god-king (Handley, 2006). As 
former Prime Minister and royal ideologue, M.R. Kukrit Pramoj stated, “[T]he king 
must be both God and human. It is the burden of the king to consider where the 
dividing line between the two is....” (Pramoj (1983) cited in The National Identity 
Board, 2000). According to Fong (2009:688), “the syncretism of devaraja and 
dhammaraja with a relational view metaphorically expressed as between father and 
children, or pho-luk, constituted Thailand’s unwritten social contract between king 
and subjects.” 
Theoretically, pre-1932 all Thai monarchs were considered absolute, with the king 
being considered the phrachao paendin (lord of the land) and phrachao chiwit (lord 
of life). The king ruled at the apex of a vast pyramidal structure of status relations, 
the sakdinaa system, where everyone occupied a position in relation to the king, and 
by extension, to each other (Ockey, 2005). However, argues Ockey (ibid.), outside 
                                                   
224 While some Thais may consider the king to embody sacred qualities as both pious dhamma-raja 
and semi-divine deva-raajaa, others perceive him more as a sammuthithep, a kind of “virtual deity”, 
rather than as an actual god (Connors, 2011) 
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the capital the sakdinaa system held less sway and more complex but less formal 
patterns of leadership were found. Generally speaking, the further one went from 
Bangkok, the greater the independence of local leaders. “In many places, the power 
of the absolute monarch meant little compared to the power of the local leader. In the 
tributary states, the king could only demand tribute, which was paid only 
intermittently, on threat of war (Ockey, 2005:4). 
Bhumibol’s grandfather, King Chulalongkorn, one of the last absolute monarchs, has 
been recognized as a political reformist of the Thai bureaucracy and founding father 
of modern irrigation in Thailand. He granted a monopoly to the Siam Land, Canals 
and Irrigation Company to develop the Rangsit Project
225
 located to the north of 
Bangkok in the 1890s and permitted the establishment of an Irrigation Department 
(Grom Khlong) in 1903 (Falvey, 2000). Chulalongkorn was instrumental in 
identifying a need to develop an improved system of water management and 
irrigation in the Central Plains, notes Brummelhuis (2005), and invited a number of 
foreign advisers including a Dutchman (described as a “brilliant engineer”) to move 
to Siam in 1902 from the Dutch East Indies colonial regime, in order to overhaul the 
irrigation system in the service of the state. In a generally sympathetic treatment of 
Homan van der Heide’s226 mission, Brummelhuis treats the protagonist as an unsung 
hero ahead of his time, who fell victim to Machiavellian court politics and a lack of 
shared vision amongst the Siamese elite regarding the productive value of irrigation 
development. Chulalongkorn reputedly labelled van der Heide as “King of the 
Waters”227, for his decisive role in designing what was then referred to as simply 
“The Great Scheme”, but would later become the Lower Chao Phraya Delta 
Irrigation Scheme
228
. As mentioned in Chapter 4, by interpreting the hydraulic 
society theory as only referring to the construction of irrigation infrastructure, rather 
                                                   
225 Described as “the first comprehensive irrigation scheme”, this project involved the development of 
1,600 kms of waterways and mechanized water control structures, followed by land drainage, 
development and sale for irrigated agriculture by the Company (Borisat) (Falvey, 2000). 
226 Van der Heide, according to Brummelhuis (2007:2), was considered a pioneer of what later 
became known as the “ethical movement” in Dutch colonial history, which had as its slogan 
“emigration, irrigation and education”, and may be viewed as a moralistic social engineer with an 
unshakeable belief in “irrigation for progress”. 
227 King Chulalongkorn is said to have once introduced van der Heide to a dinner guest with this title, 
interpreted as an ironical reference to his country of origin, which was popularly known in Siam as a 
land of water and the Dutch considered “landless buccaneers” (Brummelhuis, 2007:xiii). 
228 This irrigation scheme was eventually constructed in the early 1950s with a World Bank loan. For 
a critical treatment of the historical outcome of this controversial project over the proceeding decades, 
refer to Molle (2003, 2007a) 
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than a range of protective and productive hydraulic works, Brummelhuis (2005) 
dismisses the hypothesis near the start of his book as “unsatisfactory” (p.13) and a 
“myth” (p.14) and thereby misses an opportunity to evaluate Siam as a potential 
hydraulic society and King Chulalongkorn as a budding hydraulic despot, on the 
basis of a more nuanced engagement.  
By contrast, I would argue, a co-evolutionary process of elite nation-building began 
in earnest alongside securing hydraulic control of the core in the Chao Phraya delta 
under Chulalongkorn, but did not reach its zenith until well into the reign of 
Bhumibol. The present monarch has, on reflection, become a far more deserving 
recipient of the “King of the Waters” title than any individual before or since. Indeed, 
this was tacitly acknowledged in a recent hagiographic feature in the Thailand Tatler 
magazine about the present king’s brilliance in developing and managing Thailand’s 
waters, simply titled “The King of Water” (Ehrlich, 2011). The article timed to mark 
the occasion of his 84
th
 birthday in December 2011, noted how he had dedicated a 
lifetime’s work to “seeking viable ways to prevent the vagaries of flood and drought 
spawned by the extremes of nature that are so prevalent in Southeast Asia”, and to 
celebrate his achievements in solving the nation’s water resources management 
problems, the king would “ceremonially inaugurate” five large-scale royally initiated 
projects under the RID.   
I now proceed to consider some of the possible origins and evolution of Bhumibol’s 
interest in and dedication to hydraulic development through an analysis of some 
dominant societal narratives. 
 
10.4 Role of the king in helping forge a national identity  
 
 “’Some people wonder why I became interested in irrigation or 
forestry,’ His Majesty said in one of his speeches 30 years ago. ‘I 
remember that when I was 10 years old, a science teacher who is now 
dead taught me about soil conservation. We had to write: “There must 
be forest on the mountain or the rain will erode the soil and damage 
the mountain surface.” This is a fundamental fact of soil and forest 
conservation and of irrigation. If we fail to maintain the highland 
forest, we will have problems ranging from soil erosion to 
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sedimentation in dams and in rivers. Both can lead to floods. I have 
understood these relationships since I was 10.’” 
(Source: Bangkok Post 19 May, 2006 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/60yrsthrone/saviour/index.html 
Accessed 20 October 2011) 
In this section, I introduce the role of the Thai king as a key actor with direct agency 
to command on one hand, yet at the same time, just one amongst several powerful 
actors occupying the upper strata of a strongly hierarchical social structure that 
benefits from the maintenance of hydraulic society and state promotion of 
irrigationalism. I present an argument that suggests King Bhumibol has consistently 
been at the forefront of constructing and sustaining a potent irrigation development 
ideology in Thailand, which combines of discursive and material strategies. In the 
process, his agency has had a discernible impact on the material shape and outcomes 
of local, regional and national irrigation development. Simultaneously I 
acknowledge that such transformation cannot be achieved alone, and thus go on to 
examine some of the other actors and actor groups that have forged strategic 
alliances with the monarchy, such as the military, hydraulic bureaucracies, 
international development agencies, royalist and paramilitary groups, elements of 
civil society and various private sector companies involved in promoting the 
irrigation development paradigm (see Section 10.10 on network monarchy for 
further elaboration). I begin by examining the early period of the king’s reign and 
rise to power with relation to water resources development, in particular the role of 
an early close mentor and ally in moulding future narratives, namely the despotic and 
paternalistic military dictator Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat (refer to Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3).   
As noted already, Sarit played an instrumental role after the 1957 coup in helping to 
strengthen the legitimacy of a monarchy weakened by the toppling of the absolute 
monarchy in 1932 (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). Sarit’s restoration and re-
glorification of the monarchy as a semi-divine, “development king” was reciprocal, 
providing the dictator legitimacy in return, important given his lack of an electoral or 
popular mandate (Fong, 2009). By emphasizing the real and imagined achievements 
of Thailand’s past monarchs and re-establishing conservative definitions of Thai 
identity and conservative political structures, Jackson (2002:167) argued that both 
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military regimes and political parties sympathetic to the military found, “the 
manipulation of the symbolism which historically surrounded and supported the 
absolute monarchy to provide a convenient basis for the centralized and autocratic 
exercise of political power.”  
While most past academic attention has focused on the role of the monarchy as an 
apex institution in Thai society, a presently limited (but growing) body of literature 
has specifically spotlighted the role of King Bhumibol as the defining political actor 
instrumental in reviving its fortunes to a position unimaginable in 1950 (both 
figuratively and literally
229
) (e.g. McCargo, 2005; Handley, 2006; Ivarsson and 
Isager, 2010; Connors, 2011). Fong (2009), for example, argues that the staying 
power of the present king through six decades of tumultuous political crises and 
socio-economic transformation can only be properly understood by moving away 
from stagist views of historical development with simplistic binaries and instead 
identifying cultural themes and practices of nation construction. He argues that King 
Bhumibol should be conceptualized as a “dedicated and committed nationalist”, who 
through masterful modesty and political entrepreneurship managed to accommodate 
the military strongmen, “to bureaucratize and institutionalize royalism without ever 
abandoning his trump card: the capacity to work with royalists to generate mysticism, 
aura and most importantly a primordial connection to a glorified history that would 
have remained elegiac” (Fong, 2009:680). Hence, in this interpretation, great 
emphasis is accorded the king’s individual agency in forging national identity and 
nationhood identified earlier in Chapter 5. Critical to constructing a Thai national 
identity was the idea that Thailand was at heart an agricultural nation of self-
sufficient and contented agriculturalists (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1). This 
worldview incorporated community-managed irrigation schemes as the default water 
management strategy of farmers, throughout the kingdom. Promoting a mythical 
united notion of “Thai-ness” in agriculture was essential to securing kingship, as 
much as any other form of statecraft, argued Falvey (2000).  
 
 
                                                   
229 A 2011 report for Forbes magazine stated that King Bhumibol is the richest monarch in the world 
by a comfortable margin, having assets in excess of US$ 30 billion, mostly acquired through the 
Crown Property Bureau (Montlake, 2012). 
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10.4.1 Becoming a “Development King” 
 
To recognize his development achievements, the king has been awarded an 
impressive array of titles, academic degrees
230
 and awards during his reign, several 
relating to agriculture and water resources management, both at home and abroad 
(see Table 10.1 below). These are interpreted in official narratives as concrete 
manifestations and affirmation of his superior abilities, leadership and inventiveness. 
For instance, he was presented the FAO Agricola Medal for his “dedication and 
devotion to the progress of the agricultural development of Thailand, which is also 
beneficial to the world” (The Public Relations Department, 2000:85). The medal 
portrays images of the king instructing villagers in crop growing on one side and the 
king with a map under his arm and camera around his neck; an iconic image closely 
associated in the Thai psyche with frequent trips to the countryside to direct 
irrigation development and also features on the highest value 1,000 baht banknote, in 
which he stares down benevolently at the Pasak Cholasit dam (see Fig. 10.1 and 10.2 
and Section 10.9).  
 
 
                                                   
230 In 1997, the palace revealed that the king has 136 honorary degrees, an unsurpassed record. This 
was prior to being awarded ten honorary doctorates from Kasetsart University alone, mentions 
Handley (2006) 
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Bhumibol has sometimes been referred to as “the guiding light of development” for 
his vision in promoting national development throughout his reign (The Public 
Relations Department, 2000) and credited with personally saving it from the worst 
affects of the 1997 Asian economic crash by his “new theory” of economic self-
reliance. As if to reconfirm the official narrative that the king has been the principle 
helmsman behind progress and success in Thai water resources development and 
management, in 2008 the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment displayed 
a pavilion at the Expo Zaragoza in Spain with the theme, “Water is Life - Royal 
Initiatives”. The Thai pavilion’s objective, according to the Department of Water 
Resources, was “to disseminate His Majesty the King’s brilliant initiatives for Thai 
way of life, culture, tradition, as well as innovation for sustainable water resources 
management to the international sight” (Department of Water Resources, 2008). 
Title of Award Awarding Organization Date of 
award 
Ramon Magsaysay Award for International 
Understanding – work of the Royal Projects 
Ramon Magsaysay Award 
Foundation 
August 1988 
UNEP Gold Medal of Distinction – for 
contributions to the environment and nature 
conservation 
The United Nations Environment 
Programme 
November 
1992 
Agricola Medal - for services to agriculture 
and rural development 
The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) 
December 1995 
International Rice Award Medal - in 
recognition of “passionate and personal 
interest in and devotion to the well-being of 
rice farmers and consumers” 
The International Rice Research 
Institute 
June 1996 
Award presented  in recognition of his “strong 
support for meteorology and operational 
hydrology” 
The World Meteorological 
Organization 
February 1997 
Telefood Medal – in recognition of his 
“dedication to Thailand’s agricultural 
development, with the aim of raising the 
farmers’ standard of living and establishing 
food security” 
FAO December 1999 
Golden Ear of Paddy – commemorating 
outstanding leadership in rural development 
Asia-Pacific Rural and 
Agricultural Credit Association 
May 2005 
UNDP Lifetime Achievement Award – 
recognition of “the global relevance of his call 
for a sufficiency approach to development” 
The United Nations 
Development Programme 
May 2006 
Dr Norman E. Borlaug Medallion – in 
recognition of his “outstanding humanitarian 
service in alleviating starvation and poverty 
World Food Prize Foundation July 2007 
Source: (Thaiways Magazine, 2011) 
Table 10.1  A selection of honours and awards presented to King Bhumibol, in 
recognition of his contributions to agriculture, rural development and water resources 
management 
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In addition to these international awards, domestically too he has been given a 
number of honourific titles for his contributions and services to national water 
resources development, the most apposite of which are outlined in the following 
sections. 
 
10.4.2 The Great Engineer 
 
“During more than 50 years of his reign, His Majesty has been concerned 
with his people’s ‘suffering’, thoroughly understood its ‘cause’ [sic], 
devised the method to minimise their suffering and guided the 
government agencies involved to implement the way to the cessation of 
their suffering....... Though His Majesty’s social contributions have been 
selectively praised in this book, the Engineering Institute of Thailand 
extremely hopes that it will remind all fellow ‘engineers’ of the country 
of their commitment to carry out His Majesty’s resolution and will show 
their gratitude towards His Majesty compassion to ‘cease the Thai 
people’s suffering’.” 
Source: (Kiattikomol, 2000:10) 
A major part of the “cause” of people’s “suffering”, according to the royal discourse, 
is the impacts that “natural disasters” like drought and floods have on the livelihood 
and wellbeing of the populace, which he believes are the principal water resources 
management problems afflicting Thailand. As stressed in Chapters 5 and 6, this 
causal link is repeated so often in state-sponsored publications and media reports that 
it has become a standard article of faith in the wider national development discourse. 
Not only is the king portrayed as intimately understanding a priori the causes of 
environmental degradation, poverty and suffering (see quote at start of Section 10.4), 
but he also understands the best solutions and, more impressively, possesses a gift 
for inventing methods for the minimization and even, eliminating his people’s 
suffering through magico-divinity means (Jackson, 2010). Indeed, the same 
Engineering Institute of Thailand sponsored publication quoted above, identifying 
the king as a “fellow engineer”, reverently notes:  
 “The engineering and Buddhist Noble Truths are integrated in the 
concept to develop the country in the right direction.” (Kiattikomol, 
2000:23) 
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During the course of his reign the king has been feted for making several important 
technological contributions to the field of water resources management, some of 
which are recognized in the awards in Table 10.1. He has been praised domestically 
for inventing or adapting a number of technologies associated with improved water 
resources management (The Public Relations Department, 2000), including a 
mechanical water aeration device for pollution mitigation, an artificial rainmaking 
technique (see Section 10.4.3), small check dams for use in upland water streams, fog 
traps for irrigation at high altitudes, a massive flood control system for Bangkok, 
floodplain storage reservoirs for flood management (the “gaem ling” or “Monkey 
Cheeks” concept) and various bio-engineering techniques (e.g. vetiver grass for 
erosion control and water hyacinth
231
 for wastewater control in Bangkok’s canals). 
The first of these royal inventions was a paddle wheel aerator (named the Chaipattana 
Aerator
232
) for use in de-oxygenated waterways and densely stocked fish ponds that 
the king claims a patent for (The National Identity Board, 2000).  
While the king is often associated with the promotion of small-scale solutions to 
local water resources problems such as mechanical and biological wastewater 
treatment methods or building small “check dams” (“fai maew”) based on supposedly 
indigenous designs of highland ethnic groups
233
 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), 
this association with promoting small-scale infrastructure is a relatively new 
construction (since the rise of his Sufficiency Economy philosophy) and in the past 
he showed a greater affinity to advocating large-scale hydraulic infrastructural 
solutions to Thailand’s water woes. Despite the adoption of a recent rhetoric 
promoting internationally popular developmental terms such as “sufficiency 
economy”, “sustainable”, “participatory”, “community-based” and “locally 
appropriate” approaches, the king has rarely shied away in the past from vocally 
supporting large-scale, state-led projects, such as the Bachoh and Pak Phanang 
                                                   
231 The king likened the non-native water hyacinth to a “bandit fighting bandit”, due to its ability to 
absorb heavy metals out of polluted waters (National Identity Board, 2000). Unfortunately, these 
plants have now become a serious invasive pest species and the government spends large budgets 
annually in trying to eradicate it from waterways. 
232 The Chaipattana Aerator received a patent in Thailand in February 1995 that credits the king as its 
inventor.  
233 I found these weirs or “fai maew” being built in large numbers in the Nam Songkhram Basin 
during fieldwork, often in totally unsuitable locations for the technology (Fig. 9.7). It seemed the 
underlying rationale had more to do with distributing money and favour to local elites (i.e. “gifting”) 
than seriously addressing water scarcity issues. Through association of this technology with the king, 
and its “local scale”, it was unlikely anyone would dare question the logic of the exercise.  
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schemes in the South; the Pasak Cholasit and Tha Dan schemes in the Central Plains; 
the Khwae Noi Project in the North; and the Green Isaan and Nam Gam projects in 
the Northeast, suggesting an earlier fascination with hydraulic engineering gigantism. 
Supporting this view, Handley (2006:366) reports that a Thai environmentalist he 
interviewed commented, “[T]he king represents the mentality of a conventional 
engineer: You can conquer nature and you should do so.” 
 
10.4.3 The Royal Rainmaker 
 
Having identified water scarcity resulting from “uncertain rainfall” leading to 
suppressed agricultural productivity being the principal obstacle besetting Thailand’s 
farming sector, the king reportedly developed an interest in “the science and 
technology” of generating artificial rain (The National Identity Board, 2000). An 
official narrative suggests that his fascination dates back to the mid-1950s, during 
charitable giving trips to more remote parts of the country where he met devoted 
subjects, studied their living conditions, promoted national unity and identified 
development projects for later implementation: 
“Early in his reign, His Majesty the King became interested in 
artificial rainmaking to assist farmers, who are very dependent on 
rainwater for their cultivation. At this point, he began to study 
artificial rainmaking techniques to seek ways of bringing down more 
rain to ease the drought situation. He read research work on 
meteorology and weather modification, which he found useful for 
combating weather change. In 1955, when His Majesty visited 
northeastern provinces, he travelled from Nakhon Phanom to Kalasin, 
passing through Sakon Nakhon and the Phuphan mountain range. 
During the trip, he looked at the sky and saw a large number of clouds 
moving over the vast, arid area of the Northeast. The initial conception 
arose from his observation that there was no rain despite heavy 
cloudiness. He wondered how to make the clouds move down and turn 
into rain.” 
(Source: Foreign Office. The Government Public Relations Department Office 
website: http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/king/father.html Accessed 8 March, 2012) 
There seems to have been a considerable delay between making these initial 
observations in the Northeast and any concrete action being taken. A government 
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document relates that the king later, “ordered M.R. Debriddhi Devakul, an expert in 
agricultural engineering of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, to conduct 
research”, which resulted in the establishment of an “Artificial Rain Research and 
Experiment Project” and an initial artificial rain experiment being conducted in Pak 
Chong District, Nakhon Ratchasima province in July 1969 (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, No date). The king is often presented as the driving force behind 
the technological breakthroughs that helped foster an enduring image of his scientific 
expertise in directing rainfall to areas of greatest scarcity (The National Identity 
Board, 2000). Reports tend to stress the king’s personal agency, in taking control of 
the rainmaking project (rather than credit the efforts of state officials or foreign 
advisors) as evidenced in the following account: 
 “The early experiments faced quite a number of constraints because 
the science of artificial rainmaking was new. It was a big task and 
there were neither experts nor scientists in the field of atmospheric 
modification. The King made the experiments by himself, and he also 
gave his personal funds to support the project......By 1969, the King 
had discovered how to make rain, using non-toxic chemicals. As 
important, he discovered how to divert the rain to the required 
directions and bodies of water, such as reservoirs, lagoons, lakes and 
canals. This success has become the hope and the security of the 
farmers during the times of drought.”  
(The Public Relations Department, 2000:77)  
Paul Handley (2006) notes that in October 1972, the king invited a delegation of 
foreign diplomats to directly observe artificial rainmaking activities in Petchburi 
province
234
. Not long after, the rather bland sounding “artificial rain” terminology 
was upgraded in official accounts to the more regal “Royal Rain” (fon luang), thus 
leaving little doubt about the source of the kingdom’s fertility. In 1975, the king is 
reported to have established a “Royal Rain-Making Office” under the supervision of 
the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives, No date). Another account reports how he worked 
                                                   
234 This public relations exercise was not dissimilar to one over a century earlier, when in 1868 King 
Rama IV invited European diplomats from as far away as Singapore to witness a solar eclipse he had 
predicted on the coast of Prachuap Khiri Khan province, as a demonstration of his astronomic 
prowess. 
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closely with research institutes and military missile experts to build experimental 
artificial rain rockets
235
 (The Public Relations Department, 2000).  
The king’s apparent enthusiasm for artificial rainmaking has remained 
undiminished throughout his reign. In 1999, the king was reported to have 
“discovered” a novel technique for achieving greater cloud density and increasing 
the extent of rainfall. The king named the new cloud-seeding method the “Super 
Sandwich” technique236, which has reputedly been recognized worldwide to make 
Thailand “the centre of tropical rainmaking activities in this region” (Thaiways 
Magazine, 2011). The same article described the king as being “eulogized” as the 
“Father of Royal Rainmaking” for outstanding success in solving water shortage 
problems and increasing agricultural production through the application of his 
patented rainmaking techniques. The economic cost-benefit ratio of the rainmaking 
operations is less clear
237
, however, as it has been steadily bureaucratized and 
become a routine part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives’ and 
Ministry of Defence’s work, albeit wrapped in a cloak of royal secrecy. In recent 
years fighting the silent natural enemy (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4) has become a 
matter of such grave national concern that it has even necessitated the deployment 
of Royal Thai Air Force fighter jets in cloud-seeding efforts when drought strikes
238
 
(Anonymous, 2009). The following quote from an Asian Times article, suggested 
that the national annual costs of this exercise amounted to over £19 million
239
 at the 
time, but the financial benefits remained obscure: 
 “Over the past month, 10 new sub-stations also have been established 
to help with cloud-seeding operations. They are temporary bases and 
will cease operation once the drought is under control, said Prinya 
Sudhikoses, with the Agriculture Ministry's Bureau of Royal 
                                                   
235 The language employed for artificial rainmaking is reminiscent of military warfare, such as the 
three distinct stages of the process described as follows: Stage 1 – Agitation; Stage 2 – Enlargement; 
Stage 3 - Attack (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2007?) 
236 One of the favoured aircraft used for the cloud seeding operation was reported to be a “Super King 
Air 350” model (The National Identity Board, 2000). 
237 The king has reportedly taken the view that cost-benefit analysis and quantifying the economic rate 
of returns are less important measures of success than any social benefits that accrue from the heavily 
subsidized projects, maintains Handley (2006). 
238 The king was reported to have made another military analogy in a speech given at Chitralada 
Palace on 30 July, 1986, when he stated: “Rainmaking is like a warship; you fire the missile far, then 
close in order to properly hit the target. Since we have facilities for rainmaking, we should be sure to 
use it properly to get rain in the right places” (The National Identity Board, 2000:275). 
239 This figure is based on an assumed exchange rate of 50.1 THB to one GB £. Table 10.2 suggests 
that the total annual budget allocated for making “Royal Rain” may have nearly doubled since. 
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Rainmaking and Agricultural Aviation. Cloud seeding, however, will 
continue throughout the year. Rainmaking operations occur every year 
in line with the rainmaking department's annual operations plan, the 
budget for which is set at about 1 billion baht ($25 million).” (Source: 
Schonhardt (2005)) 
While the king is carefully portrayed to utilize the latest science and technology in 
the fight against drought and floods, he is simultaneously presented as being adept 
at drawing on traditional mythology and quasi-divine powers in understanding and 
influencing Thailand’s weather patterns. For example, in his 1995 birthday speech 
broadcast nationwide, he said he was able to predict the course of a typhoon earlier 
that year which meteorologists had said would hit Thailand directly, but in the end 
skirted by harmlessly. The king claimed to know better than the professional 
scientists the typhoon’s path due to consulting with “Mani Mekhala”240, which he 
explained was, “a weather forecast office which has its headquarters on Mount 
Sumeru” and he requested divine intervention from the deity that was duly granted, 
saving the nation from a terrible deluge (Handley, 2006:390).  
It is apparent that both the palace and the wider state public relations machine has 
recognized the immeasurable propaganda value to be derived from promoting the 
artificial rainmaking narrative to its fullest extent, combining the potent gifts of a 
scientifically astute monarch who is also privy to ancient knowledge and mysterious 
powers. The “Royal Rainmaker” moniker and attendant imagery beamed by 
television into every home, has been an invaluable ideological device in enabling a 
royally-legitimated state command over the skies and weather (as well as water on 
the ground), to bring hope and succour to the rural masses painted as being at the 
mercy of the elements. No other political competitor could hope to match the state’s 
extensive public relations machine devoted to maximising what Wittfogel 
(1957:133) termed the “rulers’ publicity optimum” in shaping public opinion 
favourably to accepting the monarch’s utter benevolence in such matters, which 
reaches its peak in the next title. 
 
 
                                                   
240 Mekhala, a folklore goddess of the seas in Indic mythology, perhaps coincidentally, was the name 
adopted for a national water resources “operations centre” run by the Department of Water Resources, 
designed in principle to be a hub that coordinates activities with other water-related agencies. 
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10.4.4 The Father of Water Resources Management 
 
The honorific title that perhaps best encapsulates the exalted position in which King 
Bhumibol is held for his skills in hydrological management, was the accolade 
presented on the occasion of his 50
th
 year on the throne, by the then Prime Minister, 
Banharn Silpa-Archa. He was awarded the title of “Father of Water Resources 
Management” in recognition of his long and significant contribution to national water 
resources development. In the presentation speech, Banharn drew strongly on the 
king’s superior problem identification framework, in a process of glorification: 
“Your Majesty’s interest in water is not only limited to help 
lessening the water shortage problem to ease the hardship of people, 
but also to maintain the quality and quantity of water in balance, a 
crucial factor for human survival. Management includes draining 
water from low-lying areas where floods stagnated, flood protection 
and mitigation, as well as waste water treatment. In our humble 
recognition of Your Majesty’s Kindness and Competence on water 
resources development and management, I, on behalf of the Royal 
Thai Government and all the Thai people, beg for your gracious 
permission to offer to Your Majesty the epithet of ‘The Father of 
Water Resources Management’” 
 (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, No date:135) 
This overtly patrimonial title has been frequently employed since to strengthen a 
narrative equating the king with meta-physical prowess in managing and developing 
water resources. A decade later on the 60
th
 anniversary of the king’s reign, a rash of 
publications were released celebrating the king’s achievements in rural development, 
many of them referring to him as “The Father of Water Resources Management“. 
His reputation as a near-genius inventor, practical sage and benevolent father figure 
in the field of agricultural water resources management and hydraulic control was 
elevated still further. Wittfogel is said to have noted, according to Fong (2009:680) 
that patrimonial society is “not so much a stage in a universal, linear theory of social 
evolution but one that is its own agent of historical unfolding over time”. The 
multiple religio-cosmological mystification elements built around the present 
monarch’s reign have only served to confirm his authority and potency in matters 
hydrological and meteorological in a primordial sense. As Handley (2006:164) 
maintains:  
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“Official accounts have the king leaping headfirst into combating rural 
poverty, and especially fostering water resources development, as soon 
as he occupied the throne in 1951. The mythology even goes so far as 
to say Bhumibol was born with a hydrological bent, predestined to 
develop sustainable water supplies for all his people, not unlike the 
Hindu devaraja as source of life and fertility to the land.”   
The king’s ideas and vision around water resources development, readily offered as 
policy advice to the government and public though up-country visits, speeches, 
exhibitions and royal publications, were first put to the test and made tangible at his 
own palaces and royal development centres, then later through his personal charity 
foundation and via the vehicle of so-called “Royally-initiated Projects”.  
 
10.5 Royally-initiated projects 
 
“His Royal Initiative Projects aim to relieve problems of water 
whether flood, drought or pollution aim to mitigate people's sufferings. 
He endeavours to study on how to tackle water resources development 
and management because he is certain that without the water-related 
problems that damage crop yields and with availability of sufficient 
water, the standard of living of those impoverished rural people could 
be better”  
Source: (Department of Water Resources, 2008) 
Originally established on an ad hoc basis during the Phibun era supposedly using the 
monarch’s own financial resources, the Royally-initiated Projects (khrong-gan an-
nuang maa jaak pracha-damree) initially concentrated on providing social welfare 
for disaster relief and providing direct charity to the poor, plus a production unit for 
royal films and radio broadcasting projects (The Public Relations Department, 2000). 
The first Royally-Initiated Project is reputed to have commenced in the 1950s at Ban 
Huay Mongkhol, Hua Hin District, Prachuap Khiri Khan Province (The National 
Identity Board, 2000), and then later another village study centre was built at Hup 
Kapong in nearby Cha-am District in an area with infertile soils and uncertain 
rainfall to put to the test the king’s formative ideas on water resources development. 
He reportedly requested the Border Patrol Police to bulldoze roads to the village and 
build a small storage reservoir in 1963, as the initial crucible for a life-long 
315 
 
experiment in developmental social engineering by the monarch (Handley, 2006). 
The projects were generally located in more remote districts of the country, 
especially those formerly considered prone to the influence of the ideology of 
communism and border insurgency from neighbouring states (see Chapter 5). As the 
ideological and physical struggle against communism intensified during and after the 
Sarit regime, so the Royally-Initiated Projects expanded their remit and scope into 
new fields of development
241
 nationwide. A key founding principle was that the 
projects were to act as sustainable agricultural demonstration sites for surrounding 
communities’ benefit based on Buddhist economic principles242.  
During the 1960s and 70s, a number of new palaces and Royal Projects were 
deliberately sited near to former Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) strongholds, 
including one in the Phu Phan hills of Sakhon Nakhon (Chapter 8, Section 8.3), 
based on a reasoning that state development assistance and democracy were the local 
population’s greatest needs, so they would not fall prey to the propaganda of 
“foreign” ideologies (Dejkunjorn, 2006). Bhumibol wished his reign to be closely 
identified with fighting poverty and championing development, so the royal projects 
became an integral part of a hegemonic process used “to win a political-ideological 
war”, argues Chitbundit (2007). At the same time, the king was reportedly critical of 
the state’s approach to development and heavy-handed excesses during the military 
counterinsurgency campaign, which he claimed was encouraging disaffected 
villagers to join the CPT (Handley, 2006). Revealingly, in a rare televised interview 
for a 1980 BBC documentary, Bhumibol explained that his main contribution to 
rural development activities was constructing over 400 irrigation projects
243
. He is 
portrayed as a hard-working and lonely monarch fighting not only local poverty and 
drought against the odds from his “bare-bones war operation centre” in the palace, 
but also battling inept and ineffectual government approaches to development. 
According to Handley (2006:272), the king “refers only to his own work, as if the 
government doesn’t exist”. 
                                                   
241 A favourite development challenge, well supported by foreign aid donors, was opium eradication 
and substitution projects for Northern hilltribes 
242 Bhumibol is reputed to have been impressed by the ideas of E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful, 
which were later integrated into his “Sufficiency Economy” philosophy (Handley, 2006). 
243 The two hour documentary called Soul of a Nation and was built on a premise that the king was a 
“humble, modern leader guided by Buddhist insight” and “protecting his kingdom from the imminent 
threat of communism” (Handley, 2006). See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJqblboHGh0 
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After the virtual military defeat of the CPT
244
 around 1981, a state-funded “Office of 
the Royal Projects Development Board” was established to bureaucratize and 
normalize the relationship between the monarchy and state institutions concerning 
rural development efforts. According to Chitbundit (2007), this new agency focused 
much of its early development efforts on implementing large-scale irrigation projects 
around the country. The king was able to mobilise support from a number of state 
agencies to set up six Royal Development Study Centres that acted as experimental 
research stations and extension centres, including one located near the Phu Phan 
Palace
245
. According to the National Identity Board (2000:311), “[T]he development 
study centres can be compared to living natural museums, which reduce the number 
of steps in the coordination of management that conventionally involves agencies 
operating separately on their own.” A Public Relations Department (2000:85) book 
on the monarchy estimates that over three thousand royal development projects have 
been established nationwide and speculates why these are “more noticeable than the 
government’s policy platform”, maintaining that only the king is able to promote 
compromise and achieve cooperation amongst squabbling agencies. 
The next logical step for the king was the formation of the Chaipattana
246
 
Foundation in 1988. This is essentially a royal development charity set up to 
complement the work of the Royal Projects and mobilize funds from a variety of 
sources, including public donations, “to help accelerate rural development” in areas 
perceived by the king to be insufficient or constrained by “budget and procedural 
problems” (The National Identity Board, 2000). This Foundation, along with 
constant monitoring of the Royal Projects, gave him more reason to devote 
increasing periods of time in the countryside advising on, designing and 
implementing water resources development projects, putting to practice his 
engineering skills (Kiattikomol, 2000). A sympathetic biography (but later banned) 
by a Briton who enjoyed almost unprecedented personal access to the king over 
                                                   
244 According to Baker and Phongpaichit (2005), most student supporters of the CPT left the jungle 
bases between 1979-81, while the majority of CPT armed units surrendered their weapons between 
1982-83 or fled to neighbouring Lao PDR.  
245 This Centre was located not far from Baan Non Rua and the Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project, with 
several villagers I met having attended agricultural training courses there at one time or another, 
including courses that focus on teaching the king’s “Sufficiency Economy” philosophy.  
246 Chaipattana literally means “Victory of Development”, with the King acting as Honorary President 
and Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, the Executive Chairperson of the Foundation (National Identity 
Board, 2000) 
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several years, noted the guardedness with which the king was obliged to speak 
when in his presence, with the exception of brief periods travelling in the privacy of 
his aeroplane, when “he’d talk excitedly about reshaping mountains, about digging 
out dams here or tapping a river there” (Stevenson, 2001:2). As Handley notes, his 
aides and observers reported being in awe of the king’s ability to look at a 
watercourse, study a map “and immediately understand the landscape and water 
resource potential. It was like Rama IV predicting a solar eclipse, the Chakri genius” 
(Handley, 2006:289). This sense of reverence at the king’s supposed inate ability to 
understand hydrology, geomorphology, sociology and agro-ecology to rapidly 
deduce the “correct solution” to local needs is conveyed in the following quote 
attributed to Dr Sumet Tantivejakul, Chairman of the Royal Projects Development 
Board: 
“We saw His Majesty getting out of the royal car with a few tools, 
perhaps a communication radio, a camera, and an indispensable map 
and a pencil which he used up to the eraser. His Majesty is prudent. He 
sets himself as an example for what he preaches. The method he uses 
is, I would say, truly modern. You can see his handwriting all over the 
map. And the first thing he does is to check the accuracy of his data, 
by talking to senior citizens in the community. He would settle down 
in this task for a long time. After checking data, His Majesty 
immediately formulates the project, deciding in five minutes or seven 
minutes at most where the reservoir will be located, what size, what 
capacity, and how the water will be transported through natural 
channels to the village. Finally, His Majesty turns to us as the core 
agency, discussing the philosophy of the project, what can be expected 
in ten years' time, how to rehabilitate the watershed areas in 
accordance with natural features, for example.”  
 (Source: Foreign Office. The Government Public Relations 
Department Office website 
http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/communication/part3.php?s=2 
Accessed 17 May, 2011) 
Integral to the hagiographic official narratives surrounding the Royal Projects and 
their supposed successes in combating rural poverty (e.g. The National Identity 
Board, 2000), was a parallel comparative notion that there was somehow a failure 
of government development policy approaches resulting from corrupt electoral 
politics. In the 1980s, the king occasionally criticized bureaucrats for ignoring the 
kind of simple and effective solutions he recommended for water resources 
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development. Handley (2006) notes a royal speech in 1981 used to describe the 
bureaucracy as “useless”, “unresponsive” and “wasteful” in tackling the 
development problems of farmers, while his own water resources projects cost just 
one tenth of those of the government and were carried out in a fraction of the time. 
Another key tenet of the royalist narratives supporting the king’s model of 
development was the idea that elected politicians were invariably greedy, self-
interested and corrupted by money and therefore were immoral, untrustworthy 
agents of development. It was implied that only a virtuous and paternalistic “moral 
politics” (see Fong, 2009), provided by the king’s interventions could deliver real 
and lasting development benefits to the rural populace. The royalists claimed the 
king’s strategy was an alternative and more enlightened water resources 
development paradigm to the state’s corrupt and bureaucratic approach (Handley, 
2006). Hewison and Kitirianglarp (2010) see the royal development projects as 
ideological symbols of royalists’ portrayal of the king’s position as a champion of 
the poor, while Ivarsson and Isager (2010) point out a critical analysis of the king’s 
development projects has yet to be written.  
On quite a few occasions during the fieldwork, I encountered state bureaucrats, 
politicians and local people who professed open admiration for the king’s public 
advice and practical work in helping solve the nation’s water resources management 
problems, especially through the Royally-initiated projects. These were perceived 
as making outstanding contributions to national development, in line with the 
“standard total view” of the monarchy (see Hewison, 1997). For example, the 
Director of the Sakon Nakhon Provincial Irrigation Project of RID, related to me 
that the king’s long term interest and intervention in the province’s main water 
resources management problems of flood and drought had alleviated much of the 
people’s “suffering” in the past. He compared the far superior hydraulic 
development situation in Sakon Nakhon over that of other provinces, being the 
direct result of the king’s intellectual and practical influence: 
“We have the same characteristics, but ours are better than elsewhere 
because we have lots of reservoirs and the Royal Projects that uses the 
King's ideas. When he came he wanted to build reservoirs here and 
there. It has helped us more than other provinces.......”  
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(Source:  Mr Sratta Rangrawd, Director of Sakon Nakhon Provincial 
Irrigation Project, the Royal Irrigation Department, during fieldwork 
interview, 29 April, 2010) 
One ex-soldier turned local politician interviewee in Sakon Nakhon expressed 
awe at the king’s personal ability to deliver water resources development 
projects and, at the same time, frustration at successive civil governments for 
promising large-scale irrigation projects to help the Northeast, but never 
actually delivering on their pledges:  
“Actually, no matter which government is in, I’ve never seen any that 
will really build this [an irrigation mega-project for Isaan], except for 
the ideas of the Royal projects of the King himself. If the government 
is going to build it by themselves, then it will be difficult. Whichever 
government is in [office], trying to build this or that reservoir is 
difficult.  The reservoir projects that happen are only because of 
him.......the Royally-initiated projects.”  
(Source: Sgt Major Amphon Khamwongsa, Deputy Chairman of Naa 
Hua Bor Sub-district, Phanna Nikhon District, Sakon Nakhon province. 
Interviewed on 25/6/10) 
This points to the credibility perception gap that the king enjoys over corrupt 
politicians as a hydraulic master. Empirical evidence gathered from the field and 
reports from various sources, however, suggest there is little evidence to support the 
idea that contemporary Royally-Initiated Projects have been any more or less 
successful or sustainable than regular bureaucratic agency projects, at least on a 
practical level. Rather, both seemed to embody an essentialized, top-down, 
bureaucratic, non-participatory and paternalistic approach to natural resources 
management that has evidently misinterpreted the Northeast’s socio-ecological 
land-waterscapes and failed to achieve lasting or equitable outcomes. During a 
survey of reservoirs located along the base of the Phu Phan hills, I found several 
irrigation schemes that, like Huay Wang Rua, have signs identifying them as 
Royally-Initiated Projects and almost without exception they were as poorly 
maintained, dilapidated, abandoned and water scarce as ordinary RID projects 
inspected (see Figs 9.6, 10.3 and 10.4). However, larger-scale Royally-Initiated 
Projects water resources development have the reputation of being considerably less 
transparent and implemented in a more authoritarian manner than regular state 
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funded projects as a result of the “royal cachet”, and were far less likely to be 
subject to any degree of public criticism by civil society (see Section 10.9 below). 
 
 
10.6 King’s seminal role behind national water resources 
management planning and policy making discourse 
 
It is a contention of this thesis that King Bhumibol’s role in Thai water resources 
development and management has been far more than just symbolic, but has been 
inherently material as well, as indicated in the foregoing evidence. His discursive 
and material influence is also evident from the manner in which water resources 
planning and policy-making processes refers to advice given in royal speeches or 
pronouncements, both directly and indirectly. This has clear knock-on implications 
for development practices and projects, a phenomenon that was readily apparent in 
all three case study villages. Moreover, I would maintain that a large proportion of 
the current policy discourse and practice in Thai water resources management is 
directly attributable to the problem and solution framing narratives established by the 
king himself. 
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This is evident in the prolific official Thai language literature
247
 devoted to idolizing 
the king’s gifts and ability as a water resources manager, with open references made 
by government agencies to the inspiration they draw from the king’s knowledge and 
ideas (e.g. Royal Irrigation Department, 2009; Anonymous, 2011; The Government 
Public Relations Department, 2011). In fact, his influence could not be more explicit 
in the following translated passage from a glossy, souvenir book produced by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to celebrate fifty years of the king’s reign, 
one section of which is devoted to his seminal role in developing national water 
resources (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 1996:97): 
“His Royal Highness the King has proclaimed that in water resources 
management for agriculture there are three issues, namely: 
 Solving the problem of water scarcity 
 Solving the problem of floods, and  
 Solving the problem of water pollution”  
The book intersperses a narrative of the king’s inventions and timely interventions in 
developing the nation’s water resources, interspersed with short excerpts from his 
speeches. It devotionally portrays the king’s wisdom and normative vision for a 
future “hydrotopia”248 based on a mix of technology-driven, modern agribusiness-
oriented intensive irrigation approaches, alongside small-scale, traditional peasant-
oriented irrigation existing together in harmony. At the same time, it was clear that 
overall hydraulic control would remain under the direction of a benevolent agro-
managerial state. The book revealed that royal advice concerning how to manage 
water resources is partly communicated to the bureaucracy in the form of so-called 
“royal guidelines”, e.g. “the Royal Guideline for Solving the Problem of Salt and 
Brackish Water from the Sea” and also in the form of occasional direct audiences 
with state officials and during frequent former visits by the king to upcountry 
projects (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, No date).  
                                                   
247 I found in the reference sections of university libraries I visited, usually several shelves devoted to 
hagiographic books about the royal family, often containing more pictures than text. Most were 
published by state agencies, but also some were produced by private companies, (e.g. the Siam 
Commercial Bank), professional bodies (e.g. The Engineering Institute of Thailand) or other 
organizations linked to a wider monarchical network.   
248 I adopt this term as a suitable one in this context, stemming from a conjunction of hydraulic and 
utopia, and apparently coined in the context of the hydraulic society of the American West, by 
lecturers at Utah State University (Source: http://environment.utah.edu/students/Hydrotopia.pdf).   
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The king’s discursive influence on water resources management in Thailand is 
readily discernible in current national plans and policy narratives. This observation 
may seem anachronistic given the popular view in the West that a constitutional 
monarch should normally remain detached from involvement in everyday affairs of 
national governance. But in this case, tracks and traces of the king’s philosophical 
views and opinions related to water resources development are evident in numerous 
state documents I have reviewed during the course of this research. The most clear 
cut indicator of this phenomenon is the manner in which the king’s problem framing 
of the three key water issues mentioned above are uncritically reproduced in official 
reports, visual and print media outputs and verbal accounts by state and non-state 
actors alike. For example, the following quotes highlight the convergence between 
the royal and bureaucratic rhetorical framing of problems and solutions, adding to 
other examples provided in Chapter 6: 
“Now what we will focus on is solving the problems that we have, 
which are drought and flood. But for flooding we are quite fortunate 
that the King has made reservoirs around Phu Phan [hills]. Therefore, 
up in the hills we rarely have problems, but down below does, so we 
are using his idea of the gaem ling projects and expanding canals by 
dredging.” 
(Source:  Yutthapoom Khamwan, RID engineer, Sakon Nakhon 
Provincial Irrigation Project, interviewed on 29 April, 2010) 
“If you look at the actual problems for Isaan, the most serious problem 
is drought, followed by the problem of flooding. But with flooding, it 
is not such a major issue really, because mostly it is the result of 
floods in lowlands that happened in the past; that used to be wetlands 
or whatever, right? And people pushed into occupying that area, so 
they have minor problems.....that is how I view it. The most serious 
problem concerns drought. The government must answer how it will 
solve the problem of drought in the Northeast.” 
(Source:  Prasit Warnset, Director of Cooperation and Management of 
the Chi Basin, under the Water Resources Department (WRD), 
Regional Area 4 Office, Khon Kaen. Interviewed 6 June, 2012) 
 “The thing I always try to propose in the Agriculture Ministry and 
prod the government continuously for, is to prepare and release a 
budget for developing existing water resources, such as tributaries, 
streams, swamps, lakes and excavate them so they can store water and 
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be in a useable state, like with the gaem ling project, following the 
theory of His Majesty the King. He proposed developing gaem ling for 
storing water throughout the local areas.”  
(Source: H.E. Supachai Phosu, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, interviewed on 27 June, 2010) 
                  Region 
Budget focal area 
Northern NE Central Western Eastern Southern TOTAL 
Solution  of water scarcity 
problem 
35,199.2 51,279.0 7,468.3 9,525.7 31,575.6 25,503.7 160,551.5 
Solution of flooding 
problem 
10,409.6 6,751.0 9,656.5 1,307.9 509.6 5,734.2 34,368.8 
Solution of water pollution 
problem 
344 407.3 351.6 362.7 638.5 260 2.364.1 
Water recycling   555.0    555.0 
Management 1,405.7 1,473.3 1,625.6 539.0 929.0 731.0 6,703.6 
Dredging existing water 
sources 
441.5 4,694.3 0 41.0 153.3 20.0 5,350.0 
Royal Rainmaking       5,153.0 
TOTAL 47,800 64,604.9 19,657 11,776.3 33,806 32,248.9 222,046 
Percentage by region 21.5 29.1 8.9 5.3 15.2 14.5  
(Source: Department of Water Resources data, 2006, obtained from unofficial source and translated by 
author) 
Table 10.2      Budget allocation plan for “Integrated Water Resources Management” in 
Thailand by region and problem sector 2006-2009 (Unit: million Thai baht
249
) 
Following the formation of the DWR in 2002, “the officially sanctioned water 
management paradigm” of Thailand has become Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) (Floch and Blake, 2011:22), which again is a dominant 
international discourse that has been promoted by the king in past speeches, along 
with the related concepts of river basin management, participatory management 
(RBOs), water user group and cooperative formation on state irrigation schemes (The 
National Identity Board, 2000). The extent to which the national planning of water 
resources development and management is modelled on the king’s problem framing, 
was graphically represented in the structure of the national water resources 
development budget plan in 2006, as illustrated in Table 10.2 above. It illustrates the 
relative budget allocation to solving each problem issue by geographical region, 
showing a/ how solutions to water scarcity receive over 79 % of the total budget; b/ 
the Northeast is allocated most state financial assistance overall, with 29 % of the 
                                                   
249 NB: In mid-2006, the exchange rate was approximately 38 THB to 1 US$  
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total national budget; and c/ water resources “management” is only allocated about 3 % 
of the total budget, with the other 97 % being essentially infrastructure construction 
projects.  
 
10.7 The king as chief ideologue of irrigationalism 
 
King Bhumibol, when perceived as a sacral, benevolent and omniscient “Father of 
Water Resources Management”, paternally guiding an awe-struck and reverential 
populace in his beloved specialist field of water resources management and rural 
development, then it becomes easier to appreciate the profundity of his chief 
ideologue role within Thai hydraulic society. I argue that the king has been the 
seminal figure responsible for constructing and nurturing the national hydraulic 
developmental discourse over the course of six decades – a contemporary 
“Irrigationist Philosopher” (cf. Hamilton-McKenzie, 2009). Like David Ben-Gurion  
and Ariel Sharon promoting an interlinked Zionism and irrigated agriculture 
expansion (Lipchin, 2007), the king has attempted to overcome a capricious drought 
and flood prone natural environment and lead his people to an irrigated Eden in the 
Northeast. In practice, the king has occupied an unassailable position within the Thai 
political landscape over many decades, protected by official narratives his station is 
said to be “above politics” and neutral in such affairs of state (Connors, 2008). 
Hewison has argued that this carefully crafted image is a myth, and in fact the king 
has regularly intervened in the political process and “often appears to be acting 
outside the limits normally considered appropriate for a constitutional monarch” 
(Hewison, 1997:72-3). Similarly with the promotion of irrigationalism as a national 
developmental and technocentric project, he is at once highly visible as a progenitor 
of the discourse, yet there is an unmistakeable societal taboo around discussing his 
role in a political sense. 
In the popular view, the king is considered virtually sacred and can literally “do no 
wrong”; unlike his wife, children and other family members, all of whom may attract 
varying degrees of public criticism, albeit in a somewhat muted manner under the 
strict restrictions imposed by the lèse majesté law and far-reaching social sanctions 
imposed on transgressors (Streckfuss, 2010, 2011). The king, by contrast, assumes a 
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decidedly more deified position in Thai society that has allowed him a significant 
degree of licence in zealously pursuing his hydraulic development interests, without 
fear of criticism or censure
250
. When the king lectures an audience concerning his 
philosophical views on “Sufficiency Economy” or water resources development, his 
words are not merely symbolic, but are likely to become translated into national 
policy. However, the discursive process is not in any sense a two-way process and 
the absence of a dialogue may in part be a contributory factor to the complex societal 
conflict associated with water resources development policy and practice in Thailand, 
as suggested by Handley (Handley, 2006).  
For example, the king’s discourse has been seminal in ensuring the irrigation sector 
has retained a status as a “privileged solution” amongst other rural development 
sectors competing for a share of state budget funding, to the direct financial benefit 
and legitimacy of the RID, creating a budgetary funding priority for irrigation 
infrastructure that appears to have changed little since the Sarit era (see Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3.6). The RID, by default, hides behind its royal credentials to remain 
obscure and remote from scrutiny, as a closed “black box” institution. The king 
justified his worldview in a speech to members of the Bangkok diplomatic corps 
gathered at Chitralada Palace (the king’s main residence) on 26 July 1989 (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 1996:102): 
 “......the area of work that receives priority concerns irrigation, 
because it is believed that if there is no irrigation, the country would 
be arid. When it is arid, one cannot cultivate; if there was no 
cultivation, there would be no agricultural work, which is work 
directly beneficial to the citizens. Irrigation makes one think of 
agriculture, but the livelihoods of ordinary people require water for 
consumption......”    
It seemed apparent from this proclamation, that the king not only regards irrigation as 
a sine qua non of Thai agriculture nationally, but without it, the nation might slide 
into a calamitous state of water scarcity and rural crisis, thereby prolonging the 
agricultural nation myth (farmers as the backbone of the nation, ideology of muang 
fai irrigation, peasant communitarianism, agriculturalism, etc. discussed in Chapter 5, 
                                                   
250 In his December 2005 birthday speech, the king appeared to invite criticism, claiming “If the king 
can do no wrong, it is akin to looking down upon him because the king is not being treated as a 
human being. But the King can do wrong” (Pilling, 2011) 
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Section 5.3.1). Such moral panic-inducing narratives have traditionally been effective 
tools for a domestic audience, by seeking to strengthen the righteous, warrior-king 
(dhamma raaaja) image in fighting for the interests of the impoverished Thai farmer 
against natural disasters and social enemies, like political corruption and predatory 
neo-liberal capitalism. Similar rhetoric is evident in the moral imperatives the king 
has used in exhorting Thai society to adopt his Sufficiency Economy philosophy 
principles to avoid national collapse (Isager and Ivarsson, 2010). The king has been 
known to initiate crisis narratives that warn of the dangers of parts of Thailand 
becoming “a desert” unless his advice was heeded on halting deforestation, managing 
upland watersheds and building sufficient and appropriate water resources storage 
infrastructure (Molle and Floch, 2008b). In a December 1993 annual birthday speech, 
the king exhorted officials to rapidly implement two large-scale “multi-purpose” 
storage dam projects in central Thailand he had proposed constructing under the 
aegis of RID
251
, reported stating: 
 “If we don’t do it now, in 5 to 6 years, the cost will rise 2 or 3 
times. In the end, we will have to postpone it further; and when 
we postpone it further, it will never be done. We will surely 
suffer lack of water. The country will become a desert. And we 
will have nowhere to go....” (Source: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, 1996)  
Such an authoritative and hubristic endorsement for accelerating state construction of 
large-scale hydraulic infrastructure to avoid looming desertification in a humid 
tropical lowland delta region is distinctly reminiscent of earlier justifications used by 
military leaders close to the monarchy for urgently pursuing the Green Isaan project 
in the late 1980s (see Chapters 6 and 7) and repeated by several prime ministers since 
to justify pet mega-projects. This allowed a “TINA” mentality (see  Mehta, 2005) to 
take hold in the military, bureaucratic and political elite classes that has fed the 
dominant public discourse since. Widespread uncritical acceptance of the elite 
problem framing is discernible to the present, for instance, in some of the responses 
to the public perception survey conducted for this thesis (see Appendix C). The main 
conduits for the king’s ideological discourse concerning water resources 
development and management have been hydraulic bureaucracies (e.g. RID, DWR, 
                                                   
251 Following this royal endorsement, both dams referred to were subsequently built by RID without 
open opposition (see Section 10.9 below for further discussion) 
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EGAT, DEDP, etc), the multiple military agencies, the directly-controlled 
monarchical organizations (e.g. Office of Royal Development Projects, Bureau of the 
Royal Household, the Crown Property Bureau, and the Chaipattana Foundation), 
international development agencies (e.g. FAO, UNDP), and various civil society 
organizations that have been co-opted to the royal vision. As noted in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.4, the RID devotes much of its website and public reports to an adulatory 
treatment of the king’s contributions to national water resources development, a trend 
being increasingly followed by the DWR in its publicity material (Fig. 9.4).  
Over the course of his reign, it appears that the king’s “developmental gaze” (see 
Grillo, 1997) or alternatively, drawing from Foucauldian notions, his “panoptic gaze” 
(Krittikarn, 2010), has been resolutely focused on promoting a techno-centric and 
managerialist discourse around water resources development and management, that 
constructs a series of normative statements concerning relationships between water, 
society and nature. These have subsequently been adopted as integral, 
commonsensical elements of the dominant national orthodoxy
252
. Naturally such 
monopolization of discourse cannot be achieved by a single actor alone, no matter 
how powerful, but requires an extensive supporting cast of strategic actors and allies, 
willing to propagate and strengthen the discourse at every opportunity in furtherance 
of their own material and political interests. According to Wittfogel’s hypothesis, 
these actors form the core ruling class or bureaucratic nobility of a hydraulic society 
and work to preserve the hierarchy from internal and external threat to ensure its 
stability.  
 
10.8 Of rulers and viziers  
 
Wittfogel’s descriptions of the autocratic nature of a sovereign governing an agro-
managerial or hydraulic society, resonates closely with the rise to and maintenance of 
power by Thailand’s present monarch. Wittfogel (1957) is adamant that basic to all 
hydraulic regimes is a hierarchical system headed by a ruler (sovereign) with a 
                                                   
252 Another example is given by Forsyth and Walker, 2008, in a comprehensive treatment of the 
powerful effects of the pervasive “deforestation causes drought” narrative in Northern Thailand, that 
has long been propagated by the monarchy and other conservative forces in Thai society. 
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personal entourage (his court) who controls and directs numerous civil and military 
underlings through a corps of ranking officials. “In his person the ruler combines 
supreme operational authority and the many magic and mythical symbols that 
express the terrifying (and allegedly beneficial) qualities of the power apparatus he 
heads. Because of immaturity, weakness, or incompetence, he may share his 
operational supremacy with an aide: a regent, vizier, chancellor, or ‘prime minister’. 
But the exalted power of these men does not usually last long. It rarely affects the 
symbols of supreme authority. And it vanishes as soon as the ruler is strong enough 
to realize the autocratic potential inherent in his position” (Wittfogel, 1957:305).   
Since assuming the paternalistic mantle prepared for him by Field Marshall Sarit, as 
the strict but benevolent “Father of the Nation”, and later a sacred “Development 
King” (Chitbundit, 2007), Bhumibol has carefully cultivated several close proxies or 
“viziers” (to use Wittfogel’s term) to share the exercise of power over national water 
resources development, while remaining firmly in control at the pinnacle of the 
hierarchy himself. I would argue that his chief vizier in recent decades has been 
General Prem Tinsulanonda, former army commander, prime minister for eight years 
and current president of the Privy Council (Khana Ongkhamontri Thai); all posts for 
which he was handpicked by the king (McCargo, 2005). The Privy Council is a 
secretive advisory council that was reinstated as an institution a year after the king’s 
ascension to the throne and has a strategic orientation towards appointing pro-royal 
politicians from parliament, retired generals and judges, asserts Fong (2009). 
McCargo (ibid.) argues that the King has placed complete trust in Prem, viewing him 
as an incorruptible and skilled alliance-builder and patronage wielder. Beginning in 
1980 and for the next twenty years, “Prem served effectively as Thailand’s ‘director 
of human resources’, masterminding appointments, transfers and promotions. Prem’s 
power was never absolute, though it was always considerable” (McCargo, 2005:506). 
As should be apparent from the genesis of the Green Isaan Project (refer to Chapter 
7), Prem acted as one of the seminal facilitators in ensuring the project’s momentum, 
until it was later hijacked by the personal political aspirations of General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh; infighting between the military, the bureaucracy and politicians over 
control; widespread local resistance (Pye, 2005) and eventually replaced by a clone-
like competitor, the Khong-Chi-Mun Project (Sneddon, 2003b).  
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Prem is widely regarded in Thailand as the mastermind behind the September 2006 
military coup that ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and placed key 
royalists in the subsequent interim administration (Pathmanand, 2008). Thus, the 
2006 coup, like its predecessors, has been regarded by some as a palace coup 
“dressed in potent royal symbolism” (Isager and Ivarsson, 2010), bringing to the fore, 
close relations between royalist and military factions. Since the rise of binary colour-
coded political conflict in the last four years, Prem has been cast as a divisive figure 
in Thai politics. For example, during fieldwork conducted at the height of the 
political tensions in early 2010, with growing internal divisions very much in the 
public consciousness, some people interviewed professed admiration for Prem’s 
style of leadership, while others expressed strong negative opinions towards him. 
Falling into the former camp, the current President of Ubon Ratchatani University 
expressed a strong faith in calling for a return to past political values and approaches 
to traditional water resources management, supposedly embodied by Prem:  
 “There is one political party that I trust; the Democrats. I think if they 
could last long as the government, they would do it [water resources 
development] in this way. I would like to see a political party that once 
they become the government, the prime minister, to follow what 
General Prem did even though he was a soldier. But during that period 
the political situation could not be solved, so he was chosen to serve as 
the prime minister. He was excellent. Concerning rural area issues, he 
allocated plenty of budget to them.......”  
Source: Interview with Dr Prakob Wirojanagud
253
, President of Ubon 
Ratchatani University, Ubon Ratchatani. 12 January, 2010. 
Amongst others who professed a dislike of Prem, there was a tendency to recall his 
past role in communist suppression and obstructing a nascent participatory 
democracy movement during his years spent as commander-in-chief of the army, 
minister of defence and prime minister, by supporting and enabling various “psych-
ops” tactics, through his control of the Internal Security Operations Command 
(ISOC)
254
. Alternatively, they referred to what they perceived as opportunistic 
                                                   
253 Dr Prakob, with a long career in Thai academia and consultant to various water resources 
development projects in the Northeast, wrote a Thai language book espousing the benefits of 
communitarian and small-scale approaches to irrigation management that praises Prem’s role in 
promoting these same approaches during his eight year premiership in the 1980s (Wirojnagud, 2004). 
254 ISOC is a unit of the Thai military devoted to national security issues that was implicated in 
numerous atrocities against activists and civilians in the 1960s and 70s (Handley, 2006). Prem was a 
senior officer in ISOC.  
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manipulation of the monarchy and military factions by Prem for selfish ends and a 
stubborn refusal to bow out from politics at the age of over ninety. Water resources 
development discourse constitutes an important, but little considered, component of 
the recent elite struggles for command and control in Thai politics, especially evident 
in the crucial electoral and economically strategic arena (or “battleground”) of the 
Northeast.  
A second closely trusted aide of the king with more direct connections to issues 
concerning water resources development and management than the militaristic-
leaning Prem, is Dr Sumet Tantvejakul, who as Assistant Secretary-General of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board and Director of the Royal 
Projects Development Board was another indispensible actor in promoting the Green 
Isaan Project and guarding it against criticism (see Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2). As 
Secretary-General of the Chaipattana Foundation, Sumet has consistently been one 
of the most ardent supporters of the king’s role in rural development, tirelessly 
portraying Bhumibol as a virtuous king, embodying “Buddhist principles of 
industriousness, sacrifice and selflessness in seeking to end poverty”, notes (Handley, 
2006:385). Sumet claimed the king was an “environmental activist”, due to his 
superior knowledge in developing appropriate water resources in balance with the 
needs of the people and the environment, while at the same time being quick to 
defend the king’s solid support of certain large-scale dams, such as the Pasak 
Cholasit (see Fig. 10.1) and Tha Dan projects
255
. Dismissing civil society calls for 
public hearings over controversial state infrastructure projects, Sumet reportedly 
dismissed them as unnecessary because, “His Majesty has been holding public 
hearings for the past 30 years……He urges people to say what they really feel”, and 
thus insinuated he instinctively knew what was best for the country into the future 
(Handley, 2006:386). Other potential contenders for vizier roles in the past have 
included Field Marshall Thanom Kittikajorn (Sarit’s successor) and less overtly, 
M.R. Kukrit Pramoj (who perhaps was more of a valued ideologue than frontline 
politician, even though he briefly became Prime Minister between 1975-76). 
 
                                                   
255 Both these “multi-purpose” dam projects are located on the eastern fringes of the Central Plains 
and are claimed by RID, their operators, to regulate seasonal flooding, provide water for Bangkok and 
supply irrigation for dry season cropping. 
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10.9  Suppression of alternative voices to state-sanctioned discourse 
 
As has been previously elucidated, the official royalist discourse has perpetuated a 
strong national myth around the king’s supposed semi-divine genius in the field of 
water resources management. Such widely held perceptions do not, however, imply 
that all citizens necessarily subscribe to the dominant problem and solution framing 
narratives, national policies, strategies and concrete projects carried out in the name 
of the king through the bureaucracy. On the contrary, I found guarded scepticism and 
criticism of the official-royal discourse on water resources management, especially 
amongst some civil society actors and foreign consultants. Evidence suggests there 
has been occasional overt opposition and resistance to some of the royal-supported 
water resources development schemes, such as the Nam Choan and Kaeng Sua Taen 
dam cases, where public pressure and protest has led to the cancellation of these 
projects (Bello et al., 1998; Hirsch, 1998; Handley, 2006). Typically, however, 
people negatively impacted by Royally-Initiated dam development projects are 
unlikely to protest, but choose to remain silent and accept their fate for whatever 
reason. Some might feel a sense of deference to the monarchy and associated 
willingness to sacrifice for the nation, which has been a common refrain from dam 
proponents for years. However, the reason may as likely be due to a genuine fear of 
state sanctions or reprisals against them or their family, should they complain to 
vocally. When the limits of ideology and consensus appear to be reached, then the 
hydraulic state has no compunction in resorting to more forceful tools in its armoury 
to ensure domination of sub-altern individuals and groups to minimize resistance to 
its development mission of socio-ecological control, simplification and legibility (cf. 
Scott, 1998). The modern Thai state has a record of resorting to a variety of violent 
and coercive methods against subaltern actors resisting its rural development 
programmes, including but by no means limited to its irrigation development 
programme (Turton, 1986; Pye, 2005). A well-documented case stretching over a 
number of years of repeated state-sanctioned violence conducted against opponents 
to a dam project was the EGAT-built and operated Pak Mun Dam, in Ubon 
Ratchatani province (Missingham, 2003; Foran and Manorom, 2009). 
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Where civil society groups and impactees have opposed dam projects on 
environmental or social grounds they have often been branded anti-development, 
unThai and selfish for representing just a small minority blocking the aspirations and 
progress of the majority (Foran, 2006; Chang Noi, 2009). The king, given his past 
enthusiastic support of large-scale “multi-purpose” dams built by EGAT and RID, 
has on occasion strengthened and vindicated the rhetoric of officials’ and politicians’ 
condemnation of citizens who have dared to resist or oppose state hydraulic 
infrastructure projects, charges Handley (2006). Bhumibol was reported to have told 
Thai diplomats in a televised speech in August 1993 that dams were inherently good 
for the people (Handley, 2006:367).  
In cases where opposition did arise to irrigation and flood control projects that the 
king had personally backed, the king was reportedly annoyed by environmental 
groups’ recalcitrance towards his superior knowledge. In December 1993, he felt it 
necessary to launch a “full-scale assault” on the detractors of the RID’s Pak Panang, 
Pasak Cholasit and Tha Dan projects during his birthday speech, alleged Handley 
(2006). The king defended the dams’ rationale, claiming they had been delayed six 
years due to green opposition
256
 and claimed, “had they been constructed, there 
should have been no problem from drought and floods” (Handley, 2006:367, citing 
The Nation, Decmber 5, 1993). Hence, the blame for any perceived negative impacts 
from earlier floods in the Central Plains was neatly pinned on environmentalists’ 
obtuseness and selfishness. The king declared that he would like to see the projects 
completed before his 72
nd
 birthday in 1999, and added he had no wish to see any 
protests, as they were “tiring and useless” (ibid.). The effect of the king’s 
intervention was almost instantaneous, reported Handley (2006), with the 
government of PM Chuan Leekpai rallying to the call and approving the Pasak 
Cholasit dam within two weeks, while the other two needed more planning. The 
Director of Royal Projects, Sumet Tantivejakul, in support of the decision is reported 
to have said, “His Majesty sensed great danger if nothing is done. His Majesty is 
very patient, but time is pressing.......The dams are like a cancer operation for a sick 
body” (Handley, 2006:367, citing The Nation, 9 December, 1993).    
                                                   
256 According to Handley (2006), the reason for the dams delay was actually attributable to politicians 
in three previous governments arguing that the projects were not cost-effective, rather than the 
objections of environmentalists. 
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Meanwhile environmental NGOs were stunned into silence by the public show of 
royal defiance to any opposition to these dams, argued Handley (2006:367), “[T]he 
king hadn’t suggested dialogue or mutual understanding, or conceded any of their 
positions. They were painted like communists of two decades before, irrational, 
opposed to the people’s welfare, and disrespectful. Now any argument they made 
could be construed as lèse majesté.” During 1994, the anti-dam activists withdrew 
from public opposition, but challenged state knowledge through building “technical 
arguments backed by scientific research”. This rationalistic approach was equally 
interpreted as questioning the veracity of the king, as at his next annual birthday 
speech in December 1994, the king was reported to have gone through “a list of 
selected points and simply declared each one wrong” (Handley, 2006:367-8). All 
three dam projects were subsequently constructed and inaugurated by the RID, with 
barely a whisper of complaint from civil society. This, like other state tactics that 
rely upon the symbolic authority of the king’s name and iconic image, demonstrates 
the material effects of the royal voice in its ability to silence dissent and create 
intimidation and fear, as predicted by Wittfogel (1957:137): “[T]error is the 
inevitable consequence of the ruler’s resolve to uphold their own and not the 
people’s rationality optimum”. 
The condemnatory attitude by Bhumibol towards critics of his hydraulic 
development vision, however, was not only confined to environmental activists. It 
could equally be turned to effect against lacklustre civil servants, corrupt politicians 
and even Prime Ministers, who could be criticized, censured or humiliated in public 
through the king’s speeches, when they did not measure up to his exacting 
expectations. It would take a brave individual to publically question the king’s 
knowledge and wisdom in the field of water resources management, given his 
proven expertise. Once a project is declared “Under Royal Patronage”, it is usually 
considered beyond-limits for civil society or academic investigation or direct 
opposition and takes on a higher degree of secrecy, making project documents harder 
to access from the implementing agency concerned. For example, with regards to the 
Royally-Initiated Nam Gam Irrigation Project, completed by RID in 2010 (see 
Chapter 9, Section 9.2.1), two environmental activists who had been monitoring the 
project for a number of years, related that they were unable to publicize its negative 
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environmental and social impacts, due to its “Royal Patronage” status257. There were 
several other smaller royally endorsed irrigation projects located in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin itself, which even though local contacts considered them purely 
“showcase” projects with minimal benefits, it was not possible to publically 
condemn them for fear of state retribution.  
There is a popular narrative in Thailand that in instances where a minority speak out 
against a state infrastructure development project, this implies that by default the 
silent majority are in favour of the project. Therefore silence is interpreted as consent, 
while opponents are smeared as representing unpatriotic rump of noisy ingrates, 
retarding the nation’s development through their actions. This sentiment is common 
amongst water bureaucrats and was expressed to me on several occasions in 
interviews, such as the following quote from a senior RID official: 
“And in our country, people who disagree will speak loudly; people 
who agree will be quiet, not give their opinions. So it appears that 
there are more people who disagree than those who agree. In fact, 
those people who agree just say nothing. It is a cultural problem in 
Thailand that is different from farang culture.”   
Source: Manas Kamnerdmanee, Director of the People’s 
Participation Promotion Office, RID, Bangkok. Interviewed on 4 
August, 2010) 
Other non-violent discursive tactics commonly used by the state to ensure irrigation 
projects proceed include “[A]voidance, distortion or manipulation of EIAs, attempts 
to denigrate social movements, continued use of overriding objectives (food security, 
national security, poverty alleviation, etc) to close debates, token participation of 
stakeholders to build legitimacy, and other political devices” argue Molle et al 
(2009a:275). During the course of living and working in Thailand, I have quite often 
encountered state officials who hold the view that to oppose or resist state 
development projects is somehow unThai behaviour and demonstrates disloyalty to 
the nation. Occasionally, protesters are portrayed as lackeys of ill-intentioned foreign 
groups seeking to sabotage Thailand’s state-sanctioned route to development and 
prosperity. Indeed, I encountered a degree of suspicion and animosity from some 
                                                   
257 This project was officially declared open on July 7, 2012 during a rare visit by the ailing king to 
the Royal Irrigation Department’s headquarters in Bangkok (The Government Public Relations 
Department, 2012). 
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district and provincial government staff in the Nam Songkhram Basin when asking 
questions about local irrigation developments and future plans. For example, one 
slightly drunk district agricultural extension staff I met in Sri Songkhram district 
blurted out contemptuously: “you are not an NGO are you?” I suspect he equated 
“NGO” with “communist”, as in this part of Thailand there has been relatively little 
NGO
258
 engagement up to the present and communist is still considered a dirty word. 
  
10.10 Network monarchy and irrigation development 
 
Through his pre-eminent position in society and unique strategic alliances with the 
hydraulic bureaucracy, royal agencies and senior military, business, politician and 
civil society actors, it would appear the king has been uniquely able to propagate and 
disseminate his ideas through an extensive network of formal and informal 
institutions and channels, largely unopposed by civil society discourse. Adapting the 
notion of “network monarchy”259 (McCargo, 2005) as a helpful general model of 
conceptualizing the process of power creation and retention by the present king, in 
this section I consider some of the chief actors complicit in a more specific notion of 
“hydraulic network monarchy”. This marries the concept to the field of socio-
political hydraulic development and how this may strengthen understandings of 
sources of power and legitimacy in Thailand. I propose the idea that the king 
presides over a hitherto little considered, but nevertheless tangible political network 
– the hydraulic network monarchy260 - that has allowed the monarch to attain 
supreme authority and control (largely exercised through proxy agents) over water 
resources development discourse and practice. McCargo (2005:501) argues that the 
main characteristics of Thailand’s network monarchy between 1980 and 2001 were, 
“the monarch was the ultimate arbiter of political decisions in times of crisis; the 
monarchy was the primary source of national legitimacy; the King acted as a didactic 
commentator on national issues, helping to set the national agenda, especially 
                                                   
258 The king used to make a pun in speeches around the acronym for NGO, which happens to sound 
like the Thai word for stupid (ngoh), reports Handley (2006). 
259 The core aim of network monarchy, according to McCargo (2006:503), is “to promote the power 
and prestige of the throne”. The prestige garnered, serves to underpin national identity, thus creating 
broader legitimacy for those associated with it.   
260 This network could alternatively be termed a hydraulic development “strategic group”, following 
Evers and Benedikter (2009). 
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through his annual birthday speeches; the monarch intervened actively in political 
developments, largely by working through proxies such as privy councillors and 
trusted military figures; and the lead proxy, former army commander and prime 
minister Prem Tinsulanond, helped determine the nature of coalition governments, 
and monitored the process of military and other promotions.” McCargo points out 
the inherent illiberality of network monarchy, as it advocates reliance on “good men” 
and the marginalization of formal political institutions and processes.  
Besides Prem and the king himself, other key figures in the hydraulic network 
monarchy have included, but certainly not limited to: certain past royalist prime 
ministers; the supreme head of the armed forces and other senior military figures 
handpicked by Prem; Dr Sumet Tantivejakul and governors of the Chaipattana 
Foundation; certain members of the Senate; senior judges; directors of the Crown 
Property Bureau; chairs of certain part royal-owned corporations involved in 
construction (e.g. Siam Cement Group) and agribusiness conglomerates;  powerful 
members of the establishment in the Privy Council, including the King’s close aide 
and ex-Director General of the RID, Pramote Maiklad; and some respected civil 
society figures (e.g. Dr Prawase Wasi and Anand Panyarachun). In McCargo’s (2005) 
view, network monarchy has become a “para-political institution”, forged by the 
king and his allies, where the king is the central component in this novel form of 
governance or “semi-monarchical rule”. In other words, the king is far more than 
merely a paternalistic, benevolent, figurehead ruler, but bears certain resemblance 
Wittfogel’s descriptions of classical oriental despots, albeit lacking absolute power, 
which tends to support the analysis of Jacobs (1971). Taking up the core of 
McCargo’s argument of monarchistic networks strengthening the traditional 
authority and staying power of Bhumibol, Fong (2009:692) advocates for 
appreciation of other parallel networks that “have since the end of absolutism 
engaged in cultural construction of the sacred nationalist in material, aesthetic and 
institutional forms.” I would argue that hydraulic network monarchy is one of these 
parallel networks, so far not considered by social scientists as a conceptual construct 
with explanatory power. 
As a consequence of resistance struggles and discursive competition from other 
domestic strategic groups or counter-hegemonic networks, the king has been unable 
to achieve outright political domination, especially since the 2006 military coup 
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when the country has become ever more fractious. However, in the field of water 
resources development I would argue, the king’s position and authority is pre-
eminent, despite vigorous attempts by political rival, the populist Prime Minister and 
now political exile, Thaksin Shinawatra, to symbolically upstage him and compete 
for the hydraulic ruler mantle. While in power, Thaksin repeatedly tried to capture 
some of the traditional legitimacy and authority of the king through usurpation of the 
hydraulic discourse and promote hydrotopian projects (Silarak, 2005) through a 
parallel network, in particular the national Water Grid
261
 and several mega-projects 
to transfer water from Laos and neighbouring countries (Molle and Floch, 2008a; 
Molle et al., 2009a). It is apparent, however, that the hydraulic network monarchy is 
much stronger and more entrenched than Thaksin’s weaker network, which lacks the 
discursive and symbolic legitimacy of its more extensive royal rival and has been 
thwarted to date. Whether this will remain so, following the death of the king is 
impossible to predict. 
 
10.11 Summary 
 
The findings from this chapter suggest that over the course of his reign, the king’s 
power and prestige has steadily increased in large part due to the dominant role he 
has assumed over hydraulic development discourse, to the extent that his symbolic 
and rhetorical imprint is embedded in large sections of national water resource 
management policy and planning texts, as well as materially influencing actual 
development outcomes in myriad ways. Over six decades, through periods of 
national and regional geo-political instability and massive socio-economic 
transformations, the king as self-appointed “moral compass” and semi-divine ruler of 
the nation, has successfully managed to navigate his way to the apex of a complex 
hierarchy of power relations expressed through hydraulic control that in turn offers a 
significant degree of social control. It is proposed he heads a coalition of allied 
powerful actors and actor groups whose web of interests are maintained through 
                                                   
261 As empirical evidence of this rivalry, I cite a “Mobile Cabinet” meeting held in March 2005 at 
Khao Phanom Rung temple in Buriram province to promote the Water Grid project to voters through 
the national media (Silarak, 2005). This Khmer built historic site is highly symbolic and suggested an 
attempt by Thaksin to steal some of the limelight from the king’s previous near-monopolistic use of 
primordial simulacra as a tool of hydraulic authority.  
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what I have termed, “hydraulic network monarchy”. While this notion corresponds 
well with Wittfogel’s observations regarding the nature of hydraulic despots’ 
maintenance of power in ancient hydraulic societies through control of an 
“organizational web” that ensures its longevity, it would be misleading to suggest 
that all power is concentrated solely at the apex or that other groups are without 
agency to resist domination from the core. Indeed, the traditional social science 
analytical dichotomies of macro/micro, core/marginal, powerful/powerless are rarely 
clear-cut or empirically tenable in the messy “problemsheds” of complex hydraulic 
development contexts and multi-actor power struggles.  
In one sense, Bhumibol can be conceived as a benevolent and patrimonial actor 
ruling through the willing consent of the people (Foucault’s “pastoral power”) and 
smart use of dominant state ideology (i.e. irrigationalism), but in another sense can 
be viewed as an autocratic leader sitting at the pinnacle of a dominant ruling elite 
class that has shown a distinct tendency to govern through force (Foucault’s 
“disciplinary power”) in the past, using the extensive state apparatuses of coercion to 
bring water and society under its control, first at the core and latterly at the margins 
of hydraulic society. While use of state-sanctioned violence to enforce authority has 
patently declined from its zenith during the military dictatorships of the 1950s to 
early 80s (e.g. Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project’s implementation), which were an 
integral part of the anti-democratic processes used to elevate the king to his present 
position; the state monopoly of tools of fear such as silencing, knowledge 
manipulation and oppression of counter-hegemonic forces have far from disappeared, 
as evidenced through growing use of the draconian lèse majesté law against state 
critics. Ultimately however, the king’s rule and authority has been more authoritarian 
than totalitarian in style and substance, and therefore, fails to fully fit the 
Wittfogelian archetypal model of an ancient hydraulic despot. I propose, therefore, 
that King Bhumibol is perhaps better viewed as more hydraulic “high priest”, at least 
in the latter years of his reign. Nevertheless, in the official discourse he firmly 
remains portrayed as a paternalistic, sacral and near-genius “King of the Waters”.  
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Chapter 11  Conclusions 
 
“And on the pedestal these words appear: 
‘My name is Ozymandias, king of kings, 
Look upon my works, ye Mighty and despair!’ 
Nothing besides remains. Round the decay 
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare 
The lone and level sands stretch far away.” 
 
(Source: Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias) 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
As has been argued by Mollinga (2008:101) and others (e.g. Mosse, 2003; Molle et 
al., 2009d), water resources management is an inherently political field, yet a 
depoliticization of discourses around the subject remains the dominant inclination of 
most water professionals and single disciplinary academic approaches to the study of 
water. In this thesis, a range of socio-political dimensions related to the irrigation 
development paradigm of Northeast Thailand, a peripheral region, have been 
explored both theoretically and empirically, based on evidence drawn mostly from a 
single river basin case study embedded in the wider context of the Thai nation. It has 
argued that a context-specific ideology of irrigation development, termed 
“irrigationalism”, can be identified as a significant driver of the nation’s “hydraulic 
mission” in Thailand, witnessed particularly starkly in the case of the Northeast, 
when the country is conceived as a modern variant of a marginal “hydraulic society”. 
The Nam Songkhram basin represents the margins of the hydraulic society, set 
against the core of Central Thailand and Bangkok where power is centred. The main 
research question entailed an inquiry into the main discourses, actors and practices 
that drive the phenomenon of irrigationalism, which have been systematically 
elaborated in the foregoing chapters. In this final chapter I lay out a summary of the 
main findings of the thesis arranged under headings of irrigationalism, hydraulic 
society, the role of the king and network monarchy, competition amongst hydraulic 
bureaucracies and resurrecting old dreams and schemes. Lastly, I provide some 
recommendations for possible further research directions.  
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11.2 The more things change the more they stay the same? 
 
This thesis has confirmed a notable fixity in Northeast Thailand’s development 
discourse noted by Molle et al (2009a:274), exemplified by “an obsessive focus” on 
irrigation and other hydraulic infrastructure development and “a disregard for 
alternatives”. Despite massive external changes in the regional and international geo-
political context and internal, domestic shifts in the political environment between 
the 1960s and the present, variants on the same hydraulic “megaprojects” based on 
TVA-type “full basin development” blueprint plans are still trotted out with 
predictable regularity by successive Thai governments. Hence, it was unsurprising to 
find the RID quietly proceeding with the previously rejected Nam Songkhram 
Project during fieldwork (but using less transparent strategies than DEDP), or note 
the RID and the DWR officials actively competing to promote parallel reconstituted 
versions of utopian, regionwide irrigation mega-projects based on transboundary 
water diversions, yet still with no reference whatsoever to the previous failures 
(Floch and Blake, 2011). While internally the state may appear more fractious, both 
parties were competing with the same essential vision and set of values, and were 
determined that their particular megaproject would prevail over that of its rival, 
which perversely may be the main reason neither project has been implemented thus 
far. Both major hydrocracies suggest “there is no alternative” to their respective 
plans, while perpetually naturalizing water scarcity (cf. Mehta, 2005). This calls to 
mind the artificially induced and socially constructed nature of water scarcity in 
numerous instances, and that recalling Molle’s (2008b), “enough is never enough” 
observations concerning the propensity to overbuild river basins, irrigation project 
planning and implementation remain constants in the Thai state’s bid to control 
water resources and society. As intimated in Chapter 6, Section 6.8.1, there was an 
announcement in August 2012, that the present government under Prime Minister 
Yingluck Shinawatra is keen to push an US$ 11 billion scheme for “a comprehensive 
water management system” to solve floods and droughts in the long term  (Royal 
Thai Government, 2012), which shows all the hallmarks of a continuation of her 
elder brother’s aborted national Water Grid Project (but with a bigger dose of flood 
control following the massive Chao Phraya floods of 2010) and all the previous 
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nirvanic water control schemes before (see Fig. 7.1), that have risen and fallen with 
the fortunes of their powerful political patrons. 
This thesis reconfirms the old adage that water is power and that the dynamics of 
water control in certain cultural, social and political contexts are such that no matter 
how ill-advised, uneconomic and socio-ecologically destructive a hydraulic 
development project may be, once embedded in the minds of a narrow elite at the 
apex of society, such projects are continually revived and pushed to the point of 
implementation, “carrying with them the baggage of outmoded dreams” (Johnston 
and Donahue, 1998). As these authors contend, the contradictions exposed between 
myth and reality, between hydraulic development and reproductive strategies, and 
between those who stand to gain and lose, results in inevitable conflict, in Northeast 
Thailand no less than other contexts worldwide that have fallen under the spell of a 
hydraulic mission, from Arizona (Worster, 1992) to the Murray-Darling Basin of 
Australia (Hamilton-McKenzie, 2009). Molle et al (2009a:276), stressed the 
“remarkable continuity to 60 years of water policy centred on the ‘desert bloom’ 
promise”, but how it remained unfulfilled, maintaining that ideology and politics 
were the “overarching” drivers of hydraulic development, yet admitted that an 
important question remaining unanswered was why were governance shifts so hard 
to enact in Thailand and why was it seemingly not possible to implement “good 
projects” with “adequate safeguards, compensations, detailed assessments of future 
impacts and strict screening”? I believe this thesis has gone some way to answering 
this apparent conundrum by widening understandings of ideological formations to 
include irrigation development itself. 
I have argued that this phenomenon of a fixed regional irrigation development 
discourse speaks to the nature of an ideologically-driven hydraulic society and 
thereby challenges the evolutionary and stagist interpretation of Asian water 
resources development paradigms suggested by Barker and Molle (2004; 2005). 
Rather, it invokes a more primordial and recursive interpretation of modern Thai 
history (Fong, 2009), where supply-led and infrastructural construction-based 
approaches to irrigation development remain the de facto norm, despite much 
vaunted discursive  shifts by some state and international actors calling for sectoral 
reform, such as decentralization and participation narratives. The evidence collected 
suggests that these notions are purely rhetorical and remain intangible to ordinary 
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water users and irrigators under regimes of unaccountable water resources 
development and management that remains controlled by a top-down hydraulic state. 
The elite interest groups are no less focused on capturing, diverting, storing, and 
controlling water resources or simplifying complex landscapes through irrigation 
development strategies in the Northeast today than they were half a century ago, but 
in fact, now enjoy a greater monopoly as the grip of hydraulic society has tightened.  
 
11.3 Irrigationalism and state domination 
 
Irrigation development has, without a doubt, formed a key part of post World War 
Two statemaking efforts in Thailand, but is under-recognized for its seminal role in 
helping to settle, stabilize and command the problematic periphery. Public state-led 
and sanctioned irrigation development (hydraulic agriculture), as opposed to more 
atomistic, independent and household-level agricultural water resources management 
modes and technologies (hydroagriculture), has progressively become one of the 
grandest, most complex, ongoing social engineering experiments in modern Thailand 
that defies easy rationalization for the extent of its reach into multiple aspects of 
rural society, materially and discursively. Irrigated areas have spread inexorably 
across Northeast Thailand (the region with statistically the least irrigation coverage) 
over the last 60 years, but not necessarily in accordance with the visions of 
nationalistic state irrigational planners, policy makers and engineers. Much of the 
expansion is measured in terms of total water storage capacity and theoretical 
command area coverage (its own indicators of “success”), rather than in terms of 
actual areas cultivated or numbers of farmers empirically practicing irrigation. So on 
paper it may appear that there is constant growth in irrigation provision (see Fig. 1.1), 
but official data can be misleading (often deliberately so, perhaps) and empirical 
evidence from the field suggests a quite different picture of irrigational use. Rural 
people nationwide, irrespective of whether an area is irrigated or not, have been 
steadily exiting agriculture for other sectors of the economy as part of an ongoing 
agrarian shift for decades (Rigg and Ritchie, 2002:4; Rigg, 2003). In Sakon Nakhon 
province, less than one percent of small and medium scale irrigation works were 
being used in the 2009-10 dry season. There was no evidence to suggest that vast 
expenditure on irrigation infrastructure or utopian irrigational discourses was likely 
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to retain rural people in farming livelihoods for the foreseeable future, given the 
economics of agriculture in relation to diverse off-farm employment options (both at 
home and abroad), the aspirations of Thai youth and inherent risks of agriculture, 
even under irrigated conditions  (Molle and Floch, 2007) (with the risks often 
exacerbated by state agro-managerialism and hydraulic control strategies).  
From a purely rational economic viewpoint, it would be difficult to justify the Thai 
state’s continued practice of funnelling fully half of the entire Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives’ budget to the Royal Irrigation Department, mostly 
spent on irrigation hardware development, not water management as such. Indeed, 
Fan et al (2004) in a study of various public investments found that irrigation had the 
smallest impact on both rural poverty reduction and agricultural productivity growth.  
I have argued through the thesis that the answer to this paradox lies not in 
instrumental, rationalistic explanations but requires gaining a better appreciation of 
underlying cultural and ideological motives for irrigation development, which I have 
termed as irrigationalism. I maintain that it bears many of the hallmarks identified 
by Adams (1991) as an ideology of “irrigationism” prevalent in certain nations of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but is less strongly related to externally derived ideological 
influence than suggested by Adams. Rather a key difference is that irrigationalism is 
tied up with primordial notions of Thai nationalism and monarchy, embedded in 
discursive constructions of “Thai-ness” and an imagined community (Anderson, 
2006), which make it more potent than Adams’ conceptualizations around the desire 
by national leadership for modernization and a “technofix” solution to development 
challenges.  
The irrigation development discourse in Thailand, as with India (Mollinga, 2010),  
has tended to become embroiled in domestic debates, characterized by strong 
polarization and dichotomies, between mainstream and critical perspectives to 
agricultural water resources management that has mostly overlooked ideology as a 
key underlying driver of development. Irrigation development may be considered a 
“privileged solution” (Moris, 1987) that relies on a state and national elite 
“sanctioned discourse” (which I understand as equivalent to ideology) for its 
legitimacy, in the words of Allan (2002:182) “constraining those who may wish to 
speak or think outside of the discursive hegemony”. 
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Irrigation development in Thailand fulfils some key definitional elements of an 
ideology on several abstract levels, as argued in Chapter 5. One interpretation of 
ideology relates to a more original Marxist usage where it is viewed as a tool of the 
bourgeoisie to subordinate the weaker and more marginalised groups in society. 
Under such an interpretation, irrigation development could be seen as a 
manifestation of power held by elite groups at the core and used to gain control over 
the periphery, especially rural people. In a more nuanced interpretation, I would 
argue that irrigationalism has congruence with all six strategies that identify an 
ideology proposed by Eagleton (2007), noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1. The 
dominant strategic group associated with irrigationalism promotes a system of values 
and beliefs that are used to justify and sustain it; such core beliefs (e.g. the “poor and 
dry” Isaan narrative) have been systematically naturalized and universalized so as to 
render it self-evident and commonsensical; the hydraulic state apparatus will attempt 
to denigrate counter-narratives and exclude rival forms of thought that challenge the 
dominant narrative in myriad ways, thus silencing opposition ; and at the same time 
it will obscure social reality in ways convenient to itself, most especially the flow of 
benefits arising from irrigation development accumulating at the centre and the 
social control aspects that monopolistic hydraulic development affords the state. 
Furthermore, it obscures the fact that villagers as voters are presented with extremely 
limited choices concerning irrigation development pathways and are poorly served 
by the misleading binary classification of agricultural land into “irrigated” and 
“rainfed” categories, based on assumptions that the state has sufficient financial 
resources and there is excess water available to convert the latter category (seen as 
backward and underdeveloped) into the former (seen as inevitable utopian end). 
There is also a nationalistic sense in which irrigation development is equated with 
notions of Thai national identity (i.e. “Thai-ness”) and civilization, ordained to instil 
a sense of lost tradition, idealized communalism embodied in the “muang fai” 
narratives, utopianism and an agriculturalism linked to contested notions of an 
idyllic rural past under benevolent and sacred monarchs (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3.2). Such narratives are ironically strengthened by misinterpretations of the 
hydraulic society thesis and state roles, which promote a dominant view of local or 
“indigenous” irrigation development technologies being historically evolved from 
farmer agency and self-interest (e.g. Stargardt, 1992; Stott, 1992). These ideological 
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factors are argued to partially explain the stubborn persistence in society of adopting 
utopian notions of an irrigational-based future for the Northeast’s countryside, even 
in the face of patent technological, institutional and economic failures of existing 
state irrigation systems at all scalar levels (Chapter 8). The economic and ecological 
absurdity of irrigation development pathways becomes all the more stark when one 
witnesses government subsidized dry season rice (the most water thirsty staple crop), 
being the principal crop promoted under recent irrigation expansionism in the 
supposedly water scarce Northeast. I argue that the dominant narratives justifying 
irrigation development in Thailand have been used as a means to “......carry and 
disperse forms of power and control into the everyday lives of the populace. That is, 
they normalise certain practices, habits and routines whilst creating deviations and 
perversions out of those that they exclude” (Layder, 2001:101). Put simply, 
irrigation development constitutes part of the Thai state’s “regime of truth”, i.e. the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true (Foucault, 1980). 
Such Foucauldian perspectives of irrigation development, seen as a “technology of 
power”, allowed the monarchy far greater “sovereign power” and the state more 
disciplinary power (including the use of coercive force to liquidate those it saw as 
obstructing its aims), than in its absence under traditional hydro-agricultural farming 
patterns. As the case of LNOIP illustrates (Chapter 8, Section 8.3), state repression 
and violence seemed to work hand in hand with irrigation expansion in first bringing 
under control the previously rebellious populace, and then subjecting the people to 
increased disciplinary measures (cf. Ertsen, 2008), partly by providing opportunities 
for vastly improved surveillance of villagers and enrolling them in state “projects” 
(every canal has a road running alongside it, built originally for ease of use by 
officials, not farmers). Indeed, in a close parallel, Turton (1986:43, citing Hirsch, 
1985) noted how the physical organization of roads and houses in resettlement 
villages in Central Thailand was laid out for “ease of administration” and to allow 
village officials “to watch over everyone”, alongside many subtle ways in which 
villagers resisted such state domination (Hirsch, 1990). 
The dogmatic, instrumental and technocentric dominant view held by state hydraulic 
bureaucrats and associated elite actors tends to be one of creating neatly ordered, 
grid-like, faux-communitarian forms of irrigation development involving a high 
degree of social control and state discipline (that entails various types and processes 
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of coercion and consent). Irrigation development in Thailand exemplifies what Scott 
(1998:4) has referred to as the “ideology of high modernism” – it entails self 
confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the 
supposed satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature, and “above all, the 
rational design of social order commensurate with the understanding of natural laws.” 
As with a religious faith, this irrigational high modernism has been “uncritical, 
unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities of the 
comprehensive planning of human settlement and production” (Scott, 1998:4). When 
embedded within the administrative reordering of society and nature beloved of Thai 
state irrigation development planners and joined to a third element – “an 
authoritarian state that is willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power 
to bring these high-modernist designs into being” -  does this combination become 
“potentially lethal” 262, argues Scott (1998:5). While these elements were 
demonstrably brought together and reached their zenith under the brutal military 
regimes of Sarit and Thanom in the 1960s and early 70s, when many of the largest 
storage dams and irrigation schemes were built through coercive means that required 
the full weight of state-sanctioned force to repress local resistance (refer to Section 
8.3.1), it is not entirely apparent that the repressive hydraulic state of that era has 
been entirely renounced in the present era of lèse majesté prosecutions, threats of 
military coups and multiple methods employed to silence dissenting voices, 
including unsolved murders of many environmental activists in recent years (Chang 
Noi, 2009).  
Away from the discourses of state utopian planning and high modernist visions, the 
empirical model of usage and adoption of irrigation technology that has emerged is 
one of individualistic and atomistic irrigation development (e.g. individual pumps 
and anarchic local irrigation methods) rather than the normative and populist 
communitarian image, suggesting a widespread rejection of the top-down, state-
controlled model of hydraulic control in the Northeast. However, the state does not 
recognise these forms of “anarchic” agricultural water management as “irrigation” 
under its own narrow classification system, as it insists on classifying all irrigation 
technologies and practices outside of its own projects as “rainfed” agriculture. These 
                                                   
262 Scott (1998:7) makes the argument that “certain kinds of states, driven by utopian plans and an 
authoritarian disregard for the values, desires, and objections of their subjects, are indeed a mortal 
threat to human well-being”, and not only referring to totalitarian states. 
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automatically become targets of the hydrocracies for conversion to officially 
“irrigated” status, thereby allowing the imposition of an external, hydraulic order. On 
paper, due to the artificial and false methods of system accounting adopted by the 
RID, as the main arbiter of irrigation data, irrigated areas are presented to expand 
year on year, perhaps as a strategy to ensure the maintenance of treasury funds 
flowing to its bloated hydraulic construction machine. But even on the ground, in 
some locations like the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin, unofficially irrigated areas 
have boomed in recent years based primarily on atomistic irrigation (Chapter 8, 
Section 8.5), stimulated by a confluence of economic and political factors that have 
encouraged the conversion of floodplain land to dry season rice cultivation, but 
without RID intervention. Increasingly, the rainfed areas of Isaan are becoming 
battlegrounds for dominance between the RID and DWR striving to implement their 
broadly similar, but competitive irrigation “mega-project” models (refer to Chapters 
7 and 9). 
Irrigationalism, as I have argued in Chapter 5, meets the basic criteria for what 
Wiener (1972) terms an “ideological problem solving attitude” in society, which 
involves basically socially-conditioned response patterns, as opposed to a 
dichotomous “analytical problem solving attitude” to development (a “pragmatic 
approach”). The ideological approach represents a basic attitude to problem solving, 
that is rooted in the systematic application of state sanctioned principles (i.e. utopian 
visions of “greening” the region and solving naturalized drought-linked poverty via 
supply-led, technocentric, top-down development approaches), to an intentionally 
highly simplified planning space. Wiener (1972:27) notes how such ideological 
tenets (national, religious, moral or political) are often adopted “uncritically from an 
irrelevant past.” In this sense, irrigationalism in Thailand is very much an ideology 
that links a mythical agricultural past to a utopian future, and in this sense it is 
similar to the centralized system of water management, allocation and development 
employed by the state of Israel under the ideological tenets of Zionism (Kartin, 2001; 
Lipchin, 2007). However, Wiener neglects to consider the crucial role that unequal 
power relations play in sustaining ideologies like irrigationalism for producing 
exploitative social conditions. Using tools of discourse analysis, it has been possible 
to show that irrigationalism, as a sub-set of nationalism, monarchism and 
developmentalism, has been used by Bangkok-based elites to dominate and exploit 
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subaltern “others” on the periphery of the state for over a century (Winichakul, 1995), 
but the process has reached its zenith during the long reign of the present king. 
This process of systematic domination by the core over the periphery of the state 
goes far beyond irrigation development strategies alone, but extends into other 
hydraulic and non-hydraulic infrastructure construction (e.g. flood control, 
hydropower and road construction), which all form integral parts of Wittfogel’s 
(1957) concept of hydraulic society, marked by its “great builders”. Irrigationalism 
and related dominant discourses of the centre are but one indispensible means by 
which unequal power relations propping up Thailand’s hydraulic society are 
maintained and reproduced. 
 
11.4 Modern hydraulic society in Thailand 
 
This thesis strongly supports Hunt et al’s (1976:397) contention that irrigated 
agriculture “is a resource of great structural potential; it is closely linked with major 
features of the social organization, closely linked with differential power, and 
embedded in the local-national linkages of states.” I have argued that the planning, 
design, funding, construction and, in most instances, operation and maintenance, of 
hydraulic infrastructure at all scales in Northeast Thailand has become the pre-
eminent domain of the state, which commands an agro-managerial and hydraulic 
development monopoly in terms of water resources control. The fieldwork revealed 
that even relatively small-scale irrigation works in the Nam Songkhram Basin (e.g. 
Nong Saeng and Huay Wang Rua) were state-led development interventions that 
reflected the interests of centralized, technocentric and instrumental hydrocracies and 
associated political and business elites over the interests of direct water users, who 
were essentially subordinated at every stage. In other words, the state maintains a 
monopoly position over irrigation system development and water allocation 
decision-making of public systems, with farmers relegated to a largely passive role 
in management, above the level of the farm turnout. The practices which the state 
mistakenly classifies as “rainfed farming”, but Wittfogel would have classified as 
“hydro-agriculture” (including the areas of household and community-level managed 
wet rice paddy which make up the majority of the Northeast’s arable land), are the 
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chief targets for conversion into the state-controlled hydraulic agriculture paradigm 
and subject of increased contestation. All irrigation systems encountered in the 
Northeast that are officially classified in scalar terms as “small”, “medium” and 
“large-scale” projects are essentially state constructed artifacts, but have frequently 
been misinterpreted by external observers as representative examples of local co-
management adaptations or communal irrigation (a not uncommon error made by 
anthropologists rejecting Wittfogel’s theories, notes Price (1994)).  
This thesis is not the first to contend that Thailand represents a modern variant of a 
hydraulic society, but rather just provides a regional reinterpretation for the present 
context and adds flesh to the bare bones of Wittfogel’s half century old claim. It has 
attempted to address some of the uncertainty raised by Wijeyewardene (1973:100) 
about what this “fact” implied for Thailand’s development paradigm, given his belief 
that irrigation development was the “most spectacular manifestation” of the modern 
state’s ideology of (and pre-occupation with) national development and national 
security. I have argued that in line with Wittfogel’s hypothesis, the Thai state 
occupies a position of unrivalled operational leadership and agro-managerial control, 
through its virtual monopoly of the construction of productive and protective 
hydraulic works, including irrigation systems. As such, it has been able to 
simultaneously cajole the rural labour force into its scheme of irrigation 
infrastructure development, initially through corralling villagers as manual labour in 
the hydrotopian schemes of the 1960s and 70s under successive military 
dictatorships when whole communities were uprooted in the name of irrigationalism 
(reminiscent of some of the schemes of state simplification and legibility raised by 
Scott (1998) in Africa), but as labour costs rose and the availability of earth-moving 
machinery became more prevalent, subsequently switching the control strategy to 
co-optation of rural voters
263
 through the ballot box (the “democrasubjection” 
mentioned by Connors (2003)) and other ideological means to legitimise its semi-
authoritarian rule in a modern hydraulic society, with a concomitant absence of 
effective societal checks on the power of the state.  
The model of a hydraulic society I suggest applies to Thailand, proposes a core 
centered on Bangkok as the seat of state authority, with peripherally located regions 
                                                   
263 Direct and indirect vote buying by politicians is perceived to be most serious in the Northeast, 
according to Chang Noi (2009). 
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showing differentially weaker subservience to and resistance against the core, but are 
in a transformational process of gradually being drawn in to the central hydraulic 
polity. Indeed, Molle’s empirical study of the Chao Phraya Basin seems to support 
this hierarchical model, without specifically identifying it as a hydraulic society, 
stating in the conclusion, “[I]nteractions are also spatially hierarchized: Bangkok 
tends to dominate the delta, the delta tends to maintain (with some difficulties) its 
privileged access to water in the basin and to impose its logic to ethnic minorities in 
the north, and the basin tends to expand its grasp on the resources of neighbouring 
basins and countries” (Molle, 2006:17). This present research argues that Thailand 
qualifies as a modern hydraulic society (cf. Evers and Benedikter’s (2009a) claims 
for the Vietnamese Mekong delta), tends to conform with Wittfogel’s classification 
schemata as a “Loose 1 (L1 + prot)”264, with a compact hydraulic core represented 
by the lower Chao Phraya delta. The Northeast, by comparison, represents a 
marginal, spatially discontinuous variant of the hydraulic society (refer to Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.2).  
Over the last sixty years or so (i.e. the developmental era), the central state has 
persistently attempted and largely succeeded in incorporating more marginal space 
(basins and administrative regions) into the folds of the hydraulic society by 
increasing hydraulic density. The furthest sub-margins of the hydro-ecologically and 
socio-politically “problematic” Northeast (such as the Nam Songkhram Basin) were 
some of the final areas to be incorporated into the core’s sphere of influence, and 
initially offered most resistance. From the 1960s on (i.e. marked by the construction 
of Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project and other large-scale hydraulic infrastructure), 
the central state (assisted initially by the US development industry and military 
complex) used overtly authoritarian and coercive means (see Chapters 5 and 7) to 
subordinate the people and bring such marginal areas as the Nam Songkhram into 
the hydraulic polity of Bangkok, gradually switching to more ideological strategies 
as time progressed. The state and allied strategic groups achieved this feat in a 
complex and multi-layered process of domination, using a mixture of coercion, 
ideology and hegemony, but not without meeting degrees of resistance and 
                                                   
264 A “loose” hydraulic society is one in which the hydraulic agriculture, “while lacking economic 
superiority, is sufficient to assure its leaders absolute organizational and political hegemony” 
(Wittfogel 1957:166). The addition of + prot, refers to the relatively strong development of protective 
hydraulic works (referring principally to flood protection), as opposed to productive (i.e. irrigation 
infrastructure) alone. 
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opposition from both human and non-human agents
265
. Indeed, the Northeast’s 
topography, hydrology, geology, ecology, even aquatic biota (Sneddon, 2003a), have 
conspired to partially thwart the process of socio-ecological transformation 
precipitated by the hydraulic overlords, as much as local resistance to large-scale 
infrastructure development. 
Rather than view the Thai hydraulic state as a monolithic entity, it is more helpfully 
conceived as a hydra-like beast, with multiple heads and far-reaching tentacles of 
influence. As Wittfogel asserted, historically hydraulic societies tended to be very 
resilient to internal challenge and able to reproduce themselves over long time 
periods: “[D]ominated by its monopoly bureaucracy, it continued to muster the 
technical and intellectual skills necessary to its perpetuation” (Wittfogel, 1957:422). 
Further, Wittfogel believed that there would be “no independent centres of authority 
capable of checking the power of the hydraulic regime” (Wittfogel, 1957:102) and 
that any freedoms in society would be “politically irrelevant”. To survive and 
strengthen its symbolic and discursive authority during the past sixty years, the Thai 
hydraulic regime has become adept at co-optation or suppression of rival discourses 
and agents that challenge its supremacy. This it has achieved partly through means of 
“strategic groups” formation (aka discourse coalitions), as also seen with the case of 
Vietnam’s hydraulic society (Evers and Benedikter, 2009b). This research has 
suggested that the most powerful strategic group in Thailand has been comprised of 
a five sided alliance of actors drawn from the military, monarchy, hydraulic 
bureaucracies, politicians and private enterprise, especially certain favoured 
construction companies. This extends the earlier notions of “iron triangles” (Worster, 
1992), or “iron quadrangles” (Molle, 2008b; Molle et al., 2009d) of actors, and 
suggests these models are inadequate in explaining hydraulic power relations in 
Thailand’s case, which is better represented by adding a fifth dimension, namely the 
monarchical institution. I have termed this formation a “golden pentagon” of 
hydraulic interests (see Fig 11.1 below). Furthermore, it supports the view of 
Connors that central to the problem of understanding Thailand’s modern ambivalent 
state is appreciating the persistence of authoritarian power in the military and 
                                                   
265 In this post-structural political ecology perspective, nature has been viewed as one amongst many 
agents that actively resists human domination. 
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monarchy as part of the present balance of power relations attempting to maintain 
the status quo. 
 
 
 
Detailed analysis of the more complex configuration of inter-connecting power 
relations in the Thai hydraulic society suggested by the preliminary heuristic above, 
goes beyond the scope of the primary objectives of this thesis, but invites further 
research and critique. At this stage, I simply suggest that these five actor groupings 
work together in “synergistic relationships” in which “the ways flows of water are 
created or modified by water infrastructure are intertwined with flows of power and 
influence, often manifested in the form of political or financial benefits, whether 
private or collective” (Molle et al., 2009d). Figure 11.1, in reality conceals the 
existence of far more complex power relations and overlooks reference to scalar or 
temporal considerations. It also conveys little about the nature of each of these actor 
groups and the interests and power struggles that occur in the “everyday politics of 
water resources management” (Mollinga, 2008) occurring within each group, all of 
which requires further elaboration in future. However, the position of the monarchy 
Figure 11.1 Conceptual diagram to illustrate the five most important strategic agent groups in 
Thailand that forge alliances at the national level to perpetuate the staying power of the hydraulic 
society, via maintaining a discursive web of mutual interests. 
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at the apex of the pentagon is not coincidental and has constituted one of the major 
arguments running through this thesis.  
 
11.5 Role of the king and network monarchy 
 
A key characteristic of hydraulic society, according to Wittfogel, was the existence 
of an absolute ruler at the pinnacle of a hierarchy, whose power was total and 
combined “supreme operational authority and the many magical and mythical 
symbols that express the terrifying (and allegedly beneficial) qualities of the power 
apparatus he heads” (Wittfogel, 1957:305). The key value of an ideal type of 
“oriental despotism” proposed by Montesquieu was said to be fear, where the ruler 
relied on religion rather than law, and the entire system was essentially static because 
of the dominant role of customs and taboos (Pye, 1985:8). Both observational 
evidence from the field and analysis of multiple narrative texts suggests that the 
modern irrigation development paradigm in Thailand has to a large extent, been 
profoundly influenced by and in some cases directly reflects, knowledge 
constructions and narratives propagated by the current monarch, King Bhumibol. 
That the linkages between strategic groups or networks of elite actors that control 
and manage the public discourse of hydraulic development has not been 
comprehensively examined to date beyond a few case studies (e.g. Sneddon, 2000; 
Molle, 2003, 2006; Floch et al., 2007), is perhaps partial testimony to the venerated 
and sacrosanct position of the present monarch in a rigidly patriarchal and 
hierarchical society (Jacobs, 1971; Hewison, 1997; McCargo, 2005; Fong, 2009; 
Ivarsson and Isager, 2010). However, the discursive agency of the king as an 
individual at the apex of the Thai state and hydraulic society structure is some way 
from the benevolent paternalistic image portrayed in popular narratives, but rather 
has been propped up by a vast range of coercive and ideological tools lying at the 
disposal of the bureaucratic state forces. The sovereign power (Foucault, 1980) held 
by the monarchical institution acts as an effective means of silencing dissent or 
resistance, by relying on the extensive use of police, judicial, military and 
paramilitary forces for coercion of non-governmental agents in the past (sometimes 
used in facilitating the implementation of “royally-initiated” hydraulic infrastructure 
projects) and more recent use of repressive lèse majesté laws to enforce public 
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silence, academic self-censorship and ensure the official discourse prevails 
(Streckfuss, 2010). Mostly, however, compliance is obtained by more consensual 
hegemonic forms of power. 
There is little doubt that the present monarch has played a definitive role in moulding 
the water resources development and management discourse of Thailand and could 
be considered an archetypal “hydraulic ruler” and chief ideologue of hydraulic 
society (see Chapter 10, Section 10.7). The thesis has demonstrated that a large 
proportion of the king’s personal authority and legitimacy has derived from a 
material and symbolic reputation as a hands-on water resources engineer, expert, 
designer, manager, inventor, and even mythical controller of rainfall without peer in 
the land (and beyond). Indeed, a meticulous process of knowledge construction has 
been conducted by the hydrocracies, the Public Relations Department and associated 
royal statecraft bodies to portray him as a hydro-social engineer and manager 
without parallel, “The Great Engineer”, “Royal Rainmaker”, “The Father of Water 
Management”, highlighted in Chapter 10. His personal and intellectual interest in 
water resources development from an early stage of his reign has had profound 
implications to the ideological and discursive terrain of Thailand’s irrigation 
development paradigm over the last half century. Bhumibol surely deserves the 
ironic epithet first given to the early twentieth century Dutch irrigational protagonist 
van der Heide by King Chulalongkorn – “The King of the Waters” (Brummelhuis, 
2005) - more than any other Thai monarch before or since. 
There is a striking convergence between contemporary national water resources 
development policy and planning discourse with the king’s personal discourse on 
water resources management, often expressed through the medium of annual 
birthday sermons. I contend that the royal stamp on water resources management 
discourse can be found throughout state and non-state organization narratives, but 
most especially within the development narratives of the powerful “black box” RID 
and its newer rival, the DWR. The royal discourse on water management is also 
discernible in the National Water Policy and successive National Economic and 
Social Development Plans (most recently with regards to promotion of Sufficiency 
Economy principles and the IWRM paradigm), in addition to justifications employed 
for many hydraulic development projects, beginning with the Bhumibol-inspired 
Green Isaan Project discussed in Chapter 7, but also its later clones. Simultaneously 
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with the large-scale hydraulic technologies and schemes, the king’s discursive tracks 
and traces are visible within the small-scale hydraulic interventions that are often the 
joint preserve of state agencies and civil society organizations (in another powerful 
discourse coalition), such as bulk-applied fai maew weirs, gaem ling flood capture 
reservoirs and on-farm ponds. This colonization of hydraulic development discourse 
across scales demonstrates how the king’s material and symbolic influence has 
effectively neutralized independent centres of authority capable of checking the 
power of the hydraulic regime, as predicted in Wittfogel’s hypothesis, to create a 
form of “beggars’ democracy”, where total social control is unnecessary for its 
perpetuation (Wittfogel, 1957:112). 
The powerful hold of the hydraulic state over its subjects, via symbolic use of the 
monarchy, is likely to remain internally resilient for as long as irrigation water 
“chonla-prathaan” is treated as a “gift from the king”, rather than an inalienable 
right under law (Molle, 2003). This partly explains the marked reluctance of 
lawmakers, bureaucrats and politicians to pass the draft Water Act through 
parliament, which would require the introduction of irrigation water fees and thereby 
change the fundamental nature of the relationship between the service provider (the 
state) and the receiver (the farmer/irrigator) of the water. The present arrangement of 
granting the farmers free water gifted from a benevolent king, is rather more 
advantageous to those in control at the core as it maintains the receiver in a state of 
subservience where he/she has to politely beg for water from the state (or politician), 
as a beggar is grateful for alms from a benefactor, but instinctively knows he/she can 
be arrested or sanctioned at any moment, should he/she have the temerity to 
complain or resist. But if farmers were required to pay for water, then they might 
start to feel more empowered to demand a better service from the RID (or other state 
agency) and the whole balance of power would shift from state to peasant, which 
would be anathema to the hydrocratic elite’s present interests of command and 
control. Hence, the strong resistance shown by the Thai state to external efforts by 
neo-liberal institutions like the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to 
make irrigation water an economic good and charge farmers for the commodity and 
related irrigation service (Molle, 2007b). Ironically perhaps, state interests in this 
regard have been protected by civil society organizations that are ideologically 
opposed to commodifying water resources. 
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It has been suggested that Figure 11.1 may be useful for conceptualizing the basic 
web of relations linking five main strategic groups involved in the maintenance of 
hydraulic society, with the monarchy as the most significant institution, firmly 
headed by the semi-divine King Bhumibol, but it does not capture the layers of 
scalar complexity and temporal dynamics. McCargo (2005) argues that Bhumibol is 
far more than a figurehead monarch, but constitutes the central component of a novel 
mode of governance he terms “network monarchy”. He stresses the active 
involvement of the king in the political process, with the network reaching its peak 
of authority during the 1973-2001 period, after which some of its earlier powers 
started to wane with the emergence of a rival network under Thaksin Shinawatra. In 
Chapter 10, I integrated Evers and Benedikter’s (2009a) concept with that of 
McCargo’s (McCargo, 2005) “network monarchy” to argue that there is reasonable 
evidence to conceive of a more resilient social formation, namely “hydraulic network 
monarchy”, which is instrumental in preserving the authority and control of the 
monarchy and the hydraulic society over which it presides (Section 10.10). It makes 
it clear that for the network hydraulic monarchy to function effectively requires a 
system of proxy actors and agencies (the network), who conduct the real material 
and ideological work on behalf of the monarch, extending from the core to the 
margins of the state. Although the extent to which the king’s reign can be considered 
authoritarian is open to debate and interpretation, it has definitely not been 
totalitarian according to Wittfogel’s definition. Hence, I liken his role as equating 
more closely with that of a hydraulic “high priest”, presiding over a loose (even 
crumbling) hydraulic society.  
 
11.6 Competing hydraulic bureaucracies 
 
Vital to the organization and maintenance of the hydraulic state is the supporting role 
of the agro-managerial bureaucracies (Wittfogel, 1957) or powerful state 
“hydrocracies” (Molle et al., 2009d). At the forefront of the hydraulic mission and 
symbolizing state power, in many countries they have been obliged to reinvent 
themselves or face reform (usually deflected reform) due to internal and external 
challenges, argue Molle et al. (2009d). In Thailand’s case, the main challenge has 
been internal, and expresses itself as political rivalry both between hydrocracies and 
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with other state bureaucracies, that connects to rivalries between powerful political 
factions and phak phuak. Following Sneddon (2003b) and Floch and Molle (2008a), 
in Chapter 9 I have documented the competition that emerged between the 
Department of Energy Development (DEDP) and the RID over implementing the 
contentious Khong-Chi-Mun irrigation project in Northeast Thailand and then, 
following the dissolution of the DEDP and replacement by the semi-regulatory 
Department of Water Resources (DWR), the new battles that have emerged with 
RID to implement each hydrocracy’s variant of Thaksin’s multi-billion dollar and 
aspirational Water Grid project (see Section 9.2.4 and Fig. 1.1).  
I have argued that the RID and the DWR, each strategically allied with political 
factions and construction industry groups that essentially compete with one another 
both materially and discursively at multiple spatial levels, leading to serious over-
building of water resources infrastructure in already closed or near-closed river 
basins. The Water Grid project is the most visible manifestation of this competition 
at the national level, but the rivalry is detectable right down to the village level, 
which also become dispersed micro-battlegrounds for their agency. Both agencies 
may be viewed as national repositories of the utopian fantasies for cabals of 
hydraulic and social engineers. They both subscribe to an ideology of irrigationalism, 
although the RID presents itself as the more zealous church, drawing strongly from 
narratives claiming historical and royal legitimacy and material control of large and 
medium size systems nationwide. The RID vastly outguns its rival in terms of 
manpower and budget at present, but this could potentially change in future. Using 
tools that pay rhetorical lip-service to neo-liberal governance terms like participation 
and decentralization, both agencies persist with an increasingly contested hydraulic 
mission of infrastructure construction in an ever-restricted planning space. Peripheral 
arenas like the lower Nam Songkhram Basin are proving the final frontier for the 
hydrocracies’ ambitions, which like the agricultural frontier, is heading towards 
basin closure. Increasingly, the hydrocracies are turning their attention to the 
“wasted” water of Laos’ rivers or damming the Mekong itself, as the next hydraulic 
frontier to exploit, in fulfilment of old utopian dreams of greening Isaan (Molle et al., 
2009a; Floch and Blake, 2011). 
As both institutions rely chiefly on infrastructure construction as their core activity 
(despite initial promise by DWR that it would limit itself to national water resources 
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policy making, planning and legislation), they are obliged to hunt for new sites to 
socio-ecologically transform. As they have been virtually freed from the constraints 
of external evaluation of their respective projects, especially since the withdrawal of 
foreign aid assistance to the Thai water sector in the 1990s, then it seems they can 
afford to be lax with cost-benefit calculations with little fear of contradiction. 
Evidence gathered in Sakon Nakhon Province, suggests that the provincial RID 
office was practicing routine gross exaggeration of irrigation command areas and 
beneficiaries of small projects (perhaps in order to make patently uneconomic 
projects appear to superiors more beneficial than the reality, so as to assure 
continued funding). The extent of this deception is unknown, but if the case of Huay 
Wang Rua, Ban Non Rua (see Chapter 8, Section 8.6) was typical, then it would 
suggest that the ratio of over-estimation of claimed potential irrigable area to that 
irrigable in practice, could be a factor of well over one hundred fold. The catalogue 
of poor water governance in the small-scale projects investigated also included bid 
rigging by front companies, lack of water user participation, no prior state agency 
consultation with water users, uncompensated tree and crop destruction by the 
contractors, inept building practices, lack of oversight and a host of other 
misdemeanours in the construction of a single small system. Startlingly perhaps, the 
same basic technical mistakes and ingrained institutional corruption were repeated 
and compounded at the same project site, despite the passage of nearly thirty years. 
Results from the field indicated that the RID was institutionally not learning from 
past malpractices and outright failure of its projects, as there was little fear of 
external scrutiny or sanction. In a hydraulic society fear lies with the people, not the 
state, which enjoys pre-eminence. This case illustrated the RID’s closed institutional 
workings and pointed to an endemic culture of poor transparency and lack of 
accountability, even to other agencies in the same ministry. The evidence suggested 
that narratives of neo-liberal sectoral reform, “good governance” and progressive 
evolutionary models in Asian irrigation paradigms, are over-optimistic in the case of 
Thailand (cf. Barker and Molle, 2004). Such models tend to overlook the staying 
power of hydraulic society predicted by Wittfogel and indeed, the Thai case suggests 
that the state now enjoys greater control over hydraulic development at the periphery 
of the nation than at any time in the past. 
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11.7 Recommendations for further research 
 
There are a number of areas of potential future research that are suggested by this 
study to be presently lacking or superficial. Firstly, the “hydraulic society” theory 
deserves further unpacking and interrogation in the light of modern water resources 
development paradigms, both domestically in Thailand, and perhaps just as 
importantly, neighbouring states in the Mekong region. This is an important task, I 
believe, given the increasingly inter-connected economies of the region and the 
efforts by Thailand as a regional hegemon, to extract natural resources and 
accumulate capital from neighbouring countries through interlinked energy and 
water grids. This would imply shifting up the research domain more from the level 
of “everyday politics”, to the level of “the politics of water policy in the context of 
sovereign states” and “inter-state hydropolitics” (see Mollinga, 2008), but without 
losing sight of the local processes of struggle and contestation against domination. 
Understanding the discourses of hydraulic development (e.g. hydropower, domestic 
water supply and flood control and not just irrigation development, for example) and 
the actors that sustain and counter them in different spatio-temporal contexts would 
be one top priority. Also, there is a need to examine the relations of power between 
the various actors in the hydraulic society model and ascertain the degree of agency 
of each, both historically and at present. For example, are the power relations 
amongst actors and actor groups nearer the core of the hydraulic society, say in the 
lower Chao Phraya basin comparable with those in irrigation systems located on the 
margins, such as the LNOIP? 
There appears to be a patent need to precipitate research and analysis of “black box” 
hydraulic bureaucracies in Thailand, the most pertinent being the inscrutable Royal 
Irrigation Department, which quite remarkably has escaped serious institutional 
research up to now, given its size, longevity and power. One suspects this may be 
strongly related to its close association with the monarchy, but this factor alone 
seems an unsatisfactory explanation for the relative absence of critical analysis of 
this institution (at least in the English language), compared to say the Royal Forestry 
Department which has been exposed for some time to quite rigorous critique by 
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domestic and foreign researchers (e.g. Pye, 2005; Forsyth and Walker, 2008). As 
Molle et al (2009d) have pointed out, the internal dynamics of hydrocracies remains 
a heavily under-researched field worldwide. Therefore, gaining access to the inner 
sanctums of the RID (or the DWR) and studying it from an inter-disciplinary 
perspective, trying to understand its history, actor motivations, policy discourse and 
intra- and inter-agency politics, would be an invaluable contribution to addressing 
one of the most obvious gaps in Thai water resources governance research.  
Closely linked to research on the RID, there is a clear need to bring the Thai 
monarchy and affiliated institutions (e.g. Royal Projects, Chaipattana Foundation) 
into the realms of being considered legitimate subjects of academic research, both 
structurally and at the individual actor level, to question further its role in producing, 
reproducing and transforming discourse and social relations around water resources 
development paradigms. Like the RID, the monarchy has thus far managed to escape 
serious political scrutiny and has become something of a “sacred cow” institution – 
considered untouchable and above criticism – which has neither served the purpose 
of sustainable water resources management nor the pursuit of intellectual freedom 
and ability to openly evaluate past paradigms, but rather has closed entire areas of 
legitimate research and debate, which may ultimately weaken the institution’s 
reputation and standing. To engage, researchers would need to be prepared to 
reappraise existing dominant discourse around irrigation and hydraulic development, 
to study water resources control from multiple perspectives that take into account 
power relations and diverse actors. This will inevitably mean consciously attempting 
to remove the barriers that have prevented the monarchy (and military) and related 
actors from being subject to a degree of open criticism. This will clearly not be a 
simple task given the prevailing political context and would likely require reform of 
the laws that presently prevent reasonable academic freedom of expression in 
Thailand, in particular Article 112 of the Criminal Code
266
. 
  
                                                   
266 Article 112 of the Criminal Code is one of three legal instruments pertinent to the crime of lèse 
majesté and prescribes punishments for violations of the crime thus: “Whoever defames, insults or 
threatens the King, Queen, the heir-apparent, or the Regent, shall be punished (with) imprisonment of 
three to fifteen years.” 
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Appendix A  List of Recorded Interviews 
 
Name Position and Organisation 
Date of 
Interview 
(dd-mm-
yy) 
Length of 
interview 
(mins) 
State officials  
Sansonthi 
Boonyothayan 
Recently retired chief of Sakon Nakhon Provincial 
Agriculture and Cooperatives Office, Sakon Nakhon 
24-11-09 60 
Satit Phiromchai Senior Policy and Planning Analyst; Dept of Water 
Resources, Bangkok 
5-1-10 45 
Sratta Rangrawd Director, Sakon Nakhon Provincial Irrigation Project, Sakon 
Nakhon 
29-4-10 70 
Pithak Chomphuchan Director of Mekong River Basin Cooperation and 
Management Division, Department of Water Resources 
Regional Office 3, Udon Thani  
7-5-10 71 
Prasit Warnset Director of Mun-Chi River Basin Cooperation and 
Management Division, Dept of Water Resources Regional 
Office 4, Khon Kaen 
10-6-10 75 
Jeddy Khotamitr Chief of Sri Songkhram District Agricultural Extension 
Office, Nakhon Phanom 
19-7-10 79 
Pakawan Chofamanee Director of Thai National Mekong Committee, Dept of Water 
Resources, Bangkok 
4-8-10 89 
Manas Kamnerdmanee Director of Public Participation Promotion Office, Royal 
Irrigation Dept, Bangkok 
4-8-10 76 
Domestic and International NGOs and civil society  
Montree Chantawong Activist-researcher with Thai-based NGO, Towards 
Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliances (TERRA), 
Bangkok. 
19-11-09 77 
Laothai Nilnuan Independent activist-researcher and Chairman of TAO in Lup 
Lao Sub-District,  Sakon Nakhon 
15-12-09 80 
Hannarong Yaowalert President of Thai Water Partnership and former NGO-
activist, Bangkok 
4-1-10 66 
Dr Carl Middleton Activist-campaigner for International Rivers, Southeast Asia 
office 
5-1-10 22 
Dr Apichart 
Anukularmphai 
President, Thailand Water Resources Association, Bangkok 
(formerly member of National Water Resources Committee 
and engineering lecturer at Asian Institute of Technology) 
4-6-10 90 
International Development and Research Organisations 
Dr Thierry Facon Senior Water Resources Management Officer for the FAO 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (FAORAP), 
Bangkok 
5-1-10 84 
Fongsamuth 
Phengphaengsy 
Water & Wetlands Coordinator, International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Vientiane, Lao PDR  
20-5-10 90 
Dr Le Huu Ti Chief of Water Security Section, Environment and 
Development Division, UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
18-6-10 52 
Dr Thanapon Piman Senior Modeller, Basin Development Plan, Planning 
Division, Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Lao PDR 
18-8-10 84 
Dr Andrew Noble Regional Director, International Water Management Institute, 
Vientiane, Lao PDR 
19-8-10 133 
Dr Philippe Floch Water Specialist, Asian Development Bank, Manila 20-12-10 40 
Private consultants 
Erhard Floether GMS Agriculture Development Specialist (semi-retired), 
Khon Kaen 
13-3-10 147 
Tony Zola Independent agricultural development consultant, Bangkok 3-8-10 80 
Academics  
Dr Kanokwan Manorom Director of the Mekong Sub-Region Social Research Centre, 
Ubon Ratchtathani University 
12-1-10 74 
Dr Prakob Wirojanagud President, Ubon Ratchathani University, Ubon Ratchathani 12-1-10 58 
Dr Srisakara 
Vallibhotama 
Semi-retired history professor at Silapakorn University, 
Bangkok and public intellectual 
9-4-10 103 
Dr Surachai Wun-gaew Research Centre Director, Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok 
4-6-10 29 
Dr Prasit Prakongsri Director of Integrated Water Resources Management 
Research & Development Centre, Khon Kaen University, 
Khon Kaen 
30-6-10 176 
Dr Pinkaew Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai 4-3-11 59 
362 
 
Luangaramsri University 
Dr Louis Lebel Director, Unit for Social and Environmental Research 
(USER), Faculty of Social Sciences, Chaing Mai University 
8-3-10 41 
Dr Chayan 
Vaddhanaphuti 
Director of Regional Centre for Social Science and 
Sustainable Development, Chiang Mai University 
8-3-10 50 
Politicians  
Pairoj Sukjai Deputy Chairman, Nong Sa Plaa TAO, Nong Han District, 
Udon Thani 
23-6-10 64 
Sgt Major Amphon 
Khamwongsa 
Deputy Chairman,  Naa Hua Bor TAO, Phanna Nikhom 
District, Sakon Nakhon 
25-6-10 47 
H.E. Supachai Phosu Deputy Minister for Agriculture and Cooperatives and MP 
for Nakhon Phanom (Bhumjaithai Party).  
27-6-10 49 
Boonhong Chaibin Chairman, Tha Bor Songkhram TAO, Sri Songkhram 
District, Nakhon Phanom 
20-7-10 65 
Local leaders  
Sanguan Phosu Ex-village chief, Ban Naa Phiang, Sri Songkhram District, 
Nakhon Phanom 
27-5-10 90 
Somboon Chaitamat Deputy Chairman of Huay Wang Rua Water Users Group 
and RID volunteer 
30-5-10 48 
Boonthavee Boonsit Ex-village chief, Baan Nong Sa Plaa, Nong Han District, 
Udon Thani 
31-5-10 33 
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Appendix B Survey Questionnaire Design 
 
A survey of the perceptions of members of the public about some water resources 
related issues in Northeast Thailand, to be used as part of the fieldwork of David Blake, 
PhD candidate at University of East Anglia, United Kingdom.  
 
Introduction 
 
“Hello, my name is ………….. (Name of Interviewer). I am a research assistant from Khon 
Kaen University, conducting a questionnaire survey on behalf of a PhD research student 
called David Blake from the University of East Anglia, England. If you agree, I would like to 
invite you to participate in this research study conducted as part of David’s PhD thesis data 
collection. It should take no more than about 15 minutes to complete.” 
 
Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to collect information concerning Thai peoples’ perceptions and 
views about various aspects of water resources development and management in Northeast 
Thailand. The data collected will be used to inform a wider study focused on irrigation 
development in the Nam Songkhram Basin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviewer   
Interview Date (Date/Month/Year)  
Interview Time (Start – Finish time)  
Location  
 
Prior Informed Consent Statement 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. In doing so, you understand that any 
information you give is strictly confidential and your answers will be used only for the purposes of 
Mr David Blake completing his PhD thesis and possible future academic research papers. All data 
will be securely stored and not used for commercial purposes. Furthermore, you participate 
voluntarily and are under no obligation to answer every question, and if you wish, you may 
terminate the interview at any point.  
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Standard demographic data collected prior to use of main questionnaire: 
Name of person interviewed   
Sex MALE FEMALE 
Age   
Highest educational qualification 
attained  
 
Present occupation  
Present domicile (District & 
Province) 
 
Birth place (District & Province)  
(NB: Each of above categories to be post-coded for later statistical analysis) 
 
Main Survey Questions 
 
(NB: respondents to be asked questions in order shown and full responses to be recorded. If 
respondent is not sure about the question or did not hear it properly, then clearly repeat the 
question, but in no circumstances invoke or suggest a response. Where boxes are used, 
please tick the answer in corresponding column)  
 
Question 1. When you hear the word “Isaan”, what does it make you think 
of? (may list up to 3 answers) 
i. ……… 
ii. ……… 
iii. ……… 
 
Question 2. What do you think are the primary development problems that 
affect the Isaan region? (may list up to 3 answers) 
i. ……….. 
ii. ………… 
iii. ……….. 
 
Question 3. What do you think are the main problems related to water 
resources management in the Isaan region? ( may list up to 3 answers) 
i. ………. 
ii. ……… 
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iii. ……….. 
 
Question 4. Do any of these water resources issues (mentioned above) affect 
you personally? If so, in what way/s?  
i. ………. 
ii. ………… 
iii. ……….. 
 
Question 5. In your own words, what do you understand by the term 
“drought”?  
Answer:……………………………………………..…………………………………
…………………………………….……..……………………………………………
…………. 
 
Question 6. Do you think the following water resources issues are getting 
better, worse or no change over the last ten years? 
 
 Issue Better Worse No change 
6.1 Floods    
6.2 Droughts    
6.3 Domestic water supply    
6.4 Agricultural water supply    
 
Question 7. If in your opinion drought is getting worse, what do you think 
may be the cause of this?  
Answer:………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………….
…………. 
 
Question 8. Do you think global climate change (global warming) may be to 
blame for changes in drought and flood frequency?  
 Response Tick 
8.1 Yes  
8.2 No   
8.3 Don’t know  
 
 
Question 9. Which economic sector do you think most contributes to water 
scarcity? 
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 Economic Sector Tick 
9.1 Agriculture  
9.2 Industry  
9.3 Domestic water supply  
9.4 Other  
 
Question 10. Do you think Thai farmers should be expected to pay the government 
for irrigation water?  
 Response Tick 
10.1 Yes  
10.2 No  
10.3 Don’t know  
 
Question 11. How strongly do you agree with each of the following statements? 
 Statement Strongly 
agree 
Slightly 
agree 
Don’t 
know/ not 
sure 
/neutral 
Slightly 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
 1 2 3 4 
5 
11.1   Isaan is the driest region of Thailand      
11.2 Isaan deserves more budget for water resources 
development than other regions 
     
11.3   It would be a good idea to withdraw water from the 
Mekong River to irrigate Isaan 
     
11.4   It would be a good idea to transfer water from rivers 
in Laos to irrigate Isaan 
     
11.5   In Isaan there are enough irrigation systems already, 
but what people need is better management of 
existing systems 
     
11.6   Powerful people in Thailand benefit the most from 
building more irrigation systems 
     
11.7   Politicians are able to win votes from policies that 
promise new irrigation systems to villagers 
     
11.8   The job of planning and managing water resources is 
more the duty of the government than the people 
     
 
Do you have any further opinions or comments you would like to make, having 
completed this survey? ........................................................ 
  
Thank you for your cooperation in answering these questions. Your responses have 
been most helpful. 
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If you would like further information, then you are welcome to contact David through the 
following channels: 
Address:  David J.H. Blake, c/o Research Group for Well Being & Sustainable Development, 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University, Amphur Muang, Khon Kaen, 
40002 
 Tel: 087 0258 528  Email: djhblake@yahoo.co.uk 
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Appendix C Responses given to Questionnaire Survey 
questions, disaggregated by location and ranked according 
to importance 
 
 
TABLE 1.  Responses given to Question 1: “When you hear the word 
“Isaan”, what does it make you think of?” (respondents may list up to 3 answers) 
Responses Interview Location TOTAL  
Khon 
Kaen
267
 
Bangkok
268
 Nam 
Song
269
 
# % # % # % # % Rank 
1.1 Poverty; poor people 9 7.4 2 1.9 4 3.7 15 4.5 11= 
1.2 Drought 29 
(3=) 
24.0 
27 
(3) 
25.2 20 18.3 76 22.6 5= 
1.3 Other climate-related 
characteristics 
4 3.3 7 6.5 6 5.5 17 5.0 10 
1.4 Physical landscape 
characteristics 
7 5.8 10 9.3 3 2.8 20 5.9 9 
1.5 Positive social 
characteristics 
0 0 6 5.6 9 8.3 15 4.5 11= 
1.6 Negative socio-economic 
factors 
1 0.8 3 2.8 1 0.9 5 1.5 13 
1.7 Culture and traditions 
46 (2) 38.0 
43 
(2) 
40.2 26 23.9 115 34.1 2 
1.8 Agriculture & farming 
livelihoods 
25 20.7 14 13.1 
65 
(1) 
59.6 104 30.9 3 
1.9 Language (Lao; Isan) 25 20.7 40 37.4 11 10.1 76 22.6 5= 
1.10 Food and eating 
79 (1) 65.3 
70 
(1) 
65.4 
53 
(2) 
48.6 202 59.9 1 
1.11 Tourism and tourist 
attractions 
9 7.4 9 8.4 7 6.4 25 7.4 8 
1.12 Music & musical 
instruments 
29 
(3=) 
24.0 23 21.5 
30 
(3) 
27.5 82 24.3 4 
1.13 Others 5 4.1 20 18.7 19 17.4 44 13.1 7 
 
  
                                                   
267
 Khon Kaen location = inside Central Plaza shopping mall and at public bus station 
268
 Bangkok location = inside Lumpini Park, central Bangkok 
269
 Nam Song = Nam Songkhram village (Ban Nong Batao, Sri Songkhram District, Nakhon Phanom)  
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TABLE 2.  Responses given to Question 2: “What do you think are the most 
important development problems that affect the Isan region?” (respondents may 
list up to 3 answers) 
Responses Interview Location TOTAL  
Khon 
Kaen 
Bangkok Nam Song 
# % # % # % # % 
Rank 
2.1 Education 63 
(1) 
53.4 40 
(2) 
37.4 14 13.3 117 35.5 
2 
2.2 Drought; water scarcity 37 
(2) 
31.4 49 
(1) 
45.8 56 
(1) 
53.8 142 43.0 
1 
2.3 Poverty; low income 36 
(3) 
30.5 31 29.0 46 
(2) 
43.8 113 34.2 
3 
2.4 Politics; governance 10 8.5 22 20.6 20 19.0 52 15.8 7 
2.5 Climate & weather 
events 
4 3.4 13 12.1 9 8.6 26 7.9 
8 
2.6 Environment related 12 10.2 13 12.1 8 7.6 33 10.0 9 
2.7 Livelihoods and 
employment 
30 25.4 37 
(3) 
34.6 45 
(3) 
42.9 112 33.9 
4 
2.8 Migration 1 0.8 10 9.3 10 9.5 21 6.4 10 
2.9 Culture; religion; 
morality; family 
4 3.4 2 1.9 0 0 6 1.8 
12 
2.10 Water resources 
management 
0 0 5 4.7 4 1.2 9 2.7 
11 
2.11 Transport; 
communications 
15 12.7 21 19.6 17 16.2 53 16.1 
6 
2.12 Others 3 2.5 38 35.5 38 36.2 79 23.9 5 
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TABLE 3.  Responses given to Question 3:  “What do you think are 
the most important development problems related to water resources 
management in Isaan?” (may list up to 3 answers) 
Responses Interview Location TOTAL  
Khon 
Kaen 
Bangkok Nam 
Song 
# % # % # % 
# % Rank 
3.1 Water scarcity problems 
(agricultural and domestic) 
51 
(1) 
44.3 43 
(1) 
40.6 66 
(1) 
61.1 
160 48.6 1 
3.2  Insufficient or poor water 
storage sources (e.g. dams, 
weirs, etc) 
25 
(3) 
21.7 28 26.4 26 
(3) 
24.1 
79 24.0 4 
3.3 Climate-related drought, 
unpredictable rainfall & 
unusual weather events  
22 19.1 24 22.6 14 13.0 
60 18.2 6 
3.4 Water quality or pollution 
problems 
22 19.1 38 
(2) 
35.8 1 0.9 
61 18.5 5 
3.5 Floods 10 8.7 7 6.6 16 14.8 33 10.0 9 
3.6 Poor water management 
practice/knowledge at the local 
level 
34 
(2) 
29.6 34 
(3) 
32.1 21 19.4 
89 27.1 2 
3.7 Poor irrigation & water 
delivery systems 
20 17.4 21 19.8 45 
(2) 
41.7 
86 26.1 3 
3.8 Demand-side problems and 
conflict 
4 3.5 1 0.9 5 4.6 
10 3.0 12 
3.9 Environmental decline e.g. 
biodiversity loss, watershed 
destruction or deforestation 
6 5.2 12 11.3 11 10.2 
29 8.8 11 
3.10 Problems with tap water 
provision 
16 13.9 10 9.4 6 5.6 
32 9.7 10 
3.11 State policy or project 
planning & implementation 
problems 
20 17.4 10 9.4 10 9.3 
40 12.2 8 
3.12 Others 14 12.2 22 20.8 15 13.9 51 15.5 7 
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TABLE 4.  Responses given to Question 4: “Do any of these water resources 
problems (mentioned in Q3) affect you personally? If so, in what way?” 
Responses Interview Location TOTAL  
Khon 
Kaen 
Bangkok Nam 
Song 
# % # % # % 
# % Rank 
4.1 Insufficient water for 
agriculture 
26 
(1) 
21.5 11 
(4) 
10.6 48 
(1) 
45.3 
85 25.7 1 
4.2 Insufficient water for 
domestic consumption 
24 
(2) 
19.8 12 
(2=) 
11.5 8 7.5 
44 13.3 3 
4.3 Pollution; poor water 
quality 
16 
(3) 
13.2 10 9.6 3 2.8 
29 8.8 5 
4.4 Low agricultural 
productivity or crop failure 
7 5.8 7 6.7 37 
(2) 
34.9 
51 15.4 2 
4.5 Floods or excess water in 
the rainy season 
7 5.8 2 1.9 7 6.6 
16 4.8 7 
4.6 Forest destruction leading 
to drier rivers/streams 
1 0.8 1 1.0 1 0.9 
3 0.9 10 
4.7 General environmental 
decline (e.g. erosion; less 
biodiversity, etc) 
1 0.8 4 3.8 1 0.9 
6 1.8 9 
4.8 Economic reasons (e.g. 
more expensive water, loss of 
livelihood, migration, etc) 
4 3.3 12 
(2=) 
11.5 26 
(3) 
24.5 
42 12.7 4 
4.9 Aesthetic and emotional 
reasons 
1 0.8 4 3.8 4 3.8 
9 2.7 8 
4.10 Others 6 5.0 7 6.7 8 7.5 21 6.3 6 
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TABLE 5.  Responses given to Question 5: “What do you understand by the 
term drought, described in your own terms?” 
Responses Interview Location TOTAL  
Khon 
Kaen 
Bangkok Nam 
Song 
# % # % # % # % Rank 
5.1 Insufficient water for 
domestic use (incl drinking 
water) 
58 
(1) 
47.9 36 
(1) 
34.0 24 22.2 
118 35.2 1 
5.2 Insufficient water for 
agricultural use (e.g. plants 
don’t grow, wilt or die) 
22 18.2 25 
(3) 
23.6 52 
(1) 
48.1 
99 29.6 2 
5.3 Lack of soil moisture; 
cracked earth 
10 8.3 20 18.9 9 8.3 
39 11.6 6 
5.4 Destruction of natural 
resources (incl forest loss) 
28 
(2) 
23.1 31 
(2) 
29.2 39 
(3) 
36.1 
98 29.3 3 
5.5 Rain doesn’t fall 
according to season or low 
rainfall 
27 
(3) 
22.3 18 17.0 41 
(2) 
38.0 
86 25.7 4 
5.6 Unhealthy; unproductive; 
not enough to eat/use 
3 2.5 9 8.5 4 3.7 
16 4.8 8 
5.7 A poor environment 1 0.8 1 0.9 2 1.9 4 1.2 9 
5.8 Hot weather 10 8.3 15 14.2 8 7.4 33 9.9 7 
5.9 Others 8 6.6 23 21.7 13 12.0 44 13.1 5 
NB: Respondents could give several answers to this question, which were all recorded in the 
data. Most only gave one single, simple definition however. 
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TABLE 7 Responses given to Question 7: “If in your opinion, drought is 
getting worse, what do you think may be the cause of this?” 
Responses Interview Location TOTAL  
Khon Kaen 
(n = 72) 
Bangkok 
(n = 43) 
Nam Song 
(n = 29) 
# % # % # % # % Rank 
7.1 Deforestation; forest 
fires  
55 76.4 35 81.4 26 89.7 
116 80.6 1 
7.2 Climate change; global 
warming 
34 47.2 15 34.9 8 27.6 
57 39.6 2 
7.3 Industry; pollution 18 25.0 12 27.9 0 0 30 20.8 4 
7.4 Poor water resources 
management by state 
5 6.1 1 2.3 0 0 
6 4.2 8 
7.5 Poor water management 
by people/farmers 
6 8.3 2 4.7 0 0 
8 5.6 7 
7.6 Rain doesn’t fall 
according to season 
8 11.1 7 16.3 10 34.5 
25 17.4 5 
7.7 Caused by humans – 
individually or collectively 
17 23.6 15 34.9 13 44.8 
45 31.3 3 
7.8 Due to decline or loss of 
natural resources 
2 2.8 0 0 0 0 
2 1.4 10 
7.9 Lack of water storage 
sources (e.g. dams, 
reservoirs, etc) 
1 1.4 1 2.3 3 10.3 
5 3.5 9 
7.10 Other 4 5.6 10 23.3 8 27.6 22 15.3 6 
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TABLE 11.  Responses given to Question 11: “How strongly do you agree with 
the following statements?”  
Statements Responses 
(in %) 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Not 
sure 
Slightly 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
11.1 “Isaan is the driest region of 
Thailand” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
51.2 22.3 11.6 6.6 8.3 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
48.6 30.8 14.0 3.7 2.8 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
35.8 39.4 11.0 11.0 2.8 
11.2 “Isaan deserves more budget for 
water resources development than 
other regions” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
71.9 20.7 5 0 2.5 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
43.9 38.3 14.0 1.9 1.9 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
71.6 21.1 5.5 1.8 0 
11.3 “It would be a good idea to 
transfer water from the Mekong River 
to irrigate Isaan” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
40.5 22.3 19.0 9.9 8.3 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
41.1 17.8 22.4 13.1 5.6 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
49.1 20.4 18.5 10.2 1.9 
11.4  “It would be a good idea to 
transfer water from rivers in Laos to 
irrigate Isaan” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
19.8 18.2 24.8 10.7 26.4 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
21.7 17.9 27.4 10.4 22.6 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
9.3 15.9 34.6 17.8 22.4 
11.5 “There are already enough 
irrigation systems in Isaan already; 
what people need is better 
management of existing systems” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
57.9 20.7 5.8 5.8 9.9 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
54.7 25.5 12.3 4.7 2.8 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
55.0 26.6 8.3 8.3 1.8 
11.6 “Powerful people in Thailand 
receive the most benefit from 
building more irrigation systems” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
27.3 22.3 15.7 14.0 20.7 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
29.9 26.2 30.6 14.0 9.3 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
18.7 31.8 35 12.1 1.9 
11.7 ”Politicians are able to win votes 
by policies that promise new 
irrigation systems to villagers” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
26.4 32.2 18.2 14.9 8.3 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
29.9 26.2 26.2 12.1 5.6 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
17.6 28.7 41.7 8.3 3.7 
11.8 “The job of planning and 
managing water resources is more the 
duty of the government than the 
people” 
Khon Kaen 
(n=121) 
32.2 24.8 16.5 9.1 17.4 
Bangkok 
(n=107) 
17.8 23.4 28.0 11.2 19.6 
Nam Song 
(n=109) 
35.8 29.4 13.8 13.8 7.3 
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Appendix D Some organizational comparisons between 
the RID and the DWR 
 
These two agencies represent two out of the three most important organizations 
involved with water resources development and management in Thailand, the third 
being the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). However, although 
EGAT is a major dam builder and operator in particular river basins, its geographical 
scope and presence in river basins is not as widespread and pervasive as that of RID 
and DWR, who are seen to have a presence in every river basin in the country and 
profess universal hydraulic development missions. In the table below are some major 
institutional differences I perceive between the two agencies. 
The Royal Irrigation Department, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
The Department of Water Resources, 
Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment 
- Annual budget = 43.902 billion baht 
(2009) i.e. $1.372 billion (@32B/$) 
- No of staff – 32,425 
- Long estbd organization dating back to 
1903 with high public profile 
- Old school “hydraulic missionaries”, 
clinging on to old traditions and 
narratives – low adaptability, but high 
resilience to threats 
- Runs its own Irrigation College, as a 
technical and ideological training 
ground for staff 
- Definite engineering and supply-led bias 
to development 
- Moving away from just irrigation 
development focus to also develop flood 
protection and domestic water supply 
projects 
- Rhetorical commitment to participation 
and decentralization (e.g. PIM/IMT) 
- Only real reform seen to date has been 
non-replacement of retiring staff 
- Seen as aloof from other state agencies, 
with little transparency in project 
planning or implementation 
- Poor record on public participation and 
perhaps less public accountability 
nowadays than in 70s & 80s when more 
open to scrutiny through foreign donor 
reports 
- Tends to deal with narrow range of 
stakeholders in project planning and 
implementation. More parochial. 
- Massive stock inventory of 
dams/projects, but better record of 
O&M for large-scale projects. Trying to 
- Annual budget = 2.584 billion baht 
(2008) i.e. $81 million (@32B/$) 
- No of staff = 2,543  
- Newly estbd (2002) with short track 
record and relatively low public profile  
- New school “hydraulic missionaries” – 
more willing to adopt new international 
discourses around water resources 
management 
- Drew staff from a variety of other 
agencies, so more pluralistic in 
worldview than RID 
- Inherited many old school engineers and 
technocrats, used to old engineering 
paradigm, but has tried to forge a 
managerial paradigm in parallel, by 
being more multi-disciplinary than RID 
- Rhetorical commitment to IWRM, 
participation and decentralization (e.g. 
RBOs) 
- DWR was product of reform process 
- Slightly better record of public 
accountability and transparency than 
RID, evident in annual report 
- Through RBOs, has developed links 
with a wider range of domestic and 
international stakeholders than RID.  
- Links with MRC via TNMC, giving it a 
wider international outlook and practice, 
and perhaps more open to change 
- Poor record of O&M practice post-
project construction, preferring to 
transfer responsibility to local users 
- Relatively accessible to outsiders, 
although still functions as “black box” 
in many aspects 
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shift responsibility for small/medium 
projects onto local govt / TAO 
- Relatively inaccessible agency to 
outsiders (black box agency) 
- Planning a pan-Isaan irrigation mega-
project, involving diversion from 
Mekong-Loei-Chi-Mun, with roots back 
to Pa Mong Dam 
- Has more internal experience and 
capacity to develop a range of irrigation 
infrastructure technologies and links 
with extension agencies in MoAC 
- Close royal associations and linkages, 
forged over long period E.g. King’s 
portrait and narratives highly visible 
internally. Uses royal endorsement and 
protection to accelerate project 
devlopment (esp. Royally-initiated 
Projects) 
- Profits from symbolic value of royal 
support and infrastructure named after 
members of monarchy 
- Close links to powerful politicians in its 
core regions (e.g. Banharn Silpa-Archa 
in Chao Phraya delta) 
- Extra-governmental status e.g. in 
provincial hierarchy 
- Budgets primarily spent on developing 
new infrastructure projects 
-  
- Has current plans to create a pan-Isaan 
irrigation mega-project via Nam Ngum 
– Huay Luang transfer, and other 
locations transferring water from Laos 
to Northeast 
- Has little internal capacity in developing 
irrigation systems or providing 
agriculture support or extension 
- Has little control or leverage over 
activities of RID, which means it cannot 
fulfill its mandate on water resources 
planning and development. 
- No overt links to monarchy, but adopts 
king’s rhetoric in own narratives 
- Close link to several politicians, 
formerly linked to TRT (e.g. Suwit 
Khunkitti) 
- Seems to be moving ever closer to 
fulfilling role as just another hydraulic 
infrastructure constructor with less 
finances and emphasis being placed on 
resource management 
 
Sources: (Molle, 2007b; Department of Water Resources, 2008; Royal Irrigation Department, 2009) 
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Appendix E Sakon Nakhon Province irrigation projects under control of RID in two Districts in 2010 
(Source: Data provided by RID Provincial Office, Sakon Nakhon. April 2010) 
Name of 
Reservoir / 
Project 
Type of 
Irrigation 
(G=Gravity, 
P=Pumped) 
Village Sub-District District Storage 
Volume 
(MCM) 
Command 
Area (rai) 
Estimated planted 
area (2009-10 dry 
season) 
Visited 
(Y/N) 
Huay Nam Bor G Baan Pracha Suksan Kamin Muang 2.20 3,000 0 Y 
Huay Sai Kamin G Baan Huay Sai Pang Khwang “ 2.40 4,000 400 Y 
Huay Sai 1 G Baan Nong Pla Duk “ “ 2.10 6,600 0 Y 
Huay Sai 2 G Baan Dong Yaw “ “ 2.10 3,800 0 Y 
Huay Sai 3 G Baan Non Sawan “ “ 0.21 700 0 Y 
Huay Wien Phrai G Baan Laad Grayer Huay Yang “ 0.33 670 ? N 
Baan Don Kaen  P Baan Don Kaen Nong Laad “ n/a 700 ? N 
Baan Tha Muang P Baan Tha Muang “ “ n/a 800 0 N 
Huay Hin Daek G Baan Hin Daek Rai Phanna Nikhom 1.50 3,200 0 N 
Phu Pek G Baan Phu Pek Naa Hua Bor “ 2.70 600 0 Y 
Huay Sua Yan G Baan Phu Pek Naa Hua Bor “ 0.34 400 0 Y 
Huay Wang Rua G Baan Naa Saow Nan “ “ 0.90 2,500 0 Y 
Huay Saeng Noi G Baan Cherng Chum Cherng Chum “ 0.27 1,200 0 N 
Huay Baan Haang  G Baan Kham Kha Rai “ 0.19 500 0 Y 
Huay Wang Tham G Baan Non Udom “ “ 4.00 6,000 167 N 
Huay Khok G Baan Pak Kham Phu Naa Nai “ 0.21 640 0 N 
Huay Hin Laad G Baan Naa Nai “ “ 0.86 4,000 0 N 
Huay Suan Baan G Baan Pak Kham Phu “ “ 1.10 1,800 0 N 
Huay Buak G Ban Oon Dong “ “ 0.44 1,500 0 N 
Huay Peung G Baan Nong Pue “ “ 0.63 1,000 0 N 
Kham Pramong G Ban Kham Pramong Sawang “ 0.40 300 0 N 
Baan Naa Kham G Baan Naa Kham “ “ 0.20 150 0 N 
Baan Tha Song Korn P Baan Tha Song Khorn Ba Hee “ n/a 600 Some  Y 
Baan Naa Dtaa Glang P Baan Naa Dtaa Glang “ “ n/a 700 Some Y 
Baan Sawang P Baan Sawang Sawang “ n/a 1,600 ? N 
Baan Naa Sorn P Baan Naa Sorn “ “ n/a 800 ? N 
Baan Don Gloy P Baan Don Gloy “ “ n/a 1,500 ? N 
    TOTALS  49,260 567  
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Acronyms 
 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
ALRO  Agricultural Land Reform Office 
ARD  Accelerated Rural Development 
DEDP  Department of Energy Development And Promotion 
DWR  Department of Water Resources 
EGAT  Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
IWMI  International Water Management Institute 
IWRM  Integrated Water Resources Management 
KCM  Khong-Chi-Mun 
LNOIP  Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project 
MoAC  Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
MoNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
MP  Member of Parliament 
NE  Northeast 
NEA  National Energy Agency 
NEB  National Environment Board 
O & M  Operation and Maintenance 
OEPP  Office of Environmental Policy and Planning 
ONEP  Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning 
PAO  Provincial Administration Organization 
RBO  River Basin Organization 
RID  Royal Irrigation Department 
TAO  Tambon (Sub-district) Administration Organization 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
USBR  United States Bureau of Reclamation 
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Glossary of Thai Terms 
 
Thai transliteration Thai English 
amnaat อ ำนำจ Power, authority 
Baan บำ้น A village 
baaray บำรำย Khmer name for floodplain storage 
reservoirs 
chao baan ชำวบำ้น Villager 
chao naa ชำวนำ Rice farmer 
chart ชำติ Nation 
chonla-prathaan  ชลประทำน Official irrigation or, more literally, 
“water gifted from the King” 
deva-raajaa เทวรำชำ A god-king in the Hindu-Brahman 
cosmological tradition 
dhamma-raajaa ธรรมรำชำ A selfless, enlightened ruler in the 
Buddhist cosmological tradition 
fai maew ฝำยแมว้ Small check-dams promoted nationwide 
by the king, based on traditional weirs 
used by highlanders in the North 
gamnan ก ำนนั Sub-district chief 
gaan pattanaa กำรพฒันำ Development 
gaem ling แกม้ลิง “Monkey Cheeks” – a simple on-
floodplain water storage reservoir; 
concept accredited to the king 
grom chonla-prathaan กรมชลประทำน Royal Irrigation Department 
grom sapayaagon nam กรมทรัพยำกรน ้ำ Department of Water Resources 
haeng laeng แหง้แลง้ Arid (e.g. weather, soil, etc)  
Isaan อีสำน Northeast Thailand – a distinct region 
geographically and culturally 
ittiphon อิทธิพล Influence 
jao pho เจำ้พ่อ Godfather; a man with great power and 
influence, often based in provincial 
capitals 
kasetagon tamadaa เกษตรกรธรรมดำ Ordinary farmer  
Khana Ongkhamontri Thai คณะองคมนตรีไทย Privy Council of Thailand 
khao nieow ขำ้วเหนียว Glutinous or sticky rice 
khao jao ขำ้วเจำ้ Plain rice 
khaaraatchagan ขำ้รำชกำร Government officials 
khrong-gan an-nuang maa jaak 
pracha-damree 
โครงกำรอนัเน่ืองมำจำก 
พระรำชด ำริ 
Royally-Initiated Projects 
khrong-gan Isaan Khieow โครงกำรอีสำนเขียว Green Isaan Project 
khrong-gan kut lawk โครงกำรขดุลอก Dredging project 
khrong-gan Thai Kaem Kaeng  โครงกำรไทยเขม้แข็ง The Strong Thailand Project 
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khlong คลอง Canal 
khlong sai gai คลองไส้ไก่ Tertiary or small distributor canal 
khwaam jaroen ควำมเจริญ Prosperity, material progress, advanced 
technologically 
khwaam ben Thai ควำมเป็นไทย “Thainess” 
mahaa anajak Thai มหำอำณำจกัรไทย Greater Thai empire 
muang fai เหมืองฝำย Traditional irrigation systems in 
Northern Thailand 
naa laeng หนำ้แลง้ Dry season 
naa ron หนำ้ร้อน Hot season 
naa fon    หนำ้ฝน Rainy season 
naa prang นำปรัง Dry season rice cultivation 
naa bee นำปี Wet season rice cultivation 
naa saeng นำแซง Indigenous flood recession rice 
cultivation in Northeast 
nam prathai jaak nai luang น ้ำพระทยัจำกในหลวง Generosity from the king 
nam tuam น ้ำท่วม Flood 
nong นอ้ง Younger brother/sister 
Ongkan Borihaan Suan Tambon 
or Or Bor Tor [acronym] 
องคก์ำรบริหำรส่วน
ต ำบล 
Tambon Administration Organization 
(TAO) 
paasaa ภำษำ Language 
paa boong paa thaam ป่ำบุ่ง  ป่ำทำม A local term for seasonally flooded 
wetlands forest in Northeast 
paa thuan ป่ำเถื่อน Jungle 
pai laeng ภยัแลง้ Drought natural disaster 
pattiwat ปฏิวติั To revolt or drastically reform 
phak phuak พรรคพวก Circle of friends; members of a patron-
client network 
pho khun พ่อขนุ Father-like figure 
pho-khun uppatham baeb 
phadet-gaan 
พ่อขนุอุปถมัภแ์บบเผดจ็
กำร 
Paternalistic despot 
pho yai พ่อใหญ่ Honorific term for a village elder 
phramahaagasat พระมหำกษตัริย ์ King or monarch  
phu yai baan ผูใ้หญ่บำ้น Village headperson 
prachaachon ประชำชน The people or the public 
phrachao chiwit พระเจำ้ชีวิต Lord of life 
phrachao paendin พระเจำ้แผ่นดิน Lord of the land 
pii พี่ Elder brother/sister 
rai ไร่ Unit of land area most commonly used 
in Thailand, equivalent to 1,600 m2 
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rattabaan รัฐบำล The government 
sakdinaa ศกัดินำ Societal status ranking system during 
era of absolute monarchy 
saatsanaa ศำสนำ Religion 
sethagit phor piang เศรษฐกิจพอเพียง “Sufficiency Economy” philosophy 
siwilai ศิวิไลซ์ Civilized, culturally refined 
tambon ต ำบล A sub-district administrative division 
thod nam ทดน ้ำ A more traditional and neutral term for 
irrigation, little heard nowadays 
udom-gaan อุดมกำรณ์ Political ideology 
utokapai อุทกภยั Flood disaster 
wattanathaam chumchon วฒันธรรมชุมชน Community culture 
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